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SUMMARY 
 
It is in the area of the regulation of a company’s share capital and distributions to 
shareholders that the inherent conflict between creditors and shareholders, and 
the fragile balance among shareholders internally, intersect. The share capital of 
a company underlies its corporate structure and represents not only its initial own 
funds from which creditors can be paid, but also the relative equity interests of 
the shareholders.  
The balance between shareholders can be disturbed by capital 
reorganisations through increase, reduction or variation of share capital or 
through disproportionate contributions by, or distributions to, shareholders. Share 
repurchases are particularly risky in this regard. Creditor interests are affected 
when their prior right to payment is endangered by distributions to shareholders.  
This study analyses the South African Law relating to share capital and 
distributions against the background of a comparative study of the laws of 
England, New Zealand, Delaware and California, as well as the provisions of the 
American Model Business Corporations Act. 
Two main approaches to creditor protection are evident. The capital 
maintenance doctrine, which is followed in England and Delaware, protects 
creditors by emphasising the notional share capital of the company as a limit on 
distributions. In contrast, the solvency and liquidity approach focuses on the net 
assets of the company and on its ability to pay its debts. New Zealand, California 
and the Model Business Corporations Act represent this approach. 
Regulatory responses to shareholder protection range from insistence on 
compliance with procedural requirements to minimal statutory intervention in the 
internal affairs of companies, instead relying on general principles of fairness and 
good faith. There is little correlation between a particular system’s approach to 
creditor protection on the one hand, and to shareholder protection on the other. 
England, New Zealand and South Africa prescribe specific formalities, while the 
American approach is more relaxed.   
South Africa is a hybrid system. Its transition from capital maintenance to 
solvency and liquidity has been incomplete and its protection of equity interests is 
relatively unsophisticated. A number of recommendations are made for an 
effective and coherent approach that will safeguard the interests of creditors and 
shareholders alike. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
This thesis considers the regulation of share capital and of distributions to 
shareholders from two perspectives: the protection of creditors and the fair 
treatment of shareholders. Transactions through which share capital flows into or 
out of a company, as well as those giving a return on share capital, have significant 
potential to cause conflict between stakeholders.1 Conflicts may thus arise between 
creditors and shareholders; between controlling and minority shareholders; and 
between management and shareholders.2 The regulation of these three conflict 
situations, which may of course also arise from transactions unrelated to share 
capital, is a central concern of company law.3 I consider solutions adopted in several 
jurisdictions or systems to resolve share capital-related conflicts of interest.   
In this chapter, I discuss the role of share capital, clarify the relationship 
between the different elements of my topic and expose the conflict situations 
pertinent to this thesis against the background of modern theoretical perspectives 
on company law.4 A brief overview of the regulation of distributions then follows, 
_________________________________________________________________  
1  See Rock, Kanda & Kraakman “Significant Corporate Actions” 145. 
2  See Hansmann & Kraakman “Agency Problems and Legal Strategies” 22. Leader “Defining 
Interests” 87 distinguishes between different types of creditors such as employees and 
suppliers and so identifies more conflict situations.  
3  Law and economics scholars view these conflict situations as ‘agency problems’ arising from 
the opportunistic and self-interested behaviour of market participants, see Wishart Company 
Law in Context 69ff. They regard the law as useful to the extent that it succeeds in reducing 
overall transaction costs. See Wishart Company Law in Context 73 for a succinct critique of 
agency cost theories. The contractual theory, based on a specific economic model of the 
company, regards the company as a nexus of contracts where parties get what they bargain for. 
As a result, contractarians prefer regulation based on default contract terms that save parties 
the cost of bargaining separately, but that can be overruled by agreement, see Easterbrook & 
Fischel “The Corporate Contract” 211 – 212. For an evaluation of the contractual theory, see 
Ferran Corporate Finance 10 – 12. Older theories tend to focus on explaining the nature of the 
company and devote little attention to the justification of regulation. The fiction theory, for 
example, sees regulation as an almost automatic consequence of the fact that the law created 
the entity in the first place, see Ferran Corporate Finance 9. 
4  The scope of my thesis does not allow a comprehensive analysis of different theories, with the 
result that only the more influential theories can be covered, and then only in very broad outline. 
For useful accounts of different modern theories and their main proponents, see Wishart 
Company Law in Context 55 – 87; Ferran Corporate Finance 9 – 13. See Cheffins Company 
Continued 
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focusing on conceptual issues. I conclude this chapter by explaining the 
methodology and structure of the thesis and the reference techniques I use. 
2 THEORETICAL ISSUES 
2.1 The relevance of share capital 
The regulation of capital accumulation and the decision-making about that capital 
accounts for a considerable part of substantive company law.5 There is a view that 
the notion of corporate personality is merely a device to designate a specific pool of 
accumulated assets for a specified purpose.6 While these observations relate to the 
company’s capital in the wider sense of total own funds, comprising contributed as 
well as accumulated capital,7 it is the existence of a share capital that distinguishes 
the typical modern company from unincorporated entities and from other company 
forms at a structural level.8 The company having a share capital, to which the 
present enquiry is restricted, is by far the most important form of company.9 
The concept ‘share capital’ does not have a standard meaning or uniform 
content. Broadly speaking, share capital reflects the consideration paid to10 or due 
to11 a company in exchange for the shares it issues. However, share capital need 
not be equal to the consideration received for the shares. It will be less if a company 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
Law 3 – 46 for a more detailed discussion of the contribution of economic theories in the study of 
corporate law, and Bebchuck (ed) Corporate Law and Economic Analysis, a collection of essays 
applying economic perspectives to different company law topics.  
5  Wishart Company Law in Context 94, 290 – 291 regards this as the purpose of company law. 
See also McGee Share Capital 1; Armour “Share Capital” 355. 
6  Radin “Problem of Corporate Personality” 654. This view is echoed by Hansmann & Kraakman 
“What is Corporate Law?” 7 – 8 who argue that the only essential purpose of corporate law is to 
facilitate affirmative asset partitioning, see also Hansman & Kraakman “Essential Role” 390. 
7  See Delport Verkryging 10 – 19 for a discussion of the various meanings of ‘capital’. See also 
Jones & Bellringer Share Capital 1. 
8  McGee Share Capital 1.  
9  The total number of active companies in South Africa as at 24 November 2003 included over 
350 000 companies having a share capital, and fewer than 12 000 companies limited by 
guarantee. More than 99% of the companies limited by guarantee were section 21 companies. 
This information was obtained from www.cipro.co.za/about_us/registration_stats.asp 
(2008-01-28). Companies limited by guarantee are also rare in the UK, see McGee Share 
Capital 1. 
10  This will constitute paid-up share capital. 
11  Amounts so due form part of issued share capital. 
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is not obliged to show the full issue price of its shares as share capital12  or 
subsequently reduces its share capital. The share capital can exceed the 
consideration if profits are subsequently capitalised13 or if shareholders contribute 
capital to the company otherwise than in respect of shares.14 Share capital is 
usually expressed as an amount, although this is not always the case.15 The precise 
content of the term depends on a particular legal framework.16 Share capital is 
treated as a notional liability in the accounts of a company, as the shareholders do 
not have a legal claim to the return of the capital they contributed.17  
According to Gansen the share capital of a company has three functions:18 
• It is a way of obtaining funds with which to operate the company’s 
business. 
• It forms a protective cushion for the creditors of the company. 
• It proportionates the interests of the shareholders in the company. 
However, each of these functions can be performed without reliance on share 
capital, as I explain in more detail below. Clearly, the efficacy of the first two 
functions depends on the total size of the share capital. Cilliers recognises the 
relevance of the size of the share capital. He postulates that in order to have a 
significant influence on the behaviour of a company and its stakeholders, the share 
capital should be sufficiently high to achieve certain results. It should ensure that 
shareholders have an interest in the fortune of the company and its continued 
success, that creditors are buffered against default, and that society is protected 
_________________________________________________________________  
12  If part of the price is reflected as a premium or as paid-in surplus, see eg the position in 
Delaware, discussed in Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.4. 
13  Through a bonus issue or otherwise. 
14  See Kellar v Williams [2000] 2 BCLC 390 PC, also referred to in Chapter 2 paragraph 2.4. 
15  Under the Model Business Corporation Act in the USA, it is not necessary to determine the 
monetary value of non-cash consideration, see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.1. Such an 
arrangement is possible because the amount of the share capital is not relevant to the 
distribution restrictions. 
16  This will be illustrated in each of the comparative chapters. In particular, it will also appear that 
some systems regulate share premiums in much the same way as share capital. While this 
quasi-capital is subject to distribution restrictions, shareholders usually do not enjoy any 
participation rights in relation to it. 
17  Delport Verkryging 23. 
18  See Gansen Kapitalaufbringung 3 – 8.  
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against abuse of incorporation and losses caused by corporate failure.19 Delport 
adds a fourth result or function: the share capital should benefit the company by 
enhancing its creditworthiness so that it can attract investments that will reduce the 
cost of capital.20 Despite the different assumptions of these sets of functions or 
results, there is a degree of overlap between them in that they emphasize the 
relevance of the share capital to the company, its creditors and its shareholders.  
2.1.1 Share capital as working capital for the company 
Although share capital is often regarded as a form of financing,21 it need not play a 
significant role in the provision of working capital for a company. In fact, companies 
may have a paid up share capital of nil.22 Subject to certain exceptions like banking 
companies, the law does not prescribe the size of the share capital or, for that matter, 
the value of the total assets that a company should have. Even where a statutory 
minimum share capital is prescribed, it is generally accepted that this requirement is 
aimed at discouraging frivolous incorporations and not at providing the company 
with sufficient working capital. 23  Companies are free to finance their business 
operations through other means of financing like loan capital or debt24 and retained 
earnings.25 Prudent business principles may dictate the use of a certain level of debt 
financing in order to maximise the potential return to shareholders.26 
It is beyond the scope of my thesis to analyse or explain corporate finance 
practices, save to draw attention to the diminishing role of share capital as a 
financing tool. The financing decisions of companies are influenced by various 
_________________________________________________________________  
19  Cilliers Limited Liability 280 – 281. 
20  Delport “Capital Rules” 407. 
21  See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 199 where it is called the ‘primary’ source of capital and 
Cox & Hazen Corporations 515 where it is referred to as ‘permanent financing’. 
22  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.2 read with paragraph 3.4 (private companies in England); Chapter 
3 paragraph 3.4 (New Zealand); Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.3 (California) and paragraph 4.3.4 
(MBCA). 
23  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 229; Armour “Share Capital” 365; Schön “Wer schützt 
den Kapitalschutz?” 4; Schön “Future of Legal Capital” 438; Prentice “Protection of Creditors” 
102 note 23. 
24  See Ferran Corporate Finance 43; Hamilton Corporations 356; Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 
199 – 200. 
25  See Ferran Corporate Finance 69 – 72 where the author states that in the UK, retained earnings 
constitutes the primary source of capital for established companies, followed by debt and lastly 
by share capital.  
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factors including taxation, capital-raising expenses and macro-economic factors 
such as the relative abundance or scarcity of capital.27 The ability to mobilise capital 
was one of the driving forces in the development of the modern company.28 
However, share capital has decreased in importance as a source of funding for 
companies, while alternative asset-oriented financing techniques have become 
prevalent.29 
Tax systems may discriminate against equity financing and encourage 
companies to use debt financing.30 Securities regulation may also have adverse 
cost implications for the raising of share capital, particularly because of strict 
regulation of public offerings of shares and other securities. This may create an 
incentive to use forms of financing that are not subject to securities regulation.   
 
2.1.2 Share capital as safety net for creditors  
Share capital is sometimes viewed as a ‘protective cushion’, ‘buffer’, ‘safety margin’ 
or ‘guarantee fund’ for creditors or even as the ‘price for limited liability’.31 These 
metaphors can be deceiving because the share capital is an artificial sum or notional 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
26  Ferran Corporate Finance 59ff; Hamilton Corporations 381.  
27  See Slater “Capital Accumulation” 430 – 431; Schmidt “Eigenkapitalausstattung” 772. See also 
Wishart Company Law in Context 148 – 149 for a discussion of factors influencing the choice 
between debt and equity. Also refer to the discussion of ‘gearing’ in paragraph 1.2 below.  
28  Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 4 – 5, 198; Berle & Means Modern Corporation 18. The need 
for vast amounts of capital to finance new business ventures during the Industrial Revolution 
played an important role in the development of the corporate form, see Berle & Means Modern 
Corporation 11 – 17 for an account of the order in which companies gradually became popular in 
different sectors of the economy in America. Also see Newmyer “Justice Story” 825.  
29  See Slater “Capital Accumulation” 433. See also KPMG Feasibility Study on Capital 
Maintenance – Main Report (Contract ETD/2006/IM/F2/71) 146, 164 for figures on the ratio of 
subscribed capital to total shareholder’s equity in the EU and in the USA respectively. 
30  Slater “Capital Accumulation” 433; Schmidt “Eigenkapitalausstattung” 773. On the tax 
advantages of thin incorporation in general, see Miller “Non-tax Aspects” 754 – 755. See 
Schmidt “Eigenkapitalausstattung” 774 – 775 for a discussion of tax and other measures that 
can be taken to promote equity financing. See also McLure “Tax Neutrality” 1076 – 1078 for an 
analysis of considerations that influence the choice between financing operations through 
retained earnings or distributing earning as dividends and raising fresh capital. Levmore 
“Positive Role of Tax Law” 280 argues that there is a positive interplay between tax law and 
corporate law and illustrates how policy objectives of corporate law can be supported by tax 
rules. 
31  See Jones & Bellringer Share Capital 6; Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 275.  
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liability.32 It does not represent money or assets that have been set aside for the 
specific purpose of creditor payment and consequently does not ensure that there 
will indeed be funds available to satisfy creditor claims, because the company’s 
assets may be dissipated in the ordinary course of its business. Share capital can 
protect creditors by acting as a buffer only to the extent that the company has 
retained the contributed funds or applied it to acquire available assets. 
It is not an automatic function of share capital to act as a restriction on 
distributions. The capital maintenance principle, which I discuss in more detail 
below,33 relies on share capital as a restriction on distributions. These legal rules 
prohibiting the return of share capital to shareholders offer a measure of creditor 
protection because they restrict the distribution of corporate funds to shareholders. 
Even if the share capital is negligible, the company would still have to have an 
excess of assets over liabilities (plus that negligible share capital) before it may 
make distributions. While it is difficult to conceive of distribution restrictions that 
achieve precisely the same as share capital-based restrictions,34 it is possible to 
design alternative restrictions requiring a specified margin or buffer over solvency, 
such as prescribing a ratio of debt to equity.35 
2.1.3 Share capital as allocation tool for shareholders 
Shareholders are entitled to participation in the general meeting of their company, 
and to share in the company’s prosperity, by reason of their interests in its share 
capital. These interests cover three main areas, namely the return of share capital, 
returns on share capital and control. 36  However, the relative interest of a 
shareholder is not necessarily determined by the amount of capital contributed by 
that shareholder, and a shareholder may further hold different proportions of the 
rights in each of the three areas. Any proportionality between the contributions of 
different shareholders and the rights they enjoy can be substantially eroded by a 
_________________________________________________________________  
32  See Manning Legal Capital 92; McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 43; South African Company 
Law for the 21st Century - Guidelines for Corporate Reform GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 
2004 8, 12. 
33  See paragraph 2.1 below. 
34  Because the particular margin depends on the size of each company’s share capital. 
35  For an example, see the Californian financial restrictions, discussed in Chapter 4 paragraph 
3.4.2.2. 
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company’s constitution, especially where the company has more than one class of 
shares. The rights and interests of each shareholder depend on the constitution of 
the company and the type and number of shares held.   
2.2 Legal and economic roles of share capital 
The preceding analysis of the three functions attributed to share capital points to a 
distinction between the economic and legal roles of share capital.37 The first two 
functions I discussed, namely the financing of the company and the margin of safety 
for creditors, are of an economic nature.38 These economic functions rely on the 
share capital as a ‘fund’. 
The legal role of share capital is to create rights, duties and legal relationships. 
The capital maintenance doctrine, which prohibits the return of capital to 
shareholders, gives share capital a legal role. In this role, it is not the contributed 
funds that are relevant, but rather an abstract amount or figure. Share capital is thus 
a ‘yardstick’. I do not regard this yardstick function as an inherent function of share 
capital. 
There is a further legal role of share capital, reflected in the share capital 
structure of a company. Clearly, the third function discussed - that of allocation - is a 
legal one which can be fulfilled regardless of the size of the contributed fund. In this 
role, share capital organises the rights of shareholders in relation to creditors and 
among themselves. Share capital can be seen as a ‘system’.    
Although the proportioning of shareholder interests is primarily a legal role, it 
also has economic implications. The device of a share representing a transferable 
proportionate interest in the business of the company facilitated the development of 
what Berle and Means term ‘passive ownership’ meaning that ownership of the 
company is greatly diversified and control has been relinquished to managers.39 It is 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
36  See McGee Share Capital 65. 
37  Eisenberg “Modernization” 199 regards the funds generated by the issuance of stock as 
economic capital and distinguishes it from legal capital which is a ‘mere legal construct’. 
38  Unless restrictions on distributions are also based on share capital, in which case this function 
has a legal as well as an economic element. 
39  Berle & Means Modern Corporation 304. The free transferability of shares is an important 
feature of company law because it facilitates the withdrawal by shareholders of their 
investments without leading to the liquidation of the company, see Hansmann & Kraakman 
“What is Corporate Law?” 10 – 11. See also Ireland, Grigg-Spall & Kelly “Conceptual 
Continued 
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through passive ownership that the resources of many different investors can be 
combined, promoting the accumulation of capital. 
In economic theory shareholders are regarded as subordinated creditors 
occupying the lowest rank in a hierarchy of creditors.40 Their position as investors is 
explained with reference to the same considerations that influence the conditions 
upon which credit is extended to the company, namely the duration of the 
investment, the expected return on investment, the risk involved and the degree of 
control that can be exercised over the company.41 
The legal difference between shareholders and creditors is well established. 
Although the shareholders contribute share capital to the company, they have no 
legal right to the return of that capital. As a separate legal entity, the company owns 
its assets, including its share capital funds, and is liable for its debts.42 This principle 
of ‘separate patrimony’43 forms the basis of the wider protection of company funds. 
It underpins two further rules, namely a ‘priority rule’ and a ‘liquidation protection 
rule’.44 The priority rule entails that the creditors of the company enjoy preference 
over the personal creditors of the shareholders in respect of the company’s 
assets.45 Liquidation protection means that the shareholders cannot withdraw their 
‘share’ of company assets at will, as this amounts to a partial liquidation.46 Also, the 
personal creditors of the shareholders have no claim to the shareholder’s share of 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
Foundations” 152 – 153 for a brief account of the evolution of the share from co-ownership of 
company property to the modern concept of a bundle of rights.  
40  Berle & Means Modern Corporation 245 – 246. This view of shareholders as a particular type of 
investor or resource holder is adopted in company law theories that see the company as a 
nexus of contracts. Because of the existence of equity markets where shareholders can realise 
the growth in their investments, proponents of this theory often argue that shareholders should 
be protected by market regulation rather than by company law, see Hill “Changes in the Role of 
the Shareholder” 191.   
41  See Cheffins Company Law 42 – 44; Ferran Corporate Finance 47 – 49; Wishart Company Law 
in Context 17 – 22. 
42  Ireland, Grigg-Spall & Kelly “Conceptual Foundations” 160 argue that the modern notion of 
separate legal personality was made possible not by incorporation, but by the recognition of a 
share as an independent form of property. 
43  See Hansmann & Kraakman “What is Corporate Law?” 7. 
44  Hansmann & Kraakman “What is Corporate Law?” 7. 
45  Hansmann & Kraakman “What is Corporate Law?” 7. This principle is not restricted to juristic 
persons but is also found in partnership law where the partnership assets are regarded as a 
separate pool of assets. 
46  This protection is absent in the case of business entities that are not juristic persons. 
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the company’s assets.47 Hansmann & Kraakman term the pattern of creditors’ rights 
that arises when both these rules apply ‘strong form’ legal personality and view it as 
the converse of limited liability:  while limited liability protects the assets of the 
shareholders against claims by the company’s creditors, strong form legal 
personality protects the assets of the company against claims by the creditors of the 
shareholders.48 Limited liability results in ‘defensive asset partitioning’ while the 
shielding of the company’s assets against the shareholders and their creditors - the 
result of separate legal personality - results in ‘affirmative asset partitioning’.49 
In return for their contribution to the company, shareholders acquire property in 
the form of shares and can thus be distinguished from creditors who have a 
personal rather than a proprietary right.50 Shareholders merely have a residual or 
reversionary interest in the company’s net assets upon its dissolution and so bear 
the ultimate risk of failure of the company. Shareholders are also not entitled to a 
return on the capital they contributed to the company. They have an expectation, but 
not a right, to share in the profits of the company during its existence and in any 
surplus assets upon its dissolution. In recognition of the risk they assume, 
shareholders are given control over the company through the general meeting. The 
share capital structure of the company defines and allocates the income rights, the 
incidence of risk of loss (priority rights in respect of capital) and the power of control 
among shareholders.51 Regulation of the continued share capital structure of a 
company and of its variation is important to shareholders.52 
_________________________________________________________________  
47  Hansmann & Kraakman “What is Corporate Law?” 7. Creditors of a shareholder may, of course, 
attach the shareholder’s interest in the company. 
48  Hansmann & Kraakman “What is Corporate Law?” 8. I think that through liquidation protection 
strong form legal personality also protects the company’s assets against premature withdrawal 
by the shareholders.  
49  Hansman & Kraakman “Essential Role” 390. They see the role of corporate law as deviation 
from property law rather than from contract law, because the separate estate of the corporation 
is paramount, as are the priority rights to it.  
50  Leader “Defining Interests” 88 sees shareholding as dual in nature. On one hand the 
shareholder acquires a (personal) proprietary right in the value of her shareholding and on the 
other, a derivative collective right in the company.   
51  See Oditah “Takeovers, Share Exchanges and the Meaning of Loss” 426 – 427. 
52  Schön “Wer schützt den Kapitalschutz?” 5 argues that it is difficult to find a replacement rule for 
this function of the legal capital rules as they regulate the relationship between shareholders 
and company pertaining to the unlawful reduction of corporate funds with great precision. See 
also Rock, Kanda & Kraakman “Significant Corporate Actions” 147.  
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Shareholders are often described as the ‘owners’ of a company, because they 
may share in its net income and control its affairs,53 ensuring that the company is 
managed in their interest.54 There is a qualitative rather than just a quantitative 
difference between the ‘investments’ of shareholders and of creditors. Company law 
requires a residual beneficiary, explaining why a company with share capital must 
have at least one issued share with unrestricted potential to receive profits and 
assets on dissolution. The potential gains to be made by the shareholders as 
residual claimants are unlimited and do not depend on the actual size of the share 
capital risked, but on the overall profitability of the company. Share capital is 
sometimes regarded as the price for limited liability.55 However, it is also the price 
for unlimited entitlement.   
The fairness of this outcome is not universally accepted.56 Greenwood argues 
that shareholders should not have the residual rights to income and capital, but 
should be entitled to a return on capital commensurate with the cost to them of 
providing that capital.57  
The relationship between shareholders and creditors, and the role of share 
capital as a ‘risk allocation device’58 is well illustrated by the concept of gearing or 
leveraging in terms of which the ratio of loan capital to share capital will influence the 
potential return to shareholders and also the potential risk faced by creditors.59 Debt 
incurred at a fixed or predictable cost to the company will be cheaper for the 
company than share capital in times when the company prospers because unlike 
shareholders expecting a return on their investment, the creditors cannot participate 
_________________________________________________________________  
53  In practice, shareholders in large companies have very little effective control, a situation that has 
become known as the ‘separation of ownership and control’, see Berle & Means Modern 
Corporation 112 – 116; 250. 
54  Hansmann & Kraakman “What is Corporate Law?” 13 describe this phenomenon as ‘investor 
ownership’. 
55  See Jones & Bellringer Share Capital 6; Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 275. 
56  See Greenwood “Dividend Puzzle” 155 who regards the fact that shareholders are residual 
claimants as unjustifiable and argues that the explanation for this irrational result can be found in 
the false rhetoric of ownership, agency and contract, as well as in the political alignment 
between management and shareholder interests.   
57  Greenwood “Dividend Puzzle” 117.  
58  Westerbeck “Stated Capital” 828. 
59  See Ferran Corporate Finance 60 for a practical example of the effect of gearing on the earnings 
of shareholders in prosperous and less prosperous times. 
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in the profits beyond their specified returns.60 The shareholders will exert pressure 
for a larger return on the capital they contributed. When the company is facing 
financial difficulties, however, the risk of default faced by creditors will increase.61 
2.3 Creditor protection 
The primary concern of creditors is that they will receive payment of their debts 
when due. This is the case regardless of whether their debtor is a company, another 
kind of entity or an individual. However, every company law system protects 
creditors of companies, mainly because the company form is perceived to pose 
unique risks arising form the abuse of limited liability.62 Protection through company 
law is also efficient because the category of ‘creditors’ is wide enough to include a 
variety of parties who deal with companies: not only parties who contract with 
companies, including employees and suppliers, but also victims of the company’s 
wrongful conduct, who are involuntary creditors.63 The existence of involuntary 
creditors is a cogent argument for regulation, because unlike voluntary creditors, 
they cannot contract with the company for protection.64 
_________________________________________________________________  
60  See Cheffins Company Law 70, 75. Modigliani & Miller “Cost of Capital” postulated a formula to 
determine the capitalisation rate for uncertain income streams (265) and concluded that in a 
perfect market, the overall cost of capital of a company would be constant regardless of the mix 
of debt and equity (268). Their original idealistic assumptions were subsequently qualified, 
primarily to take into account the effect of taxation, see Miller “The Modigliani-Miller 
Propositions” 111. Ferran Corporate Finance 61 states that these revised assumptions still do 
not take into account tax bias and the costs of insolvency in the event of a failure. See, however, 
Miller “Credit risk” 480ff for an analysis of the effect of bankruptcy costs. 
61  Cheffins Company Law 75 – 78 asserts that nearing insolvency increases the opportunistic 
behaviour of shareholders to shift risk to creditors by engaging in risky projects. Excessive 
leveraging has several further implications, including decreased creditworthiness of companies 
leading to decreased economic growth, increased outsider control and increased risk of failure, 
see Slater “Capital Accumulation” 431; Schmidt “Eigenkapitalausstattung 773.  
62  Hertig & Kanda “Creditor Protection” 71. 
63  See Hertig & Kanda “Creditor Protection” 72 – 76. 
64  The protection of involuntary creditors has been widely debated. Hansmann & Kraakman 
“Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability”; Leebron “Limited Liability”; Mendelsohn 
“Control-Based Approach”; Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility all propose 
exceptions to the principle of limited liability in respect of damages payable to delictual creditors. 
These appeals are countered by Goddard “Limited Recourse” who argues that the problem of 
involuntary creditors is less extensive than portrayed, the benefits of personal liability uncertain, 
and adverse cost implications likely to arise. Cheffins Company Law 504 – 507 also notes the 
problem, but does not recommend personal liability, arguing that the wrongdoers are usually 
large corporations in which such claims seldom cause insolvency and that insurance is available. 
Similar calls for restrictions on limited liability are made in respect of groups, see Parkinson 
Corporate Power and Responsibility 363; Parkinson “Non-Commercial Transactions” justifying 
an exception with reference to the dangers of transfer pricing. Small companies are another 
Continued 
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In addition to restrictions on the distribution of corporate funds, various other 
measures protect creditors. These mostly address the increased risk to creditors 
when a company is approaching insolvency and include the imposition of personal 
liability on directors for reckless, unlawful or insolvent trading65 and the recognition 
of fiduciary duties of directors towards creditors in certain circumstances. 66 
Insolvency law makes a contribution by providing for the setting aside of certain 
distributions of corporate funds.67  
Hertig and Kanda conclude that although the type of regulation may differ 
between jurisdictions, overall creditor protection across jurisdictions is roughly 
similar.68 
My thesis analyses creditor protection when companies make distributions 
representing either a return on or a return of share capital. However, I refer briefly to 
alternative protection mechanisms where it contributes to an overall assessment of 
creditor protection in a particular jurisdiction.  
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
target of arguments against limited liability, see Halpern, Trebilcock & Turnbull “Limited Liability” 
148 – 149; Ziegel “Incorporation” 1081 – 1084, 1093. Ziegel argues that it is too late to reverse 
limited liability for small companies, necessitating the introduction of second order protection 
such as financial disclosure and director liability for insolvent trading.  
65  Schön “Future of Legal Capital” notes an increased tendency to move liability to managers 
through fraudulent trading rather than recognise a direct fiduciary duty or regard incorporation 
as a privilege that should be conferred with circumspection.  
66  Trethowan “Directors’ Personal Liability” 48 raises the argument that in liquidation the creditor’s 
interest, which is a personal right, becomes proprietary like that of a shareholder. This view is 
based on an analysis of Australian and New Zealand case law and in particular on Kinsela v 
Russel Kinsela Pty Ltd (1986) 4 NSWLR 722 at 730. Wishart “Duties to Creditors” discusses 
different theoretical issues in this regard. Tompkins “Duties to Corporate Creditors” 189 – 191 
argues that directors will be in an untenable situation if they owe duties to different interest 
groups, and experience difficulty in assessing when the company reaches the stage where the 
focus of their duty should shift. See also Parkinson Corporate Power and Responsibility 87; 
Sealy “Wider Responsibilities” 187 – 188 regarding practical and conceptual difficulties of 
extending duties to creditors. On the South African position, see Lombard Directors’ Duties to 
Creditors.  
67  Wheeler “Swelling the Assets”  257 – 258 notes various options for setting aside dispositions 
and holding other persons personally liable for the debts of a company in liquidation in England. 
Parkinson “Non-Commercial Transactions” 65 also advocates better insolvency protection. 
Hertig & Kanda “Creditor Protection” 73 further identify more general protective measures such 
as encouraging timeous liquidation.  
68  Hertig & Kanda “Creditor Protection” 78. They point out that the same strategies can be used by 
both debtor-friendly and creditor-friendly systems, namely mandatory disclosure which acts as 
an entry strategy giving creditors a choice before contracting (79), rules such as legal capital 
and group regulation (83), and standards such as fiduciary duties (88). Ramsay 
“Mandatory/Enabling” 257 has a wider view of creditor protection, stating that creditors are also 
protected by the reputational interests of managers and by the separation of ownership and 
control. 
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2.4 Share-capital related conflict situations 
2.4.1 The inflow of further share capital 
The issuing of further shares in a company changes its share capital structure and 
can significantly dilute the relative interests of the existing shareholders. Responses 
to this problem include limiting, through the notion of authorised capital, the number 
of additional shares that may be issued, preserving the balance of power through 
pre-emptive rights, 69  and subjecting the issuing of shares to approval by 
shareholders. 
The price at which the company issues the further shares can obviously also 
affect the value of the shareholding of existing shareholders. When shares are 
issued at a price below the present value of the existing shares, it will dilute the 
value of the existing shares. This present value does not depend on the par value of 
the shares, nor, in the case of no par value shares, on the consideration paid by the 
existing shareholders. The basic idea of the par value of a share as the minimum 
consideration payable to the company does not achieve effective protection for 
shareholders. The fiduciary duties of the directors oblige them to obtain for the 
company the maximum reasonable consideration for the share issue. 70  The 
interests of the company thus overlap with those of the existing shareholders who 
are not taking up further shares.71 
Creditors may also have an interest in the adequacy of the contributions made 
by shareholders. Where distribution restrictions rely on the maintenance of share 
_________________________________________________________________  
69  Although in South Africa the term ‘pre-emptive right’ is known in the context of a sale of existing 
shares, the term is also used to refer to a right of existing shareholders to take up new shares 
being issued by their company (see, on American law: Clark Corporate Law 17.1.4; on English 
law: Gower and Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 63 and on New Zealand law: Morison’s Company 
and Securities Law 13.12. Etymologically the noun ‘pre-emption’ and the adjective ‘pre-emptive’ 
derive from the Latin prae- + emere (to buy), see Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary sv 
‘preemption’ at www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary (2008-06-30). See also Chapter 4 
paragraph  
70  See Delport Verkryging 405. 
71  However, the same remedy is not necessarily appropriate, see Dine “Content of Duties” 127 – 
129. Dine embraces the distinction between personal and derivative rights made by 
Leader ”Defining Interests” 88, briefly discussed in footnote 50 above. Dine argues that the 
application of fiduciary duties would be easier and not seem to conflict if this distinction is made. 
For example, she argues that it would be wrong to rely on the proper purpose principle to protect 
a shareholder’s personal proprietary interest in maintaining the value of her shares. Rather, the 
Continued 
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capital, the creditors’ interest in the amount reflected as share capital is obvious. In 
other instances their interest in the consideration accepted by the company does not 
differ from the indirect interest they have that any other commercial transaction of 
their debtor company should be at a fair price that will promote its financial health.  
2.4.2 Distributions 
Eisenberg identifies distributions as one of four critical areas for statutory corporate 
law.72 The term ‘distribution’ includes both returns on share capital and the return of 
share capital. 
The expected return on share capital invested is uncertain.73 Yet, in the 
preface to a revised edition of the seminal work he co-authored with Means, Berle 
describes the expectation of shareholders to receive dividends as ‘vivid’ in contrast 
with their very ‘remote’ expectation to ultimately share in the net assets of the 
company.74  
The expectation of shareholders to share in the profits of the company during 
its existence must be balanced against the expectation of creditors to receive 
payment. Similarly, creditors expect that their prior right to payment will not be 
endangered by a premature return of capital to shareholders. The response to this 
essential conflict depends on basic assumptions as to the nature of companies and 
the purpose of regulation. Those who view a company as a nexus of contracts 
assume that parties to the various contracts can agree on an appropriate level of 
protection. They favour default contract rules that will reduce transaction costs.75 On 
the other hand, those who regard incorporation as a privilege that should be 
balanced by responsibility are in favour of mandatory rules protecting weaker 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
remedy should be based on the contractual nature of the constitution or on unfair prejudice (127 
– 129). 
72  Eisenberg “Modernization” 187. The others are corporate combinations (mergers), 
shareholders’ informational rights and corporate structure (governance). 
73  This is true even of preference shareholders because they face the risk that the company may 
not declare a dividend, see Ferran Corporate Finance 53. 
74  Berle & Means Modern Corporation xxxi. 
75  Klausner “Networks of Contracts” 828 asserts that more companies will adhere to these default 
rules, because companies tend to adopt ‘plain vanilla charters’. The legislature should 
preferably provide a menu with several options, see 851. 
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parties. Nevertheless, there seems to be consensus that company law should 
regulate distributions.  
The primary form of regulation in favour of creditors is the imposition of 
financial restrictions on distributions, although it is not the only mechanism that limits 
the outflow of funds to shareholders.76 Financial restrictions can take various forms. 
I outline the two main approaches below.77  
Distributions to shareholders can potentially disturb the rights and 
expectations of shareholders. This is even possible in companies with only one 
class of shares where dividends are proportionate.78 Dividends may be withheld to 
squeeze out minority shareholders79 or excessive dividends may be paid to deprive 
the company of investment opportunities.80 Similarly, selective distributions to some 
shareholders of a class are problematic, as they divert corporate assets to 
controlling shareholders at the expense of minority shareholders.81 They infringe 
the basic principle that each share in a class represents a homogeneous claim on 
the wealth of the company.82 According to this principle, shareholders in a class are 
entitled to formal as well as substantive equality.83  
The problem is more acute in instances where the company has more than 
one class of shareholders. The existence of preference shares poses peculiar 
_________________________________________________________________  
76  Calnan “Corporate Gifts” 92 argues that financial restrictions on distributions to shareholders 
are supplemented by the application of various rules that apply to gratuitous disposals in 
general, like the ultra vires doctrine, the rules on the avoidance of pre-liquidation transactions 
and increasingly also by the recognition that directors have to take into account the interests of 
creditors when the company is experiencing financial difficulties. This last duty is particularly 
useful when a distribution has been made while the company was in fact solvent, but was 
experiencing financial difficulties at the time, see at 96.  
77  See paragraph 2 below. 
78  See Rock, Kanda & Kraakman “Significant Corporate Actions” 149; Sommer “Whom should the 
Corporation Serve?” 51 regarding shareholders with long-term and short-term views. 
79  See Dodge v Ford Motor Co 170 Nw Rep 668 (Mich SC 1919). 
80  See Rock, Kanda & Kraakman “Significant Corporate Actions” 149. 
81  See Brudney “Equal Treatment” 1073.  
82  See Brudney “Equal Treatment” 1074. Brudney explains that while the ‘investment contract’ 
between the company and investors in preferred and ordinary shares respectively 
accommodates differentiation between these classes, the contract usually does not embody 
explicit consent for discrimination within a class, see at 1075.  
83  Brudney “Equal Treatment” 1078 – 1079 asserts that dividends in particular have to be 
substantively and formally equal. This is because of the underlying assumptions of corporation 
statutes as well as the fiduciary principle extending to majority or controlling shareholders.  
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problems.84 This may explain why several jurisdictions give express recognition to 
the interests of preferent classes of shareholders in their statutory regulation of 
distributions. 
Selective distributions to certain holders of a class often take the form of share 
repurchases.85 Share repurchases have a composite nature in that they combine a 
distribution to selling shareholders with an increase in the shareholding of remaining 
shareholders. 86  While shareholders can usually rely on the fiduciary duties of 
directors to exercise their powers for a proper purpose, some jurisdictions address 
this problem through legislation that subjects selective repurchases to additional 
requirements compared to proportionate repurchases or self-tender offers. However, 
even self-tender offers, which are regarded as proportionate repurchases, can be 
used to disturb the balance of power in a company.87 For this reason, some 
commentators propose an outright ban on repurchases while others focus on the 
abuses associated with specific types of repurchases.88 
Some of the most debated abuses of share repurchases occur in the context of 
takeovers.89 The problem of ‘greenmail’ arises where a potential bidder for the 
_________________________________________________________________  
84  Ip “Share Capital Puzzle” 293 – 295 analyses advantages and disadvantages of preference 
shares and explains that while the issue of further preference shares has the advantage of 
preserving voting rights, it not only dilutes value, but also disturbs priority rights. She concludes 
that preference shares complicates the application of fiduciary duties. 
85  Rock, Kanda & Kraakman “Significant Corporate Transactions” 149 state that the biggest risk is 
posed when shares are acquired from controlling shareholders, but they also refer to greenmail 
where dissidents are bought out at a premium in order to entrench incumbent management. 
Distributions in partial liquidation of the company and going private transactions will be 
proposed by controllers only if they intend getting more than their pro rata share of corporate 
assets, see Brudney “Equal Treatment” 1078.  
86  See Brudney “Equal Treatment” 1106. Another view is that it is a constructive dividend to 
non-vendors which they use to buy out vendors, see Dugan “Repurchase” 98 who regards 
repurchases as tripartite in nature, comprising a distribution of assets (with the attendant risks of 
asset stripping and debt avoidance), a reorganisation of ownership (with the risk of unfair and 
discriminatory treatment of shareholders), and a transfer of shares (which may lead to insider 
trading and market manipulation).  
87  This will be the case where the controlling shareholders who approve the offer have no intention 
of accepting it in respect of their own shares, see Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies 
Act 5-78. Rock, Kanda & Kraakman “Significant Corporate Transactions” 149 refer to the 
imbalance of knowledge between insiders and public shareholders. Chirelstein “Optional 
Redemptions” 100, 117 regards repurchases as inherently coercive. 
88  See McCabe “Share Buy-Back Power” 138 who is opposed to a buy-back power and Magner 
“Purchase” 119 who recommends extensive regulation of abuses.  
89  See Bradley & Rosenzweig “Defensive Stock Repurchases” 1396 – 1399 who argue that 
defensive open market repurchases should be prohibited as they are essentially coercive, but 
that self-tender defensive repurchases should be allowed subject to conditions (1406 – 1411). 
Bradley & Rosenzweig “Defensive Repurchases and Appraisal” 329, 335 argue that the 
Continued 
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company is bought out at a substantial premium in order to thwart a takeover 
attempt.90 Management buy-outs are also problematic as these often occur in going 
private transactions as a first step to provide management with the level of 
shareholding enabling them to ‘freeze out’ the remaining minority through a 
compulsory acquisition. 91  The scope of my thesis does not allow a detailed 
consideration of takeover-related abuses of the repurchase power, although they 
are by implication included in any discussion of coercive or selective repurchases.92 
The advantages and disadvantages of share repurchases, and the appropriate 
regulation of the possible abuse of the power, is the subject of an ongoing academic 
debate. A possibility regarded as an advantage by some, may be seen as a 
disadvantage by others. 93  Different considerations apply to public and private 
companies.94 
In private companies the main advantages usually cited are that repurchases 
facilitate the retention of family control, provide a market for the shares of deceased 
or retiring shareholders and are useful in relation to employee share schemes. 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
appraisal remedy should not be available in these circumstances. Gordon & Kornhauser 
“Takeover Defense Tactics” 297 propose that all defensive repurchases should be outlawed.  
90  For an overview of arguments for and against regulating greenmail, see Hartnett “Greenmail” 
1301 – 1308; Anon “Greenmail” 1047–1051. Hartnett analyses different options for the 
regulation of greenmail (1308 – 1317) and concludes that the continued evolution of fiduciary 
principles offers the best solution (1318). Anon “Greenmail” 1064 is in favour of a complete ban 
on greenmail, arguing that revision of the business judgment rule will not prevent greenmail and 
that shareholders face difficulties in enforcing fiduciary obligations (1061). For a pro-greenmail 
view which nevertheless recognises possible abuses, see Macey & McChesney “Corporate 
Greenmail” 50. 
91  Brudney “Going Private” 1019. Brudney concludes (1053) that going private repurchases should 
be prohibited, forcing inside shareholders to use their own funds should they wish to work out 
public shareholders. See also Kofele-Kala “Unfinished Business” for a discussion of the 
regulation of going private transactions. 
92  However, Brudney “Equal Treatment” 1075 argues that different considerations apply to 
selective repurchases in the course of internal rearrangements between existing participants 
and during external rearrangements involving third parties, but that the issue of substantive 
versus formal equality applies to both situations. See Luiz Securities Regulation Code 725ff for 
a discussion of equal treatment of shareholders in takeovers. 
93  See The Purchase by A Company of its Own Shares, A Consultative Document Cmd 7944 
(June 1980) Part 2 par 12. See also Bourne “Purchase by a Company” 387 – 389 for a summary 
of this consultative document. Fox “Companies Purchasing” 274 is generally supportive, but 
notes the danger of fiduciary duties of directors and the temptation to use repurchases as a 
defensive device. See also Trichardt "Purchase of Own Shares" for a discussion of the 
differences between the English and American approaches. 
94  Cheffins Company Law 430 – 434 makes a clear distinction between benefits for companies 
with and without an active market for shares and those applicable to both. He discusses the 
disadvantages or objections at 434 – 435. 
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While there appears to be consensus on the advantages in private companies, the 
perceived advantages in public companies are more controversial.95  
As a consideration of the desirability of a repurchase power falls outside the 
scope of this thesis, the existence of this phenomenon is accepted as a given and 
the associated risks noted. As such, I make suggestions for the regulation of the 
distributional aspects of repurchases to the extent that they affect creditors and 
shareholders.  
This short analysis of theoretical issues illustrates the interplay between the 
regulation of share capital structure, shareholder contributions and distributions to 
shareholders. While there are different solutions to several of the issues that have 
been identified, the regulation of distributions has developed along two clearly 
discernible approaches. Distributions is also the area in which the most drastic 
reforms have taken place.  A short account of the main approaches to the regulation 
of distributions is thus necessary.   
_________________________________________________________________  
95  Brudney “Equal Treatment” 1106 – 1107 distinguishes between neutral repurchases, made in 
the context of retiring shareholders, elimination of odd lots, corporate tax benefits or partial 
liquidations resulting from contracted operations, and repurchases made for purposes of good 
investment, price rectification, takeover defence, management entrenchment or to bail out 
insiders. He concludes (1113) that in public corporations with controlling shareholders most 
repurchases should be prohibited: only housekeeping exceptions should be allowed. However, 
if there are no controlling shareholders, repurchases should be allowed subject to approval by a 
court or regulatory body. Chirelstein “Optional Redemptions” 742 – 743 compares dividends 
and proportionate as well as selective repurchases and finds that they have the same economic 
effect. The purported ‘advantages’ of equity retraction to obtain a desirable debt-equity ratio and 
return of excess capital can be achieved in alternative ways and are thus not particular 
advantages of a repurchase power. Similarly, the employee stock option plans justification is 
also neutral between dividends and repurchases (744). He dismisses the ‘good investment’ 
justification, arguing that rather than being a real investment it is a return of capital exactly 
because no real investment opportunity exists (745). Chirelstein further argues that the 
objective of price rectification does not justify channelling the benefit of the correction to 
non-selling shareholders. Getz “Corporate Share Repurchases” 16 also highlights the 
differences and similarities between repurchases and other transactions, focusing on 
reorganisation of capital, unequal treatment, and a transactional element connected with the 
need for information and knowledge. He argues that in comparison to dividends, which avoid the 
dilution of both share values and voting rights, pro rata repurchases ensure substantial 
protection against financial dilution but not against dilution of voting power, unless every 
shareholder acts in an identical way. Getz illustrates that all the advantages of repurchases can 
be achieved by alternative means including exceptions under financial assistance or through 
management or controlling shareholders acquiring shares themselves (99), but supports 
repurchases because they can be cheaper than these other methods (117).  
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3 OVERVIEW OF THE REGULATION OF DISTRIBUTIONS 
As early as the 18th century, it was common for companies voluntarily to restrict 
themselves to paying dividends out of profits only.96 The report leading to the first 
generally enabling company legislation in England recorded the fact that some 
companies paid dividends out of capital, sometimes hidden by false accounts, and 
viewed this as an abuse of the corporate form.97 Nevertheless, this first general 
legislation, the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844,98 did not contain an express 
prohibition on the payment of dividends out of capital. Instead, it included the power 
to declare dividends ‘out of the profits of the concern’ as one of the specific powers 
conferred on a company.99   
 The Limited Liability Act of 1855,100 imposed joint and several liability on 
directors who declared a dividend knowing that the company was insolvent or would 
thereby be rendered insolvent.101  The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856102 also 
imposed this liability on directors. Although dividends in insolvent circumstances 
were not prohibited as such, the risk of personal liability would discourage them from 
declaring dividends in these circumstances. 
 However, the liability provision was not re-enacted in the Companies Act of 
1862.103 In the absence of statutory regulation of distributions, the courts had to 
resolve the conflicts of interest relating to share capital by formulating rules on an ad 
hoc basis. 
_________________________________________________________________  
96  DuBois English Business Company 363.  
97  Report of the Parliamentary Committee on Joint Stock Companies BPP 1844 (119) VII 7 – 11. 
98  (7 & 8 Vict. C 110 & 111). This Act is regarded by Shannon “Coming of General Limited Liability” 
as introducing the era of modern company law. See also Cilliers Limited Liability 97 who refers 
to it as the first general Companies Act in England. The contents of this Act is discussed by 
Cilliers Limited Liability 101 – 108.   
99  Section 25 of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844.  
100  (18 & 19 Vict c 133). This Act made limited liability generally available to companies complying 
with certain requirements. See Cilliers Limited Liability 144 – 148 for a discussion of the share 
capital provisions of this Act. The Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856 (19 & 20 Vict c 47) 
abolished the additional share capital provisions introduced in the 1855 Act. 
101  Section 9 of the Limited Liability Act of 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 133). 
102  Section 14 of the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1856. (19 & 20 Vict c 47) 
103  25 & 26 Vict c 89. See Cilliers Limited Liability 166. It was only in 1980 that English company 
legislation introduced a statutory restriction on dividend distributions to shareholders, see 
Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 275. 
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3.1 The capital maintenance doctrine 
The main principles established by the English courts during the last two decades of 
the nineteenth century,104 were the following:   
• Shares may not be issued at a discount to their par value.105 
• Dividends may not be paid out of share capital.106 
• A company may not purchase its own shares.107 
These principles were inferred from the existing legislation108 and the ultra vires 
rule.109  The legislation provided for disclosure of a company’s authorised share 
capital and prescribed the procedure for the reduction of issued share capital, 
leading the courts to conclude that share capital could by implication not be returned 
to shareholders in other ways. The principle that the capital of a company should be 
devoted to the purpose for which the company was incorporated, confirmed that its 
return to shareholders would be ultra vires and void.  
This reasoning forms the basis of the capital maintenance doctrine applicable 
to companies. Different theories advance justifications for the capital maintenance 
doctrine, for example that it gives effect to an implied contract between the company 
and the creditors or between the company and the state, on behalf of creditors,110 or 
that it is the price payable by shareholders for the benefit of limited liability,111 and 
_________________________________________________________________  
104  See Knight “Capital Maintenance” 52 – 54 for a discussion of the history of the capital 
maintenance doctrine. For a more detailed overview of the gradual development of these rules, 
see Brincker Geldelike Bystand 29 – 44. 
105  Ooregum Gold Mining Co v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL).  
106  Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland (1883) 22 ChD 349 CA (356); Re Exchange Banking Co, 
Flitcroft’s Case (1882) 21 ChD 591. 
107  Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 (HL). 
108  The Companies Act of 1862 (25 & 26 Vict c 89).  
109  See Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 AppCas 409 (HL) 420; Guiness v Land Corporation of Ireland 
(1882) 22 ChD 349 (CA) 375. 
110  The statement of the company’s capital in its constitution and the disclosure of issued capital are 
important in this regard. 
111  The fact that the liability of members used to be expressed with reference to the amount 
outstanding on their shares was regarded as significant in this regard, see Re Exchange 
Banking Company, Flitcroft’s Case [1882] 21 Ch D 518. However, Cilliers Limited Liability 103 
draws attention to the fact that the increased regulation of capital was introduced in the 1844 Act, 
which did not provide for limited liability. It would thus be more correct to argue that the capital 
requirements are related to the availability of general incorporation than to limited liability. 
 21
that the contributed capital is a ‘trust fund’ for creditors.112 An evaluation of these 
theories falls outside the scope of this dissertation. 113  I agree with McGee’s 
assessment that the various capital maintenance rules were not designed in a 
coherent fashion, but that the following set of rational objectives can be inferred:114 
• protecting existing shareholders from forced depletion of their interest in 
the company and by dilution of that interest by its devaluation 
• protecting the company as an entity from being looted by unscrupulous 
shareholders or promoters 
• protecting creditors from unjustified dilution of the value of company  
In its most basic form, capital maintenance entails that share capital may not be 
returned to shareholders during the existence of the company, except as expressly 
allowed by legislation. Consequently, a company may not repurchase its shares and 
may not pay dividends out of share capital. By way of statutory exception, 
distributions can be made following a formal reduction of the share capital. 
Formulated as a financial restriction on distributions, the capital maintenance 
doctrine prohibits distributions to shareholders except out of an excess of the 
company’s assets over the sum of its liabilities plus share capital.  
Statutory and common-law rules have both extended and eroded this basic 
principle, complicating delineation of the doctrine.  
The debate on the scope and content of the capital maintenance doctrine 
encompasses a number of issues. The ultra vires aspect is described either as a 
second leg of the capital maintenance doctrine115 or as a separate but related 
principle.116 Another issue is whether the doctrine is restricted to the maintenance of 
existing capital or includes aspects of the proper raising of capital, for example the 
_________________________________________________________________  
112  This theory was formulated in Wood v Dummer 30 F Cas 435 (No 17,994) (CCD Me 1824). See 
Norton “Relationship of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors” 1062, who sketches the 
development and application of the trust fund doctrine and also discusses various criticisms 
against it. See also Westerbeck “Stated Capital” 826 – 828.  
113  For a brief summary of the most important of these theories, including implied contract, see 
Manning Legal Capital 50 – 53.   
114  See McGee Share Capital 139. 
115  See Grantham & Rickett Company and Securities Law 851. 
116  See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 322 and 345 where the two legs respectively are referred 
to as the capital maintenance doctrine and the wrongful application of share capital principle. 
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rule against issues at a discount.117 A wide view of the capital maintenance doctrine 
includes the rule denying shareholders a claim for damages arising from 
misrepresentation relating to shares.118 
There are also diverging views as to whether statutory interventions such as 
the rule against crossholdings, the rules on share premiums and, in particular, the 
prohibition on financial assistance form part of the doctrine.119 The correct view is 
that it is a separate rule with a different purpose. 120  The giving of financial 
assistance is also not a distribution, 121  although the regulation of financial 
assistance for the purchase or subscription of shares often relies on the same 
financial restrictions that apply to distributions. My thesis therefore does not deal 
with the prohibition against financial assistance.   
The relationship between ‘capital maintenance’ and ‘legal capital’ merits brief 
attention. Like capital maintenance, legal capital also has different meanings, 
complicating comparison. In America and in Europe the term ‘legal capital’ is used to 
denote a body of rules which regulates share capital structure, shareholder pay-in 
obligations and shareholder pay-outs or distributions.122 Schön123 identifies three 
separate elements of legal capital, namely minimum capital rules, mandatory 
disclosure of share capital, and distribution rules.124 The concept ‘legal capital’ is 
_________________________________________________________________  
117  See Knight “Capital Maintenance” 50ff; Wishart Company Law in Context 61, 176; Manning 
Legal Capital 20ff; Jones “Raising and Maintenance” 155 – 157. In Re Jarass Pty Ltd (1988) 13 
ACLR 728 SC (NSW) at 731 the rules on consideration were regarded as part of the capital 
maintenance doctrine. Kiggundu Share Capital 17 excludes the no discount rule.  
118  Wishart Company Law in Context 176. This principle was formulated in Houldsworth v Glasgow 
City Bank (1880) App Cas 317. It was regarded as part of the capital maintenance doctrine in 
Sons of Gwalia Ltd v Margaretic [2007] HCA 1; (2007) 232 ALR 232. In Sons of Gwalia the High 
Court of Australia held that the shareholders, who acquired shares on the basis of 
misrepresentation by the company, could claim alongside creditors in the winding-up of the 
company, despite a statutory subordination of shareholder claims that applies in Australia.  
119  Brincker Geldelike Bystand 51ff, 425; Kiggundu Share Capital 430; Knight “Capital 
Maintenance” 56 – 57; Cassim “Reform of Company Law and Capital Maintenance” 292; Dugan 
“Repurchase” 111 argue convincingly that it is not concerned with capital maintenance. 
However, Wishart Company Law in Context 176 – 177; Jones “Raising and Maintenance” 156 
include the prohibition in their discussions of the capital maintenance doctrine. 
120  See Ferran Corporate Finance 373; Trichardt & Brincker “Capital in Company Law” 149 in 
addition to the references in footnote 119 above.  
121  Although it can involve a distribution, see Knight “Capital Maintenance” 56 – 57. 
122  See Manning Legal Capital 21, 44, 63. 
123  “Future of Legal Capital” 435 – 436. 
124  See also Hertig & Kanda “Creditor Protection” 83 who explain that legal capital regulates three 
aspects of corporate finance: the maximum permissible outflow of capital, the minimum initial 
investment, and the level of capital that must be maintained throughout corporate life. The first 
Continued 
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thus potentially wider than the capital maintenance doctrine because it also 
encompasses the specific share capital structure on which a particular contribution 
and distribution regime is based. The operation of the capital maintenance doctrine 
depends on the existence of a basic framework that enables the amount of the 
share capital to be determined. In this regard, concepts such as authorised capital, 
issued capital, par value and no par value play a role and are subject to disclosure 
requirements. The regulation of shareholder contributions is also relevant, 
irrespective of whether they are viewed as part of or complimentary to the capital 
maintenance doctrine.125  
The common-law rule that dividends may not be paid out of capital126 was 
supplemented by the rule that dividends could be paid out of profits only. 127 
However, the interpretation of ‘profits’ gradually moved away from the net assets 
guarantee.128  The first step was to recognise that a decline in the value of company 
assets was not relevant to the determination of profits.129 Consequently, it was not 
necessary to make up past losses.130 In Verner v General Commercial Investment 
Trust131 the court introduced a distinction between fixed and floating assets, and 
allowed distribution of a realised profit on fixed assets. Then in Ammonia Soda 
Company v Chamberlain132 it was accepted that dividends could be paid out of 
unrealised gains, a principle confirmed in Dimbula Valley (Ceylon) Tea Co Ltd v 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
aspect relates to distributions, the second to minimum capital requirements and the third to 
reduction of capital and loss of capital.  
125  It is particularly interesting that the same justifications are used for share capital-based 
distribution rules and for the pay-in obligation of shareholders, see Mwenda “Obligation to 
Pay-Up” pars 4 – 16.  
126  See Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland (1883) 22 ChD 349 CA (356); Re Exchange 
Banking Co, Flitcroft’s Case (1882) 21 ChD 591.  
127  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 275.  
128  Yamey ‘Dividends’ 275 notes that it was accepted until 1889 that any dividend which would 
reduce the remaining assets of a company to below its nominal paid-up capital would be illegal, 
see In re Mercantile Trading Company (Stringer’s case) 4 Ch App 475 (1869); Davison v Gillies 
(1880) 16 Ch D 347. Yamey traces the gradual watering down of the dividend restriction. 
129  Lee v Neuchatel Asphalte Co (1889) 41 Ch D 1. The court held that lost capital need not be 
replaced. In re Kingston Cotton Mills Co, No 2 (1896) 1 Ch 331 confirmed that it was not 
necessary to deduct depreciation. 
130  In re National Bank of Wales Ltd (1899) 2 Ch 629 
131  [1894] 2 Ch 239 (CA) at 265 – 266. 
132  [1918] 1 Ch 266 (CA). 
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Laurie.133  
The rule against the repurchase of shares recognises the fact that a 
repurchase involves a reorganisation of the capital of the company. Even if the 
company has sufficient profits to cover the consideration given to the shareholder, a 
repurchase amounts to a return of capital to the extent that the amount of the share 
capital is required to be reduced. 134  The cushioning effect of the capital for 
subsequent distributions thus becomes less. However, if profits are used and the 
capital yardstick is not reduced, a repurchase will not violate the capital 
maintenance rule.135 In fact, this is the basis upon which the redemption of shares 
could be allowed under the capital maintenance doctrine.136 
In addition to the possibility of a formal reduction of capital, which would 
reduce the size of the capital amount that had to be maintained, the doctrine was 
qualified by several exceptions.137  
In the last quarter of the twentieth century the capital maintenance doctrine 
was abolished in various jurisdictions.138 South Africa followed suit in 1999.139 Even 
in Europe, the current stronghold of capital maintenance, the wisdom of this 
traditional approach is under reconsideration.140 
_________________________________________________________________  
133  [1961] Ch 353. Yamey “Dividends” 284 – 286 shows that the courts did this contrary to 
accounting principles despite professing to leave the determination of profits to men of business. 
See Cilliers “Reserves Created by Revaluation” 400ff for a discussion of the impact of the 
Dimbula Valley case in commonwealth countries. 
134  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-43 for a good explanation in this regard. 
135  Magner “Purchase” 80 states that there is no direct link between a repurchase prohibition and 
capital maintenance, as the effect of a repurchase on share capital will depend on the relevant 
financial limitations and the treatment of accounts.  
136  The returned capital was ‘replaced’ by the capital redemption reserve fund or by new share 
capital, see Gower “Companies Owning Their Own Shares” 313. 
137  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 3.1.1, 5.7 and 6.8 regarding South African exceptions. 
138  California was first in 1977, see Chapter 4 paragraph 3.1.  
139  See Chapter 5 paragraph 1.1.  
140  Proposals have been put forward by several influential groups. The proposals of the SLIM 
Group are set out in Recommendation by the Company Law SLIM Working Group on the 
Simplification of the First and the Second Company Law Directives; those of the High Level 
Group in Report on a Modern Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (Brussels, 4 
November 2002); those of the Rickford Group in “Report of the Inter-disciplinary Group on 
Capital Maintenance” April 2004 (15 European Business Law Review (2004 919), and those of 
the Lutter group in “Stellungname der Group of German Experts on Corporate Law zum 
Konsultationsdokument der High Level Group of Experts on Corporate Law” 2002 ZIP 1310. 
See European Commission Modernisation of Company Law and Enhancement of Corporate 
Governance in the European Union – A Plan to Move Forward (21 May 2003). For a very useful 
summary of the views and recommendations of these different groups, see the feasibility study 
Continued 
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3.1.1 Assessment of the capital maintenance approach 
The capital maintenance doctrine is the subject of an active academic debate.141  
McGee142 lists the three main criticisms against capital maintenance: 
• The size of share capital can be negligible 
• Creditors do not enquire into the size of share capital 
• Share capital can be tied up in illiquid assets and thus not be available for 
payment of creditors  
Both opponents and supporters of the capital maintenance doctrine raise the size 
issue.143 Companies are often formed with very little share capital,144 with the result 
that any perceived protection the capital could give creditors is illusory in practical 
terms. Prescribing certain ratios of debt to equity is a possible way of addressing the 
problem, but even here, the ratios would have to distinguish between different kinds 
of companies. Certain ex post remedies such as the reclassification of debt as 
equity, subordination of insider loans and piercing of the corporate veil for 
inadequate capitalisation can also contribute to construing an ‘adequate’ share 
capital. 145  However, the effectiveness of these measures will depend in each 
instance on the extent of extra funds that may become available in these ways.  
_________________________________________________________________  
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on an alternative to capital maintenance that was commissioned by the EC: KPMG Feasibility 
Study on Capital Maintenance – Main Report (Contract ETD/2006/IM/F2/71) 269 – 310. 
141  See, for example the debate between Enriques & Macey “Creditors Versus Capital Formation” 
and Mühlbert & Birke “Is there a Case?”. See also Schön “Wer schützt den Kapitalschutz?”; 
Schön “Future of Legal Capital” and Kahan “Legal Capital Rules”. 
142  Share Capital 137 
143  Enriques & Macey “Creditors Versus Capital Formation” 1186 argue that the European legal 
capital rules are ineffective unless a company has a minimum capital relevant to its operations. 
Schön “Wer schützt den Kapitalschutz?” 4 – 5 admits that the deficiency in the way the share 
capital amount is determined means that it can never be of any serious help against the 
operational risks of an enterprise, but retorts that compared to restrictions based on the 
solvency of the company, the legal capital restrictions offer no worse protection to creditors, 
even if the size of the capital is negligible. 
144  Ferran Corporate Finance 46 notes that the total allotted capital of a private company can be a 
fraction of a cent, of which no part need to be paid up. According to a DTI Consultative 
Document of 1998 The Euro: Redenomination of Share Capital, 70% of UK companies have a 
share capital of under ₤100. See Prentice “Protection of Creditors” 102 for an argument that the 
market for credit might ensure that creditors are compensated for dealing with undercapitalised 
companies. However, this is not true of prepaying customers or suppliers who do not regard 
themselves as giving credit.  
145  See Prentice “Protection of Creditors” 103. 
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Opponents of capital maintenance tend to rely on the possibility of a trivial 
capital yardstick as justification of a solvency-based approach where no margin over 
solvency is required, although there is some support for requiring a minimum margin 
of safety even within a solvency-based approach.146  
The criticism that creditors regard share capital as irrelevant to their protection 
is an attack on one of the primary justifications of the capital maintenance doctrine: 
that creditors impliedly agree to rely on the amount held out by the company as its 
share capital. Empirical evidence confirms that creditors do not place much reliance 
on a company’s share capital when considering whether to extend credit to it. 
Because they are concerned with the credit risk of the company, they consider 
aspects such as balance-sheet gearing, interest cover and minimum tangible net 
worth and rely on contractual restrictions and personal guarantees by directors or 
major shareholders.147 Although critics of capital maintenance restrictions support 
the retention of a (realistic) contractual basis for the design of financial restrictions, 
they prefer to formulate these restrictions as default contract terms which can be 
changed by mutual agreement. 
The observation that the share capital can be tied up in illiquid assets148 is 
interesting, because it may be impossible to distinguish assets in which share 
capital has been invested from other assets. However, this criticism emphasises the 
importance of liquidity from the perspective of creditors. It is not unusual for capital 
maintenance or legal capital systems to also prohibit distributions while the 
company is unable to satisfy its obligations as they arise.149  
In addition to these conceptual criticisms against capital maintenance, there 
are a number of practical disadvantages. Complexity in identifying and managing 
the extent of the share capital is first on this list.150 Another disadvantage is that the 
_________________________________________________________________  
146  See paragraph 2.2.1 below. 
147  See Day & Taylor “Loan Contracting” 318ff; Eisenberg “Modernization” 200; Westerbeck 
“Stated Capital” 838. This was also confirmed by the results of a questionnaire sent out by the 
DTI in the UK, see Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) 
par 3.5.  
148  See also Enrique & Macey “Creditors Versus Capital Formation” 1187. 
149  See Cox & Hazen Corporations 562. 
150  See also Gansen Kapitalaufbringung 188 who identifies the difference in the basic notions of 
protection through the raising as opposed to the maintenance of capital as one of the incisive 
differences between English and German law, explaining the more detailed regulation of 
non-cash consideration as well as the minimum capital amount applicable in Germany.  
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capital maintenance doctrine prevents companies from entering into certain 
potentially profitable transactions, even when doing so would neither impair their 
capital nor place their creditors at risk.151 Compliance with capital maintenance rules 
is also perceived to be difficult and costly to monitor and enforce.152 The ultimate 
effect of a legal capital system is to discourage equity investment.153 There is 
growing consensus that, at least as a distribution restriction, the disadvantages 
associated with capital maintenance outweigh the advantages that this approach 
may have over alternative measures. 
3.2 Solvency and Liquidity 
The solvency and liquidity approach developed in response to the difficulties and 
artificiality associated with the capital maintenance idea.  
The first element of this approach is the solvency test which entails that the 
assets of the company should exceed its liabilities after the distribution has been 
taken into account. Distributions may thus be made out of net assets only. The term 
balance-sheet test is also commonly used to describe this test.154 The solvency test 
recognises the ultimate priority that creditors enjoy over shareholders upon 
dissolution of the company. It stands to reason that satisfaction of the capital 
maintenance test implies that the solvency test will also be satisfied.  
Solvency in the sense of an excess of assets over liabilities is referred to as 
solvency in the bankruptcy sense and is determined through a balance sheet test. It 
_________________________________________________________________  
151  Mühlbert & Birke “Is there a Case?” 721 – 722 argue that legal capital places a greater burden 
on companies in the current economic environment than was the case a century ago. They point 
to various disadvantages that European companies have compared to their counterparts that 
are not subject to the legal capital regime, for example difficulties in effecting leveraged 
buy-outs.  
152  See Enrique & Macey “Creditors Versus Capital Formation” 1186 – 1191. They argue that the 
result is that strong creditors devise alternative protection mechanisms (1188 – 1190) and weak 
creditors are unlikely to stop unlawful distributions or veto capital reductions (1190 – 1191). 
Further, the valuation requirements for non-cash consideration imposes unnecessary costs and 
acts as an incentive to prefer private above public companies (1187 – 1188). However, the 
KPMG Feasibility Study on Capital Maintenance – Main Report 6 found that the capital 
maintenance system did not impose excessive costs on companies compared to alternative 
systems. 
153  Enrique & Macey “Creditors Versus Capital Formation” argue that the European distribution 
rules encourage the retention of funds that cannot be effectively invested and so reduces the 
liquidity of European shares while it entrenches management (1202). The net effect is that 
wealth is transferred from equity claimants (shareholders) to fixed claimants (creditors), which 
discourages equity investment (1168). 
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is distinguished from equity solvency or the ability to satisfy one’s debts as they 
become due, which is the second element.155 The equity solvency test is generally 
termed a liquidity test in South Africa. 156  In contrast with the liquidity test, 
satisfaction of the capital maintenance test does not indicate that the company is 
able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business.157 
Subjecting distributions to a liquidity requirement is not an innovation of systems 
that have abandoned the capital maintenance idea. It often applies in addition to 
capital maintenance.158 The justification for a liquidity element is that it addresses 
the fundamental expectation of creditors to be paid on time. It also fits in well with 
the representation a company is said to make when it incurs debt, namely that it 
reasonably expects to be able to pay as and when the debt becomes due.159 It 
would be unfair to allow a company which has made an implied representation of 
liquidity to subsequently compromise that liquidity by making distributions to 
shareholders.  
The justifications for the solvency and liquidity test as a control on shareholder 
distributions echo those upon which the rules for the avoidance of pre-liquidation 
transactions are founded.160 A distribution to a shareholder is a disposition without 
value, even where the distribution is in respect of the acquisition by the company of 
_________________________________________________________________  
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154  See Manning Legal Capital 65. 
155  See Manning Legal Capital 63. There are two main approaches to liquidity or the ability to 
service debt. The first entails a balance sheet test based on current assets and current liabilities, 
while the second involves a cash flow analysis. A reference to debts ‘as they become due’ or ‘as 
they become payable in the ordinary course of business’ indicates that a cash flow prediction 
should be used. This takes into account not only current assets but also future income of and 
credit given to the company. On the liabilities side not only existing current liabilities but also 
prospective liabilities are included. The choice between these two approaches may also have 
an impact on the valuation of contingent liabilities. For a discussion of these different 
approaches, see Murphy “Equity Insolvency” 847 – 850 and Grainger “Assessing Liabilities” 290 
– 291. Murphy “Equity Insolvency” 856 – 864 also discusses various methods of analysing cash 
flow. KPMG Feasibility Study on Capital Maintenance – Main Report 11 lists four different 
approaches. 
156  See the South African Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 s 51, s 70, s 85(4), 90(2). 
157  The company may experience cash-flow problems despite the fact that it has valuable fixed 
assets. 
158  See Cox & Hazen Corporations 562. 
159  See Ex parte De Villiers NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) 1993 (1) SA 
493 (A) 504. 
160  Kahan “Legal Capital Rules” 146ff asserts that the fraudulent transfer rules of the USA achieve 
the same purpose as continental distribution rules. 
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its own shares from the shareholder.161 The possibility of regulatory bias if the 
consequences of unlawful distributions under the company law and insolvency law 
systems differ, also raises a more fundamental question of unnecessary duplication. 
However, despite certain common justifications, these sets of principles apply in 
different contexts. Distribution rules operate ex ante while the setting aside of 
impeachable dispositions is an ex post remedy.162 Because this thesis approaches 
the subject from the perspective of company law, I make only brief reference to the 
position under insolvency laws.163  
3.2.1 Assessment of the solvency and liquidity approach 
Despite its relative simplicity compared to capital maintenance, it is still difficult to 
determine the solvency and liquidity of a company. If no margin over solvency is 
required, there is also no room for error. Correct valuation is thus crucial. 164 
However, provision can be made for a margin over mere solvency.165 Compliance 
and enforcement may not be much easier than in the case of capital maintenance. 
The regulation of share capital structure is still required for purposes of internal 
relations, although the constitutional law of companies can be simplified 
considerably.166 
The regulation of shareholder contributions can also be simpler, because 
creditors do not have a real interest in this aspect. Because it is unnecessary to 
distinguish between distributions that are returns of capital and those that are 
_________________________________________________________________  
161  The share is valueless in the hands of the company, see CIR v Collins 1923 AD 347; Doran 
“Transactions at an Undervalue” 169. Doran (170 – 173) distinguishes between gratuitous 
dispositions out of capital (like share repurchases), out of profits available for distribution 
(dividends in the narrow sense), and out of loan capital (any distribution by an already insolvent 
company).  
162  See Schön “Future of Legal Capital” 446 – 447. Another advantage of pay-out restrictions in 
corporate law is that they address the interests of shareholders in addition to those of creditors 
(448).  
163  Insolvency measures are potentially wider than capital rules as they also enable recovery from 
non-shareholders, see Parkinson “Non-Commercial Transactions” 65. However, they are ex 
post remedies while distribution restrictions function ex ante as preventive measures. 
164  See Schön “Wer schützt der Kapitalschutz?” 5 who criticises the determination of solvency 
without regard to accurate accounts, which would leave scope for subjective interpretation and 
valuations. 
165  The High Level Group has recommended a solvency margin, see Report on a Modern 
Regulatory Framework for Company Law in Europe (Brussels, 4 November 2002) 88. California 
follows such an approach, see Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2.2. 
166  Wishart Company Law in Context 178. 
 30
returns on capital, the same rules can apply to both kinds, resulting in a further 
simplification of rules and the avoidance of regulatory bias.   
Solvency and liquidity tests are not as sophisticated as creditor-imposed 
restrictions. Empirical evidence indicates that creditors regard aspects such as nett 
assets and interest cover as more important than cash-flow projections. 167 
Consequently, the solvency and liquidity of the company may also be irrelevant to 
creditors, although probably not to the extent applicable to capital maintenance.  
4 METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is done by way of a comparative analysis of the regulation of share 
capital structure, shareholder contributions and distributions to shareholders in a 
number of countries. The aim of the comparative study is to identify strengths and 
weaknesses of the South African law in this field and to make recommendations for 
reform. 
4.1 Need for this study 
Subsequent to the introduction in South Africa of the new provisions regulating 
distributions to shareholders in 1999, various articles commenting on aspects of the 
new provisions have been published. Understandably, these have focused on 
specific topics of limited scope. Company law textbooks also deal with the relevant 
provisions of the Companies Act, but their emphasis is mostly on describing the 
existing position rather than to suggest legal reform. An extensive company law 
reform process is underway and a Companies Bill has been introduced to 
Parliament.168 
_________________________________________________________________  
167  Day & Taylor “Loan Contracting” 320 – 321 conclude that a dividend restriction is seldom used 
in financial covenants. Wishart Company Law in Context 177 – 178 argues that creditors are 
interested in future earnings and interest cover. See also Company Formation and Capital 
Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.5.  
168  [B 61—2008], tabled in Parliament on 27 June 2008, available at www.pmg.org.za/bill 
(2008-06-27). This Bill was approved by Cabinet on 14 May 2008 (Statement of Cabinet 
Meeting 14 May 2008 dated 15 May 2008). The Minister published an explanatory summary and 
notice of intention to introduce the Companies Bill into Parliament during June 2008, see GG 
31104 of 30 May 2008 General Notice 677. The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) first 
published a draft Companies Bill in February 2007 and invited public comments.  
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The purpose of this thesis is thus to analyse the existing capital rules in South 
African company law, to point out shortcomings, comment on proposed reforms, 
and make recommendations. 
4.2 Scope and motivation of comparative study 
I survey the laws of England,169 New Zealand,170  and the American states of 
Delaware and California. I also consider the provisions of the Revised Model 
Business Corporations Act which serves as the basis for the regulation of 
corporations more than half of the American states. I chose these systems not 
because they represent different legal families, but for the variety of approaches 
they have adopted in response to the issues investigated in this thesis.171 Although 
there is considerable variation in detail, the approaches can be divided into capital 
maintenance systems on the one hand,172 and solvency and liquidity systems on the 
other. 173  England and Delaware are capital maintenance systems, while New 
Zealand, California and the model provisions of the Revised Model Business 
Corporations Act represent the solvency and liquidity approach. South Africa can be 
classified as a hybrid system with elements of each category.   
I survey England first.174 Comparison is warranted on several grounds. First, 
the capital maintenance doctrine which represents one of the two main approaches 
to the regulation of distributions, originated in England.175 Secondly, South African 
company law is based on English company law.176 Although legislation in the two 
_________________________________________________________________  
169  See Chapter 2. 
170  See Chapter 3. 
171  In view of the harmonisation of capital and distribution rules through the implementation of the 
EU Second Company Law Directive EC 91/77, the position in the most important Germanic and 
Romance jurisdictions does not differ in material respects from that in the UK. Although the 
harmonisation of company law applies to public companies only, the basic approach to private 
companies in those jurisdictions tend to approximate that applicable to public companies. 
Moreover, a number of jurisdictions have adopted reforms in this area that differ radically from 
the principles they once embraced.  
172  This includes ‘legal capital’ which is the preferred American and European term. 
173  Capital maintenance systems by necessary implication also require solvency and often impose 
liquidity as an additional requirement. My designation of a system as a solvency and liquidity 
system must be understood as indicating that the system relies exclusively or mainly on these 
restrictions.   
174  See Chapter 2.  
175  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
176  Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 19. 
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systems have moved away from each other in the past couple of decades, most of 
the general principles of company law and many of the statutory provisions still 
correspond, making comparison valuable.177 Thirdly, because of its implementation 
of the Second Company Law Directive of 1976,178 which applies in respect of public 
companies, the regulation of important aspects of share capital and distributions is 
representative of the position in other member states of the European Union, thus 
adding a wider perspective. Finally, it is unique among the systems I survey in 
prescribing a minimum amount of issued and paid-up share capital 179  and 
prohibiting shares without par value.180  
New Zealand is next in line.181 While company law in New Zealand is based on 
English law, the new Companies Act that was adopted in 1993 decisively reformed 
the regulation of share capital, consideration for shares, and distributions. Notably, it 
abolished the concept of authorised capital.182 I chose New Zealand because it 
exemplifies a successful transition from an English-based system to a modern 
approach comparable with the most progressive jurisdictions internationally. The 
New Zealand reforms have been described as ‘the most radical appraisal of 
company law that has been put forward anywhere in the Commonwealth since 
limited liability was introduced in 1855’.183 The New Zealand Act also served as the 
model for the new Companies Act in Botswana.184 These two factors make New 
Zealand preferable over the more complex Australian example as a comparative 
jurisdiction for this thesis.    
In the United States of America185 the regulation of corporations falls within the 
powers of each state. Although a majority of American states have adopted 
legislation based on the Revised Model Business Corporation Act, the two states 
_________________________________________________________________  
177  See Havenga Corporate Opportunities 5. 
178  Directive 77/91/EEC, 1997 OJ L26/1. See also Chapter 2 paragraph  1. 
179  For public companies, see Chapter 2 paragraph 2.2. 
180  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.3.  
181  See Chapter 3. 
182  See Chapter 3 paragraph 22. 
183  See the report of the New Zealand Law Commission Company Law Reform: Transition and 
Revision R16 xiv, quoting a leading English commentator, Dr Len Sealy. 
184  See Havenga “Regulating Directors’ Duties” 621. 
185  The American position is considered in Chapter 4. 
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surveyed have not done so. The selection of three different approaches in the USA 
also shows that it is dangerous to generalise about ‘American’ company law.186  
Delaware187 has a reputation as the most permissive, and consequently also 
the most popular, state for incorporations in America. 188  Curiously, it has not 
followed the trend of modernising its share capital and distribution rules and is thus 
still a legal capital system. Comparison with the law of Delaware law is useful as it 
illustrates a much more lenient approach to capital maintenance or legal capital. It is 
also the only other system surveyed that, like South Africa, allows a combination of 
par and no par value shares. 
California189 was the first American state to abolish the legal capital regime, 
thus making it an obvious choice for comparison. It replaced the legal capital system 
with economically equivalent, but legally different restrictions. The notion of retained 
earnings encompasses a higher standard than solvency. California is also unique in 
providing an alternative to the retained earnings measure in the form of a rather 
sophisticated debt to equity ratio test. The Californian innovations provided impetus 
for the revision of the financial provisions of the Model Business Corporations Act at 
the time which were subsequently taken over in the Revised Model Business 
Corporations Act of 1984. 
The provisions of the Revised Model Business Corporations Act,190 published 
by the American Bar Association,191 represent the law in many states and its 
provisions have been adopted by 29 states.192 It is a popular and easily accessible 
source of comparison that has influenced reforms in other jurisdictions such as New 
_________________________________________________________________  
186  However, see Pound “Development of American Law” 50 – 52 for a discussion of unifying 
features of American Law. 
187  See Chapter 4 paragraphs 2 – 2.7. 
188  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.1. 
189  See Chapter 4 paragraphs 3 – 3.7. 
190  See Chapter 4 paragraphs 4.1 – 4.7. 
191  The Revised Model Business Corporations Act will be referred to as the MBCA or the RMBCA 
and any references to the previous version, which is still the basis of the corporate laws of a 
number of states, will be identified with reference to its year of publication, 1969. 
192  See American Bar Association Model Business Corporations Act Official Text with Official 
Comment xxii. 
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Zealand193 and appears to have been played a role in informing the company law 
review process in South Africa.194 
I conclude my study with an analysis of the share capital rules in South 
Africa.195 Although distributions in the form of consideration for share repurchases 
and payments by reason of shareholding have been made subject to solvency and 
liquidity criteria, the rules regarding the share capital framework and shareholder 
contributions remain unchanged. I point out shortcomings of the current legislation 
and make recommendations for improvement based on my findings in the 
comparative survey. I also consider the proposals for reform that are made in the 
Companies Bill.196 
 
4.3 Specific issues considered 
In order to facilitate comparison, I address issues as far as possible in the same 
order in my analysis of each jurisdiction. 
A brief introduction sets out the kinds of companies having a share capital, the 
sources of applicable law and a concise historical overview of the capital regime 
adopted. 
I then discuss the share capital structure with reference to authorised capital, 
considering also alternative measures that achieve a similar effect of protecting 
shareholders against uncontrolled dilution of their interests. Attention is also given to 
the minimum issued share capital, regardless of whether it involves a prescribed 
amount or is determined with reference to a number of shares. I consider the use of 
par value and no par value shares and the way in which the consideration for these 
should be reflected in a company’s capital accounts and reserves. I also briefly 
address provisions regulating the variation of share capital because even 
apparently formalistic variations of share capital, like a consolidation of shares, may 
_________________________________________________________________  
193  See New Zealand Law Commission Company Law: Reform and Restatement (NZLC R9). 
194  This will as far as possible be indicated in the discussion of the proposed reforms in South Africa, 
see Chapter 5. 
195  See Chapter 5. 
196  [B 61—2008], tabled in Parliament on 27 June 2008, available at www.pmg.org.za/bill 
(2008-06-27), hereafter ‘Companies Bill’. 
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adversely affect the interests of certain shareholders.197 Formal reduction of capital 
is discussed if provided for in the particular system. 
The regulation of shareholder contributions is then analysed. I discuss the 
regulation of a minimum consideration, the kinds of acceptable consideration, 
formalities applicable to non-cash consideration, the time when consideration has to 
be given (including the regulation of partly paid shares) and circumstances under 
which shares may be issued at a discount, if applicable. 
Turning to the regulation of distributions, the first aspect I consider is whether 
or not there is a comprehensive definition of distributions and a single set of financial 
restrictions to which all distributions are subjected.  
The first category of distributions considered includes dividends and other 
payments to shareholders. I set out the kinds of payments that are regulated and the 
basic requirements for each, followed by an analysis of the procedural require-
ments. 
Share repurchases are the second category. I identify the kinds of 
repurchases that are allowed, including redemption of shares, and discuss the 
requirements for each kind of repurchase. In focusing on the procedural 
requirements for repurchases, I distinguish between measures aimed at protecting 
creditors and shareholders. I also consider the effect of share repurchases on the 
share capital accounts and on the status of repurchased shares. The consequences 
of an unlawful repurchase, including personal liability of directors and shareholders 
for unlawful repurchases, are then analysed. The final issue I deal with under this 
section is the regulation of repurchases through subsidiaries. 
My recommendations for reform are set out in the final chapter. 
5 REFERENCE TECHNIQUES 
For the sake of convenience I use the feminine form throughout this thesis to refer to 
persons. I use the terms ‘company’ and ‘corporation’ according to the practice in 
each system surveyed. In the discussion of general principles that transcend a 
particular jurisdiction, the term company is used.  
_________________________________________________________________  
197  For example, the cancellation or redemption of fractional shares resulting from a consolidation 
of shares (a ‘reverse stock split’) can be used to expropriate minority shareholders. See Kaplan 
& Young “Corporate ‘Eminent Domain’” 68. 
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When I refer to court judgments, the full citation appears in the footnote as well 
as in the table of cases. Other authorities are referred to in the footnotes by way of 
short titles while I supply the full title in the bibliography. In the case of authority 
sourced on the internet, the website and date it was last accessed is given in the 
footnote and in the bibliography, list or table, as the case may be. 
The books, articles, cases and legislation referred to are those that were 
available to me as at February 2008, although I incorporate progress with the reform 
process  up to the tabling of the Companies Bill on 27 June 2008.  
CHAPTER 2 
 
ENGLAND 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
In England, company law is regulated mainly by the Companies Act 2006 (c 46),1 
the Companies Act 1985 (c 6),2 and the common law. The Companies (Audit, 
Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (c 27), the Criminal Justice Act 
1993 (c 36), the Insolvency Act 1986 (c 45), the Company Directors 
(Disqualification) Act 1986 (c 46), the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (c 8) 
and the Business Names Act 1985 (c 7) also regulate aspects of company law.3 
Parts V and VIII of CA 1985 regulate the areas of share capital, capital maintenance 
and distributions. Parts 17, 18 and 23 of CA 2006 regulate share capital, share 
repurchases and distributions respectively, but are not yet in force. As a member 
state of the EU, the United Kingdom has to comply with its directives and 
regulations. The Second Company Law Directive of 19764 is directly relevant to the 
topic under consideration and applies in respect of public companies. The capital 
provisions required by this Directive were originally incorporated into the Companies 
_________________________________________________________________ 
1  This Act (hereafter CA 2006) received royal assent on 8 November 2006 and the 
commencement of its provisions is being staggered, see DTI, Implementation of Companies Act 
2006: A Consultative Document (DTI, 2007). According to a revised timetable published by the 
Government by Written Statement on 13 December 2007, available at www.berr.gov.uk 
(2008-02-28), most of the provisions relevant to my thesis, including those dealing with share 
capital and repurchases, will come into force on 1 October 2009, when the Act will be fully in 
force. The sections dealing with distributions in the narrow sense (ss 829 – 853) commenced on 
6 April 2008. CA 2006 is to replace the Companies Act of 1985, although certain parts of the 
latter Act will remain in force, notably those dealing with company investigations. Whenever 
possible, references will be made to both these Acts, indicating the relevant provision in each. 
For a succinct overview of CA 2006, see Blackstone’s Guide 1 – 8. 
2  Companies Act 1985 (c 6), hereafter ‘CA 1985’. Most of the provisions of this Act will be 
replaced by CA 2006, see note 1 above. 
3  See Gore-Browne on Companies Vol 1 1-2 – 1-4; Alcock Companies Act 2006 14. On the 
sources of English company law in general, see Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 45ff.  
4  Directive 77/91/EEC, 1997 OJ L26/1. In the rest of this Chapter, this directive will be referred to 
as the ‘Second Company Law Directive’. For an overview of the impact of European 
Commission regulation on company law in the UK, see Gore-Browne on Companies 1-10Aff; 
Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 17 – 41; Hannigan Company Law 38 – 61. 
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Act 1981 (c 62), later consolidated in CA 1985, and are now reflected in CA 2006. 
An innovation of CA 2006 is that it applies to the whole of the United Kingdom.5 
However, in this chapter reference will be made to the position in England. This is 
done because in addition to statute law, common-law principles developed in 
England are relevant. 
The legislation distinguishes between limited and unlimited companies. 
Limited companies can be limited by shares6 or by guarantee.7 Companies limited 
by guarantee must be private companies, while companies limited by shares can be 
public or private. There are also unlimited companies, used mainly by professional 
firms. Since 2000, it has been possible to form limited partnerships. 8  The 
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 provides for 
the registration of a limited company as a community interest company, but a 
consideration of this type of company falls outside the scope of this thesis.9 Since 
_________________________________________________________________ 
5  See CA 2006 s 1(1) s v 'company' in terms of which the 'Companies Acts' apply to the whole 
UK.  The concept 'the Companies Acts' is defined in s 2 and comprises the company law 
provisions of CA 2006 (Parts 1 to 39 and Parts 45 to 47 so far as they apply for purposes of Parts 
1 to 39), Part 2 of the Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (c 
27), as well as the provisions of CA 1985 and the Companies Consolidation (Consequential 
Provisions) Act 1985 (c 9) that in remain in force. See also CA 2006 s 1284 which implements 
the direct extension of the Companies Acts to Northern Ireland and repeals the 
separate enactments (which largely duplicated the Great Britain enactments) in force in 
Northern Ireland. CA 2006 ss 1285 – 1287 extend various other Great Britain enactments to 
Northern Ireland, for example those governing certain other forms of enterprise like limited 
liability partnerships and limited partnerships, and business names. See also Gore-Browne on 
Companies Vol 1 1 – 3; Palmer’s Annotated Guide 56, 933; Alcock Companies Act 2006 14; 
Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 2.2.1.1.  
6  CA 2006 s 3(2) defines a ‘company limited by shares’ as a company whose members’ liability is 
limited to the amount unpaid on its shares. 
7  CA 1985 s 1(2); CA 2006 s 3. Until 1981, when the amendments incorporating the Second 
Company Law Directive first came into force, it was possible to form guarantee companies that 
also had a share capital. These companies may continue to exist. See s 1(2) of the Companies 
Act 1980 (c 22); CA 2006 s 5; Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 71. Guarantee companies 
with a share capital are a hybrid form of company and the rules pertaining to the share capital of 
limited companies usually apply to the share capital of a guarantee company, see also Palmer’s 
Company Law Vol 1 2.101. Although reference will sometimes be made to provisions that apply 
also to such companies, a detailed consideration of these companies is beyond the scope of this 
thesis. 
8  With the enactment of the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (c 12). See Gower & Davies’ 
Company Law 7 ed 5 – 6 for a brief discussion of the features of this form of enterprise. 
9  See Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 2.3.1 where this company form is discussed 
briefly. 
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only companies limited by shares are relevant to my thesis, I will consider public and 
private limited companies with share capital. 
The private company is the default company form.10 The number of members 
a private company may have is not limited. A private company may not offer its 
shares to the public.11 The constitution of a private company need not restrict the 
transfer of its shares, although such restrictions are common.12 The minimum 
number of members is one.13 The common-law maintenance of capital doctrine has 
been relaxed for private companies in a number of respects.  
A public limited company must state in its memorandum that it is a public 
company14 and it is currently required to have at least two members.15 The law 
relating to share capital of public companies must comply with the Second Company 
Law Directive. Public companies have a minimum prescribed authorised and 
paid-up capital, are subject to strict regulation pertaining to the valuation of 
non-cash consideration for shares, and may not make distributions out of share 
capital.16  
Various provisions prevent abuse of the distinction between the private and 
public company rules by private companies that later convert to public companies.17 
A comprehensive review of company law was launched in 1998.18 A Steering 
_________________________________________________________________ 
10  CA 1985 s 1(3); CA 2006 s 4(1). See also Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 12 – 14 for a 
discussion of the merits of regulating these two forms of company in a single Act.  
11  CA 1985 s 81; CA 2006 s 755. 
12  See Palmer’s Company Law 2.110. 
13  CA 1985 s 1(3A); CA 2006 s 7(1). Single member private companies became lawful under a 
special dispensation that was introduced in 1992 by the Companies (Single Member Private 
Companies) Regulations 1992 (SI 1992/1699) to give effect to the Twelfth Company Law 
Directive 89/667/EEC; 1989 OJ L395/40. See Gore-Browne on Companies Vol 1 2-16, 3-1; 
Palmer’s Company Law 2.108. 
14  CA 1985, s 3(1); CA 2006 s 4(2) – (3). 
15  However, CA 2006 now makes provision for single-member public companies, s 7(1). This 
provision has been scheduled to come into operation in October 2009, see the revised timetable 
available at www.berr.gov.uk (2008-02-28). 
16  See paragraphs 2.2, 3.2 and 5.2 below. 
17  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 236 – 237. For an example, see the discussion of the 
regulation of non-cash consideration in paragraph 3.3 below. 
18  Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy is the launch consultative document issued 
by the DTI in March 1998. It sets out the purpose and terms of reference of the Review. For an 
Continued 
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Group tasked with the review published its report in July 2001.19 The government 
reacted in a White Paper, accompanied by a Draft Companies Bill, in July 2002.20 In 
2004, a further consultation document was published by the DTI,21 which again set 
in motion the process that seemed to have stalled.22 The reform process eventually 
resulted in the Companies Act 2006, which is not fully in force yet. I include parallel 
references in the footnotes where both Acts regulate an aspect in the same way. I 
will also highlight differences where relevant. 
The new Act reforms certain aspects of the law relating to share capital and 
distributions, but mainly for private companies. The Second Company Law Directive 
prevents the simultaneous relaxation of many provisions relating to public 
companies.23 However, the Company Law Review reconsidered those instances 
where the requirements of the Second Company Law Directive had been voluntarily 
extended to private companies.24 
In the course of this chapter, I refer to a number of specific proposals of the 
Company Law Review, many of which have been incorporated in CA 2006. It is 
nevertheless sensible to give a brief overview of the proposals for reform in the 
areas covered by this thesis, as it will highlight specific concerns and expose 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
overview of the reform process, see Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 53 – 54; Alcock 
Companies Act 2006 3 – 4; Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 1.5.1.3 – 1.5.1.6; 
Palmer’s Company Law 1.134. 
19  Several consultation documents and follow-up reports were issued in the mean time. There 
were four phases of consultation, and four major reports, viz The Strategic Framework URN 
99/654 (February 1999), Company Law Review: Developing the Framework URN 00/656 
(March 2000), Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 (November 2000) 
and Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy - Final Report  (May 2001). The 
follow-up reports Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) 
and Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Capital Maintenance: Other Issues 
URN 00/880 (June 2000) are also of particular importance for the topic under consideration. 
20  White Paper Modernising Company Law Cm 5553-I and II (July 2002). 
21  DTI Company Law: Flexibility and Accessibility (May 2004) 
22  Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 11 explain that the delay was caused by the need to devote urgent 
attention to the regulation of directors’ remuneration and the improvement of accounting and 
auditing standards. 
23  The European Commission has its own reform initiative which includes the simplification of 
capital rules: see Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the 
European Union - A Plan to Move Forward par 3.2. See also Chapter 1 footnote 139.  
24  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.4. 
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general trends. 
In formulating its proposals for reform of the share capital provisions of the 
Companies Act the Company Law Review Steering Group was influenced by two 
general considerations: 
• the need to comply with the Second Company Law Directive in relation to 
public companies.25 
• the idea that in assessing a company’s ability to repay credit, measures 
such as net assets, cash flow and interest cover were in most cases 
regarded as more important than the share capital of a company.26 
The Steering Group recommended abolition of the concept of authorised capital for 
both public and private companies.27 
As regards private companies, the first proposals included abolishing par 
value shares, doing away with the prohibition against issuing shares at a discount, 
and requiring the net consideration received for no par value shares to be reflected 
in a single subscribed capital account.28 The share premium account provisions 
would thus no longer apply to private companies.29 
For public companies, a number of simplifications of existing provisions were 
proposed. For example, it was proposed that a right of creditors to object to court 
replace the requirement of court confirmation for capital reductions in certain 
circumstances. Another proposal was that the directors should issue a solvency 
declaration stating that the company will be able to pay its debts after the reduction 
and remain able to do so for the following 12 months or in the event of a winding 
up.30 
_________________________________________________________________ 
25  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.4. 
26  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.5. This 
consideration resulted from responses to a question posed by the Steering Group during its 
consultation process. 
27  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.13. 
28  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.8. 
29  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) pars 3.19 – 3.21. 
30  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) pars 3.27 – 3.31. 
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The repurchase and redemption provisions did not elicit any proposals for 
substantial reform. It is interesting to note, though, that in relation to no par value 
shares, the amount of the issued capital account would not be reduced by the 
cancellation of the cancelled shares.31 Conversely, in the case where distributable 
profits were used, it would not be necessary to create a capital redemption reserve. 
This differs from the position in South Africa where the average issue price of no par 
value shares acquired by the company must be deducted from the stated capital 
account. 32  This illustrates that the purpose of the South African repurchase 
provisions is to allow a reduction of capital upon a repurchase while that of the 
English provisions is to keep the total share capital and non-distributable reserves 
intact.33 
The Steering Group also recommended the withdrawal of the exception of CA 
1985 allowing private companies to purchase or redeem their shares out of capital, 
because the simplified reduction of capital procedure it was proposing for private 
companies would achieve the same result.34 The quantum of the issued share 
capital plays an important role in the determination of distributable profits. A private 
company wishing to reflect the reduction in its contributed capital would thus have to 
resort to a separate reduction of capital procedure.35 
The Steering Group proposed maintaining the substance of the provisions 
regulating distributions to shareholders, although it suggested certain improvements 
to the basic definition.36 It also proposed that the statutory dispensation should 
completely replace the common law principles,37 but this recommendation was not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
31  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.60. 
32  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3.3. 
33  Except, of course, in the case of private companies purchasing shares from capital, see 
paragraph 6.3.4 below. 
34  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.62. 
35  However, as will appear from paragraph 6.4.2 below, the repurchase out of capital was retained. 
36  Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 (November 2000) par 7.21. 
37  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.66; 
Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 (November 2000) par 7.21; 
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Capital Maintenance: Other Issues URN 
00/880 (June 2000) Part II pars 37 – 39.  
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implemented.38 
2 STRUCTURE OF SHARE CAPITAL 
2.1 Authorised capital 
The memorandum of a company limited by shares must currently still state the 
number of shares it is authorised to issue and the division of its share capital into 
shares of a fixed amount.39  In the case of a public company, the authorised capital 
must be at least equal to the minimum prescribed capital.40 The only function of 
stating the authorised capital in the memorandum is to restrict the number of shares 
that directors may issue. However, the mentioning of an amount of authorised 
capital in other documents could cause confusion for investors.41 Any reference on 
the stationery and order forms of a company to its share capital is required to be to 
paid-up capital.42  
The Company Law Review proposed the abolition of the concept of authorised 
capital in the new legislation.43 In its opinion, direct provisions that limit the authority 
of directors to issue shares,44 as well as pre-emptive rights,45 provide sufficient 
_________________________________________________________________ 
38  See paragraph 6.1 below. 
39  CA 1985 s 2(5). This will not be required under CA 2006. The provisions on company formation 
are scheduled to come into force on 1 October 2009, see the authority referred to in note 1 
above. 
40  CA 1985 s 11. 
41  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 228. 
42  CA 1985 s 351(2). This provision also addresses the problem of possible deception by referring 
to issued rather than paid-up capital. Although CA 2006 does not contain a similar provision, the 
First Directive on Company Law 68/151/EEC; 1968 OJ spec ed 41 – 45 dictates regulation in 
this regard. Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 6.1.2 explain that the requirement of the 
directive will be implemented by regulations issued under CA 2006 s 82.  
43   Modernising Company Law Cm 5553-I and II (July 2002) par 6.5. 
44  These restrictions are required in respect of public companies by art 25 of the Second Company 
Law Directive. CA 1985 s 80 subjects the power of directors to allot shares to authorisation by 
the general meeting or the articles of association. The maximum number of shares that may be 
allotted under the authorisation must be stated and the authorisation may not be given for a 
period exceeding 5 years. CA 1985 s 80A allows private companies to grant authorisations for 
longer than 5 years. See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 630ff. 
45  CA 1985 s 89ff. See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 631ff. 
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protection to shareholders. Consequently, under CA 2006 the only information 
about its share capital that needs to be contained in the memorandum of a company 
limited by shares is a statement by the subscribers that they agree to take up at least 
one share each.46 However, the company must lodge a statement of capital and 
initial shareholdings, which sets out the issued capital and its division into shares, 
with the Registrar together with its memorandum.47 This statement, or each further 
statement lodged when more shares are issued, 48   forms part of the current 
constitutive documents of the company.49 
The directors may allot and issue further shares, subject to authority in the 
articles of association or a resolution of the company.50 Pre-emptive rights apply in 
respect of issues wholly for cash consideration.51 Existing shareholders of ordinary 
shares are entitled to subscribe for further shares in proportion to the nominal value 
of their shares, and may renounce their right to be allotted shares to anyone else. 
Exceptions apply in respect of employee share schemes and bonus shares.52 
Pre-emptive rights are compulsory for public companies.53 Private companies may 
exclude or limit pre-emptive rights in a number of ways.54  
_________________________________________________________________ 
46  CA 2006 s 8(1)(b). According to the schedule this provision will come into force on 1 October 
2009, see the revised implementation timetable available at www.berr.gov.uk (2008-02-28). 
47  CA 2006 s 9(4). The contents of the ‘statement of capital and initial shareholdings’ is prescribed 
in s 10(2)(a).  
48  CA 2006 s 555. 
49  CA 2006 s 32(1)(g). The annual return to be submitted by a company also has to reflect the 
composition of its issued share capital, s 856(1) – (2). 
50  CA 1985 ss 80 – 80A; CA 2006 s 551(1). Under CA 2006 s 550 a private company with only one 
class of shares need not subject the directors’ power to allot and issue shares to restrictions in 
the articles. See Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 6.2.6.1; Paul Myners Pre-emption 
Rights: Final Report URN 05/679 (DTI, 2005). 
51  CA 1985 s 89; CA 2006 s 561, s 565.  
52  CA 1985 s 89(4) – (5); CA 2006 s 564, s 566. 
53  As required by article 29 of the Second Company Law Directive. 
54  CA 1985 s 95; CA 2006 ss 567 – 569. According to Weinbaum “Dilution” 4 companies usually 
grant the directors a general authority to issue shares and are likely to exclude pre-emptive 
rights as well.  
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2.2 Minimum share capital 
A minimum allotted 55  share capital of £50 000 applies in respect of public 
companies.56 No minimum amount of issued or allotted capital is prescribed for 
private companies, although such a company must have issued at least one issued 
share.57 
The amount of the minimum capital for public companies is substantially 
higher than the 25 000 euros prescribed in terms of the Second Company Law 
Directive. A public company may not do business or exercise its borrowing powers 
until it has obtained a certificate from the Registrar that it has complied with the 
requirements of the Act regarding allotment of the prescribed minimum capital.58  
When the minimum prescribed capital is increased, which can be done by the 
Secretary of State by statutory instrument,59  public companies with an issued 
capital of less than the minimum may be required to increase their capital to an 
amount equal to the new minimum capital, or alternatively, to reregister as private 
companies.60   
It is important to note that shares are not required to be fully paid up when they 
are issued, so that the paid-up share capital of a company may be lower than its 
issued or allotted capital. I consider the requirement regarding the minimum paid-up 
_________________________________________________________________ 
55  A share is ‘allotted’ at the moment when a person acquired an unconditional right to be entered 
in the register in respect of that share and is regarded as ‘issued’ when it is registered in the 
name of the shareholder, see CA 2006 s 558. See also Marsden “The Issue” 144 – 145 on the 
difference between ‘issued’ and ‘allotted’. The par value of allotted and issued shares is known 
as the allotted share capital and the issued share capital respectively. See also Mayson, French 
& Ryan on Company Law 6.1.10; Palmer’s Company Law 4.004. 
56  CA 1985 s 117 and s 118; CA 2006 s 761(2) and s 763(1). The Secretary of State may also set 
an equivalent in euros. The amount of a company’s capital need not be stated in pounds sterling 
and could include different currencies. The minimum capital must, however, be designated in 
pounds sterling, see Re Scandinavian Bank Group plc [1988] Ch 87; Re Anglo-American 
Insurance Co Ltd [1991] BCLC 564; Gore-Browne on Companies 6-19. See also Instone 
“Multi-currency Share Capital” 168 – 170 and Thornton “Lawfulness of Multi-currency Share 
Capital” 51 – 54 for discussions of Re Scandinavian Bank Group plc [1988] Ch 87. The minimum 
paid-up amount at incorporation is discussed in paragraph 3.4 below. 
57   Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 229. 
58  CA 2005 s 117(8); CA 2006 s 761(2).  
59  CA 1985 s 118(1). 
60  CA 1985 s 118(2). 
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capital for public companies below.61 
2.3 Kinds of shares  
All shares are required to have a fixed amount or par value.62 England still does not 
allow shares without par value, despite the fact that both the Gedge Committee63 in 
1954 and the Jenkins Committee64 in 1962 recommended the introduction of no par 
value shares. 65  The Company Law Review contemplated replacing par value 
shares with no par value shares for private companies,66 but eventually abandoned 
the proposal.67 The Second Company Law Directive prevents the abolition of par 
value in respect of public companies.68 The potential problems different systems for 
public and private companies would create upon the conversion of companies 
motivated the ultimate recommendation to retain the par value system for private 
companies.69 
_________________________________________________________________ 
61  See paragraph 3.4 below. 
62  CA 1985 s 2(5); CA 2006 s 542. The par value need not be an amount that could be paid in legal 
tender, need not be designated in sterling and could be stated in different currencies for different 
classes of shares, see Re Scandinavian Bank Group plc [1988] Ch 87 at 99 – 100. However, the 
minimum prescribed capital must be reflected in sterling, see paragraph 2.2 above.  
63  Board of Trade Report of the Committee on Shares of No Par Value (Cmd 9112 of 1954). 
64  Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749 of 1962). 
65  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 230. 
66  See The Strategic Framework URN 99/654 (February 1999) pars 5.4.26 – 5.4.33; Company 
Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.8; Modern Company 
Law for a Competitive Economy: Capital Maintenance: Other Issues URN 00/880 (June 2000) 
Part I pars 8 – 12, and see pars 13 – 23 for a discussion of the intended transitional provisions. 
67  See Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 (November 2000) par 7.3. 
68  See Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.4. It 
appears that McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 42 may have lost sight of this fact when he 
thought it unusual that the possibility was being considered for private companies only. 
69  See Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 (November 2000) par 7.3; 
Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 230. In England the most common method of forming a 
public company is to incorporate a private company and convert it into a public company, 
avoiding the necessity of obtaining a trading certificate under CA 1985 s 117; CA 2006 761(2), 
see Palmer’s Company Law 2.206. Ease of conversion is commercially important. See also 
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Capital Maintenance: Other Issues URN 
00/880 (June 2000) par 9. It is interesting that unlimited companies with share capital may 
indeed use no par value shares, see Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 6.1.14.  
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2.4 Share capital and reserve accounts 
In addition to the share capital account, provision is made for non-distributable 
reserves which are treated like share capital, subject to certain exceptions. The 
share premium account and the capital redemption reserve are the most important 
statutory non-distributable reserves and serve to limit the amount of distributions to 
shareholders.70 
While the par value of a share is reflected in the share capital account of a 
company, any premium is shown in its share premium account.71 When a company 
resells treasury shares72 for more than the price it paid when repurchasing them, it 
has to transfer this excess to the share premium account.73 The share premium 
account is also the appropriate account in which any other amounts of capital that 
unrelated to specific shares can be reflected.74  
The share premium account is treated as if it was paid-up share capital,75 but 
provision is made for exceptions76 and reliefs.77 While an exception allows the 
reduction of the share premium account, the effect of a relief is that an amount that 
should otherwise have been transferred to the share premium account need not be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
70  In relation to distributions by public companies, additional reserves must be created; see CA 
1985 s 264 and s 148(4); CA 2006 s 831 and s 669. See also the discussion in paragraph 5.2 
below. 
71  CA 1985 s 130; CA 2006 s 610(1). Prior to 1948 share premiums were regarded as paid in 
surplus which could be distributed to shareholders; see Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 
231. Also see Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.3.1 for a brief account of the history of the regulation of 
share premiums. 
72  Treasury shares are repurchased shares that have not been cancelled, but are held by the 
company. See paragraph 6.6 below for further detail as to how such shares are regulated. 
73  CA 1985 s 162F; CA 2006 s 731(3). This provision is also considered in paragraph 6.6 below.  
74   Palmer’s Company Law 4.009. Kellar v Williams [2000] 2 BCLC 390 PC provides an example of 
share capital not related to specific shares. A shareholder had advanced money to the company, 
but it was not regarded as a loan. The amount was held to be share capital even though it could 
not be reflected in the share capital account.  
75   CA 1985 s 130(3); CA 2006 s 610(4). 
76  CA 1985 s 130(2); CA 2006 s 610(2) – (3).  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 232 states that 
there are two exceptions, but although the provision contains paragraph numbers (a) and (b), it 
mentions at least three exceptions (if writing off preliminary expenses and providing for 
commissions or discount are regarded as a single exception).  
77   CA 1985 s 130(4) states that the reliefs are provided in ss 131 and 132; CA 2006 s 610(5) 
makes s 620 subject to the reliefs provided in ss 611, 612 and 614. 
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so transferred. 
The exceptions allow use of the share premium account for: 
• paying up bonus shares78  
• writing off preliminary expenses or commissions paid or discount allowed 
on an issue of shares or debentures79 
• the premium payable on the redemption of debentures.80 
Although these provisions dealing with the application of the share premium account 
do not refer to the application of the share premium account in respect of a premium 
payable on the redemption or repurchase of shares, this is provided for separately.81 
In its regulation of how the share premium account may be applied, CA 2006 
introduces a degree of correlation between the shares that contributed the premium 
and the transactions in respect of which the premium may be applied.82  Expenses 
or commissions may be written off out of share premium only to the extent that the 
shares in respect of which the expenses or commissions were incurred contributed 
to the share premium account.83 Similarly, the extent to which the share premium 
account can be applied in respect of a redemption or repurchase at a premium is 
limited to the premium initially contributed in respect of those shares or the current 
amount of the share premium account, should the latter be lower.84 
The two reliefs pertain to the treatment of share premiums in mergers85 and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
78   CA 1985 s 130(2); CA 2006 s 610(3). 
79   CA 1985 s 130(2)(a); CA 2006 s 610(2)(a) – (b).  
80   CA 1985 s 130(2)(b). However, CA 2006 s 610 does not provide for this use.  
81   CA 1985 s 160; CA 2006 s 687(5) and s 692(4), see also paragraph 6.2.1 below.  
82   Although s 133 of the 1989 Companies Act (c 40) also provides for such a link, it has not been 
put in force. See also Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 10.3.3 on the issue of linking up 
the contribution and distribution of share premiums. See also Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 
ed 232 where draft clause 48 in the Bill accompanying the White Paper Modernising Company 
Law Cm 5553-I and II is commented on. See further Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 on the 
position in South Africa. 
83   CA 2006 s 610(2)(a) – (b). CA 1985 did not limit the application in this way 
84   CA 2006 s 687(4) (redemptions) and s 692(3) (repurchases). 
85   CA 1985 s 131; CA 2006 s 611. 
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group reconstructions.86 Where shares are issued in exchange for other shares in a 
merger or group reconstruction, the amount by which the value of the shares given 
in exchange for the issue of new shares exceed the par value of the new shares, 
need not be carried over to a share premium account.87 A further opportunity for 
relief is introduced in CA 2006, in that the Secretary of State is given the power to 
provide further relief in respect of non-cash premiums or to restrict or modify the 
other reliefs by regulation.88 
When a redemption or repurchase is made out of distributable profits, an 
amount equal to the nominal value of the shares redeemed or purchased must be 
transferred to the capital redemption reserve.89 An amount equal to the distributable 
profits used to fund the redemption or repurchase becomes undistributable, 
because the capital redemption reserve is treated as share capital. 90  The 
application of the capital redemption reserve is more limited than the share premium 
account, as it may only be capitalised as bonus shares. Premiums on debentures or 
preliminary expenses and commissions may not be paid from the capital redemption 
reserve.91  
A public company that holds its own shares in treasury must, if it reflects the 
shares as an asset in its balance sheet, transfer an amount equal to their value into 
a statutory reserve fund out of its distributable profits.92 It may not distribute the 
amount of this reserve as dividend.93 The same principle applies where a company 
has an interest in its own shares being held on its behalf by a nominee.94 
_________________________________________________________________ 
86   CA 1985 s 132; CA 2006 s 612. See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 232. 
87   The excess value would otherwise have had to be reflected in the share premium account as 
was held in Shearer v Bercain Ltd [1980] 3 All ER 295. See also Palmer’s Company Law 4.009.1. 
Similar relief for pooling of assets mergers introduced in the previous New Zealand Companies 
Act 1955 is criticised by Ross “Creditors’ Protection” 368 as flying in the face of accounting 
convention and conflicting with the protection of creditors. 
88   CA 2006 s 614. 
89   CA 1985 s 170; CA 2006 s 733. 
90   CA 1985 s 170(4); CA 2006 s 733(6). 
91   Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 249; CA 1985 s 170 (4); CA 2006 s 733(5).  
92   CA 1985 s 148(4); CA 2006 s 669(1). 
93   See paragraph 5.2 below. 
94  CA 1985 s 148(4); CA 2006 s 669(1). 
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2.5 The variation of share capital 
The ways in which a company may alter its share capital are set out in the Act.95 CA 
2006 also contains a list of adjustments or reorganisations of share capital that are 
possible under other provisions of the Act and preserves the right of a company to 
use these.96 In most cases, these require replacement of the share capital by some 
or other reserve or alternatively, court approval. 
2.5.1 Increase and decrease 
A company limited by shares may, if authorised by its articles, increase its share 
capital by new shares of such amount as it thinks expedient.97 The increase must be 
authorised by the company in general meeting.98 An ordinary resolution will suffice 
unless the articles prescribe a special or extraordinary resolution.99 The Registrar 
must receive notification within fifteen days of the resolution authorising the 
increase.100 
A company authorised to do so in its articles may cancel shares that, at the 
time of passing of the resolution, have not been taken or agreed to be taken by any 
person. 101  This is not a reduction of issued capital and is not subject to the 
restrictions applicable to the reduction of issued capital.102 CA 2006 does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
95   CA 1985 s 121; CA 2006 s 617. 
96   CA 2006 s 617(5). These are a purchase of own shares, redemption of shares, forfeiture or 
surrender of shares, cancellation of shares under s 662 and an alteration under a compromise 
or arrangement sanctioned by the court. 
97   CA 1985 s 121; CA 2006 s 549 – 551 allows an increase through the allotment of further shares, 
but the notion of authorised capital is abolished. The formalities for allotment set out in CA 2006 
ss 29 – 30 have to be complied with.  
98  CA 1985 s 121(4). 
99  Gore-Browne on Companies 26[2]. Regarding the position under CA 2006, see s 29. 
100  CA 1985 s 123(1); CA 2006 s 551(9) read with s 30. 
101  CA 1985 s 121(5); CA 2006 s 641(4). See also CA 1985 s 121(2)(e). In Re Swindon Town 
Football Company Ltd [1990] BCLC 467 the court held that ‘agreed to be taken’ referred to a 
binding contract between the subscriber and the company. As a result, unissued shares could 
be cancelled despite the fact that someone had offered to subscribe for them. See also Fox 
“Right to Cancel” 73 – 74.  
102  In order to distinguish it from a reduction of issued capital, Palmer’s Company Law 4.209 refers 
to such a cancellation of unissued shares as a diminution of capital. 
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provide for the cancellation of unissued shares, in view of the abolition of authorised 
capital. 
2.5.2 Consolidation and subdivision 
Under CA 1985 a company so authorised by its articles may consolidate and divide 
all or any of its share capital into shares of larger amounts than its existing shares, 
subdivide its shares, convert all or any of its paid-up shares into stock, and 
subsequently reconvert such stock into paid-up shares of any denomination.103 The 
company in general meeting must exercise this power.104 The memorandum must 
be amended accordingly.105 The Registrar must be notified of any consolidation, 
conversion or reconversion.106 Under CA 2006, it is no longer possible to convert 
shares into stock, 107  although the other kinds of variations, including the 
reconversion of existing stock into shares, remain possible.108 
Although these variations pertain to the issued capital of a company, they 
affect only the number of shares and their nominal value and do not amount to an 
increase or diminution of the amount of issued capital. It is expressly provided that 
the ratio of paid-up to unpaid amounts may not be changed by subdivision or 
consolidation.109  
A company may also redenominate its shares under CA 2006 by converting 
their nominal value into another currency.110 
_________________________________________________________________ 
103  CA 1985 s 121; CA 2006 s 617. 
104  CA 1985 s 121(4), or in the case of a private company, by written resolution under s 381A. CA 
2006 s 618(3) requires a resolution of members. 
105  CA 1985 s 20. Under CA 2006 the memorandum cannot be amended but any change must be 
notified to the Registrar, see s 555, s 619, s 621, s 625.  
106  CA 1985 s 122. Apparently the Registrar need not be notified of subdivisions. This appears to be 
an oversight. Upon a subdivision the amount paid on the original shares must be equally 
apportioned to the shares of reduced amount, s 121(3). CA 2006 requires a statement of capital 
within 1 month of consolidation or subdivision (s 619) and of reconversion (s 621). See Mayson, 
French & Ryan on Company Law 6.1.12.3 
107  CA 2006 s 540(2), see also Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 6.1.12.3 
108  See CA 2006 s 617 and, with regard to stock, s 540(2) read with s 620. 
109  CA 1985 s 121 (3); CA 2006 s 618(2). 
110  CA 2006 s 617(4) read with s 622(1). Limitations apply with regard to the exchange rate, see s 
622(3). The articles could prohibit or restrict redenomination, s 622(7). Further formalities 
Continued 
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Although South African legislation provides that a company may convert 
shares of one class into shares of another class,111 the equivalent English provision 
does not expressly allow such a conversion.112 However, this result can be achieved 
by a variation of class rights and, if necessary, a consolidation of classes of 
shares.113 
2.6 Formal reduction of capital 
Both CA 1985 and CA 2006 provide for a formal reduction of capital confirmed by 
the court. 114  The procedure applies to companies limited by shares and to 
guarantee companies having a share capital. It applies to public as well as private 
companies. Under CA 2006, private companies can also reduce their share capital 
without court confirmation.115 
A company can also reduce its issued capital by the redemption or repurchase 
of shares under separate provisions,116 but under the present heading I deal only 
with formal reductions of capital.  
A reduction is subject to the articles of association117 and must be approved by 
special resolution.118 Although a reduction can be made ‘in any way’,119 CA 1985 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
include a resolution by the company (s 622(1)), recalculation of the par value of the shares (s 
623) and disclosure in a statement of capital (s 627). The rights or obligations of members under 
the constitution are not affected (s 624). Provision is made for the reduction of capital to 
accommodate a suitable nominal value in the other currency, s 626. In such a case a 
redenomination reserve is required, s 628(3), In the case of a public company, public disclosure 
is required, s 1077 read with s 1078(3). See also Mayson, French & Ryan on Company Law 
6.1.12.5. 
111  See s 75(1)(i) of the South African Companies Act and Chapter 5 paragraph 2.5.  
112  CA 1985 s 121 provides only for consolidation or subdivision, and for conversion and 
reconversion between shares and stock. 
113  See Palmer’s Company Law 6.029. 
114  CA 1985 ss 135 – 141. CA 2006 s 641(1). See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 242ff. This 
is discussed in paragraph 2.6.1 below. 
115  CA 2006 ss 642 – 644. This procedure is discussed in paragraph 2.6.2 below. 
116  These are discussed in paragraphs 6 and 6.8 below. CA 1985 s 160(4); CA 2006 617(5) provide 
that redemptions and repurchases are not regarded as reductions of capital for purposes of the 
formal reduction of capital provisions. 
117  CA 1985 s 135(1); CA 2006 s 641(6). 
118  CA 1985 s 135(1); CA 2006 s 641(1)(b).  
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sets out three distinct examples, namely: 
• reducing or extinguishing the amount of any uncalled liability on shares120 
• cancelling any paid up share capital which is lost or unrepresented by 
available assets, 121  either with or without extinguishing or reducing 
liability on any of its shares122 
• paying off any paid up share capital in excess of the company’s needs, 
either with or without extinguishing or reducing liability on any of its 
shares. 
 
Under CA 1985 the memorandum may have to be amended to reduce the amount of 
authorised share capital and shares.123 An amendment is not required where the 
share premium account or capital redemption reserve fund is reduced. 124 
Companies often use the reduction procedure to reduce their share premium 
accounts.125 Under CA 2006, a statement of capital must be filed in which the effect 
of the reduction on share capital is set out.126 
Where a reduction of capital will amount to a variation of class rights, the 
company must also comply with the procedure applicable to such variations.127 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
119  CA 1985 s 135(1); CA 2006 s 641(3). See Poole v National Bank of China Ltd [1907] AC 229 HL. 
See also Re Elders IXL Ltd (1984) 9 ACLR 280 SC (SA) where shares held by subsidiaries were 
cancelled without compensation. 
120  CA 1985 s 135(2)(a). Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 234 points out that partly paid shares 
are seldom used and consequently uncalled capital seldom exists. Even uncalled capital which 
can only be called up in the event of a liquidation, may be reduced. CA 2006 s 641(4)(a) refers to 
‘unpaid amounts’. 
121  CA 1985 s 135(2)b); CA 2006 s 641(4)(b)(i). Strictly speaking share capital cannot be ‘lost’ but 
the courts regard it as lost if the value of the company’s net assets fall below the value of the 
share capital including statutory reserves, see Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 242.  
122  CA 1985 s 135(2)(c); CA 2006 s 641(4)(b(ii).  
123  CA 1985 s 135(2). This is not required under CA 2006. 
124  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 243. 
125  Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 229 – 230. See Re Ratners Group plc (1988) 4 BCC 293; Re 
Thorn EMI plc (1988) 4 BCC 698. See also Re Vavasseur Pacific Ltd [1977] 1 NSWLR 86 SC 
(NSW). As regards the limitations on the use of the share premium account, see paragraph 2.4 
above. 
126  CA 2006 s 644(2). The statement of capital is registered together with the reduction order, s 
649. 
127  CA 1985 s 125; CA 2006 s 630. 
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2.6.1 Capital reduction subject to court confirmation 
Except in the case of the new reduction procedure available to private companies, 
application should be made for confirmation by the court once the special resolution 
has been passed.128 The court has to take into account the interests of creditors and 
of shareholders. The rights of creditors are expressly set out in the statutory 
provisions and will be discussed first. 129  Shareholder protection is left to the 
discretion of the courts. I discuss creditor rights first.  
Where existing creditors of the company are affected, all creditors have to be 
notified130 and given the opportunity to object against the proposed reduction, 
unless a sum of money sufficient to pay all creditors has been set aside or 
guaranteed by a bank or insurance company.131 The court can also order the 
company to follow the notification and objection procedure in any case where any 
liability in respect of unpaid share capital is reduced or when any paid up capital will 
be paid to any shareholder.132 
The court can confirm the reduction if it is satisfied that every existing creditor 
has consented or that her debt has been discharged or secured. The court may also 
impose other terms and conditions.133 The court has the power to dispense with the 
creditor protection provisions if it is proper to do so in the special circumstances of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
128  CA 1985 s 136; CA 2006 s 645. According to Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 243 – 244 the 
purpose of requiring court confirmation is to ensure strict compliance with the formalities and fair 
treatment of shareholders. The court must take into account three principles: fair treatment of 
shareholders, proper disclosure and explanation to shareholders so that they could exercise an 
informed judgment on the proposals and lastly, safeguards to creditors.  
129  See also Gore-Browne on Companies 64[18] on the creditor protection measures. 
130  See CA 1985 s 136(4); CA 2006 s 646 regarding compilation of the list of creditors. 
131  CA 1985 s136(3) – (5); CA 2006 s 646(1) – (2).  
132  CA 1985 s 136; CA 2006 s 646. 
133  CA 1985 s 137(1); CA 2006 s 648(3). CA 1985 s 137(2) provides that the court may order the 
company to add the words “and reduced” at the end of its name, but Gower & Davies’ Company 
Law 7 ed 243 note 12 explains that this is seldom resorted to in practice. However, CA 2006 
retains this in s 648(4). In the event of a reduction based on an alleged ‘loss’ of capital, the 
conditions that may be imposed include the creation of a non-distributable reduction reserve, as 
was done in Re Jupiter House Investments Ltd [1985] 1 WLR 975 because the loss of capital 
was likely to be temporary. However, in Re Grosvenor Press plc [1985] 1 WLR 980 the court 
declined to order such a reserve in similar circumstances. See also Gore-Browne on 
Companies 26[9]. 
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the case.134  
A creditor who was unaware of the reduction and who is subsequently not paid 
when the company goes into insolvent liquidation may apply to the court to hold 
liable members who benefited from the reduction.135  
The protection of shareholders in a capital reduction has enjoyed considerable 
attention by the courts. The basic points of departure are that the reduction must be 
fair and equitable between classes, must affect all shares of the same class in a 
similar manner, and that shareholders should be informed properly to enable them 
to make an informed decision.136 
In taking into account the rights of different classes of shareholders, their 
relative rights to a return of capital on winding-up are of prime importance.137 The 
reduction should simulate a result that gives effect to these rights, which means that 
a return of excess capital should give preference to shares with a priority to the 
return of capital.138 When capital has been lost, the reduction should usually affect 
the ordinary shares.139  
Shareholders of the same class are entitled to equitable treatment,140 although 
disproportionate reductions are allowed in exceptional circumstances.141 Proper 
_________________________________________________________________ 
134  CA 1985 s 136(6); CA 2006 s 645(3). The Company Law Review proposed that it should be 
made clear that the court’s power to dispense with the creditor protection provisions would 
depend on the availability of sufficient assets, see The Strategic Framework URN 99/654 
(February 1999) par 5.4.5. The draft clause proposed by the Company Law Review states that 
the court can confirm the reduction even though creditors have not consented to it or had their 
claims secured where the court thinks these safeguards are ‘unnecessary in view of the assets 
the company would have after the reduction’, see draft clause 61(3)(c) in the draft Companies 
Bill accompanying the White Paper Modernising Company Law Cm 5553-I and II (July 2002). 
See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 244. However, CA 2006 s 645(3) is a simple 
re-enactment of CA 1985 s 136(6).  
135  CA 1985 s 140; CA 2006 s 653.  
136  See Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 230. 
137  See Bannatyne v Direct Spanish Telegraph Co (1887) 34 Ch D 287 (CA) at 300. 
138  See House of Fraser plc v ACGE Investments [1987] AC 387 (HL). 
139  Poole v National Bank of China Ltd [1907] AC 229 (HL). 
140  Re Jupiter House Investments Ltd [1985] WLR 975 at 978; Re Grosvenor Press plc [1985] 
BCLC 286 at 290 – 291; Re Ratners Group plc (1988) 4 BCC 293 at 295; Re Thorn EMI plc 
(1988) 4 BCC 698 at 701. 
141  Re Robert Stephen Holdings Ltd [1968] WLR 1 522; Re Holders Investment Trust Ltd [1971] 1 
WLR 583. However, Telfer & Mitchell “Reductions of Capital” 249 argue that these judgments 
Continued 
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disclosure is also extremely important, as the right to reduce capital is dependent on 
the approval of shareholders by special resolution.142  
The reduction becomes effective from the date of registration of the confirming 
order. 143  Notice of the capital reduction must be published in the prescribed 
manner.144 
When the share capital of a public company is reduced to an amount below the 
minimum allotted capital, the reduction order will not be registered until the company 
has reregistered as a private company, or unless the court has directed 
otherwise.145  
These provisions bear some similarity to the old capital reduction procedure in 
the South African Companies Act, which was abolished when the new capital rules 
came into force.146 However, it is not possible to reduce share capital without court 
intervention, as was possible under the now repealed section 84 of the South 
African Companies Act. 
2.6.2 Alternative reduction procedure for private companies 
One of the points of criticism of the Company Law Review was that the requirement 
of court confirmation in all cases was too onerous and overprotected creditors to the 
disadvantage of the company. Upon a reduction, creditors can effectively force the 
company to settle or secure its debts, placing them in a better position than they 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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are based on an incorrect interpretation of earlier English cases and that a court cannot sanction 
a reduction of capital in violation of class consent provisions in the articles (257).  
142 Re Ransomes plc [1999] 1 BCLC 775 and [1999] 2 BCLC 591 (CA) at 599 – 600. 
143  CA 1985 s 138; CA 2006 s 649(3)(b). The statement of capital is registered simultaneously.  
144  CA 1985 s 138; CA 2006 s 649(4). 
145  CA 1985 s 139; CA 2006 s 650. Section 651 of CA 2006 provides for an expedited 
re-registration as a private company which dispenses with the requirement of a special 
resolution and is incorporated in the court order. As to when the court would allow a reduction 
despite the fact that the capital of a public company will fall below the minimum, it appears that 
this would be possible if the deficiency is merely temporary. See Re Anglo-American Insurance 
Co Ltd [1989] BCLC 672; Re Anglo-American Insurance Co Ltd [1991] BCLC 564 where the 
capital was to be increased immediately afterwards.  
146  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.1.  
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were before the reduction.147 
The Company Law Review proposed an alternative capital reduction 
procedure. While the existing reduction subject to confirmation by the court would 
be retained because of the certainty it provides to the company, the alternative 
procedure would require a special resolution and a solvency statement by the 
directors.148 At the same time, the Company Law Review proposed that private 
companies should no longer be able to repurchase or redeem their shares out of 
capital, as they would instead be able to achieve a similar result by reducing their 
share capital under the new provision.149 Section 642 of CA 2006 now provides for 
the ‘reduction of share capital supported by solvency statement’. This procedure is 
available to private companies only.150 However, CA 2006 has retained share 
repurchases out of capital.151  
The solvency statement must state that the company will be able to pay its 
debts immediately after making payment, and will be able to continue carrying on 
business as a going concern in the year following payment.152 
The content, form and timing of the solvency statement must comply with 
minimum standards.153 Each director must agree to the statement.154 Directors 
commit an offence if they sign such a statement without having reasonable grounds 
_________________________________________________________________ 
147  The Strategic Framework URN 99/654 (February 1999) par 5.4.5. 
148  The Strategic Framework URN 99/654 (February 1999) par 5.4.5.  
149  They will reduce capital and return the money to shareholders and be able to repurchase further 
shares out of surplus (which will have been increased by the fact that the capital will have been 
reduced.  
150  CA2006 s 642(1) read with s 641(1)(a). The Company Law Review considered making this 
option available to public companies too, subject to notification of creditors and the preservation 
of their right, entrenched through the Second Company Law Directive, to object to the court, see 
draft clause 56. This idea did not materialise in CA 2006.  
151  CA 2006 s 692 allows private companies to repurchase and redeem their shares out of capital in 
accordance with ss 709 – 723. See paragraph 6.2.2 below. 
152  CA 2006 s 643(1). 
153  CA 2006 s 643. The content of the solvency statement is discussed in paragraph 6.2.2 below. 
154  CA 2006 s 643(1) introductory sentence. See also Re In A Flap Envelope Co Ltd [2004] 1 BCLC 
64, dealing with the substantially similar requirement under CA 1985 s 155 for financial 
assistance. In this matter it was held that a statement did not comply with the requirements 
because one of the directors had formally resigned from office in order to avoid having to sign it.  
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for the opinion expressed in it.155 As the reduction will be void if the requirements 
have not been met, the shareholders will have to return any payments they 
received.156  
It can be expected that the principles on fair treatment of shareholders as 
formulated by the courts will have to be adhered to.157 
In view of the similar effect of the two procedures, also evidenced by the 
Company Law Review’s initial intention to replace the one with the other, this 
procedure must be compared to that pertaining to share repurchases out of capital. 
It is best to do this after the discussion of the repurchase of shares out of capital.158  
2.7 Serious loss of capital 
In conformity with the Second Company Law Directive,159 a public company must 
hold an extraordinary general meeting if its net assets are worth half or less than half 
of the amount of its called-up share capital.160 The heading of the section refers to a 
‘serious loss of capital’. The directors must convene such a meeting within 28 days 
of any director having become aware of the situation.161 The meeting must take 
place within 56 days of the day on which a director first became aware of the 
situation.162 The purpose of the meeting is to consider which steps, if any, should be 
taken to deal with the state of affairs.163 A director who knowingly and willfully 
authorises a failure to convene a meeting or the continuation of such a failure is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
155  CA 2006 s 643(4).  
156  See Palmer’s Annotated Guide 507. 
157  See paragraph 2.6.1 above. 
158  See paragraph 6.3.1.5 below. 
159  Article 17. 
160  CA 1985 s 142; CA 2006 s 656. 
161  CA 1985 s 142(1); CA 2006 s 656(2). 
162  CA 1985 s 142(1); CA 2005 s 656(3). 
163  CA 1985 s 142(1); CA 2006 s 656(1). CA 1985 s 142(3) expressly states that only matters 
relating to the situation may be considered at the meeting. CA 2006 s 656(6) states that the 
provision does not allow the consideration at the meeting of matters that may not otherwise 
have been considered at the meeting. 
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liable to a fine.164 
The term ‘called-up capital’ used in this provision refers to all amounts paid up 
on shares, including amounts paid in advance of calls or instalments, as well as all 
amounts that have been called up, regardless of whether or not payment has been 
received, as well as all amounts that are payable under installments.165 Called-up 
capital does not include amounts paid or payable in respect of premiums.   
This provision confirms by implication that the share capital of a company need 
not be represented by assets and that it can be lost in the course of trade. It also 
shows that a company need not take any positive steps to end the situation, for 
example through a formal reduction of capital or a winding up. The insistence on a 
meeting rather than on any positive steps to correct the discrepancy between assets 
and capital has been criticised.166 The provision is apparently not important in 
practice because other considerations will usually force the directors to take 
appropriate steps at an earlier stage.167 
However, the idea that the share capital of a public company must be 
represented by assets, or more accurately, that the net assets must equal or exceed 
the called-up share capital plus undistributable reserves finds expression in two 
other provisions of the Act. First, it is a prerequisite for the conversion of a private 
company into a public company that the value of its assets must be at least equal to 
its called-up capital plus reserves.168  Secondly, it is part of the financial limitations 
on distributions by public companies.169 
_________________________________________________________________ 
164  CA 1985 s 142(2); CA 2006 s 656 (4) – (5). 
165  See Palmer’s Company Law 4.005; CA 2006 s 547. 
166  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 230. 
167  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 230. 
168  CA 1985 s 43(3)(b); CA 2006 s 92(1)(c). See Palmer’s Company Law 2.208; Mayson, French & 
Ryan on Company Law 6.6.2. 
169  CA 1985 s 264(1)(a); CA 2006 s 831. The financial limitations for distributions are discussed in 
paragraph 5.2 below. 
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3 CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
3.1 Size of the capital contribution 
The minimum consideration must be at least equal to the par value of a share. The 
no discount rule was established in Ooregum Gold Mining Co v Roper170 and is 
confirmed by legislation,171  which in addition expressly imposes liability on an 
allottee to pay the amount of any discount with interest.172 Subsequent holders of 
the shares issued at a discount are liable jointly and severally unless they acquired 
them for value and had no knowledge of the contravention.173 
The prohibition against discount on shares is fortified by a prohibition on the 
payment of any commission, discount or allowance out of share capital in 
consideration for subscribing or procuring subscriptions for shares.174 Underwriters’ 
commission is allowed, but limited to ten per cent of the issue price of the shares.175 
Underwriters’ commission may be provided for out of the company’s share premium 
account.176 
The position with regard to commissions is similar to the South African 
position.177 However, although the South African provision allowing the issue of 
shares subject to court confirmation178 is based on an English example,179 the 
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170   [1892] AC 125 HL. 
171  CA 1985 s 100; CA 2006 s 580(1).  
172  CA 1985 s 100; CA 2006 s 580(2). Directors are also liable for breach of their duty, see Hirsche 
v Sims [1894] AC 654 PC. See also Gore-Browne on Companies 24-3. 
173  CA 1985 s 112(1), (3); CA 2006 s 588(1) – (2). See CA 1985 s 113; CA 2006 s 589 for the power 
of the court to grant relief. See also Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 233 and 288 – 289. 
174  CA 1985 s 98(1); CA 2006 s 552(1). CA 1985 s 98(2); CA 2005 s 552(2) extends the prohibition 
to disguised payments made by methods such as increasing a contract sum due by the 
company in respect of goods or services acquired by it. 
175  CA 1985 s 97; CA 2006 s 553. A company’s articles can determine a lower percentage of 
commission. The articles of the company must allow the paying of such commission, see CA 
1985 s 97(2); CA 2006 s 553(2). 
176  CA 1985 s 130(2)(b); CA 2006 s 610(2). See also paragraph 2.4 above. 
177  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.6. 
178  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.1.1. 
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English exception was repealed because of the implementation of the Second 
Company Law Directive.180 
Although the Company Law Review undertook to reconsider instances where 
the requirements of the Second Company Law Directive had been extended to 
private companies,181 it seems that no proposals were made in this regard.182 This 
could be due to the fact that consideration was given to abolishing par value shares 
for private companies, 183  which would have avoided the discount problem 
altogether.184 
3.2 Form of capital contribution 
Consideration for shares of a private company can be paid up in money or money’s 
worth, including goodwill and know-how.185  However, a company may not agree in 
advance to accept non-cash consideration against future calls.186 When a private 
company accepts non-cash consideration, a copy of the contract or particulars of it 
must accompany the return of allotments.187 However, unless the inadequacy of the 
non-cash consideration appears ex facie the transaction, or the parties have acted 
in bad faith, the valuation placed upon the goods by the parties will be conclusive.188 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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179  A statutory exception to the no discount rule was first introduced as s 47 of the English 
Companies Act 1929 (19 & 20 Geo 5, c 23), see also the Company Law Amendment Committee 
Report Cmd 2567 (1925 – 1926) (Greene Committee) paragraph 19.  
180  See Schedule 4 of the Companies Act 1980 (c 22) which repealed s 57 of the Companies Act 
1948 (11 & 12 Geo 6, c 38). Article 8(1) of the Second Company Law Directive provides that 
public companies may not issue shares at a discount. 
181  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.4. 
182  See Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 (November 2000) par 7.4, 
where it is merely stated that the retention of par value shares implies that the current regulation 
of discounts and commissions should remain in place. 
183  See The Strategic Framework URN 99/654 (February 1999) pars 5.4.26 – 5.4.33 
184  An idea that was later abandoned, see Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 
00/1335 (November 2000) par 7.3.  
185  CA 1985 s 99(1); CA 2006 s 582(1). 
186  Re Wragg Ltd [1897] 1 Ch 796 CA at 829. See also Gore-Browne on Companies 24-5.  
187  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 235. 
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The position is similar to that which applies to private and public companies in South 
Africa.189 
‘Cash’ includes not only cash or a cheque but also an undertaking to pay cash 
in the future and the release of a liability of the company for a liquidated sum.190 
Under CA 2006 payment by any other means giving rise to a present or future 
entitlement (of the company or a person acting on the company’s behalf) to a 
payment or credit equivalent to payment, in cash also qualifies as cash 
consideration.191 The payment of cash to any person other than the company, or an 
undertaking so to pay, is non-cash consideration.192 
As required by the Second Company Law Directive193 public companies may 
not accept future services as consideration for shares in respect of either their 
nominal value or any premium.194   Any sort of undertaking that need not be 
performed within five years from the date of allotment is also unacceptable.195 
However, should a company nevertheless accept as consideration future services 
or a long-term undertaking, the allotment will be valid, and the holder of the shares 
will be liable to pay to the company the nominal value or such part of it as is shown to 
be paid up, plus the premium.196  
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188  Re Wragg [1897] 1 Ch 796 CA; Park Business Interiors Ltd v Park [1992] BCLC 1034. See 
Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 234 – 235 and Gore-Browne on Companies 24-4 – 24-5 
and cases referred to in note 8. See also Giugni “Consideration” 380 – 381 for a critical 
discussion of Re Wragg [1897] 1 Ch 796 CA. 
189  Except that in South Africa the full consideration has to be received by the company before 
issue of the shares. See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.4. 
190  CA 1985 s 738(2); CA 2006 s 583(3). According to Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 235 this 
facilitates debt for equity swaps. See System Controls plc v Munro Corporate plc [1990] BCLC 
659 on the meaning of non-cash consideration and the consequences of non-compliance with 
the formalities. 
191  CA 2006 s 583(3)(e). 
192  CA 1985 s 738(3); CA 2006 s 583(5). 
193  Article 7. 
194  CA 1985 s 99(2); CA 2006 s 585(1). 
195  CA 1985 s 102(1); CA 2006, s 587(1). However, because an undertaking to pay cash in the 
future is still regarded as payment in cash, it is not subject to a similar time limit. Gower & 
Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 235 – 236 points out that this increases the risk posed by insolvency 
of the allottee. See also Gore-Browne on Companies 24-2. 
196  CA 1985 s 99(3) and s 102(2); CA 2006 s 585(2) and s 587(2). See paragraph 3.4 below for a 
discussion of the consequences should performance not be rendered within the five year period.  
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In a public company, a subscriber to the memorandum must pay in cash for 
shares taken up in pursuance of the undertaking in the memorandum.197 However, 
this provision has little impact since in practice almost all public companies are 
formed through the conversion of private companies.198   
The paying up, from available funds of the company, of bonus shares or of 
amounts unpaid on shares, is expressly allowed as an exception to the rule that 
shares must be paid up.199 
3.3 The regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
The regulation of non-cash consideration depends on whether the company is a 
private or a public company. ‘Cash’ is defined as including an undertaking to pay 
cash in the future or the release of a liability of the company for a liquidated sum.200 
Stringent requirements apply to the valuation of non-cash consideration accepted 
by public companies, dictated by the Second Company Law Directive.201  The 
integrity of the initial share capital of public companies is further protected by an 
anti-avoidance measure in terms of which certain non-cash transactions shortly 
after formation of the company are subjected to scrutiny.202  
With regard to private companies accepting non-cash consideration for 
shares, CA 1985 requires that a copy of the contract or written particulars of it 
accompany the return of allotments.203 This disclosure requirement is similar to that 
which applies to allotment for non-cash consideration in South Africa.204 However, 
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197  CA 1985 s 106; CA 2006 s 584.  
198  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 236; Buckley Companies Act [106.6]. Even if a 
company is incorporated as a public company this requirement is easy to meet because the 
requirement will be satisfied provided the subscribers agree to take up one share each. 
199  CA 1985 s 99(4); CA 2006 s 582(2). 
200  CA 1985 s 738(2); CA 2006 s 583(3). 
201  Article 10.  
202  CA 1985 s 104; CA 2006 s 598. 
203  CA 1985 s 88(2). According to Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 235 the provision is more 
for the benefit of the tax authorities than for shareholders and creditors. 
204  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.3. 
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CA 2006 does away with this requirement.205 
In the case of a public company, valuation by an independent valuator is 
required in addition to disclosure of particulars of the contract.206 The valuation 
requirement applies regardless of whether the shares are fully or partly paid up. It 
does not matter whether the non-cash consideration is given in respect of the par 
value of the share or in respect of the premium. An independent valuator must be a 
person who qualifies to be the auditor of the company.207 The valuation must be 
made during the six months immediately preceding the allotment208 and a copy of 
the report must be sent to the proposed allottee.209 The valuator must confirm that 
the consideration is equal in value to the nominal value that will be reflected as paid 
up, plus the full amount of any premium.210 A copy of the report must be lodged with 
the Registrar of Companies for registration.211 If the allottee has not received a copy 
of the valuation certificate or if there has been another contravention of the 
provisions that the allottee was or should have been aware of, she becomes liable to 
pay the consideration in cash, with interest.212 However, the court has the power to 
grant relief for non-compliance with these requirements.213 
_________________________________________________________________ 
205  CA 2006 s 555, which is the successor to CA 1985 s 88, requires a return of allotments but does 
not mention a copy of a contract for non-cash consideration.   
206  CA 1985 s 103; CA 2006 s 593. See also Gore-Browne on Companies 24-3. 
207  CA 1985 s 108(1); CA 2006 ss 1150 – 1153. 
208  CA 1985 s 103(1)(b); CA 2006 s 593(1)(b). This provision applies to the initial allotment only. If 
at a later stage non-cash consideration is agreed on in respect of a call made, no valuation is 
apparently required. 
209  CA 1985 s 103(1)(c); CA 2006 593(1)(c). 
210  CA 1985 s 108(6); CA 2006 596(3). The report must state the nominal value of the shares to be 
wholly or partly paid for by the non-cash consideration, the amount of the premium payable, the 
description of the consideration and of the part of it valued by the valuator personally, the extent 
to which the nominal value and any premium will be treated as paid up on allotment by the 
non-cash consideration and in cash. The report must also state that the method of valuation was 
reasonable in the circumstances, that there has been no material change in the value of the 
consideration since valuation and lastly that the non-cash consideration together with any cash 
consideration is equal in value to the nominal value and premium treated as paid up. It is not 
required that the value of the consideration should be stated, see Mayson, French & Ryan on 
Company Law 6.5.4. 
211  CA 1985 s 111(1); CA 2006 s 597(1) – (2). 
212  CA 1985 s 103(6); CA 593(3). See Re Bradford Investments plc (No 2) [1991] BCLC 688. 
213  CA 1985 s 113; CA 2006 s 606. See Re Ossory Estates plc [1988] BCLC 213 where the court 
granted relief under CA 113(3) for non-compliance with the valuation procedure on the basis 
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No valuation is required in respect of bonus issues.214 Exceptions also apply in 
relation to takeovers, mergers and arrangements.215  
In public companies, creditors and shareholders also enjoy protection with 
regard to certain non-cash transactions during the ‘initial period’.216 The initial period 
is the two years from the date on which the company is first allowed to trade. The 
provision targets transactions that may adversely affect the financial position of the 
company, including the evasion of the valuation requirements for non-cash 
allotments through a splitting of transactions.217 It applies when a company enters 
into a transaction in terms of which the subscriber (or member) will transfer to it a 
non-cash asset and the price payable by the company, in cash or kind, is equal to at 
least ten per cent of the company’s nominal issued capital at the time of the 
transaction. An independent valuator must value the non-cash consideration to be 
received by the company as well as any non-cash consideration to be given by it.218 
The report must be made within the six months immediately preceding the 
agreement. The terms of the agreement also have to be approved by ordinary 
resolution.219 All the members and the other party must receive a copy of the 
report.220 A copy of the resolution and the valuer’s report must be lodged with the 
registrar.221 
Should these requirements not be met, the agreement will be void and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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that the company had indeed received money’s worth. This judgment is noted by Birds 
“Valuation” 67 – 68. 
214  CA 1985 s 103(2); CA 2006 s 593(2). A bonus or capitalisation issue is a way of converting 
reserves into capital and the amount applied is not regarded as consideration. 
215  CA 1985 s 103(3) – (5); CA 2006 s 593(4).  
216  The term ‘initial period’ is defined in CA 1985 s 104(2); CA 2006 s 598(2).  
217  CA 1985 s 104; CA 2006 s 598. This provision is necessary in order to comply with article 11 of 
the Second Company Law Directive. In terms of CA 1985 s 104(3); CA 2006 s 603 this 
procedure is also applicable to transactions between private companies converted to public 
companies and their members as at date of conversion.  
218  CA 1985 s 109; CA 2006 s 599.  
219  CA 1985 s 104(4); CA 2006 s 601. 
220 CA 1985 s 104(4)d); CA 2006 s 599(1)(c). 
221  CA 1985 s 111(2); CA 2006 s 602. 
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company will be able to recover any consideration given by it.222 If shares were to be 
allotted under the agreement, the allotment will be valid but the allottee will be 
personally liable for the consideration plus interest.223 
3.4 Timing of capital contribution 
Shares issued by private companies need not be paid up to any extent at the time of 
allotment. The full consideration can be made payable in the future. A public 
company, however, may not allot a share until at least one-quarter of its nominal 
value as well as the whole of any premium has been paid up.224 
I explained that a public company may accept as consideration undertakings 
to be performed within five years.225 If performance has not taken place within that 
time, payment in cash becomes due immediately.226 
When shares are not fully paid upon being issued, the shareholder is liable to 
pay the outstanding consideration in accordance with the articles of association.227 
The voting, dividend and other rights attaching to shares that are not fully paid will 
be in accordance with the articles of association.228 Should a call remain unpaid, the 
shares may be forfeited to the company if the articles so provide.229  
It is possible under CA 1985 for a limited company to adopt a special resolution 
to the effect that it will not call up its uncalled capital except in a winding up.230 This 
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222 CA 1985 s 105(2); CA 2006 s 604(2). 
223  CA 1985 s 105(3); CA 2006 s 604(3). 
224  CA 1985 s 101(1); CA 2006 s 586(1); (2). This rule is required by article 26 of the Second 
Company Law Directive. There is an exception with regard to employee share schemes, see CA 
1985 s 101(2); CA 586(2). See also Gore-Browne on Companies 3-1. 
225  See paragraph 3.2 above. 
226  CA 1985 s 102(5) – (6); CA 2006 s 587(4). 
227  See Palmer’s Company Law 6.202 for a discussion of common provisions in company articles. 
228  CA 1985 s 119; CA 2006 s 581(c). See Palmer’s Company Law 6.207 for a discussion of the 
model articles and the usual practice in this regard. 
229  The model articles under CA 1985 (Table A) articles 18 – 22 provide for the forfeiture of shares 
for non-payment of calls. Although the forfeiture of a shares is a reduction of capital, forfeiture 
for non-payment of calls is not regarded as an acquisition of own shares, CA 1985 s 143(3)(d); 
CA 2006 s 659(2)(c). See also Palmer’s Company Law 6.901. 
230  CA 1985 s 120. See also s 124 in respect of guarantee companies with share capital. 
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is referred to as long-term uncalled capital or reserve liability.231 However, the 
Company Law Review proposed the deletion of this provision as such capital has 
become obsolete.232 Accordingly, CA 2006 does not contain a similar provision, 
although it does provide for the extinguishing of liability in respect of shares, which 
constitutes a reduction of capital.233 
4 DISTRIBUTIONS 
The general principle in England is that share capital should be maintained unless 
the court confirms a reduction of capital. As a result, distributions may be made out 
of distributable profits only. However, various exceptions qualify this general 
principle. These exceptions were designed piecemeal and do not apply similarly to 
similar distributions. Moreover, public and private companies are subject to different 
regimes. 
The term ‘distribution’ is defined in two separate provisions with different 
functions.  However, under CA 2006 the second of these definitions will fall away, as 
I explain below. 
The first use of the concept ‘distribution’ is to indicate which payments may be 
made only out of distributable profits. For purposes of the general regulation of 
distributions, it means ‘every description of distribution of a company’s assets to its 
members, whether in cash or otherwise’.234 However, the issue of bonus shares, the 
redemption and repurchase of shares, the reduction of share capital by 
extinguishing or reducing unpaid consideration or by paying off paid up capital, and 
any distribution on winding-up are excluded. The term ‘distribution’ includes both 
dividends and any other payments to shareholders.235 This is similar to the definition 
of ‘payment’ in section 90 of the South African Companies Act that also excludes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
231  Palmer’s Company Law 4.005. 
232  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.16. 
233  CA 2006 s 641, see also paragraph 2.6 above. 
234  CA 1985 s 263(2); CA 2006 s 829. 
235  See Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd [1989] BCLC 626 where the sale of a company asset to 
another company controlled by a shareholder was regarded as a distribution to that shareholder. 
Also see Calnan “Corporate Gifts” 91 for a discussion of this judgment. 
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repurchases and redemptions.236 
The second use relates to the determination of the concept ‘permissible capital 
payment’. This concept is relevant when a private company repurchases or 
redeems its shares out of capital. Here CA 1985 extends the meaning of distribution 
to include payments for repurchases and redemptions out of distributable profits,237 
certain other payments pertaining to repurchase contracts, 238  and financial 
assistance given out of distributable profits.239 Although this definition appears to 
cover every kind of distribution, it is not a general definition identifying transactions 
subject to specific financial limitations. Its function is to limit the extent to which a 
private company may acquire its own shares out of capital.240 CA 2006 achieves the 
same result of including these other payments but, instead of extending the 
meaning of ‘distribution’ it refers to ‘other relevant payment lawfully made’ and then 
lists the three instances.241  
The approach to distributions in the wider sense remains fragmented. 
However, all distributions still comply with the capital maintenance doctrine because 
they are made either out of distributable profits or, if out of capital, accompanied by 
appropriate adjustments to share capital which are similar to capital reductions. 
5 DIVIDENDS AND OTHER PAYMENTS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
The common-law rule that dividends may not be paid out of capital which gradually 
came to mean that dividends could be paid out of ‘profits’ as determined under 
permissive standards 242  has to a large degree been superseded by statutory 
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236  See Chapter 5 paragraph 5.1. 
237  CA 1985 s 172(5)(b). 
238  CA 1985 s 172(5)(c).  
239  CA 1985 s 172(5)(a). 
240  See paragraph 6.2.2 below for a discussion of such acquisitions out of capital. 
241  CA 2006 s 712(3) – (4). 
242  See Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland (1883) 22 ChD 349 CA (356); Re Exchange 
Banking Co, Flitcroft’s Case 918820 21 ChD 591. See Chapter 1 paragraph 2 for a brief 
overview of the gradual erosion of the rule, based on the courts’ interpretation of ‘profits’. 
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rules.243 The 1980 Companies Act (c 22), implementing the Second Company Law 
Directive, first introduced these rules in England. Whilst it was not mandatory to 
tighten the rules for private companies, this was done simultaneously. 244  The 
statutory exposition of what constitutes permissible distributions has aligned the law 
with good commercial practice.245 
However, the more restrictive common-law rules still guard against the 
unlawful reduction of capital, usually through transactions that are not in the nature 
of ordinary dividends. 246 The common law is very relevant in the interpretation of 
the concept ‘distribution’, given that the statutory definition refers to every 
‘description of distribution’.247   
The statutory dispensation prohibits the making of distributions otherwise than 
out of ‘profits available for the purpose’ as determined by the Act.248 Distributable 
profits represent the excess of net assets over the company’s share capital and 
non-distributable reserves. 
With regard to the determination of distributable profits, public companies are 
subject to stricter requirements than private companies. The main substantive 
difference is the net assets restriction applicable to public companies which in effect 
requires it to take into account unrealised losses.249 
Special rules apply to investment companies, but I do not consider these in this 
thesis.250 
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243  These are set out in CA 1985 Part VII; CA 2006 Part 23. See Gore-Browne on Companies 25[1]. 
Section 281 clearly retains more restrictive common law rules. Gower & Davies’ Company Law 
7 ed 287 states that the Company Law Review has proposed to make the statutory rule 
exclusive, overriding the common law rule. However, CA 2006 s 851 expressly retains the 
common law (except in relation to the exceptions in s 845 and s 846 dealing with intra-group 
transactions). 
244  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 275. 
245  Gore-Browne on Companies 25[2]. 
246  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 279 – 280 and the discussion in paragraph 5.1 below.  
247  The definition is discussed in paragraph 5.1 below. 
248  CA 1985 s 263(1); CA 2006 s 830(1). See paragraph 5.2 below. 
249  CA 1985 s 264; CA 2006 s 831, discussed in paragraph 5.2 below. 
250  CA 1985 ss 265 – 266; CA 2006 ss 832 – 835, see Gore-Browne on Companies 25[2].  
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5.1 Kinds of payments regulated 
A distribution is defined251 as ‘every description of distribution of a company’s assets 
to its members whether in cash or otherwise’, but certain transactions are then 
excluded, either because they are not distributions in the normal sense of the word, 
or because they are regulated in other provisions. 
The exceptions are: 
• the issue of fully or partly paid bonus shares252 
• the redemption or purchase of any of the company’s own shares out of 
capital (including the proceeds of any fresh issue of shares) or out of 
unrealised profits253 
• the reduction of share capital by extinguishing or reducing the liability of 
any of the members on any of its shares in respect of share capital not 
paid up or by paying off paid up share capital254 
• the distribution of assets to members of the company on its 
winding-up.255 
There is a difference between CA 1985 and CA 2006 in the wording of the 
introductory part of the list of exceptions. 256  CA 1985 terms the exceptions 
‘distributions’, which may imply that they are regarded as distributions to begin with. 
Clearly, this is not the case with bonus shares, as shares are not assets in the hands 
of the company.257 CA 2006 is more accurate in this regard by merely providing that 
certain instances are not distributions for purposes of the relevant part of the Act.258  
The notion of a distribution clearly includes, but is wider than, the regular 
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251  CA 1985 s 263(2); CA 2006 s 829(1). 
252  CA 1985 s 263(2)(a); CA 2006 s 829(2)(a). 
253  CA 1985 s 263(2)(b); CA 2006 s 829(2)(c). 
254  CA 1982 s 263(2)(c); CA 2006 s 829(2)(b)(i) – (ii). 
255  CA 1985 s 263(2); CA 2006 s 829 (2)(d). 
256  CA 1985 s 263(2); CA 2006 s 829(2). 
257  The issue of bonus shares is a capitalisation of profits. 
258  Part 23, regulating distributions. 
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dividends declared and paid by the company.259 However, it is not clear to what 
degree a distribution is wider than a dividend. The courts are prepared to regard the 
disguised return of capital as a distribution. This is evidenced by the decision in 
Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd260 where a company that did not have distributable 
profits transferred an asset to another company, that was controlled by the same 
shareholder that controlled it, at an undervalue. The court held this to be an unlawful 
reduction of capital and had no problem ruling that a distribution was made to the 
controlling shareholder, despite the fact that the payment was not made directly to 
the shareholder, but to the other company. 
In similar vein, the payment of remuneration to directors who were also 
shareholders of the company can be regarded as a disguised distribution in specific 
circumstances.261 
However, there is uncertainty about the payment of interest on advance 
payments by shareholders in respect of partly paid shares. These are not expressly 
excluded and while one authority argues that the payment of interest on payments 
made by a shareholder in advance of calls on partly paid shares would be regarded 
as a distribution,262 another argues that such interest can be paid even out of 
capital.263 Although the payment of interest on payments made by shareholders in 
advance of calls can be regarded as payments to them in their capacity of creditors, 
and so is distinguishable from interest payments on certain shares under South 
African legislation, it is notable that there is similar uncertainty about the inclusion of 
interest payments under a comparable South African definition.264  
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259  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 279. 
260   [1989] BCLC 626. See also the discussion of the implications of this judgment in Calnan 
“Corporate Gifts”. 
261  See MacPherson v European Strategic Bureau [1999] 2 BCLC 203 (Ch D) and [2000] 2 BCLC 
683 (CA) at 702. In this case, however, the remuneration was held to be bona fide remuneration. 
In Re Halt Garage (1964) Ltd [1982] 3 All ER 1016 remuneration was held to be a disguised 
distribution, as no services had in fact been rendered. See also Barclays Bank plc v British and 
Commonwealth Holdings plc [1996] 1 BCLC 1 (CA) on the indirect return of capital. 
262  Gore-Browne on Companies 25[3]. 
263  Palmer’s Company Law 6.214.  
264  The definition of ‘payment’ in s 90 of the South African Companies Act. This issue is discussed 
in Chapter 5 paragraphs 5.1.1 and 5.7. 
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The difficulty lies in the meaning of the phrase ‘to its members’. It is not clear 
whether, apart from disguised returns of capital, the distribution must be made to a 
member in the capacity of member or whether the mere fact that a payment is made 
to a member, albeit in another capacity, like director or creditor, would qualify it as a 
distribution for purposes of the definition. 265  The words ‘every description of 
distribution’ support the second alternative.266   
The Company Law Review recommended that the words ‘or to others at the 
direction of the members’ should be inserted in the definition to deal with the 
problem of payments to someone other than the shareholder.267 It also proposed 
clarification that only payment to members in their capacity as members is 
included.268 In addition, the Company Law Review recommended that the statutory 
rule should be exclusive, overriding the common law rule.269 However, CA 2006 
expressly retains the common law.270 
The South African provision that refers to a ‘direct or indirect’ payment made 
‘by reason of shareholding’ addresses both the problems that arose in the Aveling 
Barford case.271  
While the exclusions to ‘distribution’ are similar to the South African definition 
of ‘payment’, the latter obviously does not exclude capital reductions, since these 
are no longer provided for in South Africa. However, liquidation distributions are not 
excluded under the South African provision and consideration should be given to the 
need for such exclusion.272 
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265  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 279. 
266  See Gore-Browne on Companies 25[3].  
267  Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 (November 2000) par 7.21. 
268  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.66; Modern 
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Capital Maintenance: Other Issues URN 00/880 
(June 2000) Part II pars 35 – 36. 
269  Company Formation and Capital Maintenance URN 99/1144 (October 1999) par 3.66; 
Company Law Review: Completing the Structure URN 00/1335 (November 2000) par 7.21; 
Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Capital Maintenance: Other Issues URN 
00/880 (June 2000) Part II pars 37 – 39.  
270  Section 851. 
271  Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd [1989] BCLC 626. See Chapter 5 paragraphs 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. 
272  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 4.3, 4.4 and 5.1.3. 
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5.2 Financial Restrictions  
Distributions may be made only out of ‘profits available for the purpose’.273 This rule 
applies to all companies, but the determination of the available amount depends on 
whether the company making the distribution is a public or private company or an 
investment company.274 Public companies in addition have to satisfy a net assets 
test as a further restriction on the amount that may be distributed.275 
5.2.1 Distributable profits 
 ‘Profits available for the purpose’ are defined as a company’s ‘accumulated realised 
profits, so far as not previously utilised by distribution or capitalisation, less its 
accumulated, realised losses, so far as not previously written off in a reduction or 
reorganisation of capital duly made’. 276  This means that distributions out of 
unrealised profits or out of current profits without making up losses incurred in 
previous years, 277  possible under the common law, are no longer allowed. 278 
Capitalisation issues and bonus shares may still be funded from unrealised 
profits.279 
The determination of profits available for distribution must be based on certain 
items reflected in the company’s ‘relevant accounts’.280 These items are: 
• profits, losses, assets and liabilities 
• certain provisions 
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273  CA 1985 s 263(1); CA 2006 s 830(1). See paragraph 5.2.1 below. 
274  The rules pertaining to investment companies are not considered here. See Gore-Browne on 
Companies 25[12] for a discussion. 
275  CA 1985 s 264; CA 2006 s 831. See paragraph 5.2.2 below. 
276  CA 1985 s 263(3); CA 2006 s 830(2).  
277  Dividends out of current profits are also known as ‘nimble dividends’, see Chapter 1 paragraph 
2. 
278  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 277. 
279  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 288.  
280  CA 1985 s 270(1) – (2); CA 2006 s 836(1). 
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• share capital and reserves, including undistributable reserves.281 
The ‘relevant accounts’ that must be used are in most instances the company’s last 
annual accounts.282 Exceptions exist in relation to companies that are in their first 
accounting period and in relation to companies that cannot validly make a 
distribution based on their last accounts.283  
A distribution will be lawful if it is justified by the items referred to above and the 
accounts have been properly prepared in accordance with the Act, or have been 
properly prepared subject only to matters not material for determining whether the 
distribution would be lawful.284 In particular, the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account, must present a true and fair view.285 If the directors knew or should have 
known about a serious defect in the accounts, the accounts will not satisfy these 
requirements and distributions by the company will be unlawful.286 The accounts 
must be audited287 and if the auditors have issued a qualified report, the auditors 
must state in writing whether the respect in which the report was qualified is material 
in determining whether the distribution would be lawful.288 The auditors may make 
this statement irrespective of whether distributions have been proposed at the time 
they make the statement.289 The statement must be laid before the general meeting. 
When a company wants to make successive distributions on the basis of the 
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281  CA 1985 s 270(2); CA 2006 s 836(1). The reserves for public companies also differ from those 
required for private companies, see paragraph 2.4 above. See Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 
206 – 208. 
282  CA 1985 s 270(3); CA 206 s 836(2). See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 281. 
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where a distribution cannot be made based on the last annual accounts. 
284  CA 1985 s 271(1) – (2); CA 2006 s 836(1), (4) read with s 837. 
285  CA 1985 s 271(2); CA 2006 ss 837 – 839. 
286  Re Cleveland Trust plc [1991] BCLC 424. 
287  CA 1985 s 271(3); CA 2006 ss 837(3) 839(5). This does not apply if the company is exempted 
from the audit requirement by s 249E(1)(c), (2)(c). 
288  CA 1985 s 271(3) – (4); CA 2006 s 837(4), s 839(6).  
289  CA 1985 s 271(5); CA 2006 s 837(5). 
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same relevant accounts,290 the distributions that have previously been made must 
be added back to the amount of the proposed distribution to determine whether it is 
permissible. Distributions have a wider meaning for this purpose. It includes 
payments made since the date of the accounts in respect of financial assistance for 
the acquisition of the company’s shares, or in respect of the purchase price for the 
acquisition of its own shares. However, it is unnecessary to take into account 
payments made for acquisitions otherwise than out of distributable profits or 
assistance payments that do not reduce the company’s net assets or increase its 
net liabilities.291 
The rules discussed above have replaced the rather lax common-law 
approach to the determination of profits and are generally regarded as an 
improvement on the common law.292 
5.2.2 The net assets restriction 
In order to give effect to article 15 of the Second Company Law Directive, public 
companies are subject an additional restriction on the distribution of their assets. A 
public company may make distributions only to the extent that the value of its net 
assets exceeds its share capital and undistributable reserves.293  
The assets have to be accounted for as set out in the Act.294 Undistributable 
reserves are the share premium account, the capital redemption reserve, the 
excess of unrealised profits over unrealised losses and any other reserve the 
company is prohibited from distributing.295 The inclusion of the reserve in respect of 
net unrealised profits merits further consideration. Although the unrealised profits 
and unrealised losses are already accounted for in the determination of net assets, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
290  For example, pay interim dividends without preparing interim accounts. 
291  CA 1985 s 274(2) – (3); CA 2006 s 840(2). Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 283 – 284. This 
provision bears some similarity to s 172(4) which requires distributions lawfully made to be 
deducted from a company’s distributable profits, see 4.2.2 above. 
292  See Leyte “Regime of Capital Maintenance” 87; Egginton “Distributable Profit” 3. 
293  CA 1985 s 264; CA 2006 s 831.  
294  CA 1985 s 275; CA 2006 s 836.  
295  CA 1985 s 264(3); CA 2006 s 831(4).  
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net assets must cover the net unrealised profit (the excess of unrealised profits over 
unrealised losses) again. The effect of this requirement is that the company’s profits 
must be sufficient to cover any unrealised losses.296 
5.2.3 Distributions in kind 
Distributions in kind are subject to relief in respect of unrealised profits. To the extent 
that the stated value of a non-cash asset297 being distributed represents or includes 
an unrealised profit in the relevant accounts, that profit will be treated as a realised 
profit for purposes of determining whether the distribution is lawful and whether that 
profit can be included in or transferred to the profit and loss account.298 This 
exception was inserted to facilitate de-mergers, but is not restricted to it.299  
In CA 2006 the transfer of a non-cash asset by a company is regarded as a 
distribution to the extent only that the book value, as opposed to the real value, of 
the asset exceeds the consideration given. A transfer at consideration equal to the 
book value of the asset is valued at zero.300  
5.3 Timing for the application of the financial restrictions 
The Act refers to the ‘making’ of distributions,301 which indicates that the financial 
restrictions apply at the time a distribution is executed rather than authorised.302 Yet 
distributions are based on the relevant accounts, which will reflect an earlier 
_________________________________________________________________ 
296  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 278; Buckley Companies Act [264.3]; Charlesworth’s 
Company Law 487. 
297  Defined in CA 1985 s 739; CA 2006 s 1163. 
298  CA 1985 s 276; CA 2006 s 846. 
299  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 284. 
300  CA 2006 s 845. This provision was inserted on the recommendation of the Company Law 
Review to address concerns of the business community that the decision in Aveling Barford Ltd 
v Perion Ltd [1989] BCLC 626 might affect innocent intra-group transfers because the residual 
common-law rules might operate in addition to the statutory rules on the determination of 
distributable profits, see Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Capital 
Maintenance: Other Issues URN 00/880 (June 2000) Part II pars 24 – 36. 
301  CA 1985 ss 263, 264 and 265; CA 2006 ss 830, 831 and 832 – 833. 
302  Gore-Browne on Companies 25[2]. 
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financial position.303 It appears that payments based on properly prepared accounts 
are valid under the Companies Act. However, if the company’s financial situation 
has changed so that the conditions are no longer met, payment could constitute a 
breach of directors’ fiduciary duties or an act of wrongful trading and could further 
amount to an unlawful return of capital at common law.304 The Company Law 
Review recommended a provision obliging the directors to deduct any subsequent 
losses they are aware of at the time of declaration of the dividend from the 
distributable profits as determined in the relevant accounts,305 but CA 2006 does not 
incorporate this proposal. 
5.4 Status of claim in respect of authorised but unpaid distributions 
In view of the prohibition on the making of a distribution in violation of the financial 
restrictions, it appears that a shareholder will not be able to insist on payment of a 
lawfully declared dividend when the company no longer has sufficient distributable 
profits.306 A shareholder will be able to obtain a prohibitory interdict against the 
payment of an unlawful distribution.307 
  
5.5 Authorisation 
As in South Africa, the power to declare dividends and the procedure to be followed 
depend on the articles of association. The usual provision of articles is that the 
directors recommend dividends and that the general meeting adopts an ordinary 
resolution confirming the recommendation. The general meeting may not declare a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
303  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 285 explains that the accounts will usually be about 7 
months old by the time the dividend is actually paid. 
304  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 285. 
305  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 286. Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: 
Capital Maintenance: Other Issues URN 00/880 (June 2000) par 38.  
306  Gore-Browne on Companies 25[2] especially note 1. The authors state that the wording of the 
provision clearly intends actual payment. 
307  Gore-Browne on Companies 25[14]. 
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dividend exceeding that recommended by the directors.308 As in South Africa, it 
seems that the articles of companies tend to regulate dividends, but not other 
distributions.309    
5.6 Liability for distributions made in contravention of the Act 
No statutory criminal liability is imposed for non-compliance with the restrictions on 
distributions. 310  Instead, members who received certain distributions made in 
contravention of the provisions may incur statutory civil liability.311 
When a distribution is made to a member who knew or had reasonable cause 
to believe that the distribution was made in contravention of the requirements of the 
Act, that member is liable to repay it or, if the distribution was otherwise than in cash, 
its value.312 The provision applies in respect of any distribution, other than financial 
assistance for the acquisition of a company’s own shares given in contravention of 
the Act313 or any payment made in respect of the redemption or purchase of shares 
in the company.314 Since the definition of distribution in this part of the Act315 already 
excludes financial assistance payments and payments for the redemption or 
purchase of shares, it is not clear why the liability provision also expressly mentions 
them as exceptions. 
The payment received in contravention of the distribution provisions is not void 
or unlawful, but can be recovered from members who received it and who knew or 
should have known that it was made in contravention of the requirements.316 
The statutory remedy does not exclude liability that may exist under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
308  See article 102 of Table A. See also Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 285.  
309  See Chapter 5 paragraph 5.5. 
310  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 286. 
311  CA 1985 s 277; CA 2006 s 847. 
312  CA 1985 s 277(1); CA 2006 s 847(2). 
313  CA 1985 s 151; CA 2006 ss 678 – 679. 
314  CA 1985 s 277(2); CA 2006 s 847(4).  
315  CA 1985 Part VIII; CA 2006 Part 23. 
316  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 286. 
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common law.317 At common law, shareholders who receive an unlawful distribution 
with actual knowledge of its unlawfulness are liable.318 There is uncertainty as to 
whether shareholders who received an unlawful distribution in good faith are 
liable.319 Although the statutory provision provides a wider basis of liability by 
covering constructive notice, the common law remedy is stronger, as the 
shareholders will be regarded as constructive trustees of the distribution.320  
The South African position regarding liability of members, which does not 
require knowledge or imputed knowledge of the unlawfulness of the distribution, is 
stricter than the common law and the statutory liability in England.321  
The Act imposes no statutory liability on directors who make unlawful 
distributions. This is similar to the position in South Africa in respect of unlawful 
‘payments’ by reason of shareholding.322 Directors may be liable at common law.323 
The common law liability of directors is not limited to the amount of the unlawful 
dividend, but is in respect of the loss suffered by the company because of the 
distribution.324 Directors are liable even if the company has remained solvent.325 It is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
317  CA 1985 s 277(2); CA 2006 s 847(3). See Gore-Browne on Companies 25[14]. 
318  Moxham v Grant [1900] 1 QB 85 CA. See also Precision Dippings Ltd v Precision Dippings 
Marketing Ltd [1986] Ch 447; Allied Carpets plc v Nethercott [2001] BCC 81 and Re Cleveland 
Trust plc [1991] BCLC 424. In these cases the shareholders were either also officers of the 
company or other companies in the same group. It is unlikely that shareholders in a public 
company will have the requisite knowledge, see Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 286. 
However, in It’s a Wrap (UK) Ltd v Gula [2006] 2 BCLC 634 (EWCA Civ) the court indicated that 
members are liable if they knew or could be taken to know that the company has no distributable 
profits, despite the fact that they did not know the legal rules on distributions. See also 
Gore-Browne on Companies 25[14].  
319  See Segenhoe Ltd v Atkins (1990) 1 ACSR 691 SC (NSW) at 708 where the Australian court 
stated that this matter had not been authoritatively determined. 
320  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 286. An important benefit of the constructive trustee 
basis would be that the assets are protected from the recipient’s creditors in insolvency. See 
Precision Dippings Ltd v Precision Dippings Marketing Ltd [1986] Ch 447; Allied Carpets plc v 
Nethercott [2001] BCC 81. 
321  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.2. 
322  See Chapter 5 paragraph 5.6. 
323  Re Exchange Banking Co (Flitcroft’s case)  (1882) 21 Ch D 519 CA. 
324  Re Exchange Banking Co (Flitcroft’s case) (1882) 21 Ch D 519 CA. Liability is also not limited to 
the unlawful part of the dividend either, see Bairstow v Queen’s Moat Houses plc [2001] 2 BCLC 
531 CA. See Target Holdings v Redferns [1996] AC 421 HL for authority that the loss should be 
measured at the time of the trial. In Inn Spirit Ltd v Burns [2002] 2 BCLC 780 Ch a dividend 
Continued 
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possible that the directors could claim an equitable contribution from shareholders 
who received the improper dividend with knowledge of the facts.326 
The directors may be relieved from liability by the court if they acted honestly 
and reasonably in paying the improper dividend.327 
6 SHARE REPURCHASES 
6.1 Power to acquire shares 
The common-law prohibition against a company acquiring its own shares328 has 
been codified.329 This section provides that a company limited by shares may not 
acquire its own shares ‘whether by way of purchase, subscription or otherwise’, 
except in one of the instances set out in the section.330 A number of exceptions are 
then set out.331 The first exception is that a company may acquire its fully paid up 
shares otherwise than for valuable consideration.332 A second exception is the 
repurchase and redemption of shares in accordance with the specific provisions that 
regulate repurchases and redemptions. 333  The remaining exceptions are the 
acquisition of shares in a capital reduction,334 purchase of shares under a court 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
which would have been lawful had the accounts been drawn up correctly, was nevertheless held 
to be unlawful: a clear indication of the importance of the statutory requirements on accounts. 
325  Bairstow v Queen’s Moat Houses plc [2001] 2 BCLC 531 CA at 545 – 548. See Gower & Davies’ 
Company Law 7 ed 287 fn 91 regarding the so-called ‘windfall’ objection. 
326  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 287 note 91. 
327  CA 1985 s 727; CA 2006 s 1157. 
328  Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409. 
329  CA 1985 s 143; CA 2006 s 658(1). 
330  CA 1985 s 143(1); CA 2006 s 658(1). 
331  CA 1985 s 143(3); CA 2006 s 659. 
332  CA s 143(3); CA 2006 s 659(1). 
333  CA 1985 s 143(3)(a); CA 2006 s 658(1). 
334  CA 1985 s 143(3)(b); CA 2006 s 659(2)(a). See paragraph 2.6 above regarding the reduction of 
capital. 
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order,335 and the forfeiture or surrender of shares in terms of the articles for failure to 
pay any sum due on shares.336  
The second exception, the redemption and repurchase of shares in 
accordance with the specific provisions in the Act, refers to share repurchases in the 
ordinary sense. Separate requirements apply to redemptions and repurchases that 
are made ‘not out of capital’337 and those that are made ‘out of share capital’.338  
Redemptions and repurchases are subject to the same financial restrictions. 
As regards repurchases and redemptions not out of capital, the financial restrictions 
are those that previously applied to the redemption of shares.339 Private companies 
may repurchase and redeem shares out of capital.340 Companies have an express 
power to repurchase rather than redeem their redeemable shares.341 
6.2 Financial restrictions for repurchases  
The redemption of redeemable preference shares has been possible in England 
since 1929.342 The requirements were similar to the requirements still found in the 
South African Companies Act today.343 The capital yardstick was maintained either 
by the issue of new shares to replace the redeemed shares, or by the creation of a 
capital redemption reserve. It first became possible for English companies to 
repurchase their shares in 1981, but, at least in respect of public companies, this 
amounted to nothing more than an extension of the redemption provisions to shares 
_________________________________________________________________ 
335  CA 1985 s 143(3)(c); CA 2006 s 659(2)(b). The court order may be given under CA 1985 s 5, s 
54 or Part XVII; CA 2006 s 98, s 721(6), s 759 or Part 30. These instances all involve relief to 
dissenting minorities, see Charlesworth’s Company Law 150. 
336  CA 1985 s 143(3)(d); CA 2006 s 659(2)(c). See paragraph 3.4 above. 
337  These are set out in CA 1985 ss 162 – 170; CA 2006 ss 687 (redemptions) and ss 692 – 708 
(repurchases). 
338  See CA 1985 ss 171 – 177; CA 2006 ss 709 – 723. Repurchases out of capital apply to private 
companies only. 
339  These restrictions are similar to the South African requirements for the redemption of shares, 
see Chapter 5 paragraph 6.8. 
340  See paragraph 6.2.2 below. 
341  CA 1985 s 162; CA 2006 s 690(1). 
342  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 248. 
343  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.8. 
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other than redeemable shares.344 
Private companies may repurchase or redeem shares out of capital in certain 
instances.345 However, the amount of capital that may be applied is restricted to the 
‘permissible capital payment’.346 The effect of this is that share capital may be used 
only for the deficit between the purchase price and the available distributable profits. 
Repurchases out of capital are subject to strict creditor protection provisions. The 
reduction in issued share capital may not exceed the amount of the capital payment 
and, to the extent that distributable profits are used, a capital redemption reserve 
must be created. 
These rules support the basic philosophy that creditors rely on the issued 
capital as stated in the memorandum of a company. 
6.2.1 Repurchases otherwise than out of capital 
The shares of public and private companies may be redeemed or repurchased out 
of distributable profits or out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares.347 Only fully 
paid shares may be repurchased or redeemed.348 A company may not repurchase 
shares if only redeemable shares will remain after the repurchase.349  
Repurchases not out of capital may be financed from two possible sources: 
distributable profits350 or the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares made for the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
344  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 250. 
345  CA 1985 ss 171 – 177; CA 2006 ss 709 – 723.  
346  Defined in CA 1985 s 172(5); CA 2006 s 710. 
347  CA 1985 s 160, s 162(1); CA 2006 s 687(2), s 692(2). While CA 1985 made the requirements for 
redemptions applicable to share repurchases through cross referencing, CA 2006 sets out all 
the requirements for redemptions and repurchases respectively. 
348  CA 1985 s 159(3); CA 2006 s 686(1), s 691(1). 
349  CA 1985 s 162(3); CA 2006 s 690(2). It is interesting to note that the equivalent provision for 
redeemable shares, CA 1985 s 159(2); CA 2006 s 684(4), only prohibits the ‘issue’ of 
redeemable shares at a time when there are no unredeemable shares in issue. One would 
perhaps expect a similar restriction in respect of the actual redemption of redeemable shares. 
However, the combined effect of these two provisions is that a redemption cannot result in a 
situation where no unredeemable shares will be left. On the redemption of redeemable shares, 
see paragraph 6.8 below. 
350  See CA 1985 s 181(a); CA 2006 s 736 for the meaning of distributable profits. 
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purpose of the repurchase.351 To the extent that distributable profits are used, an 
amount equal to the nominal value of the repurchased shares must be transferred to 
a capital redemption reserve.352 
Any premium payable on repurchase must generally be paid out of 
distributable profits.353 If the shares being purchased were issued at a premium, the 
premium payable on repurchase may be paid out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of 
shares.354 However, such proceeds may be used only up to an amount which is 
equal to the lesser of the amount that was transferred to the share premium account 
in respect of those shares or the current amount of the share premium account, 
including any premiums received on the new shares.355 When the premium on 
repurchase is paid out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares, the share premium 
account has to be reduced by the amount of such payments made out of the 
proceeds of the fresh issue.356 The practical effect of this provision is that the share 
premium account may be applied so that so much of the premium originally 
contributed by those shares as is still reflected in the share premium account, may 
be taken out to provide for the premium payable on repurchase. However, the share 
premium account may not be applied in this way, unless the proceeds of the new 
issue of shares are sufficient to cover the nominal value of the repurchased shares 
as well as any premium not covered by distributable profits.  
A comparison of section 130(2), which deals with the application of the share 
premium account, and the equivalent South African provision, section 76(3), may 
lead one to think that their application in respect of a premium payable on 
redemption or repurchase is identical. However, the effect of section 160(2) is that 
the reduction of the share premium account applied will also have to be offset by the 
proceeds of the new shares. In contrast, the South African section 98(1)(c) and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
351  CA 1985 s 162(2); CA 2006 s 687(2) (redemptions), s 692(2) (repurchases). 
352  CA 1985 s 170; CA 2006 s 733(2)(b). 
353  CA 1985 s 160(1)(b); CA 2006 s 687(3), s 692(2)(b). 
354  CA 1985 s 160(2); CA 2006 s 687(4), s 692(3). 
355  CA 1985 s 160(2); CA 2006 s 687(4), s 692(3). 
356  CA 1985 s 160(2); CA 2006 s 687(5), s 692(4). 
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section 85(7) allow the share premium account to be reduced without a similar 
limitation.357      
Any payment in addition to the purchase price made by the company in 
consideration of acquiring any right to repurchase shares under a contingent 
repurchase contract, or in consideration of the variation of an off-market contract or 
in consideration of the release of any of the company’s obligations under any 
off-market contract, may only be made out of distributable profits.358 
6.2.2 Repurchases out of capital 
Private companies may redeem or repurchase their shares out of capital if certain 
requirements, aimed at protecting both creditors and shareholders, are met.359 The 
financial restrictions consist of a solvency test as well as a limit on the extent to 
which share capital may be applied, termed the ‘permissible capital payment’. 
The solvency test, which could be called a liquidity test in South Africa, 
involves asking: 
• whether the company will, immediately after payment has been made, be 
able to pay its debts,360 and 
• whether it will be able to continue carrying on business as a going 
concern in the year following payment.361  
The directors are required to issue a formal solvency statement that has to be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
357  The application of the share premium account is also discussed in paragraph 2.4 above. For 
discussion of the position in South Africa, see Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.3.3.2.  
358  CA 1985 s 168; CA 2006 s 705. Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 252 explains that such 
payments are not in the ordinary course of business of a company and really amount to 
distributions to a member or members. Should this provision not be complied with, the purchase 
or release would be void. 
359  CA 1985 ss 171(1) CA 2006 s 709. The additional procedural requirements that apply to 
purchases and redemptions out of capital are identified in paragraph 6.3 and in particular in 
paragraph 6.3.1.4 below. 
360  CA 1985 s 173(3)(a); CA 2006 s 714(3)(a). 
361  CA 1985 s 173(3)(b); CA 2006 s 714(3)(b). 
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reported on by the auditors of the company.362 It is clear that both the directors and 
the auditors have an active duty to enquire into and report on the affairs of the 
company.363 The South African solvency and liquidity provision does not require any 
positive action from the directors and auditors.364  
The ability of the company to pay its debts immediately after payment must be 
assessed taking into account the contingent and prospective liabilities of the 
company.365 The continued liquidity of the company is to be judged with reference to 
the way in which the directors intend managing the company’s business during that 
year, and the amount and character of the financial resources the directors 
anticipate will available to the company during that year. The ability of the company 
to continue to carry on business as a going concern expressly includes the ability to 
pay its debts as they fall due.366 It is worth noting that South African legislation does 
not prescribe the manner of application of the liquidity test.367  
The extent to which share capital may be applied is limited to the ‘permissible 
capital payment’.368 The permissible capital payment is the amount by which the 
price payable by the company for its shares exceeds its available profits and the 
proceeds of any fresh issue made for purposes of the repurchase or redemption. 
The available profits and the permissible capital payment must be determined as set 
out in the Act.369 
_________________________________________________________________ 
362  The procedural aspects relating to the solvency declaration and auditors’ report are dealt with in 
paragraphs 6.3.3.1 and 6.3.3.2 below.  
363  The directors have to declare that they have made a full inquiry into the affairs and prospects of 
the company, CA 1985 s 173(3); CA 2006 s 714(3). The auditor has to report that she has 
inquired into the company’s state of affairs , CA 1985 s 173(5); CA 2006 s 714(5). It is a criminal 
offence to make a false or misleading declaration, see paragraph 6.3.3.1 below. 
364  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.1.1.  
365  CA 1985 s 173(4); CA 2006 s 714(4). See Grainger “Assessing Liabilities” 291 regarding the 
valuation of such liabilities. 
366  CA 1985 s 173(3)(b); CA 2006 s 714(3)(b) reads that ‘the company will be able to continue to 
carry on business as a going concern (and will ‘accordingly’ be able to pay its debts as they fall 
due)’ (emphasis added). The question whether carrying on business as a going concern means 
more than the ability to pay debts is not discussed by the authorities consulted. 
367  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.1.2. 
368  CA 1985 s 171(3); CA 2006 s 710. 
369  CA 1985 s 172; CA 2006 ss 711 – 712. 
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The concept ‘available profits’ corresponds with ‘profits available for 
distribution’ in the provisions dealing with the distribution of profits and assets.370 
The important difference is that the determination of available profits must be based 
on the ‘relevant accounts’ and not on the last annual accounts.371 The relevant 
accounts are accounts that satisfy two requirements.372 First, they must be prepared 
within the three months preceding the date of the statutory declaration of the 
directors.373 Secondly, they must enable a reasonable judgment to be made as to 
the amounts of the profits, losses, assets, liabilities, provisions, share capital and 
reserves.374 
The permissible capital payment must be determined as at the date of the 
statutory declaration. This is implied by the requirement that distributions lawfully 
made between the date of the relevant accounts and the date of the declaration 
have to be deducted from the amount of available profits when calculating the 
permissible capital payment.375 ‘Distributions lawfully made’ are distributions out of 
distributable profits only and includes financial assistance, payments in respect of 
the purchase price of shares, and payments in consideration of the acquisition of a 
right, variation of a contract, or release of an obligation, to acquire own shares.376 
The effect of the deduction of these distributions from available profits is to increase 
the amount of the permissible capital payment.377 
The permissible capital payment rule is not a financial restriction in the true 
sense of the word. It does not limit the total amount that can be distributed by the 
company as consideration for the purchase of its shares. Its purpose is rather to limit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
370  CA 1985 s 172(1); CA 2006 s 711. The available profits must be determined as set out in CA 
1985 Part VIII; CA 2006 Part 23. This is discussed in paragraph 6 below. 
371  CA 1985 s 172(1); CA 2006 s 711(2). See also Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 253 – 254, 
Gore-Browne on Companies 24[32]. 
372  CA 1985 s 172(3); CA 2006 s 712(6). 
373  CA 1985 s 172(3) read with s 172(6); CA 2006 s 712(6)(a) read with s 712(7). 
374  CA 1985 s 172(3) read with s 172(2); CA 2006 s 712(6)(b) read with s 712(2). 
375  CA 1985 s 173(4); CA 2006 s 712(3). 
376  CA 1985 s 172(5); CA 2006 s 712(3) – (4).  
377  There will be a larger difference between the purchase price and the available profits plus any 
proceeds of a fresh issue. 
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as far as possible the reduction of the company’s share capital.  
The adjustment of capital accounts following a repurchase out of capital is 
discussed elsewhere.378  
6.2.3 The timing for the application of the financial restrictions 
The Act provides that a company may repurchase or redeem shares out of 
distributable profits, the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares and, in the case of 
private companies, out of capital up to the amount of the permissible capital 
payment. However, since the distributable profits have to be determined by 
reference to the company’s financial statements, the financial restrictions are 
practically applied in advance of the actual authorisation and payment.  
When a repurchase is made out of distributable profits, the latest annual 
accounts of the company have to be used in determining the amount of the 
distributable profits.379 There is no statutory provision regarding changes in the 
company’s financial position since the accounts were made up. However, as in the 
case of distributions, the common-law principles of directors’ fiduciary duties may 
apply.380 It is also clear that a company cannot be compelled to make a payment in 
respect of the purchase or redemption of shares if the company can show that its 
distributable profits are not adequate.381 This indicates that the financial position of 
the company at the time of payment remains relevant. 
In the case of a repurchase or redemption out of capital by a private company, 
the accounts that must be used to determine the amount of the distributable 
reserves and indirectly also the permissible capital payment, have to be prepared 
within the three months preceding the date of the statutory declaration.382 The 
permissible capital payment must be determined as at the date of the statutory 
_________________________________________________________________ 
378  See paragraph 6.3.4 below. 
379  CA 1985 s 181(a); CA 2006 s 736. 
380  See paragraph 5.6 below. 
381  CA 1985 s 178(3); CA 2006 s 735(2) – (3). These provisions are discussed in paragraph 6.6 
below. 
382  CA 1985 s 172(6); CA 2006 s 712(7). 
   88 
declaration of directors. The permissible capital payment takes account of allowable 
distributions made since the date of the accounts and consequently reflects the 
situation on the date of the statutory declaration.383 The time limits imposed in 
respect of the period between the date of the declaration and the date of the 
authorisation (1 week)384 and in respect of the date of authorisation and the date of 
payment (not less than 5 weeks and not more than 7 weeks)385 ensure that payment 
is based on recent financial information.386  
As in England, the intention in South Africa is that the company’s position at 
the time of payment is relevant. However, the requirements prescribed by CA 1985 
necessarily result in a delay between the enquiry into satisfaction of the financial 
requirements and payment. Although the English provisions could afford more 
certainty, require active involvement of directors and sometimes auditors, and 
possibly protect creditors better, the introduction of similar formal requirements in 
South Africa should be approached with caution in view of their complexity.387 
6.3 Procedure and other requirements 
The procedure for repurchases depends on whether the acquisition is to take place 
by way of an off-market 388  or market purchase 389  or contingent purchase 
contract.390 The procedural requirements for repurchases by private companies out 
of capital differ from those for other purchases. A market purchase is one in respect 
of shares listed or admitted on an investment exchange391 if the purchase is made 
on that exchange.392 Other purchases are off-market purchases.393 
_________________________________________________________________ 
383  CA 1985 s 173(4); CA 2006 s 714(4). 
384  CA 1985 s 174(1) ; CA 2006 s 716(2). 
385  CA 1985 s 174(1) ; CA 2006 s 723(1). 
386  The statements cannot be older than 5 months (3 months plus 8 weeks). 
387  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.  
388  CA 1985 s 164 ; CA 2006 s 693(2). 
389  CA 1985 s 166 ; CA 2006 s 701. 
390  CA 1985 s 165 ; CA 2006 s 694. 
391  For the definition of recognised investment exchange, see CA 1985 s 163(4); CA 2006 s 693(5). 
392  CA 1985 s 163(3); CA 2006 s 693(4). 
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In general it can be said that the prescribed procedure is not as 
comprehensive as in the South African legislation, probably because purchases are 
not made out of capital.394 In the case of private companies the procedure for 
repurchases out of capital is indeed more detailed.395 
There is no express reference to selective as apposed to pro rata acquisitions. 
The Act appears to be concerned only with the approval of the terms of the contract. 
There is no statutory pro rata offer procedure similar to that found in the South 
African Companies Act. The disclosure and authorisation requirements are the only 
elements of shareholder protection. It remains to be seen if the courts will adapt the 
shareholder protection principles applicable to capital reductions to share 
repurchases. 
The FSA Listing Rules that apply to listings on the London Stock Exchange 
require equal treatment once more than 15 per cent of a company’s equity shares is 
to be acquired. Such repurchases are referred to as substantial market purchases 
and must be carried out by way of a partial offer to all shareholders or by way of a 
tender offer.396 
6.3.1 Authorisations 
The articles of a company wishing to repurchase its shares must allow it do so.397 
The requirements regarding authorisation depend on the kind of purchase involved. 
6.3.1.1 Off-market repurchases 
In an off-market purchase, the terms of the contract of repurchase must be 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
393  CA 1985 s 163(1).  
394  Sealy Company Law and Commercial Reality 10 – 11 criticises the complexity of the repurchase 
provisions and suggests that general common-law and equitable principles dealing with 
misapplication of company funds are adequate protection against abuse of the repurchase 
power. 
395  See paragraph 6.3.3 below. 
396  FSA Listing Rules par 15.7 and par 15.8. Also see Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 259. 
397  CA 1985 s 162(1) requires an express authority while CA 2006 grants a power subject to any 
restrictions or prohibition in the articles. The model articles under CA 1985 contain such an 
authority, see Table A art 35.  
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authorised by a prior special resolution398 or, under CA 2006, approved by special 
resolution after conclusion of a contract that has been made conditional upon such 
subsequent approval.399 The authorisation can be varied, revoked or renewed by a 
similar special resolution.400 In the case of a public company, the resolution may 
remain valid for a maximum of 18 months and the expiration date must be 
specified.401  
Although English law rarely imposes voting restrictions on members,402 the 
shareholder whose shares are being acquired may not vote in respect of the 
affected shares. 403  This is a powerful measure against abuse by controlling 
shareholders and should be considered for South Africa too.404  Only the voting 
rights in respect of the shares that are to be acquired are neutralised. A majority 
shareholder from whom some shares are to be repurchased selectively can still 
exercise influence on the adoption of the special resolution, which may be a problem 
as her interests will not fully coincide with those of the other shareholders of the 
class.405 However, unless the legislation expressly draws a distinction between 
selective and pro rata repurchases, this is the only sensible voting restriction 
_________________________________________________________________ 
398  CA 1985 s 164(1) – (2); CA 2006 s 693(1)(a) read with s 694(1) – (2). Fox “Companies 
Purchasing” 274 notes that the Bill preceding the 1981 Companies Act contained a clause 
preventing alteration of the articles to enable a coercive acquisition of existing issued shares. It 
was not enacted, see Fox ”Companies Act 1981” 113.  
399  CA 2006 s 694(2)(b). Although CA 1985 does not provide for ratification, it was held in Western 
v Rigblast Holdings Ltd 1989 GWD 23-950 (SC) that where the company and a shareholder had 
agreed on a repurchase, the contract would not become enforceable until approved under this 
provision. See also Gore-Browne on Companies 24[25] note 14 on 24-24. 
400  CA 1985 s 164(3); CA 2006 s 694(4). 
401  CA 1985 s 164(4); CA 2006 s 694(5). 
402  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 258. 
403  CA 1985 s 164(5); CA 2006 s 694(6) read with s 695. This applies whether voting is by poll or by 
show of hands. Any member may request a poll, regardless of the provisions of the articles, see 
Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 258. If the resolution is by written resolution the member 
may not be regarded as a member for purposes of the resolution unless the written resolution 
cannot be agreed to without her agreement. See Gore-Browne on Companies 24[25] note 6 on 
24-24; Schedule 15A paragraph 5(2). 
404  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3.1.2. 
405  See Kiggundu “Corporate Dealings” 22. Kiggundu points out that the intended protection can 
also be negated by splitting a repurchase programme from controlling shareholders into a 
number of individual repurchases, thereby allowing the controlling shareholders to vote in 
respect of each other’s shares.  
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because it allows shareholders to vote in a proportionate repurchase in respect of 
their shares that are not to be acquired.406 
A copy of the contract or a memorandum of its terms, disclosing also the 
identity of the members from whom shares will be repurchased, must be available 
for inspection by members at the meeting and for at least 15 days before the 
meeting. 407  Should the contract or memorandum not have been available as 
prescribed, the special resolution will not be effective. 408  Any variation of the 
contract must also be approved by special resolution, subject to similar 
requirements.409 In view of these requirements, it is clear that off-market purchases 
under a general authority are not possible.410 
It is not clear what consequences non-compliance with this procedure will 
have, since no penalty or consequences are prescribed. Gore-Browne on 
Companies argues that the resultant contract will be void as an unlawful purchase of 
shares and that the penalties prescribed for a contravention of the restrictions on 
repurchases will apply. 411  
6.3.1.2 Contingent repurchase contracts 
A contingent repurchase contract is a conditional contract in terms of which the 
company may become obliged or entitled to repurchase its shares. Contingent 
_________________________________________________________________ 
406  If all the voting rights of vendor-shareholders were to be excluded, there would be no votes left 
to sanction proportionate repurchases.  
407  CA 1985 s 164(6); CA 2006 s 696(1) – (4). 
408  This requirement can be waived with the unanimous approval of all the shareholders, see BDG 
Roof-Bond Ltd v Douglas [2000] 1 BCLC 401 at 416 – 417. Also, in Vision Express (UK) Ltd v 
Wilson (No 2) [1998] BCC 173 the court was prepared to read in an implied term that the correct 
procedure for an off-market purchase would be followed. However, procedural requirements 
aimed at protecting creditors may not be waived. In this regard it was held in Re R W Peak 
(Kings Lynn) Ltd [1998] 1 BCLC 193 at 204 – 205 that the requirement of a special resolution 
could not be waived and in BDG Roof-Bond Ltd v Douglas [2000] 1 BCLC 401 that 
non-compliance with the requirements as to an auditor’s statement rendered a distribution 
invalid.  
409  CA 1985 s 164(7). A copy or memorandum of the original contract, previous variations and a 
copy or memorandum of the proposed varied contract must then be made available. 
410  There is no similar restriction in South Africa, see Chapter 5 paragraphs 6.3.1.3  and 6.3.2.1. 
411  Gore-Browne on Companies 24[25]. 
   92 
repurchase contracts are regulated under a separate provision in CA 1985,412 but 
are subject to the same authorisation requirements as off-market repurchases.413 
The contingent repurchase contract is an alternative procedure for an off-market 
repurchase.414 For this reason, CA 2006 no longer provides for these repurchases 
in a separate provision but treats them as a specific type of off-market 
repurchase.415  
Once the contingent repurchase contract has been approved, the company 
may proceed with an off-market repurchase when the condition is fulfilled, without 
the need for a further approval.416  Put and call options over shares are contingent 
repurchase contracts.417 Any payments in addition to the repurchase price that are 
made under a contingent repurchase contract must be made out of distributable 
profits.418 
6.3.1.3 Market repurchases 
For market purchases, the company has to be authorised by an ordinary resolution 
of the general meeting to make such repurchases.419 Although only an ordinary 
resolution is required, the resolution must be lodged with the Registrar in similar 
fashion as a special resolution.420 The reason why an ordinary resolution is required 
is to save time in view of the shorter notice period for ordinary resolutions.421  
_________________________________________________________________ 
412  CA 1985 s 165. 
413  The requirements of s 164(3)-(7) regarding procedural formalities apply, see paragraph 6.3.1.1 
above. 
414  Gore-Browne on Companies 24[26]. 
415  CA 2006 s 694(3). 
416  CA 1985 s 164(1) – (2). Variations will have to be approved in the same way as the original 
contract. 
417  Gore-Browne on Companies 25[26]. 
418  CA 1985 s 168; CA 2006 s 705. See also paragraph 6.2.1 above. 
419  CA 1985 s 166(1); CA 2006 s 701(1). Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 259 explains that the 
shorter notice period for ordinary resolutions is the reason why a special resolution is not 
required. See also Cheffins Company Law 448 – 450 for a discussion of additional regulation in 
the FSA Listing Rules and The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers. 
420  CA 1985 s 166(7); CA s 701(8). 
421  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 259. 
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The authorisation must specify the maximum number of shares that may be 
acquired,422 the maximum and minimum prices,423 and the date upon which the 
authority expires.424 The expiration date may not be later than 18 months after the 
passing of the resolution.425 The authority could be conditional or unconditional, and 
could either be general or refer to shares of a specific class or description.426 Once 
the market repurchase has been made, the exact terms of the contract including the 
maximum and minimum price that was paid must be disclosed in a return submitted 
to the Registrar.427  
6.3.1.4 Repurchases out of capital 
Should a private company wish to redeem or repurchase shares out of capital under 
CA 1985, its articles of association must expressly allow it to purchase or redeem 
shares otherwise than out of distributable profits or the proceeds of a fresh issue of 
shares.428 Under CA 2006, a private company will have this power subject to any 
restriction or prohibition in its articles.429 
_________________________________________________________________ 
422  CA 1985 s 166(3); CA 2006 s 701(3)(a). The FSA Listing Rules par 15.7 and par 15.8 provide 
that repurchases of more than 15% of the company’s equity shares must either be made 
proportionately from all shareholders or through a tender offer. Such acquisitions are known as 
substantial market purchases. In South Africa, general market acquisitions can be used to 
acquire up to 20% of the shares of a class in a particular year, see Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3.2.2. 
423  CA 1985 s 166(3)(b); CA 2006 s 701(3)(b). The price could be determined by specifying a 
particular sum or by providing a basis or formula for calculating the price without reference to 
any person’s discretion or opinion, CA 1985 s 166(6); CA 2006 s 701(7). 
424  CA 1985 s 166(3) – (4); CA 2006 s 701(5) – (6). 
425  CA 1985 s 166(4); CA 2006 s 701(5). This accords with the off-market authorisation rule for 
public companies.  
426  CA 1985 s 166(2); CA 2006 s 701(2). 
427  CA 1985 s 169; CA 2006 s 707. It provides that detailed returns of acquisitions must be lodged 
with the Registrar within 28 days of delivery of the shares to the company. Contracts or 
memoranda of agreements must be retained by the company at its registered office for ten 
years. They may be inspected by any member or in the case of a public company, by any person, 
s 169(4) – (9); CA 2006 s 694, s 702(2) – (7). Public companies must submit a return that also 
indicates the maximum and minimum prices paid, CA 1985 s 169(2); CA 2006 s 707(4). This 
covers the situation of market purchases, but the subsection is not limited to market purchases.  
428  CA 1985 s 171(1). A general power to purchase its shares will not suffice.  
429  CA 2006 s 709. 
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A special resolution must authorise the payment out of capital.430 The special 
resolution will not be valid unless the statutory solvency declaration by the directors 
and the auditors’ report are available for inspection by members at the meeting 
passing the resolution.431 The resolution must be passed on or within a week of the 
date of the statutory declaration.432 Members whose shares are being acquired may 
not vote in respect of those shares.433 
6.3.1.5 Comparison of reduction procedures 
The alternative reduction of capital procedure for private companies in CA 2006 was 
originally intended as a substitute for the rules allowing private companies to 
purchase or redeem their shares out of share capital. However, both procedures 
have been retained. It appears that CA 2006 may have introduced regulatory bias 
by prescribing different requirements for two procedures that can be used to achieve 
the same effect, for example the repayment of capital in excess of the wants of the 
company.434  
I note various differences, although the basic financial restrictions are the 
same. First, the standards for compliance with the two procedures are different. In 
the case of a reduction there is no need for an auditor certificate in respect of the 
solvency statement, while such a certificate is required in respect of the solvency 
statement that has to be made for repurchases and redemptions out of capital.435 
Secondly, each director has to be involved in the solvency statement for a 
reduction,436 while the solvency statement for repurchases has to be made by ‘the 
directors’.437 Thirdly, public notice is required of an intended repurchase out of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
430  CA 1985 s 173(2); CA 2006 s 716(1). 
431  CA 1985 s 174(4); CA 2006 s 718 read with s 716(3).  
432  CA 1985 s 174(1); CA 2006 s 716(2). 
433  CA 1985 s 174(2); CA 2006 s 716(3) read with s 717. The voting restrictions are discussed in 
paragraph 6.3.1.1 above. 
434  See CA 2006 s 641(4)(b)(ii). 
435  Compare CA 2006 s 714(3) with s 643. See also Palmer’s Annotated Guide 504. 
436  CA 2006 s 643(1). 
437  See CA 1985 s 173(3); CA 2006 s 714(1). 
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capital and members and creditors are given the right to object to court against a 
repurchase. The new reduction of capital procedure does not provide for notice or 
objection. Finally, while both provisions impose criminal liability for making an 
unsubstantiated statement, directors incur statutory civil liability under the 
Insolvency Act 1986 in respect of repurchases but not in respect of reductions. It is 
difficult to justify this divergence in the procedural requirements. 
6.3.2 Assignment and release of right to repurchase shares 
A company may not assign its rights under a contract to repurchase its own 
shares. 438  This total prohibition applies to off-market, contingent, and market 
purchases and is aimed at preventing a company from speculating against its share 
price.439 
A company can also not agree to release its rights under an off-market 
repurchase except with the prior approval of a special resolution.440 The purpose of 
this provision is to guard against undue influence that a prospective 
seller-shareholder may exert over the company should the transaction later appear 
to her to be unfavourable.441 No comparable protection against abuse exists in 
South Africa and it may be useful to consider whether there is a need for it and 
whether this provision can serve as a starting point.442 
6.3.3 Additional requirements for repurchases out of capital 
I have shown that the authorisation requirements for repurchases out of capital differ 
from those for repurchases in general.443 The remaining requirements include strict 
timing provisions to ensure that the resolution is based on recent financial 
information and that the payment takes place when the situation is likely not to have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
438  CA 1985 s 167(1); CA 2006 s 704. 
439  See Charlesworth’s Company Law 165. 
440  CA 1985 s 167(2); CA 2006 s 700. 
441  See Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 252.  
442  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.10.5. 
443  See paragraph 6.3.1.4 above. 
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changed. Creditors and shareholders are also given a right to object to the proposed 
repurchase out of capital. I now discuss these requirements in more detail. 
6.3.3.1 Statutory declaration 
The directors have to issue a statutory declaration, in the prescribed form, setting 
out the permissible capital payment. 444   The declaration must also contain a 
solvency statement by the directors. They have to state that, having made full 
inquiry into the affairs and prospects of the company, and taking into account the 
contingent and prospective liabilities of the company 445  they have formed the 
opinion: 
• that as regards its initial situation immediately following the date on which 
the payment of capital is proposed to be made, there will be no ground on 
which the company could then be found unable to pay its debts 
• that as regards its prospects for the year immediately following that date, 
having regard to their intentions with respect to the management of the 
company’s business during that year, and to the amount and character of 
the financial resources which will, in their view, be available to the 
company during that year, the company will be able to continue to carry 
on business as a going concern (and will accordingly be able to pay its 
debts as they fall due) throughout that year.446 
The declaration of the directors must be based on accounts prepared in the three 
months before the date of the declaration.447 It is a criminal offence for a director to 
make a declaration knowing it to be false or misleading, or without reasonable cause 
to believe in its truth.448  
_________________________________________________________________ 
444  CA 1985 s 173(3); CA 2006 s 714(2). 
445  CA 1985 s173(4); CA 2006 s 714(4). 
446  CA 1985 s 173(3)(b); CA 2006 s 714(3)(b). 
447  See paragraph 6.2.2 above. 
448  CA 1985 s 173(6); CA 2006 s 715(1). The penalty is a maximum of two years imprisonment and 
an unlimited fine. 
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6.3.3.2 Auditors’ report 
A report by the company’s auditor must be annexed to the statutory declaration.449 
The report must be addressed to the directors. The auditor must state that: 
• she has enquired into the company’s state of affairs 
• the amount specified in the statutory declaration as to the permissible 
capital payment is in her view properly determined 
• she is not aware of anything to indicate that the opinion expressed by the 
directors in the declaration as to any of the matters required to be in it, is 
unreasonable in the circumstances.450 
6.3.3.3 Publicity 
Within one week of the special resolution authorising the purchase out of capital, the 
company has to give public notice of the intended payment out of capital. A notice 
must appear in the Gazette451 and the company must either send a written notice to 
each of its creditors452 or place a notice in an approved national newspaper.453 The 
notice must be in the prescribed form and must state: 
• that the company has approved a payment out of capital for the purpose 
of acquiring its own shares by redemption or repurchase 
• the amount of the permissible capital payment for the shares in question 
and the date of the resolution for payment out of capital 
• that the statutory declaration of the directors and the report of the 
auditors are available for inspection at the company’s registered office 
• that any creditor of the company may within five weeks of the special 
resolution apply to the court for an order prohibiting the payment. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
449  CA 1985 s 173(5); CA 2006 s 714(6). 
450  CA 1985 s 173(5); CA 2006 s 714(6)(a) – (d). 
451  CA 1985 s 175(1); CA 2006 s 719(1). 
452  CA 1985 s 175(2); CA 2006 s 719(2)(b). 
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This is more onerous than the South African provisions where no notice is given to 
creditors and they are not afforded any right to object.454 
6.3.3.4 Creditors’ and members’ right of objection 
Any dissenting member and any creditor of the company may apply to court for the 
cancellation of the resolution.455 The application must be brought within five weeks 
of the date of the resolution.456 The company must notify the Registrar immediately 
of any such application and has to deliver an office copy of the court order to the 
Registrar within fifteen days of its being made.457  
The court may order that the dissentient members be bought out by other 
members or by the company and may make any order for the protection of the 
dissentient creditors.458 The court may also make consequential orders, such as an 
amendment of the company’s memorandum and articles.459 
It is not stated what kind of order a creditor could ask for. Presumably, a 
creditor can obtain an order preventing the company from going ahead with the 
proposed purchase. The court can also order that the creditor be paid or that her 
debt be secured. When a company asks the court to confirm a formal reduction of 
capital, creditors have the right to insist on payment or security.460 Due to the 
similarity of the two procedures, it can be expected that creditors will be afforded 
similar remedies. 
While a formal reduction of capital requires court confirmation, the purchase of 
shares out of capital can take place without court intervention if no objections from 
shareholders or creditors are lodged. Yet these transactions have a substantially 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
453  CA 1985 s 175(2); CA 2006 s 719(2)(a). ‘Approved national newspaper’ is defined in CA 1985 s 
175(3); CA 2006 s 719(3). 
454  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3.2 for a discussion of the South African formalities.  
455  CA 1985 s 176(3); CA 2006 s 721. 
456  CA 1985 s 176(1)(b); CA 2006 s 721(2)(a). 
457  CA 1985 s 176(3); CA 2006 s 722. 
458  CA 1985 s 177(1); CA 2006 s 721(3). 
459  These are set out in CA 1095 s 177(2) – (4); CA 2006 s 721(3) – (7). 
460  See paragraph 2.6.1 above. 
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similar effect. This discrepancy was considered by the Company Law Review, which 
recommended introduction of an alternative formal reduction procedure in which the 
requirement for court confirmation would be replaced with a right of objection. 
Although it further recommended that the right of private companies to purchase or 
redeem their shares out of capital should be abolished, this was not done. The result 
is that similar transactions are still subject to different requirements.461  
6.3.3.5 Timing of payments 
Payment may be made only during the period between five and seven weeks after 
the date of the resolution.462 This provision ensures that payment is not made until 
the creditors have had the opportunity of applying to court,463 but that it is indeed 
made very soon thereafter.  
The timing restriction makes the procedure rather different from that in South 
Africa where there is no similar restriction. This can be explained by the fact that in 
South Africa the solvency and liquidity test is applied at the time of payment with the 
result that these timing issues do not arise. However, if South Africa were to adopt 
rules that involve determining the financial position of the company on a specific 
date or that prescribe reliance on specific accounts of the company, specific rules 
limiting the time within which payment must be made may become necessary.464  
6.3.4 Adjustment of capital accounts  
Unless the repurchased shares are held in treasury,465 a repurchase of shares will 
have an effect on the company’s share capital accounts. However, the size of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
461  See paragraph 6.3.1.5 above. 
462  CA 1985 s 174(1); CA 2006 s 723(1). The period may be extended by court order, see CA 1985 
s 177(2); CA 2006 s 721(5). 
463  It appears that because the company can only pay until 7 weeks after date of the resolution the 
court has to dispose of the matter within two weeks. As this may be impossible, CA 1985 s 
177(2); CA 2006 s 721(5) expressly authorises the court to alter or extend any date or period of 
time specified in the resolution or in any provision of the Act relating to the redemption or 
repurchase of shares to which the resolution applies.  
464  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.2.  
465  This exception is discussed in paragraph 6.7 below. 
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company’s total share capital, including the share premium account,466 will not be 
reduced. The repurchase of shares out of capital is an exception because it will lead 
to a reduction of share capital.  
6.3.4.1 Repurchases not out of capital 
Where a repurchase or redemption is funded wholly out of distributable profits, the 
amount by which the company’s share capital is diminished on cancellation of the 
shares467 must be transferred to the capital redemption reserve.468 The capital 
redemption reserve is an undistributable reserve and, subject to some exceptions, is 
treated as if it was share capital of the company.469 The amount transferred to the 
capital redemption reserve will ‘replace’ the cancelled share capital.   
Where the repurchase is made wholly or partly out of the proceeds of a fresh 
issue of shares and the aggregate amount of the proceeds is less than the 
aggregate nominal value of the shares redeemed or purchased, an amount equal to 
the difference must be transferred to the capital redemption reserve.470 The effect of 
this provision is that the capital redemption reserve will reflect that part of the 
nominal value of the redeemed or repurchased shares that is not replaced by the 
fresh capital. The cancelled capital will be replaced by the capital attributed to the 
new shares and the amount transferred to the capital redemption reserve. Where a 
private company has purchased or redeemed its shares partly out of capital and 
partly out of a fresh issue of shares, this latter provision does not apply.471  
_________________________________________________________________ 
466  As to which, see paragraph 2.4 above. 
467  That is, the nominal value of the shares, see CA 1985 s 160(4); CA 2006 s 688(b) (redemptions), 
s 706(b)(ii) (repurchases) read with s 733(2). 
468  CA 1985 s 170(1); CA 2006 s 733(1). Sealy “Views on Share Repurchase” 27 regards the 
capital redemption reserve requirement as an unnecessary safeguard.  
469  See paragraph 2.4 above. 
470  CA 1985 s 170(2); CA 2006 s 733(3). It stands to reason that if the redemption or repurchase is 
made wholly out of the proceeds of the fresh issue the nominal value of the redeemed or 
repurchased shares can only exceed the proceeds of the new shares if the old shares are 
redeemed or repurchased at a discount.  
471  CA 1985 s 170(3); CA 2006 s 733(3) proviso. The company will be reducing its capital by the 
amount of the permitted capital payment. If redemption or repurchase is funded partly out of 
Continued 
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When a public company holds shares it repurchased in treasury, those shares 
will not be cancelled and the capital accounts will accordingly not be adjusted.472 If 
the shares are later cancelled, the issued capital must be reduced by the nominal 
value of the cancelled shares.473 
6.3.4.2 Purchases out of capital 
In the case of a private company purchasing its shares out of capital, the accounts 
will be adjusted to reflect the cancellation of the shares and the total share capital 
will be reduced. However, the capital reduction is restricted to the amount of the 
‘permissible capital payment’.474 
If the nominal value of the shares repurchased is higher than the permissible 
capital payment (and there is no fresh issue of shares), the difference must be 
transferred to the capital redemption reserve.475 This difference represents the 
distributable profits used in respect of the par value of the shares. 
On the other hand, if the permissible capital payment exceeds the nominal 
value of the shares, the excess may be used to the reduce the share premium 
account, capital redemption reserve, revaluation reserve or fully paid share capital 
of the company.476 So, apart from the reduction in the share capital account in 
respect of the cancellation of the acquired shares, the capital and reserve accounts 
of the company may be reduced up to the balance of the permissible capital 
payment. 
The same principles apply to instances where the proceeds of a fresh issue of 
shares are used in conjunction with the permissible capital payment. The difference 
between these two amounts combined and the nominal value of the shares is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
distributable profits, the capital redemption reserve must reflect the distributable profits used, 
see paragraph 6.4.5.2 below. 
472  See s 162A, discussed in paragraph 6.7 below. 
473  CA 1985 s 162D(4); CA 2006 s 724. 
474  As defined in CA 1985 s 171(3); CA 2006 s 710, see paragraph 6.2.2 above. 
475  CA 1985 s 171(4); CA 2006 s 734(2).  
476  CA 1985 s 171(5); CA 2006 s 734(3). 
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treated either as a capital redemption reserve (where the nominal value is greater) 
or can be used to reduce the capital or reserves (where the nominal value is less).477  
6.4 Liability for unlawful repurchases 
6.4.1 Purchases otherwise than out of capital 
If a company purports to repurchase its shares otherwise than in accordance with 
the Act, the company and any officer in default commits a criminal offence.478 The 
transaction will be void479 and consequently any consideration paid will have to be 
returned. There is no express provision to the effect that the directors will be liable to 
refund the consideration should it not otherwise be recoverable. 
6.4.2 Purchases out of capital 
Apart from imposing criminal sanctions on a director who makes a statutory 
declaration without having reasonable grounds for the opinion expressed in it, the 
Companies Act does not regulate liability for unlawful capital payments to acquire 
shares. The substantive protection is found in the Insolvency Act 1986 which 
provides for personal liability of directors and shareholders should the company be 
wound up within one year of making a payment out of capital for the purchase or 
redemption of shares. 
Where a company has repurchased or redeemed its shares out of capital and 
is subsequently wound up within one year of the date of the payment, the person 
from whom the shares were acquired and the directors who signed the statutory 
declaration may be held liable to contribute to the assets of the company.480 No 
defence is available to the former shareholder.481 However, a director can escape 
_________________________________________________________________ 
477  CA 1985 s 171(6); CA 2006 s 734(4). 
478  CA 1985 s 143(2); CA 2006 s 658(2)(a). 
479  CA 1985 s 143(2); CA 2006 s 658(2)(b). 
480  Section 76 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  
481  It would, for example, not help the shareholder to prove that the company was indeed solvent or 
able to pay its debts when the payment was made and that the eventual winding-up was caused 
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liability by proving she had reasonable grounds for forming the opinion set out in the 
declaration.482  This means that some directors may be excused while others may 
be liable, depending on the exact information at their disposal. The grounds for relief 
are set out with more clarity than in the South African provisions.483 
Any shareholder or director who has contributed an amount under the liability 
provision may apply to court for an order directing any other person jointly and 
severally liable in respect of that amount to pay her such amount as the court thinks 
just and equitable.484  This allows the court a discretion to allocate the blame 
between shareholders and directors and facilitates equitable contribution between 
shareholders.  
The shareholders and directors will be liable for the ‘deficiency’. This is the 
difference between, on the one hand, the aggregate of the company’s assets and 
any contributions paid and, on the other hand, the total of its debts, liabilities and the 
costs of winding-up.485 It is interesting to note that the liability to contribute to the 
assets of the company is limited to the lesser of the amount of the unlawful payment 
and the amount required for meeting the company’s liabilities at the time when 
liability is imposed. 
A number of differences between the South African and English liability 
provisions are evident. In South Africa, liability is imposed regardless of whether or 
not the company is insolvent or unable to pay its debts at the time when the 
provision is invoked. The company’s financial situation at the time of payment is 
relevant. The English provision does not depend on whether or not the company 
was able to pay its debts immediately after the payment nor on whether or not the 
payment caused the company to become unable to pay its debts in the ensuing 
year. The only question is whether the company was in fact wound up within one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
by unforeseen events. It is difficult to predict how the court might exercise its discretion in such a 
case. 
482  Section 76(1). 
483  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.1.1. 
484  Section 76(4). 
485  Insolvency Act 1986 s 76. 
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year of making a payment out of capital. The English provision may be easier to 
apply, as the liquidator will be certain of repayment, at least from shareholders. 
The extent of liability is also different. In England, the liability is restricted to the 
deficiency or amount required to pay debts. Under the South African provision,486 
the amount of the unlawful payment can be recovered, even if the company’s assets 
exceed its liabilities at the time when the payment is recovered. The English 
approach is similar to the approach of the Close Corporations Act in South Africa in 
respect of the liability of former members.487  
Another important difference between the two provisions is that in South Africa 
the directors are primarily liable for any amount of the unlawful payment not 
otherwise recovered by the company. Shareholders are liable only upon application 
of the directors or creditors. In England, however, the court can apportion liability 
and is not restricted to holding directors liable for amounts unrecovered from 
shareholders.  
6.5 Enforceability of repurchase agreements 
An agreement by a company to repurchase its shares, whether out of capital or not, 
is binding. However, the consequences of company’s breach of such a contract are 
regulated.488 This provision changes the ordinary rules on breach of contract in 
important respects and further regulates the position should the company be wound 
up before the contract has been completed. The same principles apply to a 
company’s failure to redeem redeemable shares.489 
A company is not liable in damages for failing to redeem or purchase its own 
shares.490 An explanation for this deviation from ordinary principles of breach of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
486  Companies Act 61 of 1973 (South Africa) s 86, see Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.1.2. 
487  Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (South Africa) s 70(3). 
488  CA 1985 s 178; CA 2006 s 735. 
489  CA 1985 s 178(1); CA 2006 s 735. The section applies where a company has on or after 15 June 
1982 (the date when the 1981 Companies Act came into operation) issued redeemable shares 
or agreed to purchase any of its own shares. 
490  CA 1985 s 178(2); CA 2006 s 735(2). In Barclays Bank plc v British and Commonwealth 
Holdings plc [1996] 1 BCLC 1 (CA) at 27 damages were awarded in respect of another 
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contract is that it will be inappropriate to pay damages to a shareholder who retained 
her shares, especially since damages may have to be paid out of capital.491 Other 
remedies for breach, such as a prohibitory interdict, remain available.492 
However, the court may not grant an order for specific performance if the 
company shows that it is unable to meet the cost of redeeming or repurchasing out 
of distributable profits.493 A literal interpretation of this provision means that a 
company will not be able to escape an order for specific performance if the 
repurchase or redemption was to be funded out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of 
shares and the company has been unable to obtain this fresh capital.494 Further, a 
company that undertook to fund a repurchase or redemption out of the proceeds of a 
fresh issue could technically avert an order for specific performance by proving 
insufficient distributable profits. However, I think an order should in fact be made 
against a company that has sufficient proceeds from a fresh issue of shares. This 
argument should also be extended to purchases out of capital where the 
distributable profits together with the permissible capital payment and any proceeds 
of a fresh issue are adequate. 
One may have expected a further provision regulating the enforceability of a 
repurchase or redemption out of capital. Such a provision should refer to the 
company’s solvency situation and should provide that an order for specific 
performance cannot be given against a company that shows that it is unable to pay 
its debts or that making the payment will affect its continued ability to pay its debts 
within the ensuing year.  Perhaps such a provision was considered unnecessary in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
agreement that was connected with the company’s obligation to redeem. See also Gower & 
Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 256 note 11 and Gore-Browne on Companies 24[37] note 3. 
491  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 256. 
492  See Re Holders Investment Trust Ltd [1971] 1 WLR 583 at 590 for an example where the holder 
of redeemable shares prevented the payment of a dividend which would have left the company 
with insufficient assets to redeem her shares. See also Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 
257. 
493  CA 1985 s 178(3); CA 2006 s 735(3).  
494  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 256, especially note 13.  
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view of the strict time limits for payments out of capital.495  
If a company is wound up while it has an outstanding liability496 in terms of a 
redemption or repurchase contract, the terms of the redemption or repurchase may 
be enforced by the shareholder497 provided that the company could, during the 
period between the due date for redemption or repurchase and the date of 
commencement of winding-up lawfully have made a distribution498 equal in value to 
the purchase or redemption price.499 If the shares were liable to be redeemed or 
repurchased at a date later than the date of commencement of the winding up, the 
terms of the redemption or contract may not be enforced against the company.500 
Upon purchase or redemption the shares will be cancelled.501 Any money 
owed to a shareholder in this respect ranks for payment: 
• after all other debts and liabilities of the company, except debts due to 
members in their capacity as members 
• after any amounts due in respect of shares having preference as to 
capital or income over the rights as to capital attaching to the shares in 
question 
• before any other amounts due to members in satisfaction of their rights 
as members to capital or income.502 
This is similar to the South African provision503 that affords claims for repurchase 
consideration the same ranking. However, it is significant that the South African 
_________________________________________________________________ 
495  See paragraph 6.3.3.5 above. Payment has to be made within 7 weeks of the date of the 
statutory declaration. 
496  In order to qualify as being outstanding, the terms of the redemption or repurchase must have 
provided for payment at a date not later than the commencement of the winding-up, see Gower 
& Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 257. 
497  CA 1985 s 178(4); CA 2006 s 735(4). 
498  As defined in CA 1985 s 181 read with s 263(2); CA 2006 Part 23. 
499  CA 1985 s 178(5)(b); CA 2006 s 735(5)(b). 
500  CA 1985 s 178(5)(a); CA 2006 s 735(5)(a). 
501  CA 1985 s 178(4); CA 2006 s 735(4). 
502  CA 1985 s 178(6); CA 2006 s 735(6). 
503  Companies Act 61 of 1973 (South Africa) s 88. 
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provision is restricted to repurchase agreements, leaving the position of shares that 
have become redeemable prior to liquidation to be determined under general 
principles. 504  South Africa may benefit from providing for the enforceability of 
redemptions and the ranking of redemption claims along similar lines as for 
repurchases.505 
6.6 The status of repurchased shares 
In most instances, shares acquired by the company have to be cancelled.506 Under 
CA 1985 they are restored to the status of authorised but unissued shares. 
However, CA 2006 does away with authorised capital and merely requires 
cancellation of the shares. 
Although the Second Company Law Directive has since its inception provided 
that companies could hold up to ten per cent of any class of their own shares in 
treasury,507 this option was introduced in England only fairly recently and to a limited 
extent.508 Since December 2003 companies with publicly traded shares may hold up 
to ten per cent of any class of their own shares in treasury.509  
Publicly traded shares are shares that are included in the official list under Part 
6 of the Financial Services and Markets Act; traded on the Alternative Investment 
Market; officially listed in an EU State; or traded on a regulated market established 
in an EU State that is a regulated market for the purposes of article 16 of the 
Investment Services Directive.510 Shares that cease to be qualifying shares, may no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
504  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.5. 
505  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.8. 
506  CA 1985 s 162(2), read with section 160(4) – (5); CA 2006 s 662 read with s 706(b). 
507  Article 19. 
508  See Morse “Treasury Shares” 305 – 308 for an overview of the reform process followed. 
509  This possibility was introduced with effect from 1 December 2003 by the Companies 
(Acquisition of Own Shares) (Treasury Shares) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/1116, made under s 
2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. The regulations were supplemented by the 
Companies (Acquisition of Own Shares) (Treasury Shares) No 2 Regulations 2003, SI 
2003/3031 which were made on 18 December 2003.  
510  CA 1985 s 162(4); CA 2006 s 724(2). 
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longer be held in treasury and have to be cancelled.511 
Treasury shares must be acquired through a repurchase512 by the company 
out of distributable profits513 and held by the company continuously since their 
repurchase.514 The company must be entered in the register of members as the 
member holding the shares.515  
The maximum number of shares the company may hold is ten per cent by 
nominal value of the shares in any class or ten per cent of the nominal value of the 
issued share capital, should the company have only one class of shares.516 Setting 
a limit with respect to any specific class of shares is more sophisticated than the 
South African provision that takes into account the total number of issued shares in 
the holding company.517 
Further, if the company holds more than the maximum limit of ten per cent, the 
excess has to be cancelled or disposed of before the expiration of twelve months 
from the date on which the limit was first exceeded.518 This provision allows the 
company some leeway following a share repurchase or reduction of capital which 
has the effect of increasing the percentage of shares held by it. Although treasury 
shares are not allowed in South Africa, it is suggested that a cancellation provision 
may be useful in respect of shares held by subsidiaries in excess of the prescribed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
511  CA 1985 s 162E; CA 2006 s 729(2). A mere suspension of listing or from trading on the relevant 
market does not mean that the shares cease to be qualifying shares, see Gore-Browne on 
Companies 24[39]. 
512  CA 1985 s 162(4); CA 2006 s 724(2) read with s 724(5)(a). Redeemable shares must be 
cancelled upon redemption; see paragraph 6.8 below. 
513  CA 1985 s 162A(1); CA 2006 s 724(1)(a). Morse “Treasury Shares” 310 explains that the reason 
for not allowing shares acquired out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares to be held in 
treasury is that it would lead to capital maintenance and accounting problems.  
514  CA 1985 s 162A(3); CA 2006 s 724(5)(b). 
515  CA 1985 s 162A(2); CA 2006 s 724(4). 
516  CA 1985 s 162B(1) – (2); CA 2006 s 725(1) – (2). Note the word ‘hold’ rather than acquire. The 
implications of the use of ‘acquire’ in the South African provisions allowing cross-holdings is 
considered in Chapter 5 paragraph 6.7. 
517  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.7. 
518  CA 1985 s 162B(3); CA 2006 s 725(3). The cancellation or disposal must be done in accordance 
with CA 1985 s 162D; CA 2006 s 727 (disposal) and s 729 (cancellation). 
   109
limit, as this situation is currently not regulated.519 
Treasury shares do not confer on the company any rights that may be 
exercised by a shareholder, including the right to attend or vote at meetings and 
pre-emptive rights on further issues.520 Any attempt by the company to exercise 
these rights during their suspension is void. 521  Further, no dividend or other 
distribution, including a distribution on liquidation, may be paid in respect of treasury 
shares.522 
Fully paid bonus shares may, however, be allotted in respect of treasury 
shares523 and will be treated as if they were repurchased in the same circumstances 
as the original treasury shares.524 As the bonus shares are issued proportionately to 
all shares in the class, the company will not exceed the ten per cent limit. However, 
if a cash alternative accompanies the bonus issue, the proportionality may indeed 
be disturbed. The company may then have to cancel or dispose of the excess 
shares. 
A company may hold, cancel,525 sell for cash,526 or transfer for purposes of or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
519  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.7. 
520  CA 1985 s 162C(2); CA 2006 s 726(2). Morse “Treasury Shares” 313 explains that the general 
principle is that a company holding treasury shares should be in the same position as if it had 
cancelled the shares. Morse also outlines the implementation of this principle in relation to 
takeover regulation and tax consequences, see 318 – 324.  
521  CA 1985 s 162C(2; CA 2006 s 726(2)). See also Gore-Browne on Companies 24[39]. 
522  CA 1985 s 162C(4); CA 2006 s 726(3). 
523  CA 1985 s 162C(5)(a); CA 2006 s 726(4)(a).  
524  CA 1985 s 162C(6); CA 2006 s 726(5). They will be regarded as having been purchased out of 
distributable profits and continuously held and will be subject to the same suspension of rights 
as other treasury shares. 
525  CA 1985 s 162D(1)(c); CA 2006 s 729(1). It must then reduce its issued capital, CA 1985 s 
162D(4); CA 2006 s 729(4). The requirements for a formal reduction of capital need not be 
complied with, CA 1985 s 162D(5); CA 2006 s 729(5). 
526  CA 1985 s 162D(1)(b); CA 2006 s 727(1)(a). Cash means cash, including foreign currency 
received by the company; a cheque received in good faith which the directors have no reason to 
suspect will not be paid; a release of liability of the company for a specified sum; or an 
undertaking to pay cash on or before a date not more than 90 days after the date of which the 
company agrees to sell the shares, CA 1985 s 162D(2); CA 2006 s 727(2). This definition is 
similar to the definition of cash in CA 1985 s 738(2); CA 2006 s 583(3) that applies to the 
distinction between cash and non-cash consideration for the issuing of shares. However, under 
CA 1985 s 738(2) CA 2006 s 583(3) an undertaking to pay cash in the future is not subject to any 
time limit as is the case in CA 1985 s 162D(2); CA 2006 s 727(2). 
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pursuant to an employees’ share scheme527 any treasury shares. However, it may 
not sell them if it has received notice of the exercise of minority buy-out rights,528 
except to the person giving the notice.529 The company may redeem its redeemable 
treasury shares and pay (to itself) the amount payable on redemption.530 It is difficult 
to see how a company can pay an amount to itself. As the redemption must be 
funded out of distributable profits or a fresh issue of shares,531 the payment to the 
company will not even involve an adjustment to its share capital account. It appears 
preferable for the company to cancel its treasury shares prior to redemption, in order 
to avoid the need of covering the redemption price payable to itself out of its 
distributable profits or the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares. 
When treasury shares are sold, the proceeds of the sale, up to an amount 
equal to the purchase price paid by the company, have to be treated as realised 
profit of the company.532 Any part of the resale price which exceeds the price paid by 
the company, must be transferred to the share premium account.533 
As far as disclosure is concerned, a company has to distinguish between 
shares repurchased and cancelled upon acquisition534 and shares that will be held 
in treasury. 535  When treasury shares are subsequently sold, transferred or 
cancelled, the number and nominal value of the shares so disposed of or cancelled, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
527  CA 1985 s 162D(1)(b); CA 2006 s 727(1)(b). An employees’ share scheme is defined in CA 
1985 s 743; CA 2006 s 1166. 
528  Minority buy-out rights are provided for in CA 1985 s 429; CA 2006 s 979. See Gore-Browne on 
Companies 24[39] and 46[32]. 
529  CA 1985 s 162D(3); CA 2006 s 727(4). 
530  CA 1985 s 162C(5)(b); CA 2006 s 726(4)(b).  
531  Only public companies may have treasury shares so the option of using capital is not available. 
532  CA 1985 s 162F(2); CA 2006 s 731(2). The price paid by the company is calculated as the 
weighted average price, set out in CA 1985 s 162F(4); CA 2006 s 741(4)(a). No price is 
regarded as having been paid by the company in respect of shares allotted to it as fully paid 
bonus shares, CA 1985 s 162F(5); CA 2006 s 731(4)(b). This makes sense, because the 
company purchased them out of distributable profits (and created a capital redemption reserve) 
or out of a fresh issue of shares. 
533  CA 1985 s 162F(3); CA 2006 s 731(3). 
534  CA 1985 s 169(1A); CA 2006 s 707(1) – (2). 
535  CA 1985 s 169(1B); CA 2006 s 707 (1) – (2). 
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and the date on which this happened, must also be disclosed within 28 days.536  
The introduction of treasury shares in England at a time when other 
jurisdictions have abolished them can be explained by the retention of the share 
capital concept. One of the main advantages of treasury shares identified in 
England relates to the management by companies of their debt-equity ratios. Unless 
treasury shares are allowed, a repurchase will result in an increase of the ratio of 
debt to equity and the only way to counter this is to resort to an issue of new shares, 
which can be expensive.537 When treasury shares are resold, the company need not 
incur underwriting costs. Other advantages include having shares available for 
employee share schemes and share option demands.538  
The risk of market manipulation and abuse is addressed by the FSA Listing 
Rules. The disposal of treasury shares are subject to the same limitations as a 
disposal of shares by a director, and when being disposed of at a discount of more 
than ten per cent to the middle price of the shares at the time of sale, all existing 
shareholders must be given the opportunity of acquiring them proportionately.539 
6.7 Repurchases through subsidiaries 
A subsidiary may not purchase shares in its holding company. This prohibition is 
inferred from the fact that a company may not directly or through a nominee be a 
member of its holding company.540 A subsidiary may continue to hold shares in its 
holding company that it acquired before becoming a subsidiary 541  or in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
536  CA 1985 s 169A; CA 2006 s 728 (disposals) and s 730 (subsequent cancellations). 
537  See Morse “Treasury Shares” 304, 306. 
538  Morse “Treasury Shares” 306. 
539  See Morse “Treasury Shares” 316 – 318. See also chapter XV of the FSA Listing Rules. 
540  CA 1985 s 23(1); CA 2006 s 136(1)(a). Limited exceptions apply. A subsidiary may hold shares 
as a personal representative or as a trustee, provided the holding company or a subsidiary of it 
is not beneficially interested under the trust, CA 1985 s 23(2); CA 2006 s 138. A subsidiary who 
is an authorised dealer in securities may also hold shares in its holding company in the ordinary 
course of its business as intermediary, CA 1985 s 23(3); CA 2006 s 141. For an explanation of 
the extent of this exception, see Gore-Browne on Companies 24[45] – 24[49]. 
541  CA 1985 s 23(5); CA 2006 s 137. 
   112 
circumstances where it could lawfully acquire them,542 but may not vote in respect of 
the shares while it remains a subsidiary.543 It may receive bonus shares allotted out 
of the capitalisation of reserves.544 Since the right to vote is expressly excluded, but 
not the right to receive a dividend, it can be inferred that subsidiaries may receive 
dividends. This is also in line with the position in South Africa.545 
6.8 Redemption of shares 
The redemption of redeemable preference shares has been possible in England 
since 1928.546 When the new share repurchase provisions were first introduced, it 
became possible for a company to issue shares of any class as redeemable 
shares, 547  provided it also issues at least one class of shares that are not 
redeemable.548 Although CA 1985 subjected the power to issue redeemable shares 
to authorisation in the articles, CA 2006 requires this only in respect of public 
companies. 549  Under CA 2006 private companies have the power to issue 
redeemable shares unless restricted or excluded by their articles.550 Relaxation of 
the formalities by CA 2006 also affects the terms and manner of the redemption. It is 
expressly provided that the directors can determine the terms, condition and 
manner of redemption either in terms of an authority in the articles or in terms of an 
ordinary resolution, despite the fact that the resolution may amend the articles.551 
_________________________________________________________________ 
542  CA 1985 s 23(4); CA 2006 s 136(1)(b) – (c). 
543  CA 1985 s 23(5); CA 2006 s 137(4). See Acatos & Hutcheson plc v Watson [1995] BCC 446. 
544  CA 1985 s 23(6); CA 2006 s 137(3). 
545  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.7. 
546  Gore-Browne on Companies 7 ed 248. 
547  CA 1985 s 159; CA 2006 s 684(1) refers only to shares issued as redeemable shares and 
consequently does not allow for the conversion of other shares into redeemable shares, see Re 
St James’ Court Estate Ltd [1944] Ch 6, see also Forth Wines Ltd, Petitioners, [1991] BCC 638, 
1993 SLT 170 Ct of Session, Inner House. See Gore-Browne on Companies 24-22 note 6. par 
24[23],  26[18] – 26[19]. The same effect as a subsequent conversion can presumably be 
achieved through a contingent repurchase contract. 
548  CA 1985 s 159(2); CA 2006 s 684(4). 
549  CA 2006 s 684(3). 
550  CA 2006 s 684(2). 
551  CA 2006 s 685. This relaxation is particularly interesting in view of CA 1985 s 159A, which was 
inserted by the 1989 Companies Act, but which has not been put into force. This amendment 
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Redemption may take place out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares or 
out of distributable profits.552 Details about the financial restrictions appear in the 
discussion of share repurchases and so are not repeated here.553 
While CA 1985 requires payment of the full redemption price on the date of 
redemption,554 CA 2006 allows an exception whereby an agreement between the 
company and the shareholder may provide for payment on a later date.555 
When redeemable shares were issued at a premium, any premium payable 
upon redemption may be paid out of a fresh issue of shares up to an amount equal 
to the lesser of: 
• the aggregate of the premiums received by the company on the issue of 
the shares redeemed 
• the current amount of the company’s share premium account, including 
any sum transferred to the account in respect of premiums on the new 
shares.556 
The share premium account must then be reduced by the amount of any payment 
made in respect of the premium out of the proceeds of the fresh issue of shares.557 
Redeemed shares are to be treated as cancelled and the issued capital of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
took the opposite direction by requiring extensive terms and conditions for redemption in the 
articles, which would limit the discretion of directors. See Gore-Browne on Companies 24-21 
24[23].  
552  CA 1985 s 160(1); CA 2006 s 687(2). CA 1985 s 180(2) provides that redeemable preference 
shares issued under section 59 of the 1948 Companies Act may also be redeemed out of the 
share premium account. CA 2006 does not provide for this. 
553  See paragraph 6.2.1 above. 
554  CA 1985 s 159(3); CA 2006 s 686(3). Peňa v Dale [2004] 2 BCLC 508 at pars 107 – 114. See 
Gore-Browne on Companies 24[23] note 13 on 24-22. 
555  CA 2006 s 686(2). 
556  CA 1985 s 160(2); CA 2006 s 687(4). See also paragraph 2.4 above. It has been noted that 
these requirements are stricter than the comparable South African provision in that they limit 
application of the premium to the shares that contributed it, see further Chapter 5 paragraph 
2.4.3.3.2. 
557  CA 1985 s 160(2); CA 2006 s 687(5). The Standing Committee on Company Law of the Law 
Society was opposed to the application of the share premium account to provide for a premium 
on redemption, see Sealy “Views on Share Repurchase” 27. 
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company must be reduced by the nominal value of the redeemed shares.558 The 
authorised capital is not regarded as having been diminished and the company can 
issue fresh shares up to the value of redeemable shares that are about to be 
redeemed. 559  The Registrar has to be notified within one month of any 
redemption.560 
Private companies may redeem their shares out of capital, subject to the same 
requirements that apply to purchases out of capital. 561  I consider these 
requirements in relation to share repurchases562 and do not repeat them here. 
7 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
Despite the significance which other financial facts about the company may 
have for creditors, British law still regards a company’s statement of the level of 
assets contributed by the shareholders to the company in exchange for shares 
as an important element in creditor protection.563 
Although the above statement was made with reference to CA 1985, it remains true 
under CA 2006. Apart from the abolition of the concept ‘authorised capital’ by CA 
2006,564 very little will have changed once all its provisions are in force.  
In addition to submitting current statements pertaining to their issued 
capital,565 companies generally have to maintain their share capital and may make 
distributions only out of an excess of assets over liabilities and share capital.566   
In respect of public companies, England has little freedom to reform its share 
capital and distribution rules and is dependent on EU initiatives that may allow it to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
558  CA 1985 s 160(4); CA 2006 s 687(6). 
559  CA 1985 s 160(4) – (5); CA 2006 s 688(a) – (b). 
560  CA 1985 s 169; CA 2006 s 689. Failure to do so renders the company and every officer in default 
liable to a daily default fine. See Gore-Browne on Companies 24[23] at 24-22. 
561  CA 1985 s 160(1); CA 2006 s 687(1). 
562  See paragraph 6.2.2 above. 
563  Gower & Davies’ Company Law 7 ed 289 – 290. 
564  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
565  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
566  See paragraph 5.2 above. 
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do so.567 Although it is theoretically possible to drastically reform the rules for private 
companies, an option that was indeed contemplated in the reform process, practical 
considerations militate against drastic divergence in the regulation of the capital 
structure of public and private companies. 568  As a result, the recent reforms 
pertaining to private companies tend to affect procedure rather than substance. 
The abolition of the concept of authorised capital has the effect of simplifying 
the variation of capital provisions.569 While authorised capital is a feature of CA 
1985, the risk of confusion on the part of investors and creditors is reduced by the 
requirement that references on the stationery of the company must be to its paid-up 
capital. Such a provision has definite advantages, because it also avoids the risk of 
confusion between allotted or issued capital and paid-up capital, given the fact that 
partly paid shares are allowed in England. South Africa could benefit from such a 
provision. 
Shareholders are protected against the dilution of their equity interests through 
pre-emptive rights that apply to all companies, unless expressly excluded in their 
articles of association.570 Any issue of shares wholly for cash consideration is 
subject to pre-emptive rights. In addition, the issue of shares must be approved by 
the shareholders or by a general authority in the articles. This existing protection of 
shareholders was regarded as adequate, so it was not necessary to introduce any 
further restrictions on the power of directors to issue shares in CA 2006.  
Public companies have to have a minimum allotted share capital of £50 000, of 
which at least a quarter must be paid up when the company is incorporated.571 As in 
South Africa, no specific amount of minimum share capital is prescribed for private 
companies and such companies may have shares that are not paid up to any extent 
upon being issued. 
Shares have to have a par or nominal value and may not be issued at a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
567  See paragraph 1 above. 
568  See paragraph 2.3 above.  
569  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
570  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
571  See paragraph 2.2 above. 
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discount.572 The consideration received by the company must be reflected in a 
share capital account and, if the shares are issued at a premium, in a share 
premium account. The capital structure of a company is closely regulated. A specific 
feature of the regulation of share premium accounts is the much greater degree of 
correlation between the contribution of a premium by a particular class of shares 
and the subsequent application of the share premium account.573 This reveals a 
much more sophisticated approach than the current South African position. Specific 
relief is also provided in the case of mergers and group reconstructions, with the 
result that the amount by which the value of shares received exceeds the par value 
of shares issued in exchange, need not be reflected in the share premium 
account.574 
Provision is made for the variation and reduction of share capital, where the 
basic approach entails that share capital is substituted by a non-distributable 
reserve.575 Reductions of capital are also possible with the sanction of the court.576 
However, CA 2006 introduces an alternative reduction of capital procedure for 
private companies. 577  This procedure dispenses with the requirement of court 
approval and depends on the solvency and liquidity of the company.  
Under the traditional reduction procedure subject to court approval, creditors 
enjoy particularly strong protection. They can object to the reduction and can in 
effect force the company either to pay them immediately or to provide security for 
the satisfaction of their claims.578 Under the new alternative reduction procedure 
applicable to private companies, creditors are protected by the solvency and 
liquidity requirements only.579  
Shareholders are also protected in various ways when a company reduces its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
572  See paragraphs 2.3 and 3.1 above. 
573  See paragraph 2.4.3 above. 
574  See paragraph 2.4.3 above. 
575  See paragraph 2.5 above. 
576  See paragraph 2.6.1 above. 
577  See paragraph 2.6.2 above. 
578  See paragraph 2.6.1 above. 
579  See paragraph 2.6.2 above. 
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capital. 580   First, a special resolution is required for any reduction of capital. 
Secondly, where class rights are affected, the procedure for variation of class rights 
must be followed. Thirdly, the courts have formulated particular guidelines about the 
fair treatment of different classes of shares and of shares within a class.   
Shareholder capital contributions are closely regulated, and shares may not be 
issued at a discount.581 Specific provision is made for the issuing of capitalisation 
shares, to make it clear that such issues do not violate the requirements on 
consideration. The types of consideration that may be accepted by public 
companies are more limited than for private companies.582 Further, in the case of 
public companies independent valuation of non-cash consideration is required, 
while proper disclosure of non-cash consideration is required in private companies. 
583  Although shares need not be fully paid up upon issue, restrictions apply to public 
companies.584 At least a quarter of the par value must be paid up when the shares 
are issued and it is required that the consideration must be transferred within five 
years of the issue of the shares. These rules are aimed at protecting creditors and 
existing shareholders.   
In line with the capital maintenance doctrine, the prescriptions on the formation 
of share capital are supplemented by distribution rules that rely on the concept of 
distributable profits. Distributable profits are net assets of the company in excess of 
its issued capital and prescribed reserves.585  Although there is a definition of 
‘distribution’, this definition excludes share repurchases and redemptions, 
reductions of capital and capitalisation issues as these are provided for separately. 
Liquidation distributions are also excluded. Distributions include dividends as well 
as any other payments to shareholders. Although the definition of distribution does 
not expressly require the payment to be ‘in respect of’ or ‘by reason of’ shareholding, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
580  See paragraph 2.6 above. 
581  See paragraph 3.1 above. 
582  See paragraph 3.2 above. 
583  See paragraph 3.3 above. 
584  See paragraph 3.4 above. 
585  See paragraph 4 above. 
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the courts apply it in this way.  
Distributable profits must be determined as prescribed in the legislation. This 
entails that specified items in the ‘relevant accounts’, usually the last annual 
accounts, properly audited, must be considered. Public companies also have to 
provide for unrealised losses. These rules are stricter than the common-law rules on 
the determination of ‘profits’. Although the limitations theoretically apply at the 
moment of payment or making of the distribution, there is some confusion in this 
regard, given that the last annual accounts must be used to determine the amount of 
the distributable profits.  
When a company has made a distribution in violation of the requirements, the 
recipient who knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the distribution was so 
made, is liable to repay to the company the amount of the distribution or its value.586 
The statutory liability does not replace and common-law liability, but it is uncertain 
whether shareholders can be held liable despite receiving a distribution in good 
faith. Directors can be held liable at common law.587  
A definite benefit of the English system is that the same financial restrictions 
are applicable to repurchases and redemptions, although the procedural aspects 
differ.588 This avoids the arbitrage of the current South African regulation of share 
repurchases and redemptions.  
Repurchases and redemptions can be made out of distributable profits or 
alternatively out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares.589 When distributable 
profits are used, the nominal capital of the acquired shares must be reflected in a 
capital redemption reserve.  
By way of exception, private companies may repurchase or redeem their 
shares out of share capital, although distributable profits and the proceeds of a fresh 
issue of shares must be exhausted first so that the resultant capital reduction is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
586  See paragraph 5.6 above. 
587  See paragraph 5.6 above. 
588  See paragraph 6.1 above. 
589  See paragraph 6.2 above. 
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limited to the ‘permissible capital payment’.590 An equity solvency test applies and 
directors have to issue a formal declaration certified by the auditors.591 Moreover, 
there must be public notice of the intended repurchase and members as well as 
creditors have the opportunity of objecting to court against the intended 
repurchase.592  
Payment out of capital must take place within strict time limits that are 
designed to ensure on the one hand, that the financial position of the company will 
unlikely have changed since the date of the solvency statement and, on the other 
hand, that creditors and members are nevertheless given sufficient opportunity to 
object if they so wish.  
There are a number of differences between this procedure and the new 
alternative reduction of capital procedure provided for in CA 2006. It is difficult to 
justify these differences given that the two procedures can achieve the same effect 
and that the simplified reduction procedure was intended to substitute the 
repurchase of shares out of capital.593  
The procedure for share repurchases depends on the kind of repurchase that 
is involved. A distinction is made between off-market repurchases, 594  market 
repurchases and repurchases out of capital.595 In all three instances, the articles of 
the company must authorise a repurchase.596 A special resolution is required, 
except in the case of a market repurchase where an ordinary resolution will 
suffice.597   
Although no express provision is made for self-tender or proportionate offers, 
minority shareholders are protected by the voting exclusion applicable in respect of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
590  See paragraph 6.2.2 above. 
591  See paragraph 6.3 above. 
592  See paragraph 6.3.3.4 above. 
593  See paragraph 6.3.1.5 above. 
594  Including contingent repurchase contracts. 
595  See paragraph 6.3 above. 
596  See paragraph 6.3.1 above. 
597  See paragraph 6.3.1 above. 
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the shares that will be acquired in an off-market repurchase.598 The identity of the 
vendor-shareholder(s) and the terms of the repurchase must also be disclosed.599 A 
further safeguard is the requirement that any variation of the contract must be 
approved by special resolution.600  
Although an ordinary rather than a special resolution is required for market 
purchases, the maximum number of shares as well as the maximum and minimum 
prices must be specified in the resolution. Provision is also made for full disclosure 
of the terms of the acquisition once implemented.601  
Finally, the FSA Listing Rules require that substantial market repurchases602 
should be implemented by way of an offer extended to all shareholders, either 
through a partial offer or as a self-tender offer.603 
The repurchase of shares out of capital is subject to additional requirements 
pertaining to publicity and timing.604 No voting rights may be exercised in respect of 
the shares that are to be acquired. The right of members and creditors to object to 
an intended repurchase is a significant protection measure.605 
It is clear that in England the main protection for shareholders against unfair 
repurchases lie in the requirements of authorisation, the exclusion of voting rights, 
and proper disclosure. Although companies are generally free to repurchase their 
shares proportionately from shareholders in an off-market repurchase, it is only in 
the case of substantial market repurchases that equal treatment is compulsory.606   
The treatment of a share repurchase in the company’s share capital accounts 
depends on the source from which the acquisition is funded. However, the 
underlying principle is that the cancelled share capital must be replaced either by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
598  See paragraph 6.3.1.1 above. 
599  See paragraph 6.3.1.1 above. 
600  See paragraph 6.3.2 above. 
601  See paragraph 6.3.1.3 above. 
602  An acquisition of more than 15% of a company’s equity shares. 
603  See paragraph 6.3.1.3 above. 
604  See paragraph 6.3.3 above. 
605  See paragraph 6.3.3.4 above. 
606  See paragraph 6.3.1.3 above. 
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fresh capital or by a capital redemption reserve.607 When shares are repurchased 
out of share capital, the accounts may be adjusted to reflect a reduction equal to the 
permissible capital payment. 
A repurchase in violation of the statutory requirements is void, and gives rise to 
a claim for restitution. Directors will also have committed an offence. Where shares 
have been repurchased out of share capital and the company is subsequently 
wound up within one year of the payment, the directors and vendor-shareholders 
will be personally liable under the Insolvency Act 1986 to contribute to the assets of 
the company.608 Liability is for the lesser of the amount of the unlawful payment and 
the deficiency between assets and liabilities including the costs of winding-up. The 
court can apportion the liability between directors and shareholders. It is notable that 
no similar liability is imposed in respect of unauthorised reductions of capital under 
the new alternative capital reduction procedure. In addition, liability for repurchases 
from capital differs from the liability that can be imposed in respect of other unlawful 
distributions. Although South Africa may possibly benefit from a consideration of 
certain aspects of liability for unlawful distributions in England, such as the flexibility 
in apportioning liability between directors and shareholders in the case of 
repurchases out of capital, the English model is too fragmented and inconsistent to 
serve as an example for South Africa. 
The English provisions on enforceability of unexecuted repurchase 
agreements rely on the same principle as the South African provision, namely that 
specific performance cannot be ordered if performance will contravene the financial 
restrictions.609 But the English provision is primarily designed for repurchases and 
redemptions otherwise than out of capital because it provides that specific 
performance is possible only if the company has sufficient distributable profits. 
However, the ranking of claims on winding-up applies to any outstanding liability for 
repurchase or redemption, regardless of the financial restrictions involved and so 
_________________________________________________________________ 
607  See paragraph 6.3.4 above. 
608  See paragraph 6.4.2 above. 
609  See paragraph 6.5 above. 
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will apply to repurchases out of capital as well. The advantage of the English 
provision is that it also addresses the status of an obligation to redeem shares. 
South Africa could benefit by extending its rules regarding enforceability of 
repurchases to instances of redemption.  
Shares repurchased or redeemed by a company must be cancelled. However, 
listed companies may hold up to ten per cent of their own shares in treasury. 610 The 
acquisition, holding and disposal of treasury shares are strictly regulated and the 
underlying objective is to ensure neutrality between holding and cancelling acquired 
shares. Nevertheless, several advantages remain, particularly flexibility and cost 
savings compared to subsequent fresh issues.  
Under English Law, subsidiaries are not allowed to purchase shares in their 
holding companies.611  In view of the fact that in South Africa shares held by 
subsidiaries are analogous to treasury shares, some comparison of direct and 
‘indirect’ treasury shares may be useful.612  
The temptation of dismissing English law as a useful source of comparison 
because it still adheres to the basic tenets of the outdated capital maintenance 
doctrine should be resisted. The basic objectives of creditor and shareholder 
protection play a central role in English company law and recently enjoyed the 
attention of policy-makers in the course of a very thorough and well-documented law 
reform process. 
Despite the unavoidable rigidity of capital structure brought about by a par 
value system, the CA 2006 nevertheless managed to introduce some relief by 
abolishing authorised capital, with resultant simplification of capital variations, and 
simplification of the reduction of capital for private companies. 
Even after these reforms, the English approach to creditor protection is 
somewhat out of step with that in other modern jurisdictions. Apart from the 
complexity caused by the co-existence of financial restrictions based on the ideas 
_________________________________________________________________ 
610  See paragraph 6.6 above. 
611  See paragraph 6.7 above. 
612  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.10.7. 
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underlying the capital maintenance doctrine and the modern solvency and liquidity 
approach, the system is incongruous in a number of respects. This is evident from 
the haphazard availability of the creditor objection procedure613 and the anomalous 
treatment of liability in respect of different unlawful distributions. Nevertheless, the 
rules on the determination of distributable profits in accordance with statutory 
guidelines represent a marked improvement on the vague common-law standards 
that applied to dividends. This in itself addresses many of the criticisms against the 
ineffectiveness of the eroded capital maintenance doctrine.   
Shareholders enjoy considerable protection against the dilution of their equity 
interests and against unfair treatment. The Companies legislation provides some of 
this protection in the form of prescriptions regarding approval for the issuing of 
shares, pre-emptive rights, the regulation of non-cash consideration, the right to 
object against capital reductions, the authorisation of repurchases and the 
regulation of treasury shares. These rules are supplemented by the FSA Listing 
Rules in appropriate circumstances. Finally, English courts have developed specific 
principles regarding fair treatment of shareholders. 
It will be interesting to monitor developments in England against the 
background of the reform of the principles embodied in the Second Company Law 
Directive. As the United Kingdom is increasing in popularity as a state of 
incorporation in the EU,614  it can be expected to make maximum use of any 
opportunity to modernise its share capital and distribution rules.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
613  It is available for capital reductions subject to court confirmation and for share repurchases out 
of capital, but not for the alternative capital reduction procedure, although the last two 
procedures both involve private companies and depend on a solvency statement. 
614  See Boyle & Birds’ Company Law 24. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
NEW ZEALAND 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
The main statutory source of Company Law in New Zealand is the Companies Act 
19931 that came into force on 1 July 1994.2  It applies to all new companies 
incorporated or reregistered since that date and, from 1 July 1997, to all existing 
companies that failed to reregister.3 The Act is supplemented by various other 
statutes,4 the common law,5 and precedents. The distinction between public and 
private companies was abandoned under the Companies Act of 1993.6 Another 
innovation is that companies need not have a constitution, in which case the default 
provisions of the Act apply.7 
Prior to the enactment of the 1993 Act, the capital maintenance doctrine 
applied in New Zealand.8 In addition to this, distributions to shareholders were 
subject to compliance with a common-law solvency and liquidity test.9 The 1993 Act 
_________________________________________________________________ 
1  No 105, hereafter in this chapter ‘the Act’. All references to section numbers in this chapter are 
to sections in this Act, unless otherwise indicated. 
2  Section 1(2). 
3  Companies Reregistration Act 1993, No 121, s 3, s 13. The Companies Act 1955, No 63 was 
repealed by the Companies Act Repeal Act 1993, No 126 which came into force on the close of 
day of 30 June 1997, s 1(2). For a discussion of the position during the 3 year transitional period, 
see Goodwin “New Zealand Companies Act 1993” 278 – 279. 
4  Other applicable legislation includes the Takeovers Act 1993, No 107, the Financial Reporting 
Act 1993, No 106, the Receiverships Act 1993, No 122 and the Companies (Registration of 
Charges) Act 1993, No 125. 
5  Which is based on English Law, see Grantham & Rickett Company and Securities Law 33. The 
Companies Act of 1955 No 63 mirrored the English Companies Act of 1948 (11&12 Geo, c 36), 
see Grantham & Rickett Company and Securities Law 38.  
6  Company Law: Reform and Restatement (Report No 9, 1989). Certain other statutes, for ex-
ample, the Financial Reporting Act 1993, No 106 do distinguish between companies on other 
grounds, such as turnover, number of shareholders etc. Generally all companies afford their 
members limited liability, but the constitution of a company may provide for personal liability of 
the members, see s 21. 
7  Section 26. See also Grantham & Rickett Company and Securities Law 181 – 182. 
8  Grantham & Rickett Company and Securities Law 851 – 852; Morison’s Company and Securi-
ties Law 14.1. 
9  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 14.1. See Hilton International Ltd v Hilton (1988) 
NZCLC 64, 721 at 750 – 751; [1989] 1 NZLR 442 on the application and history of the common 
law principle of solvency, which included balance sheet and liquidity elements. For an outline of 
the reform process, see Morison’s Company and Securities Law 1.5 
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moves away from capital maintenance and subjects distributions to the solvency 
and liquidity of the company, as certified by the directors.10  
2 STRUCTURE OF SHARE CAPITAL 
The Act does not use the concepts ‘authorised capital’ and ‘share capital’.11 For 
certain purposes reference is made to shareholders’ funds as being the aggregate 
of amounts received by shareholders for the issue of their shares plus reserves.12 
One of the essential requirements for the registration and existence of a 
company is that it must have at least one share.13 The liability of shareholders is 
expressed with reference to any amount unpaid on their shares.14 
Although a company is obliged to issue the shares specified in its application 
for registration immediately upon incorporation, 15  it need not receive any 
consideration for these initial shares.16 A company may be formed without any 
share capital.  
Shares may not have a nominal or par value.17 The Act does not require the 
consideration received for the issue of shares to be reflected in any particular 
account of the company. However, a copy of the directors’ certificate setting out the 
amount or the present cash value of the consideration for the issue of shares must 
be registered 18  and may be inspected by shareholders. 19  In a sense, these 
_________________________________________________________________ 
10  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 14.2. 
11  Grantham & Rickett Company and Securities Law 835. 
12  See s 80(1) which deals with certain instances of financial assistance. 
13  Section 10. The remaining requirements are that it should have a name, one or more share-
holders, and one or more directors. 
14  Section 97(2)(a). The constitution of a company can also provide for unlimited liability, s 97(2), 
or for specific instances of liability, s 97(2)(b). Further, it is expressly stated that shareholders 
are liable to repay unlawful distributions, s 97(2)(d). Finally, shareholders can be liable as di-
rectors, s 97(2)(c), or because they exercised the functions usually exercised by directors, s 
97(2)(e). See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 3.1. 
15  Section 41(a). 
16  See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.9. Initial shares are issued by the company 
under s 41 while subsequently issued shares are issued by the board of directors under s 42 or, 
if the company has a constitution that limits the rights of directors to issue shares, under s 44 
following shareholder approval for the issue.  
17  Section 38(1). Under the Companies Act 1955 all shares had to have a par value, see Morison’s 
Company and Securities Law 13.3. 
18  Section 43(1). 
19  Section 216. 
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certificates will give an indication of the contributed share capital of the company. 
Such disclosure is not required in respect of initial shares of the company, though.20 
The board of directors may issue further shares at any time, to any person, and 
in any number it thinks fit.21  However, this right is subject to compliance with the Act 
and the constitution of a company.22 Compliance with the Act and the constitution of 
the company can be waived by unanimous assent of entitled persons.23 The Act 
controls the power of directors to issue further shares in different ways. 
First, pre-emptive rights apply unless excluded in the constitution of a 
company.24 The default pre-emptive rights apply to any issue of shares by the 
company, regardless of the nature of the consideration for which the shares are 
issued.  
A second measure controlling the power of directors to issue shares is the 
imposition of a positive duty on directors to consider the interests of the company 
and all the existing shareholders.25 The common-law duties of directors when 
further shares are issued are partially codified and extended. The directors have to 
determine by resolution that not only the consideration, but also the terms of the 
issue, are fair and reasonable to the company and all the existing shareholders.26 A 
determination by the directors is a precondition for the issuing of shares.27 A 
purported issue is void if the relevant determination was not made.28 
Thirdly, shareholder approval is required in certain instances. The issue of 
further shares that rank equally with or in priority to existing shares is deemed to be 
an action affecting the rights attaching to existing shares.29 This is so unless the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
20  Section 43(1) refers only to shares issued by the directors (s 42) and to shares issued following 
an amalgamation (s 41(b)). 
21  Section 42. 
22  Section 42. 
23  Section 107(2). ‘Entitled person’ is defined as a shareholder or any other person who in terms of 
the constitution of a company has any of the rights or powers of a shareholder, s 1. 
24  Section 45(1) read with s 45(3). 
25  Section 47. A similar duty applies in respect of the issue of options and convertible securities, 
see s 49. 
26  Section 47. 
27  The introductory words of s 47(1) read ‘Before the board of a company issues shares…’ (em-
phasis added). 
28  Waller v Paul (1997) 8 NZCLC 261 (High Court of New Zealand). 
29  Section 117(3). 
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constitution expressly permits the issue of these further shares or the issue is 
subject to pre-emptive rights.30 Since the issue of further shares is deemed to be an 
alteration of shareholder rights, it has to be approved by special resolution of each 
interest group.31 Dissenting shareholders can exercise appraisal rights.32  
The constitution of a company can also require that the issue of shares will be 
subject to shareholder approval. 33  In the event of non-compliance with this 
requirement, the issue will nevertheless be valid, 34  but the directors will incur 
criminal liability.35  
3 CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
3.1 Size of capital contribution 
Although consideration for the issuing of shares is regulated, the purpose is to 
protect the company and its existing shareholders rather than the creditors of the 
company.36 The directors have to decide for which consideration and on which 
terms the shares will be issued.37 Then they have to resolve that the consideration 
and terms they decided on are fair and reasonable to the company and to all its 
existing shareholders.38 The directors who vote to adopt this resolution have to sign 
a certificate setting out the consideration, terms, and their assessment of the 
fairness and reasonableness of the issue.39 A director who fails to comply with the 
requirements pertaining to the certificate commits a criminal offence.40 
_________________________________________________________________ 
30  Section 117(3)(a), (b). 
31  Section 117(1). An interest group is a group of shareholders with identical rights and whose 
rights are affected by an action or proposal in the same way, s 116. An issue in violation of this 
requirement will, however, not be void, s 119. 
32  Section 118, read with s 111. 
33  Section 44(1). 
34  Section 44(5). 
35  Section 44(6). 
36  However, the reduction of a shareholder’s liability in respect of a share is regarded as a distri-
bution, see paragraph 4.1 below. This is indicative of a link between the liability to contribute and 
the interests of creditors. 
37  Section 47(1)(a). 
38  Section 47(1)(c). 
39  Section 47(2). 
40  Section 47(4). 
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The regulation of consideration for and terms of issue of shares is solely for the 
protection of the company and its shareholders. As a result, the shareholders can by 
unanimous written assent 41 dispense with requirements as to authorisation of 
issues,42 determination and certification of consideration and terms,43 pre-emptive 
rights,44 any other restriction in the Act or the company’s constitution.45  
The constitution of a company may provide that shares carry a liability to calls 
or may otherwise impose a liability on a shareholder.46 Unlike the liability to pay the 
consideration for the issue of a share, which remains a liability of the person to 
whom the share was issued or who assumed liability for the consideration at the 
time of issue, the liability to pay calls always rests on the present holder of a share.47 
3.2 Form of capital contribution 
Consideration for the issue of shares may be cash, promissory notes, contracts for 
future services, real or personal property, or other securities of the company.48 
It is not clear whether the issue of bonus shares is regarded as an issue for no 
consideration. When shares that are ‘fully paid up from the reserves’ of the company 
are issued proportionately to all shareholders in a class, the directors do not have to 
pass a resolution and sign a certificate regarding the consideration and terms of 
issue.49 A leading commentary questions the justification for this exception by 
pointing out that such an issue can nevertheless disturb the overall equity interest in 
the company.50 The exception leaves shareholders of the other classes unprotected 
by the requirements designed to protect all existing shareholders. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
41  Section 107. See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.14. 
42  Section 44. 
43  Section 47. 
44  Section 45. 
45  Section 42. 
46  Section 100. The liability rests on the shareholder at the time the call is made, see Morison’s 
Company and Securities Law 13.18. 
47  Section 100(1). This is so even if the liability became enforceable prior to the transfer of the 
share to its present holder. 
48  Section 46. 
49  Section 48(a). Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.14 criticises the reference to the 
shares being ‘paid up’ from reserves as these seem to be remnants of the previous Act. 
50  See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.14 
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The directors’ determination and certificate are also not required in the case of 
proportionate consolidations and subdivisions of shares.51 These actions clearly do 
not involve the reallocation of equity interests.52  
3.3 The regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
Where non-cash consideration is accepted either when shares are to be issued or 
when they are subsequently credited as paid up, wholly or partly, other than in cash, 
the directors must determine the reasonable present cash value of the 
consideration.53 They must also adopt a resolution declaring that the present cash 
value is not less than the amount to be credited for the issue of the shares.54 Then 
they have to sign a certificate describing the consideration in sufficient detail to 
identify it, stating the present cash value and the basis for assessing it, and 
declaring that the present cash value is fair, reasonable, and at least equal to the 
amount to be credited in respect of the shares.55 A copy of such a certificate has to 
be delivered to the Registrar for registration within 10 working days after it is given.56  
The reference to an amount that is to be credited for the issue of shares has 
been criticised as being anomalous, given the absence of a concept of nominal 
capital.57 Presumably, this provision can only apply if the board of directors fixed an 
amount of money as consideration and then later accepts non-cash consideration 
from some shareholders. If the directors determine a non-cash consideration only, 
there is no ‘amount’ to be credited.58 
_________________________________________________________________ 
51  Section 48(b), (c).  
52  See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.14 who further asserts that a subdivision or 
consolidation does not really involve the issuing of shares.  
53  Section 47(1)(b). 
54  Section 47(1)(d) and 47(2)(e). Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.13 criticises this 
requirement because in the absence of par value and share capital accounts it is impossible to 
determine ‘the amount to be credited for the issue of shares’ if the shares are to be issued for 
specified property. However, the purpose seems to be that the consideration should not be 
overvalued in the books of the company. Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.19 regards 
this as an example of old concepts brought forward from the capital maintenance rule. A 
company need not reflect any amount as consideration. 
55  Section 47(2) and (4). 
56  Section 47(5). 
57  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.13. It is said that it carries forward vestiges of the old 
share capital idea. 
58  But the present cash value will still have to be determined and certified as fair by the directors. 
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Shares are also regarded as paid up ‘other than in cash’ if they are credited as 
fully or partly paid up as part of an arrangement involving a transfer of property or 
the provision of services, even if the arrangement also involves an exchange of cash 
or cheques or other negotiable instruments.59  
When previously issued shares are later credited as fully or partly paid up 
other than for cash, the directors also have to determine the present cash value of 
the consideration and resolve and certify that it is fair and reasonable to the 
company and all its existing shareholders and that the present cash value is not less 
than the amount to be credited in respect of the shares.60 This provision appears to 
be an important anti-avoidance measure and should be considered as a possible 
improvement on the proposed regulation in the South African Companies Bill.61 
3.4 Timing of capital contribution 
It is not a requirement that the company should actually receive the consideration 
before the shares are issued. The person to whom a share was issued, or another 
person who undertook the liability for the consideration at the time of issue will, 
however, remain liable to pay the consideration for the issue of the share, despite a 
subsequent transfer of the share.62 The directors may also have the power to refuse 
to register the transfer of a share while any liability attaching to it remains 
outstanding.63  
4 DISTRIBUTIONS 
A company may make distributions to shareholders subject to requirements 
designed to protect creditors and ensure fair treatment of shareholders. 
Non-compliance with any of these requirements is deemed to constitute unfairly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
59  Section 47(6). 
60  Section 47(3). See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 13.19 for criticism of this provision. 
Morison’s Company and Securities Law argues that the provision of agreed services or 
non-cash consideration cannot strictly be regarded as ‘paying up’ a share and that s 47(3) thus 
possibly does not apply where the shares were initially agreed to be issued for non-cash con-
sideration. 
61  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 3.6.3 and 3.7.3. 
62  Section 100(2). 
63  Section 84(5). 
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prejudicial conduct towards a shareholder for purposes of the minority oppression 
remedy.64  
Distributions are regulated in general by the inclusion of a definition of 
‘distribution’ and by the requirements of the solvency test. However, the solvency 
test is modified for certain specific kinds of distributions and different procedures 
and other requirements are prescribed for different kinds of distributions. 
4.1 Kinds of payments regulated  
‘Distribution’ is defined as: 
• in relation to a distribution by a company to a shareholder: 
• the direct or indirect transfer of money or property, other than the 
company’s own shares, to or for the benefit of the shareholder; or 
• the incurring of a debt to or for the benefit of the shareholder – 
• in relation to shares held by that shareholder, and whether by means of a 
purchase of property, the redemption or other acquisition of shares, a 
distribution of indebtedness, or by some other means.65 
The essence of this definition is that the company must make the distribution in 
relation to shares held by the shareholder. A distribution requires both an outflow of 
funds from the company and a corresponding benefit conferred on the 
shareholder.66 This is comparable to the requirement in the definition of ‘payment’ in 
South Africa that the payment must be ‘by reason of the shareholding’ of the 
shareholder.67 The use of the words ‘direct or indirect’ is another feature common to 
these two definitions.  The current South African definition does not expressly 
include the incurring of a debt, although such an extension has been proposed.68  
Apart from this general definition, various other provisions specifically state 
that a particular transaction is a distribution.69 The cancellation or reduction of a 
shareholder’s liability in relation to a share will be regarded as a distribution to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
64  Section 175. The minority oppression remedy is set out in s 174. 
65  Section 2(1) s v ‘distribution’. 
66  DML Resources Ltd (in liquidation) [2004] 3 NZLR 490 (HL) 505. See also Blackman, Jooste & 
Everingham Companies Act 5-116 – 5-117.  
67  See Chapter 5 paragraph 5.1.2. 
68  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.  
69  See s 55(5) and s 57. 
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shareholder of the amount by which the liability is reduced.70 This will be the case 
regardless of whether the reduction or cancellation is achieved through an alteration 
of the company’s constitution, the acquisition of own shares, or the redemption of 
shares.71 It is interesting to note that in addition to being a distribution, it will also be 
a dividend, necessitating equal treatment of shareholders.72 The same principle 
applies to amalgamations between companies resulting in the reduction of 
shareholder liability, but its ambit is there extended to include shareholders who do 
not become shareholders of the new company.73 
4.2 Financial restrictions 
The solvency test is set out in section 4. It comprises two elements, namely an 
equity solvency or liquidity test which is satisfied if the company is able to pay its 
debts as they become due in the normal course of business,74 and a balance sheet 
test, which requires the value of the company’s assets to be equal or exceed the 
value of its liabilities, including contingent liabilities.75  
Section 4 contains various prescriptions regarding the application of the 
balance sheet test, but no further indication as to the interpretation of the liquidity 
test. In determining whether the balance sheet test is satisfied, the directors must 
have regard to the most recent financial statements of the company that comply with 
the Financial Reporting Act 1993, as well as to other circumstances they know of or 
ought to know of that affect or could affect the value of the assets or liabilities.76 The 
valuation of contingent liabilities may be determined by having regard to the 
likelihood of the contingency occurring.77 The directors may deduct the amount of 
any claim the company can make and which can reasonably be expected to be met, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
70  Section 57. 
71  Section 57(1)(a), (2). 
72  Section 57(1)(b). Section 53 provides for proportionality of distributions among the shareholders 
of the same class, see paragraph 6 below. On the common-law presumption of shareholder 
equality, see Preston v Grant-Collier Dock Co (1840) 11 Sim 327; Galloway v Halle Concert 
Society [1915] 2 Ch 233. 
73  Section 57(3). 
74  Section 4(1)(a). 
75  Section 4(1)(b). 
76  Section 4(2)(a). 
77  Section 4(4)(a). 
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that would reduce or extinguish the contingent liability.78 A director may rely on 
valuations of assets or estimates of liabilities that are reasonable in the 
circumstances.79 
The solvency test is refined for purposes of section 52, which deals with the 
power to make distributions, and section 56, which governs the recovery of 
distributions made in breach of the solvency test.80 Debts, which are to be taken into 
account in assessing the liquidity of the company, include fixed preferential returns 
on shares ranking ahead of the shares in respect of which a distribution is made.81 
However, debts arising by reason of the authorisation must not be taken into 
account. 82  It makes sense to disregard debts that arise by reason of the 
authorisation, as these cannot really be described as debts becoming due in the 
normal course of business.83 This provision could provide clarity and a similar 
provision should be considered for South Africa.84  
Liabilities include the amount necessary to repay fixed preferential amounts 
payable on deregistration if the company were to be deregistered at the time of the 
distribution. 85  If the shares are liable to be redeemed before the date of the 
distribution, the redemption price must also be counted as a liability.86  
The interests of preference shareholders are protected. However, the 
constitution of the company can expressly provide that the fixed preferential 
amounts are subject to the power of the directors to make distributions.87 This 
approach stands in contrast with the current position in South Africa, where the 
preferential claims of shareholders are not regarded as liabilities.88  
_________________________________________________________________ 
78  Section 4(4)(b). See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 14.5 – 14.8 for a discussion of the 
practical application of the solvency test. 
79  Section 4(2)(b). 
80  Section 52(4). 
81  Section 52(4)(a). Where the company’s constitution provides that the fixed preferential return is 
subject to the directors’ power to make distributions, these preferential returns need not be 
taken into account. 
82  Section 52(4)(a). See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 14.5.  
83  Section 52(1), (2). 
84  See also Chapter 5 paragraph 4.2. 
85  Section 52(4)(b). 
86  Section 52(4)(b). 
87  Section 52(4)(b). 
88  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 4.3.1.2 and 4.4.1.3. 
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4.3 Timing for application of the financial restrictions 
Before it authorises a distribution, the board has to consider the financial position of 
the company and be satisfied that it will be solvent and liquid immediately after 
making the distribution.89 At this stage, the directors who support the distribution 
must sign a solvency certificate.90 However, if the board subsequently ceases to be 
satisfied that the company will satisfy the test, the distribution is deemed not to have 
been authorised.91 Although an enquiry must be made at the time of authorisation, 
the board’s view of the solvency and liquidity of the company at the time the 
distribution is actually made is decisive. The initial satisfaction of the board is 
relevant with respect to the question of authorisation only.  
The recoverability of a distribution from shareholders and directors depends 
on the actual solvency and liquidity of the company at the time of the distribution, not 
when it is authorised.92 
The formulation of the solvency test facilitates this distinction between its 
application in determining whether a distribution has been authorised and in 
establishing the recoverability of a distribution. This perspective can be useful in 
reforming the position in South Africa.93 
4.4 Status of claim in respect of authorised but unpaid distributions 
Although the Act expressly regulates the enforceability of repurchase contracts,94 it 
does not address the status of a claim in respect of an authorised but unpaid 
distribution. The authors of Morison’s Company and Securities Law argue that the 
authorisation of a distribution does not create a debt and that the common-law 
principle, that the declaration of a dividend created a debt recoverable by a 
shareholder, no longer applies.95 
_________________________________________________________________ 
89  Section 52(1). 
90  Section 52(2). 
91  Section 52(3). 
92  Section 56(1). Liability for the return of distributions is discussed in paragraph 4.6 below. 
93  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.1.1. 
94  In s 67, discussed in paragraph 6.5 below. 
95  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 14.5. 
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4.5 Authorisation 
Any distribution to shareholders must be authorised by the board of directors.96 The 
board must authorise a distribution only if it is satisfied on reasonable grounds that 
immediately after the distribution, the company will satisfy the solvency test.97 The 
directors voting in favour of a distribution have to sign a certificate stating that in their 
opinion the company will satisfy the solvency test and setting out the grounds for 
that opinion.98 
If after the authorisation of a distribution but before it is made, the board is no 
longer satisfied that the company will comply with the solvency test, the distribution 
is deemed not to have been authorised.99  
4.6 Liability for distributions made in contravention of the Act. 
Section 56 provides for the recovery of distributions made in breach of the solvency 
test. If the company did not actually satisfy the test immediately after the distribution 
was made the distribution can, in principle, be recovered from the shareholder.100 In 
order to retain the distribution, a shareholder must satisfy three conjunctive 
requirements.101 First, the shareholder must have received the distribution in good 
faith and without knowledge of the company’s failure to satisfy the solvency test.102 
Secondly, the shareholder must have altered her position in reliance on the validity 
of the distribution.103 Thirdly, it must be unfair to require repayment in full or at all.104 
The authors of Morison’s Company and Securities Law point out that these 
requirements are similar to those for resisting the repayment of voidable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
96  Section 52. 
97  Section 52(1). 
98  Section 52(2). A director who fails to comply with the certificate requirements commits an of-
fence, see s 52(5). 
99  Section 52(3). 
100  Section 56(1). 
101  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 14.11. 
102  Section 56(1)(a). 
103  Section 56(1)(b). 
104  Section 56(1)(c). 
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preferences and suggest that judgments dealing with voidable preferences may 
provide guidance on their interpretation.105  
Directors are liable for non-compliance with the solvency test 106  and for 
non-compliance with the procedural requirements.107 They are, however, liable only 
to the extent that the distribution cannot be recovered from the shareholders.108 A 
director can be liable on one of the following bases:  
• failing to take reasonable steps to ensure that the proper procedure is 
followed109 
• signing of a solvency certificate when reasonable grounds for believing 
that the company would satisfy the test did not exist110 
• failing to take reasonable steps to prevent a distribution after no longer 
being satisfied that the company would satisfy the solvency test.111 
5 DIVIDENDS AND OTHER PAYMENTS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
The significance of regarding a distribution as a dividend is to provide for the 
proportionate treatment of shareholders.112 Dividends paid to members of a specific 
class must be proportionate to their shareholding or alternatively, proportionate to 
the consideration paid to the company in satisfaction of the liability of the 
shareholder under the constitution of the company or under the terms of issue of the 
share.113 A shareholder may waive his or her entitlement to a dividend.114 
A ‘dividend’ is defined as ‘any distribution other than a distribution to which 
section 59 or section 76 applies’.115 Thus, it is any distribution except an acquisition 
_________________________________________________________________ 
105  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 14.11.  
106  Section 52(2)(b). 
107  Section 56(2)(a). 
108  Section 56(2) – (4). 
109  Section 56(2)(c). 
110  Section 52(2)d). 
111  Section 52(3). 
112  Section 53. Share repurchases and financial assistance are not regarded as dividends because 
otherwise it would have been difficult to make selective repurchases or give financial assistance 
in connection with a specific acquisition. 
113  Section 53(2).  
114  Section 53(3). 
115  Section 53(1). 
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of shares and the provision of financial assistance for the acquisition of shares. 
Since redemptions are distributions under sections 69 to 75, the question arises 
whether redemptions are ‘dividends’. It is expressly provided that the redemption of 
shares at the option of a shareholder or on a fixed date is not regarded as a 
distribution for purposes of section 52 or as a dividend for purposes of section 53.116 
The position regarding redemption at the option of a company is not clear. Although 
it is expressly stated that in a redemption at the option of the company the solvency 
test of section 52 must be complied with,117 nothing is said about section 53. At first 
glance, it may appear that a redemption at the option of a company should be 
regarded as a dividend. However, since non-pro rata redemptions are expressly 
allowed, it is unlikely that redemptions qualify as dividends, which are by definition 
proportionate.  
Shareholders of a company may agree to accept an issue of shares wholly or 
partly in lieu of a proposed dividend or proposed future dividends. 118  All 
shareholders must be treated proportionately. Since shares will be issued, the 
requirements of section 47 regarding consideration must also be satisfied. 
6 SHARE REPURCHASES 
The acquisition by a company of its own shares is specifically regulated by sections 
58 to 67 of the Act, while section 107 and sections 110 to 112 also apply to 
repurchases. 
6.1 Power to acquire shares 
Various provisions of the Act regulate the repurchase by a company of its own 
shares. Section 58 provides that a company may acquire its own shares in 
accordance with sections 59 to 66, section 107, and sections 110 to 112, ‘but not 
otherwise’. A repurchase in compliance with a court order such as an order made 
_________________________________________________________________ 
116  Section 74(2)(a), s 75(2)(a). 
117  Section 70(1). While ss 74(2)(a) and 75(2)(a) state that a redemption is not a distribution for 
purposes of ss 52 or 53, s 70 does not state that a redemption at the option of a company is 
indeed a distribution under s 52 – it merely provides that the solvency test of s 52 must be 
satisfied. 
118  Section 54. 
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under the minority oppression remedy119 is also possible, although not covered in s 
58.120  
Sections 59 to 66 provide for four different types of share repurchases that can 
be initiated by a company, namely: 
• a pro rata offer to all shareholders121 
• a selective offer direct to some shareholders122 
• an on-market purchase with prior notice to shareholders123 
• an on-market purchase not subject to prior notice to shareholders.124 
The first three of these types of repurchase involve an offer made by the company to 
shareholders.125 Regardless of the type of repurchase, compliance with section 52, 
which sets out the solvency test as it applies to distributions, is required. Sections 60, 
63 and 65 set out the procedure for the different types of repurchase.126 
Section 107 provides for the repurchase of shares by a company with the 
agreement of all ‘entitled persons’. 127  The authorisation and procedural 
requirements do not apply,128 but the directors have to be satisfied on reasonable 
grounds and sign a certificate to the effect that the company will satisfy the solvency 
test.129  
_________________________________________________________________ 
119  Section 174(2)(a). 
120  Section 59(3) provides that repurchases in terms of a court order do not have to be authorised in 
the company’s articles. 
121  Section 60(1)(a). The procedure and requirements are set out in s 60(2) – (7), discussed on 
paragraph 6.3.1 below. 
122  Section 60(1)(b). The procedure is set out in s 61, s 62 and s 60(3) – (7), see paragraph 6.3.2 
below. This procedure need not be followed if approved by unanimous consent as envisaged in 
s 107. 
123  Sections 63 and 64, see paragraph 6.3.3 below. Section 63 expressly states that the company 
may make an offer on a stock exchange. 
124  Section 65, see paragraph 6.3.4 below.  Note that this section does not say the company must 
make an offer but refers to the acquisition of shares. 
125  A company may only accept an offer made by a shareholder to sell her shares to the company 
with the unanimous assent of the shareholders, see Morison’s Company and Securities Law 
15.3 note 3. 
126  See paragraphs 4.3.1 to 4.3.4 above for a discussion of the procedure. 
127  Entitled persons are shareholders and persons on whom the constitution confers any of the 
rights and powers of a shareholder, s 1 s v ‘entitled person’. 
128  Section 107(1)(c). 
129  Section 108. 
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A company may also acquire its own shares in compliance with a court order, 
such as an order under section 174 that the company must acquire the shares of a 
prejudiced shareholder. I do not consider this type of repurchase further.   
In certain circumstances, dissenting shareholders may insist that the company 
buy them out. This appraisal remedy is set out in sections 110 to 112 and such 
acquisitions are not subject to sections 59 to 67.130 Further discussion of the 
reasons and procedure for repurchases under the appraisal remedy falls outside the 
scope of this thesis.   
I focus on repurchases initiated by the company. 
6.2 Financial restrictions 
Compliance with the solvency test is a basic prerequisite for a repurchase.131 
However, section 59(3) expressly states that the requirements of section 59, which 
includes compliance with the solvency test as required by section 52, does not limit 
or affect court orders for purchase of shares or the acquisition of shares under the 
appraisal remedy. Therefore, although acquisitions under the appraisal remedy are 
not dependent on solvency and liquidity, the company must approach the court for 
an exemption if the purchase will result in its failure to satisfy the solvency test.132 
6.3 Procedure 
I now consider the procedure for share repurchases by way of an offer to 
shareholders. Since the company has the power to make an ‘offer’ that can be 
accepted by shareholders, coercive repurchases are ruled out. 
The constitution of the company must expressly permit it to purchase or 
otherwise acquire its own shares. 133  Companies without constitutions cannot 
acquire their own shares under section 59. However, they will be able to do a 
repurchase in terms of section 107, that is, with the unanimous assent of 
shareholders. Although a company can subsequently adopt a constitution or alter its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
130  Section 59(3)(b). 
131  See paragraph 4.2 above for a discussion of this test. 
132  Section 115. The company also has to prove that its reasonable efforts to arrange that someone 
else purchases the shares were unsuccessful. 
133  Section 59(1). 
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existing constitution by special resolution,134 such a step will entitle dissenting 
shareholders to an appraisal remedy.135 
The board has to notify the Registrar of any purchase or acquisition within 10 
working days of the purchase or acquisition.136 In terms of section 66(2), shares are 
deemed to be acquired on the date on which the company would have become 
entitled to exercise the rights attached to the shares if they did not have to be 
cancelled. However, this date applies only for purposes of determining the moment 
of cancellation of the shares as envisaged in section 66(1). So it is not clear when 
the shares are ‘acquired’ for purposes of the notification period of 10 days. 
There are various procedures which can be followed, namely a pro rata offer to 
all shareholders,137 an offer to acquire shares from one or more shareholders,138 a 
stock exchange acquisition subject to prior notice to shareholders,139 or a stock 
exchange acquisition not subject to prior notice to shareholders. 140  Failure to 
comply with any aspect of the prescribed procedure will automatically constitute 
prejudicial conduct for purposes of the oppression remedy.141 In each instance, the 
board must declare that the acquisition is in the best interests of the company and 
the shareholders and that the terms of and consideration for the acquisition is fair 
and reasonable. It must also declare that it is not aware of any information which will 
not be disclosed to the shareholders142 or is not available to them143 that is material 
to an assessment of the value of the shares and as a result of which the terms of and 
consideration for the acquisition of the shares are unfair to shareholders who accept 
the offer or from whom shares will be acquired.144 Such a certificate by directors 
dealing with the solvency test and the effect of the repurchase on the company and 
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134  Section 32(1), (2). 
135  See s 110 read with s 106(1)(a). 
136  Section 58(3).  
137  Section 60(1)(a). 
138  Section 60(1)(b). 
139  Section 63. 
140  Section 65. This type of acquisition is subject to a limit of 5% of the shares of that class that can 
be acquired in a twelve month period.  
141  Section 174 read with s 175. 
142  Section 60, s 63. 
143  Section 65, 
144  See McKenzie “Disclosure Requirements” 455ff for an analysis of the disclosure requirements, 
including the additional requirements of the Stock Exchange Listing Rules. 
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its shareholders is required, except for stock exchange acquisitions without prior 
notice. 
It is interesting to note the way in which the requirement to heed the interests 
of shareholders is formulated in each type of acquisition.145 In certain instances, the 
interests of the remaining shareholders are paramount, in others, the interests of the 
shareholders accepting an offer, or the shareholders from whom shares are 
acquired. This depends on whether it is a proportionate or selective offer and on 
whether the shares are acquired on the stock exchange or not.  
6.3.1 Pro rata offer to all shareholders 
A pro rata offer is described as an offer to all shareholders to acquire a proportion of 
their shares that would, if accepted, leave unaffected relative voting and distribution 
rights, and that affords a reasonable opportunity to accept the offer.146 The offer 
may permit the company to acquire additional shares from a shareholder to the 
extent that another shareholder does not accept the offer or accepts it only in part.147 
This is known as a ‘top-up invitation’ because, although not expressly required by 
the provision, the company will have to invite all shareholders to tender more than 
their proportionate number of shares.148 If the number of additional shares exceeds 
the number of shares the company wants to acquire, the number of additional 
shares must be reduced rateably.149 This provision is unclear. It refers to the 
‘number of additional shares’ rather than the number of additional shares offered to 
the company. This is confusing especially since section 60(2)(a) does not refer to 
any invitation to tender more shares – it merely states that the offer ‘may permit the 
company to acquire additional shares’. On the positive side, this provision makes it 
clear that the rateable reduction applies only in respect of additional shares and 
cannot affect the initial proportion in respect of which each shareholder may accept 
the offer. The intention appears to be that the reduction must be proportionate to the 
number of additional shares offered or tendered by each shareholder under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
145  For a discussion of how the interests of shareholders and of the company could differ, see 
Gardner “Company Purchase” 170 – 171. 
146  Section 60(1)(a). 
147  Section 60(2)(a). 
148  See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.9. 
149  Section 60(2)(b).  
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top-up invitation.150 This aspect may need reconsideration in South Africa where 
there is no proper distinction between the proportion of shares each shareholder 
may sell if all shareholders fully accept the company’s offer and the total number of 
shares tendered by each shareholder.151  
Before making the pro rata offer, the board has to resolve that the acquisition is 
in the best interests of the company,152 and that the terms of and consideration for 
the acquisition is fair and reasonable to the company.153 It must also resolve that it is 
not aware of any information that will not be disclosed to the shareholders that is 
material to an assessment of the value of the shares and as a result of which the 
terms of the offer and the consideration offered for the shares are unfair to 
shareholders who accept the offer.154 The resolution must set out the reasons for 
the board’s conclusions.155 The directors who vote in favour of the resolution must 
sign a certificate on the matters covered by the resolution.156 If circumstances 
change after the passing of the resolution but before the making of the offer and the 
directors are no longer satisfied about the three aspects covered by the resolution, 
no offer may be made.157 Unlike sections 63 and 65, which refer to the best interests 
of the company and its shareholders, section 60(3)(a) refers only to the best 
interests   of the company. A similar distinction exists between section 60(3)(b) and 
sections 63 and 65 in respect of the fairness of the terms of the offer and the 
consideration. This indicates that the distinction was not unintended but is probably 
drawn because under section 60(3)(a) all the shareholders will be affected 
proportionately. When a selective offer is made directly to some shareholders, the 
resolution in section 60(3)(a) is required as well as a resolution in terms of s 61(1) 
dealing with the interests of the remaining shareholders.  
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150  See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.9 where it is explained that the top-up invitation 
must be accepted rateably.  
151  See Chapter 6 paragraph 6.3.2.1. 
152  Section 60(3)(a).  
153  Section 60(3)(b). 
154  Section 60(3)(c). 
155  Section 60(4). 
156  Section 60(5). The certificate may be combined with the solvency certificate required by section 
52. 
157  Section 60(6).  
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6.3.2 Selective offer direct to some shareholders 
Section 60(1)(b) refers to an offer to one or more shareholders to acquire shares 
and section 61 calls such an offer a ‘special offer to acquire shares’. However, the 
term selective offer is commonly used.158  
A selective offer may be made with the written consent of all the 
shareholders159 or under an express authorisation of non-pro rata offers in the 
constitution and in accordance with the procedure prescribed in section 61.160  
Protecting the interests of the remaining shareholders is an important 
consideration in the regulation of selective offers.161 In addition to resolving that the 
acquisition is in the best interests of the company and that the terms of the offer and 
the price are fair and reasonable to the company,162 the board must also resolve 
that the acquisition of the shares is of benefit to the remaining shareholders163 and 
that the terms of the offer and the consideration offered for the shares are fair and 
reasonable to the remaining shareholders.164 If circumstances change after the 
passing of the resolution so that the board ceases to be satisfied of the contents of 
the resolution, either in respect of the best interests of the company165 or in respect 
of the benefit of the remaining shareholders,166 the board may not make the offer. 
Before making a selective offer, the company has to send to each shareholder 
a disclosure document.167 This document has to set out the nature and terms of the 
offer, and if made to specified shareholders, to whom it will be made.168 It has to 
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158  See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.13.  
159  Section 60(1)(b)(i). Written consent of all the shareholders in terms of this section must be dis-
tinguished from a share repurchase made in terms of s 107 with the unanimous assent of all 
entitled persons. As Morison’s Company and Securities Law points out in 15.15, the conse-
quences and requirements differ. 
160  Section 60(1)(b)(ii). Section 60(3) – (7) also apply to selective offers and relate to the interests of 
the company.  
161  Section 61(1) – (4) and (9) mirrors s 60(3) – (7), except that the resolution in s 61 must be made 
with regard to the remaining shareholders while that in s 60 concerns the best interests of the 
company.  
162  Section 60(3). 
163  Section 61(1)(a). 
164  Section 61(1)(b).  
165  Section 60(6). 
166  Section 61(4). 
167  Section 61(5). Failure to send out the disclosure document is an offence by the company and 
the directors, s 61(10). 
168  Section 62(a). 
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disclose the nature and extent of any relevant interest of any director in any shares 
that are the subject of the offer.169 The text of the resolution required by section 61 
must be set out170 together with further information and explanations necessary to 
enable a reasonable shareholder to understand the nature and implications for the 
company and its shareholders of the proposed acquisition. 171  A disclosure 
document is not required if a company listed on a registered stock exchange makes 
an offer to acquire less than the number of quoted shares that has been determined 
by the relevant exchange to be the minimum holding of shares in the company.172   
The selective offer must be made not less than 10 working days and not more 
than 12 months after the sending out of the disclosure document.173 A shareholder 
or the company may apply for an order restraining the proposed acquisition on one 
of two grounds: 
• it is not in the best interests of the company and of benefit to remaining 
shareholders 
• the terms of the offer and the consideration offered are not fair and 
reasonable to the company and remaining shareholders.174 
This right to approach the court to restrain a repurchase is only available if the 
repurchase is a selective offer. Either the company or a shareholder can apply and 
there is no limitation requiring the objection to relate to the interest of the applicant 
only. It appears that the company can rely on unfairness towards remaining 
shareholders and vice versa. It is not clear whether both the terms and the 
consideration have to be unfair or whether it is sufficient to prove either aspect. The 
use of the conjunctive ‘and’ rather than the disjunctive ‘or’ may be a mistake. 
Because the resolution has to state that both the terms and the consideration are 
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169  Section 62(b). 
170  This resolution relates to the interests of remaining shareholders only. It is not required that the 
resolution under s 60 regarding the interests of the company be disclosed.  
171  Section 62(c). Although the further information and explanations must enable the shareholders 
to assess the impact of the acquisition also on the company itself, only the text of the s 61 
resolution has to be disclosed.   
172  Section 61(7). 
173  Section 61(6). This subsection does not apply to the acquisition of less than a marketable parcel 
of quoted shares. 
174  Section 61(8).  
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fair, the rebuttal of either aspect should be a sufficient ground for a restraining order. 
The practical utility of the restraining procedure in preventing unfair repurchases, 
including greenmail, can be criticised in view of the speed with which remaining 
shareholders will have to act.175 
6.3.3 Stock exchange acquisitions subject to prior notice to shareholders 
A company may make an offer to acquire not more than a specified number of its 
shares on a stock exchange. The board must resolve that the acquisition is in the 
best interests of the company and its shareholders, and that the terms of the offer 
and the consideration offered for the shares are fair and reasonable to the company 
and its shareholders. The board must also state that it is not aware of any 
undisclosed information material to an assessment of the value of the shares and as 
a result of which the terms of the offer and consideration offered are unfair to 
shareholders accepting the offer.176 This third leg of the resolution, dealing with 
undisclosed information, is concerned only with fairness to shareholders accepting 
the offer. 
Prior to making the offer the company must send to each shareholder a 
disclosure document that complies with section 64 of the Act.177 This document has 
to set out the nature and terms of the offer, the nature and extent of any relevant 
interest of any director in any shares that may be the subject of the offer, and the text 
of the resolution required by section 63. It must also contain further information and 
explanations necessary to enable a reasonable shareholder to understand the 
nature and implications for the company and its shareholders of the proposed 
acquisition. The offer must be made not less than 10 working days and not more 
than 12 months after the sending out of the disclosure document.  A shareholder or 
the company may apply for an order restraining the proposed acquisition on one of 
two grounds: 
• it is not in the best interests of the company or the shareholders 
_________________________________________________________________ 
175  See Gardner “Company Purchase” 169. 
176  Section 63(1).  
177  Section 63(6). 
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• the terms of the offer and, if it has been disclosed, the consideration 
offered are not fair and reasonable to the company or the 
shareholders.178  
The authors of Morison’s Company and Securities Law explain that the procedure 
set out in section 63 envisages that the board will implement the acquisition by 
making offers on the stock exchange over a period until the required number of 
shares has been acquired. 179  It is important to note that disclosure of the 
consideration is not required. On the one hand, disclosure of an exact price can 
influence the market price of the company’s shares. On the other hand, the price is 
the only variable term of a stock exchange acquisition and so the only term relevant 
to shareholders in assessing the fairness of the terms and 
consideration. 180 Presumably the board must disclose how the price will be 
determined, either by specifying a price range or by resolving to acquire the shares 
at the prevailing price.181 
6.3.4 Stock exchange acquisitions not subject to prior notice   
Section 65 provides for acquisitions on a stock exchange without prior disclosure to 
shareholders. A company can use the section 65 procedure to acquire a maximum 
of five per cent of the issued shares of any class during any 12-month period. Prior 
to making the acquisition the directors have to adopt the usual resolution regarding 
the fairness of the acquisition, in this instance to the company and the shareholders 
from whom shares are acquired.182 A notice disclosing particulars of the acquisition 
must be sent to each stock exchange on which the shares are listed within ten 
working days after an acquisition183 and to each shareholder within three months of 
the acquisition.184  
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
178  Section 63(8). 
179  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.21.  
180  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.20. 
181  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.20. 
182  Section 65(1)(a). 
183  Section 65(2). The class of shares, the number of shares acquired, the consideration paid and 
the identity of the seller and, if applicable and known, of the beneficial owner must be disclosed. 
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6.4 Liability for unlawful repurchase 
Shareholders and directors can be liable in respect of non-compliance with the 
requirements for a distribution,185 or on various other grounds.186 Failure to comply 
with the prescribed procedure for the particular type of repurchase will also amount 
to prejudicial conduct.187 
6.5 Enforceability of contracts for the acquisition of own shares 
The enforceability of a contract for the acquisition of shares is regulated by section 
67. The contract will not be enforceable if the company can prove that performance 
of the contract will result in it being unable to satisfy the solvency test as set out in 
section 52.188 The claim for outstanding performance will remain and the seller can 
enforce payment as soon as the company is lawfully able to comply.189 When the 
company is deregistered while the claim remains unpaid, the claim will rank 
subordinate to the rights of creditors, but in priority to the other shareholders.  
6.6 The status of repurchased shares 
Section 66 provides for the cancellation of shares immediately upon acquisition of 
shares, and applies to acquisitions pursuant to section 59, which includes all the 
offers to repurchase, and acquisitions under the appraisal remedy. Section 58(2), 
which also provides for the cancellation of shares immediately upon acquisition, 
applies where shares are acquired otherwise than in accordance with sections 59 to 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
184  Section 65 (2A). 
185  See paragraph 4.6 above. See also Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.25. 
186  See Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.26. These include liability of directors for breach 
of fiduciary duties, and voidability of the contract for non-compliance with the company’s con-
stitution. 
187  See s 175(1)(d) – (g). 
188  Section 52 extends the solvency test so that preferential returns to preference shareholders are 
provided for, see paragraph 4.2 above. 
189  Section 67(3). This provision must be distinguished from s 52(3), which deems a distribution not 
to have been authorised if circumstances change after authorisation but before the distribution 
is made. Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.11 points out that s 52(3) does not render 
payment unauthorised if the test was satisfied when the debt was incurred, because the incur-
ring of a debt qualifies as a distribution. 
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66 and sections 110 to 112, that is, when shares are acquired by unanimous 
assent190 or in compliance with a court order.191 
It is not clear why there are two separate provisions on the deemed 
cancellation of repurchased shares.192 
Section 66(2) contains a definition of ‘acquisition’ for purposes of section 66, 
that is, it explains exactly when the shares are deemed to be cancelled.193 Section 
58(2) does not contain a similar definition and it is uncertain exactly when the shares 
are regarded as having been acquired and thus deemed to be cancelled. 
As an alternative to cancellation, a company may hold a maximum of five per 
cent of the shares of each class as treasury shares.194 The constitution of the 
company must expressly provide for this, and the board of directors must resolve 
not to cancel the shares.195 All rights and obligations attaching to shares are 
suspended while they are held in treasury,196 and in particular, the shares may not 
be voted and may not share in any distribution.197 Any transfer by the company of 
treasury shares are subject to the requirements for the issue of new shares, 
including the requirements on consideration. 198  A specific prohibition applies 
against the disposal of treasury shares to frustrate a takeover offer.199 
_________________________________________________________________ 
190  See s 107. 
191  Section 58(1) does not seem to envisage acquisitions in compliance with court orders. It states 
that shares may be acquired in accordance with ss 59 – 66, s 107, and ss 110 – 112, ‘but not 
otherwise’. Section 58(2) then applies to shares acquired otherwise than in accordance with ss 
59 – 66 and ss 110 – 112, thus leaving the impression that it applies only to s 107. The provi-
sions in relation to acquisitions which can be overridden by s 107 (unanimous assent) are ss 58 
to 65. However, s 66 does not seem to apply to s 107 acquisitions. Section 59(3)(a) does en-
visage acquisitions under a court order. 
192  As will be seen in paragraph 5.8 below, there are also three separate provisions providing for 
the cancellation of redeemed shares. 
193  Perhaps this definition would also have been helpful for determining time of distribution. 
194  Section 67A(1)(c) read with s 67A(2). 
195  Section 67A(1)(a), (b). 
196  Section 67B(1). 
197  Section 67B(2). 
198  Section 67C. The certification of consideration required by s 47(2) is not required where the 
shares are transferred in terms of a system approved under the Securities Transfer Act 1991 No 
119, s 67C(2). 
199  Section 67C(4). 
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6.7 Purchases through subsidiaries 
A subsidiary may not acquire, either through issue or by transfer to it, shares in its 
holding company. 200  Shares in the holding company that were held by the 
subsidiary prior to it becoming a subsidiary may be retained, but the voting rights in 
respect of those shares may not be exercised.201  
6.8 Redemption of shares 
The constitution of a company can provide for redeemable shares that may be 
redeemable at the option of the company, at the option of the shareholder, or on a 
specified date.202 Prior to 1993 only preference shares could be redeemable, but 
under the present Act there is no limit as to the kind of shares that may be 
redeemable. It is possible that all the shares of a company can be redeemable 
shares, although it will obviously not be possible to redeem all the issued shares of a 
company.203 
An important feature of the regulation of the redemption of shares is the 
distinction made between shares that are redeemable at the option of the company 
and those that are redeemable at the option of the shareholder or on a fixed date. 
The equal or fair treatment of shareholders of the same class is regulated in each 
case. The incurring of a debt in favour of a shareholder in relation to the redemption 
of shares is regarded as a distribution.204 Although all redemptions qualify as 
distributions for purposes of section 56, which regulates the recovery of unlawful 
distributions, only redemptions at the option of the company are subject to the 
solvency test of section 52,205 which requires a prior solvency resolution and a 
certificate. 
Because redemptions at the option of the company may be abused just like 
repurchases, the resolutions required by the board of directors relating to the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
200  Section 82. 
201  Section 82(4). 
202  Section 68. 
203  Morison’s Company and Securities Law 15.27 points out that a company is liable to be wound 
up if it does not comply with the essential requirement of s 10 that it should have at least one 
share. 
204  Section 2(1) s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (b) of the definition. 
205  Section 70. 
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protection of the company and its shareholders resemble those required for 
repurchases. In the case of pro rata redemptions, the resolutions deal only with the 
best interests of the company. In the case of special or selective redemptions, 
additional resolutions are required dealing with the interests and position of the 
remaining shareholders. A disclosure document must then be sent to shareholders, 
change of circumstances rules apply, and shareholders and the company may apply 
for a restraining order.206 
Redemption at the option of a shareholder is regulated by section 74 and 
redemption on a fixed date by section 75. In both instances the company is obliged 
to redeem the share, the share is deemed cancelled on the date of redemption and 
the former shareholder ranks as an unsecured creditor in respect of the redemption 
price.207 
Redemption at the option of a shareholder or on a fixed date is not regarded as 
distributions for purposes of sections 52 and 53, but is deemed to be a distribution 
for purposes of section 56(1) and (5), which means that it or the ‘unlawful’ portion of 
it may be recovered from the shareholder. 208  Directors are not liable for the 
redemption price paid to the shareholder in these cases. 
It makes sense to provide separately for redeemable shares, especially if they 
are not redeemable at the option of the company. A similar distinction should be 
considered for South Africa.209 
7 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
New Zealand has done away with the notion of nominal or authorised share capital 
and with the idea of protecting creditors by a company’s issued share capital.210 
However, shareholders enjoy considerable protection against the dilution of their 
equity interests through pre-emptive rights and through the specific duty on directors 
to consider the fairness to shareholders when the company issues shares.211 
_________________________________________________________________ 
206  Section 71. 
207  Section 74(1) and s 75(1). 
208  Section 74(2) and s 75(2). 
209  See Chapter 6 paragraph 6.8. 
210  See paragraph 2 above. 
211  See paragraph 2 above. 
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Maximum flexibility is retained as pre-emptive rights can be excluded or restrictions 
imposed on directors’ power to issue shares.  
Although consideration for the issue of shares is regulated, the purpose of this 
regulation is to protect the company and its shareholders.212 This makes sense, 
because the company is giving up an enforceable claim. 
Creditors enjoy protection when a company makes distributions to its 
shareholders, although their protection does not depend on the contributed share 
capital. The company has to comply with a ‘solvency test’ comprising of a liquidity 
element and a balance sheet element.213 The solvency test also takes into account 
the rights of shareholders with rights preferent to those of shareholders that will 
receive a distribution. Although designed to protect preferent shareholders, the 
creditors also benefit from this restriction. In comparison with the position in South 
Africa, positive action is required from directors to ensure compliance with the 
solvency test.214 As in South Africa, the Act does not specify a time period during 
which the company should remain able to pay its debts.215 
The solvency test is applied with reference to the time when the company 
decides to make a distribution rather than the moment of payment.216 However, 
when there has been a change in the position of the company and the directors are 
no longer satisfied that the company will meet the test, the making of a distribution is 
prohibited. The recovery of distributions depends on the actual financial position of 
the company immediately after the distribution.217 Shareholders who received an 
unlawful distribution in good faith and who altered their position in reliance on it, can 
avoid having to return the distribution if it would be unfair to oblige them to return 
it.218  
_________________________________________________________________ 
212  See paragraph 3.1 above. 
213  See paragraph 4.2 above. 
214  The directors have to adopt a solvency resolution and issue a solvency certificate. Compare 
Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.1 for the South African position. 
215  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.1.2. 
216  See paragraph 4.3 above. 
217  See paragraph 4.6 above. 
218  See paragraph 4.6 above. 
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Another feature of New Zealand law is that it expressly defines the concept 
‘dividend’ as encompassing all distributions except share repurchases.219 Subject to 
certain exceptions, dividends must be made proportionately to all shareholders of 
the same class.  
When a company repurchases its shares, the requirements for distributions 
apply.220 For purposes of shareholder protection, the Act distinguishes between 
different kinds of repurchases, namely pro rata offers, selective offers, and stock 
exchange acquisitions with or without prior notice to shareholders.221 The procedure 
is prescribed in detail for each kind of repurchase and is designed to address the 
risks faced by shareholders in a particular type of repurchase.222 Shareholders may 
apply to court for an order restraining the company from proceeding with a selective 
repurchase.223 In comparison with South Africa, shareholders in New Zealand are 
better protected against unfair repurchases. 224  Shareholder activism is further 
encouraged by the recognition that non-compliance with procedures automatically 
amounts to unfairly prejudicial conduct.225 
The regulation of the redemption of shares depends on whether the 
redemption is at the option of the company or at the option of a shareholder or at a 
specified time.226 If shares are redeemable at the option of the company, the 
redemption is regulated along lines similar to repurchases of shares. In all cases of 
redemption the company can potentially recover the redemption price if it appears 
that it was not in fact solvent when it redeemed the shares. 
In conclusion, while creditors enjoy a level of protection that is comparable to 
that enjoyed by creditors in South Africa when distributions are made, the real 
difference between the approach in New Zealand and that in South Africa is found in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
219  See paragraph 5 above. 
220  See paragraph 6.2 above. 
221  See paragraph 6.1 above. 
222  See paragraph 6.3 above. 
223  See paragraph 6.3.2 above. 
224  This is primarily as a result of the certification duties imposed on directors in respect of the effect 
of repurchases on selling and existing shareholders, see Gardner “Company Purchase” 191 
who describes the statute as ‘pro-shareholder’, yet questions whether the institutional frame-
work facilitates shareholder activism. See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3 for a discussion of the po-
sition in South Africa. 
225  Section 175, See paragraph 4 above. 
226  See paragraph 6.8 above. 
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the regulation of shareholder interests. The effective shareholder protection is 
achieved through the coherent design of pre-emptive rights, the regulation of 
consideration, the financial restrictions that take into account preferential 
shareholder rights, the share repurchase procedures and the requirement that 
dividends in the extended sense should be proportionate. Despite this, companies 
retain a large measure of freedom to arrange their internal affairs in different ways 
that suit them.   
 
   
CHAPTER 4 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
In the United States of America, laying down the legal principles governing the 
formation and regulation of corporations falls within the jurisdiction of the individual 
states.1 Federal laws govern some aspects of corporation law, notably securities 
regulation.2  
The main body of corporation law is found in state legislation. There is 
considerable variation in the way in which different states regulate corporations, 
also as regards capital contributions and distributions to shareholders.3 There have 
been efforts to harmonise the corporation laws in the different states.4 Many states 
adopted the 1969 Model Business Corporation Act5 and the 1984 (Revised) Model 
Business Corporation Act6 developed by the American Bar Association.7 
_________________________________________________________________  
1  Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 7, 25. The constitution does not expressly confer on 
the federal government a power to grant incorporation. However, Henn & Alexander Laws of 
Corporations 25 explain that the federal government has an implied power of incorporation that 
it may exercise should it be necessary to advance one of its express powers, such as the 
regulation of interstate commerce.  
2  See Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 1, 7, 36 – 41; Luiz Takeovers 397. Securities 
regulation is the field in which the law of corporations has been most affected by federal 
legislation. For a brief historical overview of the interplay between state and federal regulation 
of corporations, see Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 24 – 36.  
3  These differences may have an effect on the jurisdiction in which promoters choose to 
incorporate. Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations devotes a whole chapter (chapter 4) on 
the selection of a jurisdiction of incorporation. Competition between states for incorporations 
has also been identified as an important driver of legal reform in individual states, see Henn & 
Alexander Laws of Corporations 31 – 32.  
4  For an overview of these efforts, see xxi – xxii of the introduction to the American Bar 
Association Model Business Corporation Act: Official Text with Official Comment and Statutory 
Cross-references 2005 (MBCA Official Text).  
5  Hereafter the ‘1969 MBCA’. Prior to the publication of the 1984 Revised Model Business 
Corporation Act, 27 states had adopted the 1969 MBCA, see Henn & Alexander Laws of 
Corporations 8. Manning Legal Capital 176 states that ‘approximately’ 35 states had based 
their statutes on the old version. By 2005 the corporation laws of only four states were based on 
this earlier version of the Model Act, see introduction to American Bar Association Model 
Business Corporation Act: Official Text with Official Comment and Statutory Cross-references 
2005. The 1969 MBCA was amended from time to time and the capital provisions were 
substantially redrafted in 1979 – 1980 following the reforms in California in 1977. 
6  In the rest of this thesis the 1984 Model Business Corporations Act, which is also sometimes 
referred to as the Revised Model Business Corporations Act or RMBCA to distinguish it from 
the 1969 version, will be referred to as the ‘MBCA’ or, when it is necessary to distinguish it from 
Continued 
  
   
156 
The law of the state in which a corporation has been incorporated generally 
applies to that corporation.8 A corporation conducting business in a state other than 
the state of its incorporation may also be subject to the legislation of that state to the 
extent that its laws apply to foreign corporations doing business in its area of 
jurisdiction.9 
The capital and distribution rules of the different states can be classified into a 
number of categories. The most important distinction is between ‘traditional’ 
statutes based on legal capital and ‘modern’ statutes that rely on the net worth of a 
corporation.10 The 1969 MBCA was initially based11 on non-impairment of stated 
capital and is thus a good example of a ‘traditional’ statute. The 1984 MBCA is an 
example of a ‘modern’ or ‘net worth’ statute. 
Each of these two main approaches has been implemented in various ways, 
thus allowing further categorisation. The basic premise of a traditional legal capital 
system is that distributions may be made to the extent only that the net assets of the 
corporation exceed the stated share capital. This means that the capital will not be 
‘impaired’. A related approach is to define the surplus from which distributions may 
legally be made in order to leave the capital intact. In its simplest form a surplus is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
the older version, the ‘1984 MBCA’.  
7  More specifically, it was developed by the Committee on Corporate Laws of the Section of 
Business Law with support of the American Bar Foundation. The introduction to the 2005 
edition of the official text of the MBCA mentions that 29 states had adopted all or substantially 
all of the MBCA as their general corporation statute, while several other states have adopted 
selected provisions. 
8  For example, s 1.40(4) of the 1984 MBCA defines a ‘corporation’ or ‘domestic corporation’ as a 
corporation for profit that was incorporated in the particular state. Section 17.01 states that the 
Act will apply to such (domestic) corporations only. 
9  The 1984 MBCA contains provisions relating to foreign corporations, see ss 15.01 – 15.05. 
Although the regulation of foreign corporations is usually limited to administrative issues such 
as maintaining a registered office and appointing a registered agent, some states regulate more 
substantive issues pertaining to foreign corporations. California makes its financial restrictions 
on distributions applicable to ‘pseudo-foreign’ corporations, California Corporations Code s 
2115(b). A pseudo-foreign corporation is a corporation incorporated in another state but who 
does more than half its business in California and of which more than half the shareholders of 
record reside in California, see California Corporations Code s 2115(a). New York is another 
example of a State that subjects certain foreign corporations to its dividend restrictions, see the 
New York Business Corporation Law ss 1317, 1318, 1320. Although they state that it is not 
common for state legislation to apply to foreign corporations, Henn & Alexander Laws of 
Corporations 898 argue that the MBCA could have this effect. Their argument can also be 
applied to the revised MBCA, which is similarly worded (see s 15.05). 
10  See Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 889 – 896; Clark Corporate Law 610 – 624; 
Hamilton Corporations 389 – 395. 
11  Prior to the 1980 amendments that substantially altered the contribution and distribution rules. 
  
   
157
the excess of assets over liabilities and stated capital. However, different rules are 
used in different states to determine what would qualify as surplus available for 
distribution.  
Because surplus is determined with reference to assets, liabilities and stated 
capital, a variation of each of these elements can affect the size of the surplus. 
Depending on the source, different kinds of surplus can be distinguished:12 
• Paid-in surplus, also known as capital surplus, arises when shares are 
issued for more than their par value or stated value or when treasury 
shares are resold for more than the stated capital they represent. 
• Capital reduction surplus arises when a corporation formally reduces its 
stated capital. 
• Revaluation surplus arises when assets are revalued to reflect 
appreciation. 
• Earned surplus is the undistributed net profits earned by the corporation 
since its formation. In an economic sense it is the equivalent of retained 
earnings. 
Some states allow distributions out of any kind of surplus.13 This is called the 
balance sheet surplus approach.14 The 1969 MBCA allows dividend distributions 
only out of earned surplus.15 Nevertheless, special distributions may be made out of 
capital surplus or other unearned surplus in certain circumstances.16 
Irrespective of whether they use surplus or earned surplus, some states 
nevertheless allow dividends out of current earnings in certain circumstances. 
These dividends are called ‘nimble dividends’.17 
_________________________________________________________________  
12  Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 894; Manning Legal Capital 74 – 78. See also 
Eisenberg “Modernization” 199. 
13  Delaware is an example, although it also allows distributions out of current earnings, see 
paragraph 2.4. 
14  See Kummert “State Statutory Restrictions” 211. 
15  See Kummert “State Statutory Restrictions” 197. 
16  Manning Legal Capital 80. 
17  See Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 892 note 19 for a possible explanation of the 
origin of this term. Nimble dividends are sometimes subject to additional restrictions such as 
provision for liquidation preferences. 
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The modern approach considers the net worth of the corporation, without 
reference to its stated capital. A simple excess of assets over liabilities is thus 
sufficient, although provision for amounts that may become due to preference 
shareholders is sometimes required. The way in which surplus or net worth of a 
corporation is determined, is through a balance sheet test, that is, a comparison of 
the value of assets and liabilities on a specific date.18 
In addition to a restriction based on the surplus or net worth of a corporation, 
every state imposes an equity solvency or liquidity test.19 This is also known as the 
‘insolvency limitation’, referring to insolvency in the equity sense of inability to pay 
debts.20  
The modern approach was first adopted in California in 1977 when it 
eliminated the rules associated with stated capital and surplus and made all 
distributions subject to compliance with one of two alternative tests, namely 
retained earnings or maintaining a fixed financial ratio of equity to debt. The 
California approach is economically equivalent to the earned surplus test. In 
reaction to these innovations the financial provisions of the 1969 MBCA were 
substantially revised in 1979 to 1980 and the rules based on stated capital, surplus 
and par value were abolished. Instead, distributions became subject to a net assets 
test. The 1984 MBCA took over these capital and distribution provisions.21 
For purposes of comparison with the position in South Africa, I will discuss the 
provisions of the 1984 MBCA and the laws of Delaware and California, two states 
that have not adopted the MBCA. I selected these two individual states not only 
because of their commercial significance,22   but also because they represent 
diverging approaches to the topic under consideration. 
_________________________________________________________________  
18  See Manning Legal Capital 68 – 69. 
19  See Manning Legal Capital 64. Massachusetts, Minnesota and North Dakota have an equity 
solvency or liquidity test as the only financial restriction on distributions, see Cox & Hazen 
Corporations 562.  
20  See Cox & Hazen Corporations 562. 
21  See Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 895 note 44. 
22  Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 7 – 8 regard the corporate statutes of Delaware, 
California, New York and the jurisdictions following the MBCA (at that time still the pre-1984 
version) as the most significant, based on the number of incorporations of major corporations 
and total incorporations of business corporations in those jurisdictions. Although New York is a 
significant jurisdiction, its regulation of distributions is largely similar to that of Delaware. New 
York is an example of a system based on legal capital that allows distributions out of earned 
surplus, the economic equivalent of retained earnings. Unlike California, it does not allow 
Continued 
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Other researchers have alluded to various difficulties and dangers of drawing 
comparisons between American and South African law.23 This phenomenon is also 
particularly relevant to the topics considered in this thesis. The central concepts 
‘stated capital’ in the USA and ‘issued share capital’ in South Africa differ 
fundamentally in some respects. As a result, related concepts such as par value, no 
par value, surplus and reserves that may at first glance seem comparable, may 
have very different connotations and implications. The group concept is also more 
informal than in South Africa. There is no statutory definition and groups are largely 
ignored by legislation and the courts.24 
As regards the financial restrictions on dividends and other distributions, 
different states use different statutory formulations and provide various exceptions, 
allowing for a number of permutations in the application of the same original 
principle. The terminology used to describe these different formulations, for 
example, ‘earned surplus’ and ‘net worth’ are not well established in South African 
company law.25 Some terms that appear to be used in both systems, have different 
meanings, for example, ‘solvency’ that is mostly used in America in the sense of 
what is understood as ‘liquidity’ in South Africa.26  
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
dividends out of current profits. It is also different from Delaware in that no provision is made for 
liquidation preferences, see Manning Legal Capital 78. The New York Business Corporation 
Law allows distributions to the extent that net assets exceed stated capital. Thus, revaluation 
and appreciation surplus can be distributed. Since it appears that the basic approach adopted 
in Delaware and New York is not the most suitable option for South Africa, a separate 
discussion of the position in New York will not further the purposes of this research. Since the 
1984 MBCA has now been adopted by more states than the 1969 version, I discuss its 
provisions rather than those of the 1969 MBCA.  
23  Luiz Takeovers 396 – 398; Havenga Corporate Opportunities 125, Hurter Statutêre 
Minderheidsbeskerming 160 – 162. 
24  See Hertig & Kanda “Creditor Protection” 76. The regulation of financial statements of groups is 
an exception. See Cox & Hazen Corporations 111 for a discussion of different approaches to 
the definition of groups in American law. 
25  See, however, Hahlo’s Company Law 141 – 142.  
26  In general, the following terms or concepts need brief explanation: a ‘series’ of shares is a 
subdivision in a class and may, for example, have the same liquidation priority as another series 
in the class, but different dividend or voting rights (Marsh California Corporation Law 4.25); to 
‘retire’ shares involves cancelling them as issued shares and restoring them to the status of 
authorised shares, while to ‘cancel’ shares means cancelling them also as authorised shares 
(Cox & Hazen Corporations 585); a share that is ‘outstanding’ is a share that has been issued 
and that has not been reacquired by the corporation; a treasury share held by the corporation is 
thus a share that is ‘issued but not outstanding’, see Cox & Hazen Corporations 485.  
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Apart from the differences in the corporation or company laws of the two 
countries, other legal principles that may have an impact on capital and distributions, 
such as principles of creditors’ rights laws and bankruptcy or insolvency laws do not 
correspond.  
It is interesting to consider the effect of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,27 
which provides for the impeachment or recovery of ‘conveyances’ made in fraud of 
creditors. A conveyance is a transfer of money or property or the incurrence of an 
obligation. Both the distribution of a dividend and the repurchase of shares qualify 
as conveyances for which the corporation received no reasonably equivalent 
value.28 
Any conveyance made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value by a 
person who is or will thereby be rendered insolvent, is automatically regarded as a 
fraud on creditors and can be recovered from the transferee.29 The intention of the 
transferor is irrelevant.  
A conveyance made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value by a 
debtor-transferor who is left with unreasonably small capital after making the 
transfer, is also regarded as fraudulent.30 
An obligation incurred when the debtor intends or believes that she will incur 
debts beyond her capacity to pay as they mature, is also a fraudulent conveyance.31 
Fraudulent conveyances may be set aside, either in the bankruptcy of the 
debtor or by individual creditors of a solvent debtor.  
_________________________________________________________________  
27  Chapter 1 (commencing with section 3439) of Title 2 of Part 2 of Division 4 of the California Civil 
Code. 
28  US v Gleneagles Investment Co 803 F 2d 1288 (1986) (US CA 3rd Cir). The shares that the 
corporation reacquires in a repurchase transaction do not constitute value in the hands of the 
corporation. See also Marsh California Corporation Law 1180. 
29  Section 3439.05 of the Civil Code.  
30  Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act s 5. 
31  Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act s 6. 
  
   
161
2 DELAWARE 
2.1 Introduction 
Delaware is the most popular state of incorporation.32 It has been growing in 
popularity despite remaining a ‘traditional’ stated capital jurisdiction while many 
other states have abandoned this approach.33  
Immediately after the revision of its 1899 General Corporation Law in 1967, 
the Delaware corporation statute, the Delaware General Corporation Law34 was 
more permissive than any other corporation statute of its time.35 In 1969, Delaware 
amended its statute again to implement certain principles of the 1969 MBCA.36 
An analysis of how the stated capital doctrine finds expression in Delaware 
shows that it has been substantially eroded. This could explain why the continued 
use of a legal capital system, which is often described as rigid and outdated, does 
not deter incorporators. 
2.2 Structure of share capital 
2.2.1 Authorised capital 
The authorised capital of a corporation must be set out in its certificate of 
incorporation. If a corporation is to have only one class of shares, the certificate of 
_________________________________________________________________  
32  Eisenberg Corporations 101. See also the 2007 Annual Report of the Delaware Department of 
State Division Corporations, available at www.corp.delaware.gov (2008-06-27). More than 90% 
of all US-based public offerings in 2007 were incorporated in Delaware. More than 50% of all 
publicly-traded corporations in the USA (60% of Fortune 500 companies) are incorporated in 
Delaware.  
33  Delaware’s success in attracting incorporations has been described as the ‘Delaware effect’ 
and it has been criticised for leading a ‘race to the bottom’ through lenient regulation, see Louis 
K Liggett Co v Lee  (1933) 288 US 517; Cary “Federalism” 663ff; Winter “State Law” 251ff. 
Other commentators justify the prominence of Delaware by identifying several positive aspects 
of this jurisdiction, such as its flexible legislative process and the fact that bar associations 
rather than politicians draft its laws (Alva “Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters” 
885), the fact that it has become a centre of corporate expertise (Bratton “Corporate Law’s 
Race” 401), and its infrastructure (Kaouris “Is Delaware Still a Haven” 965; Romano “State 
Competition Debate” 721 – 722). See also Macey & Miller “Toward an Interest-Group Theory of 
Delaware Corporate Law”; Klausner “Networks of Contracts” 842 – 847 for a discussion of the 
debate.  
34  Delaware General Corporation Law, Title 8, hereafter ‘Delaware General Corporation Law’. 
35  Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 31. 
36  Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 31. 
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incorporation has to state the total number of authorised shares, as well as the par 
value of the shares or the fact that the shares are no par value shares. If the 
corporation has more than one class of shares, the certificate of incorporation has 
to specify the total number of authorised shares, the number of shares in each class 
and whether they are no par value or par value shares and the par value of the 
shares of each class of par value shares.37 
The position regarding authorised capital is thus similar to the South African 
position, except that in Delaware the total amount of capital in respect of par value 
shares need not be stated separately.38 This difference is insignificant, because a 
simple calculation will reveal the total par value share capital. 
2.2.2 Minimum share capital 
A corporation must have one or more shares of one or more classes or series which 
must have full voting powers.39 No minimum amount of capital is prescribed.  
2.2.3 Kinds of shares 
Any class of stock40 may consist of either par value or no par value shares. It is not 
required as in South Africa that all the ordinary or all the preference shares be of 
one kind.41 Although different series42 of shares in a class may apparently have 
different rights, it seems that all the shares in a class must be either par value or no 
par value shares.43 
The stock of any class or series may be made subject to redemption at the 
option of the corporation, the shareholders, or upon the happening of a specified 
event.44 Immediately after redemption, the corporation must have one or more 
_________________________________________________________________  
37  Delaware General Corporation Law s 102(a)(4).  
38  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.1.  
39  Delaware General Corporation Law s 151(b). 
40  The term ‘stock’ rather than ‘shares’ is used, see s 151. 
41  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.3. 
42  See note 26 above on the meaning of ‘series’.  
43  Delaware General Corporation Law s 151(a). In the case of par value shares the par value of 
shares in different series in the class must be the same, see Folk Delaware General 
Corporation Law 102:10. 
44  Delaware General Corporation Law s 151(b). 
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shares of one or more classes or series in issue that must have full voting powers.45 
Unlike South Africa, Delaware thus allows ordinary redeemable shares.46 If the 
redemption of ordinary shares were to be allowed in South Africa, a similar 
restriction regarding shares remaining following a redemption would be necessary. 
The Delaware requirement that one or more shares with full voting powers should 
remain in issue is preferable to the comparable South African requirement that 
shares that are not redeemable or convertible must remain in issue following a 
repurchase of shares.47 
2.2.4 Capital accounts 
The treatment of share capital accounts in Delaware is not as complicated as in 
South Africa.48 Although par and no par value shares are allowed, there is only one 
type of share capital account, namely a stated capital account.49 
There is very little correlation between the consideration for which shares are 
issued and the amount reflected in the stated capital account. The directors 
determine the total amount of stated capital of the corporation and in effect, the 
‘legal capital’ can be much lower than the ‘economic capital’ contributed in respect 
of the shares.50 Where the corporation has only par value shares, the amount of 
stated capital must be at least equal to the aggregate par value of the issued shares. 
Where there are also no par value shares, the total capital has to be in excess of the 
aggregate par value of the issued shares.51 The directors have to specify in dollars 
the part of the consideration for issued shares that will be capital.52 If the shares are 
issued for cash, and the directors have not determined the portion of the 
consideration that will be capital, the capital will be equal to the aggregate par value 
of all the issued par value shares and the full consideration received in respect of all 
_________________________________________________________________  
45  Delaware General Corporation Law s 151(b).  
46  Ordinary redeemable shares have been allowed since 1990, see Folk Delaware General 
Corporation Law 151:12. 
47  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3.2. 
48  Compare Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4. 
49  See Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. 
50  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. See also Eisenberg “Modernization” 199. 
51  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. 
52  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154.   
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the no par value shares.53 In the case of cash consideration, the determination has 
to be made at the time of issue of the shares and in the case of shares issued for 
property other than cash, within 60 days after the issue.54 
The way in which the amount of share capital is determined differs from the 
position in South Africa in two important respects. First, a premium received over 
the par value of par value shares, need not be allocated to a share premium 
account as is the case in South Africa. In Delaware, a premium is regarded as 
surplus.55 Alternatively, the directors may decide to allocate a portion of such 
premium to the capital account.56  The share capital can thus be higher than the par 
value of the issued shares if the directors determine a part of the ‘premium’ to be 
capital. Directors in South Africa do not have this option and a strict distinction 
exists between the share capital account and share premium account.57 
Secondly, there is no restriction as to the portion of consideration received for 
no par value shares that have to be regarded as share capital.58 In South Africa, the 
full consideration for no par value shares is regarded as stated capital. 59  In 
Delaware, this will be the case only if the directors fail to make an allocation.  
It is evident that in Delaware the capital yardstick is far more flexible than is the 
case in South Africa.60    
2.2.5 The variation of share capital 
2.2.5.1 Increase, decrease and reclassification 
A corporation may amend its certificate of incorporation to vary its capital in various 
ways. It may increase or decrease its authorised capital, reclassify its capital by 
_________________________________________________________________  
53  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. 
54  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. 
55  It is called ‘paid-in surplus’, see Manning Legal Capital 41.  
56  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. This determination must made at the time of issue of 
shares for cash or, if shares are issued for consideration other than cash, within 60 days of the 
issue. 
57  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 2.4.1 and 2.4.3. 
58  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. 
59  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.2. 
60  Regard must also be had to the difference between paid-in surplus in Delaware and the share 
premium account in South Africa, see Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.3. 
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changing the number, par value, designations, preferences or other rights of the 
shares, or by changing par value shares into no par value shares and vice versa, 
either with or without increasing or decreasing the number of shares. It may 
subdivide or combine shares or any class or series of shares into a greater or lesser 
number of outstanding shares.61 Such variations of the capital structure do not 
necessarily increase or decrease the stated capital of the corporation and thus may 
not affect the rights of creditors.62 Where par value shares are changed into no par 
value shares, the interests of creditors may be affected in that the requirement of a 
stated capital that is at least equal to the issued par value will fall away, allowing the 
corporation to reclassify existing capital as surplus.63  
2.2.5.2 Capitalisations 
The directors may from time to time increase the stated capital of a corporation by 
transferring to its capital account a portion of the corporation’s net assets that are in 
excess of the amount of its capital, in other words, out of its surplus.64 The board 
may determine the allocation of the increased capital to classes or series of 
shares.65 
Shares that are ‘issued but not outstanding’, that is, shares held by the 
corporation66 may be retired or cancelled.67 When shares are retired, they resume 
the status of authorised and unissued shares of the class or series to which they 
belong, unless the certificate of incorporation provides otherwise.68 Shares that are 
cancelled are no longer authorised shares. 
If the certificate of incorporation prohibits the reissue of the shares altogether 
or prohibits their reissue as part of a specific series, a certificate stating that fact has 
to be executed, acknowledged and filed. The effect of this certificate is to amend the 
_________________________________________________________________  
61  Delaware General Corporation Law s 242(a)(3). 
62  Sapperstein v Wilson & Co, Inc 21 Del Ch 139, 182 A 18. See Fletcher Cyclopedia 5151 note 1. 
63  See s 244(a)(3) – (4). This aspect is discussed in paragraph 2.2.5.3 below. 
64  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. 
65  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. 
66  See Fletcher Cyclopedia 5084. Outstanding shares are defined as shares in the hands of the 
public and excludes treasury shares, see Nerken v Standard Oil Co 810 F2d 1230 (CA DC 
1987).  
67  Delaware General Corporation Law s 243(a). A resolution of the board of directors is required. 
68  Delaware General Corporation Law s 243(b). 
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certificate of incorporation so as to reduce the number of authorised shares of the 
class or series or, if all the shares of the class or series have been retired, to 
eliminate all references to the class or series from the certificate of incorporation.69 
If the corporation’s capital will be reduced by the retirement of shares, the reduction 
of capital has to be effected in accordance with section 244.70 
2.2.6 Reduction of issued capital 
A corporation may reduce its capital by unilateral resolution of the board of directors 
in four ways.71 First, the capital represented by shares that have been retired may 
be reduced or eliminated.72 Unlike the position in South Africa where the share 
capital of a company is automatically adjusted when shares are cancelled,73 the 
amount of capital represented by specific shares is not automatically removed from 
the stated capital account when the shares are retired. This can be attributed to the 
fact that in Delaware there is no similar close correlation between the consideration 
received for issued shares and the stated capital account.  
Secondly, some or all of the capital represented by shares being purchased or 
redeemed, or any capital that has not been allocated to any particular class of 
shares, may be applied to an otherwise authorised repurchase or redemption of 
such shares.74 Once again, the position in South Africa is quite different. On the one 
hand, in a South African company the capital represented by the shares that are 
being purchased or redeemed will automatically be removed from the company’s 
issued or stated capital.75 On the other hand, the concept of stated capital not 
allocated to particular shares is foreign to South African law. A similar provision for 
reduction of capital is thus not necessary in South Africa.76  
_________________________________________________________________  
69  Delaware General Corporation Law s 243(b) 
70  Delaware General Corporation Law s 243(c). 
71  Delaware General Corporation Law s 244. 
72  Delaware General Corporation Law s 244(a)(1). 
73  The cancellation of shares in South Africa has the same effect as the retirement of shares in 
Delaware, which is to restore them to authorised but unissued shares, see paragraph 2.2.5.2 
above and compare Chapter 5 paragraph 6.6. 
74  Delaware General Corporation Law s 244(a)(2). 
75  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3.3.  
76  The reduction of capital in South Africa is discussed in Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.  
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Thirdly, some or all of the capital represented by shares that are being 
converted or exchanged, or any capital not allocated to a particular class of shares, 
may be applied to the authorised conversion or exchange of outstanding shares. 
This may be done to the extent that the capital in the aggregate exceeds the total 
aggregate par value or stated capital of any previously unissued shares that may be 
issued upon such conversion or exchange.77 The remarks I made in the two 
preceding paragraphs on the position in South Africa, apply equally to this type of 
reduction. 
Lastly, some or all of the capital not represented by any particular class of 
shares and some or all of the capital represented by par value shares which is in 
excess of the aggregate par value of those shares or some of the capital 
represented by issued shares of no par value, may be transferred to surplus.78 
There is no limitation on the portion of no par value stated capital that can be 
transferred out of stated capital to surplus. The word ‘some’ is rather vague, but in 
view of the directors’ initial discretion in allocating consideration to capital,79 not 
anomalous. 
In all instances of the reduction of capital, a solvency test must be satisfied.80 
The assets of the corporation remaining after the reduction must be sufficient to pay 
any debts of the corporation for which payment has not otherwise been provided.81 
It was held in In re Bell Tone Records, Inc82 that the right to reduce capital is by 
necessary implication conditioned upon the solvency of the corporation and the 
rights of creditors.83  
A reduction of capital does not release any shareholder from liability in respect 
of shares that have not been fully paid.84 Existing creditors also have an interest in 
the consideration due on authorised but partly paid shares. In State v Benson85 the 
_________________________________________________________________  
77  Delaware General Corporation Law s 244(a)(3). 
78  Delaware General Corporation Law s 244(a)(4).   
79  See paragraph 2.2.3 above. 
80  Delaware General Corporation Law s 244(b) 
81  Delaware General Corporation Law s 244(b). Secured debts will be regarded as debts 
otherwise provided for. 
82  86 FSupp 806.  
83  See also Fletcher Cyclopedia 5150 note 9.  
84  Delaware General Corporation Law s 244(b). 
85  2 WW Harr (32 Del) 576, 128 A 107. 
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court decided that a corporation could retire shares and release the subscribers 
from liability for the amount unpaid on their shares, provided all unsecured debts 
are paid first.86 However, this is not generally allowed in the USA.87 
It appears that a repurchase of shares, which has to be funded out of 
surplus,88 will not reduce the share capital unless a reduction of capital is done 
simultaneously. The reduction is subject to compliance with a solvency test. In 
order to achieve the same effect as a repurchase in South Africa, which 
automatically reduces the issued share capital of a company, a Delaware 
corporation will have to have sufficient assets to pay its debts, in addition to funding 
the repurchase out of surplus. 
When the board resolves to reduce the corporation’s capital, it must lodge a 
certificate of reduction. This certificate is deemed to amend the certificate of 
incorporation.89 
2.3 Capital contributions 
2.3.1 Size of capital contribution 
The consideration for the issue of shares is determined by the board of directors or 
by the shareholders if the certificate of incorporation so provides.90 In the case of 
par value shares the consideration may not be less than the par value thereof.91 
Treasury shares may be disposed of for the consideration determined by the board 
or shareholders, regardless of any par value.92 The judgment of the directors as to 
the value of consideration is conclusive, unless actual fraud was present in the 
_________________________________________________________________  
86  See Fletcher Cyclopedia 5150 note 11. 
87  In re State Ins Co 14 F 28. 
88  See paragraph 2.5.2 below. 
89  Delaware General Corporation Law s 243(b). 
90  Delaware General Corporation Law s 153(a) – (b). See also Folk Delaware General 
Corporation Law 153:1 – 153:3. 
91  Delaware General Corporation Law s 153(a). 
92  Delaware General Corporation Law s 153(c). 
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transaction.93 The directors need not record the value of the consideration nor 
make any formal declaration regarding the adequacy of the consideration.94 
Shareholders may consent to the issuance of shares below par value,95 but 
subject to the rights of creditors and dissenting shareholders. Such an issue below 
par will be binding between the corporation and the purchasers or subscribers, but 
creditors may require full payment based on equity.96 This differs from the South 
African position where court sanction is required for the issue of par value shares at 
a discount and where creditors do not have a right to the difference between the 
consideration and the par value.97 The South African solution seems to afford 
greater certainty to shareholders, but is arguably more cumbersome to follow due to 
the involvement of the court. 
A corporation may issue stock in exchange for property worth less than par 
value, but an agreement that such shares are fully-paid and non-assessable is 
forbidden as against the corporation or its creditors.98  
When shares have been issued as fully paid while the consideration is in fact 
worth less than the par value of the shares, they are referred to as ‘watered stock’ or 
‘fictitiously paid up stock’.99 Watered stock may be created when shares are issued 
for non-cash consideration or as a gratuity or bonus. Holders of such shares, as 
well as promoters, may be held liable for the difference between the par value of the 
shares and the value of the consideration in certain circumstances. The basis for 
liability is misrepresentation by the corporation and the potential injury to existing 
shareholders, investors and creditors.100 
_________________________________________________________________  
93  Delaware General Corporation Law s 152. This section corresponds with s 18 of the 1969 
MBCA. 
94  See Bowen v Imperial Theatres Inc 13 Del Ch 120, 115 A 918; Fletcher Cyclopedia 5186; Folk 
Delaware General Corporation Law 152:4.  
95  See Fletcher Cyclopedia 5199 and the authority quoted at note 9. 
96  Handley v Stutz 139 US 417, 35 L Ed 227, 11 S Ct 530, Scoville v Thayer 105 US 143, 26 L Ed 
968. See also Fletcher Cyclopedia 5199 note 10. In connection with the position regarding 
dissenting shareholders see Kirkup v Anaconda Amusement Co 59 Mont 469, 197 P 1005, 
1011 (Montana); Fisk v Chicago RI&P R Co 53 Barb 513 (New York). 
97  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.5.1. 
98  Peters v United States Mortg Co 13 Del Ch 11, 114 A 598. See also Fletcher Cyclopedia 5207.9 
note 22. 
99  Fletcher Cyclopedia 5199. 
100  See Fletcher Cyclopedia 5199. See also Cook “Watered Stock” 585 – 588 regarding the 
common-law basis for liability and the different approaches to determining the extent of the 
liability as well as the gradual evolution of ‘Blue-Sky Laws’ protecting investors against 
Continued 
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2.3.2 Form of capital contribution 
The consideration for shares may be in the form of cash, services rendered,101 
personal property, real property, leases of real property, or a combination 
thereof.102 Shares are fully paid and non-assessable once the corporation has 
received the full consideration or when at least the amount that will be represented 
as capital has been received and the corporation has received a binding obligation 
of the subscriber or purchaser to pay the balance of the subscription or purchase 
price.103 
2.3.3 The regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
There are no additional requirements as to the acceptance or valuation of non-cash 
consideration. It is interesting to note, though, that the directors have 60 days after 
the issue of shares for non-cash consideration to determine which part of the 
consideration will become stated capital.104 The function of this extended period is 
apparently to allow the directors time to value the consideration, which implies that 
they do not have to do so prior to the issue of the shares.  
2.3.4 Timing of capital contribution 
Some part of the consideration has to be given when the shares are issued, and the 
remainder of the consideration can be made payable subject to call.105 
A Delaware corporation may issue partly paid shares.106 The amount paid on 
such shares as well as the total consideration payable should be stated on the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
securities fraud, at 590 – 591. 
101  The phrase ‘labor done’ is used. Future services cannot be regarded as ‘labor done’, see 
Catherines v Copytele Inc 602 FSupp 1019 (ED NY 1985). 
102   The nature of the consideration that is allowed corresponds with the Delaware constitutional 
provision regarding consideration, see Fletcher Cyclopedia 5181.95; Folk Delaware General 
Corporation Law 152:4. Property must have pecuniary value capable of ascertainment and not 
be something constructive or speculative and must be able to be delivered to the corporation, 
see Scully v Automobile Finance Co 11 Del Ch 355, 101 A 908. Promissory notes with collateral 
are regarded as personal property ‘actually received’, see Sohland v Baker 15 Del Ch 431, 141 
A 277; Fletcher Cyclopedia 5194 note 12. 
103  Delaware General Corporation Law s 152. A promissory note is an example of a binding 
obligation that can be used as consideration for the paid-in surplus part of the issue price, see 
Fletcher Cyclopedia 5194. 
104  Delaware General Corporation Law s 154. 
105  Delaware General Corporation Law s 156. 
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share certificate or in the books or records relating to uncertificated shares.107 
When a dividend is declared on fully paid shares, a dividend must be declared on 
partly paid shares of the same class, proportionate to the percentage of 
consideration actually paid.108 The directors may determine in which amounts and 
at which times the outstanding consideration of partly paid shares must be paid.109 
It is an express requirement that the directors must exercise this power in view of 
their judgment of the necessities of the business.110 
The directors may institute action for the recovery of an unpaid instalment or 
call on shares. Alternatively, the part of the shares of the delinquent shareholder 
sufficient to meet the outstanding demands plus incidental expenses may be sold at 
a public sale. If no bidder can be found to pay the amount due on the stock or, if the 
amount is not collected by an action within one year after the bringing of such action, 
the shares and any amount previously paid on them are forfeited to the 
corporation.111 
 The subscriber to or holder of shares in respect of which the full consideration 
has not been paid in, is liable for the unpaid balance if the corporation’s assets are 
insufficient to satisfy the claims of its creditors.112 
A person who became a transferee or assignee of shares or of a subscription 
of shares in good faith and without knowledge or notice that the full consideration 
has not been paid, is not personally liable for the outstanding consideration. The 
transferor will remain liable for the balance of the consideration.113 The liability for 
outstanding consideration must be asserted within six years of the issue of the 
stock or the date of subscription.114 Creditors may enforce a claim for outstanding 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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106  Delaware General Corporation Law s 156. 
107  Delaware General Corporation Law s 156. 
108  Delaware General Corporation Law s 156. 
109  Delaware General Corporation Law s 163.  
110  Delaware General Corporation Law s 163. 
111  Delaware General Corporation Law s 164. 
112  Delaware General Corporation Law s 162(a).  
113  Delaware General Corporation Law s 162(c). 
114  Delaware General Corporation Law s 162(e). 
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consideration if a writ of execution against the corporation has been returned 
unsatisfied.115 
2.4 Distributions 
2.4.1 Kinds of payments regulated 
The Delaware General Corporation Law contains separate provisions for different 
kinds of distributions. It does not contain a central definition of the concept 
‘distribution’. Repurchases and redemptions are regulated together in section 160 
while dividends are regulated by section 170. Section 244 provides separately for 
the reduction of capital.116 
2.4.2 Financial restrictions 
The basic rule is that repurchases, redemptions and dividends may be made out of 
surplus, so that stated capital will not be impaired.117 However, the Delaware 
General Corporation Law uses different terminology in the two main sections 
dealing with distributions. Section 160 states that a corporation may not repurchase 
or redeem its shares when its capital is impaired or if the redemption or repurchase 
would cause the impairment of its capital. In contrast to this negative formulation, 
section 170(a) is couched in positive form and allows the payment of dividends out 
of surplus. In addition, dividends may be paid out of current profits if there is no 
surplus.118 This possibility of paying ‘nimble dividends’ means that the financial 
restrictions applicable to dividend payments are not as strict as those governing 
repurchases and redemptions.119  
Despite the non-impairment principle, distributions can be made out of capital, 
provided a reduction of capital takes place simultaneously.120 Reductions of capital 
are in turn subject to compliance with a liquidity test.121 
_________________________________________________________________  
115  Delaware General Corporation Law s 162(b) read with s 325. 
116  See paragraph 2.2.4.3 above. 
117  See paragraph 1 above. 
118  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170(a).  
119  ‘Nimble dividends’ are discussed below, see paragraph 2.5.2 below. 
120  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170 refers to the surplus as calculated in accordance with 
Continued 
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A further exception applies in respect of dividends out of current net profits in 
the case of wasting assets corporations.122 A corporation that is engaged in the 
exploitation of wasting assets including natural resources and patents or that is 
engaged primarily in the liquidation of specific assets, need not take the depletion of 
those assets into account in determining the net profits derived from their 
exploitation.123 
2.4.3 Timing for application of financial restrictions 
The Delaware General Corporation Law does not contain a general timing provision, 
but each of the two provisions regulating distributions sets out a timing rule for 
promissory notes, debentures or other obligations given by the corporation.124 The 
time the corporation delivers the note, debenture or obligation is decisive. If the 
relevant test125 is satisfied at that stage, subsequent payment cannot be attacked 
as an unlawful distribution. It appears that the general principle is that the financial 
requirements should be satisfied at the time when the obligation arises.126 This 
principle is derived by analogy to the timing provision in the legislation. However, 
since the legislation refers to the ‘delivery’ of the note, debenture or obligation this is 
not altogether clear. This seems to imply that in the case of a post-dated cheque, for 
example, the test must be satisfied at a stage when the debt has not really been 
incurred. The regulation of timing issues in relation to promissory notes, debentures 
and other obligations in particular could be considered as an option in South 
Africa.127 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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ss 154 and 244, the latter being the reduction of capital provision. Such distributions out of 
capital are usually referred to as distributions out of capital surplus, see Clark Corporate Law 
614 – 615.  
121  See paragraph 2.6 above. 
122  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170(b). 
123  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170(b). 
124  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(a)(1); s 170(a). 
125  Non-impairment of capital as set out in Delaware General Corporation Law s 160 and the 
surplus test in s 170. 
126  In re Reliable Mfg Corp 703 F2d 996, 1002 (7th Cir 1983). See Folk Delaware General 
Corporation Law 160:3.  
127  See Chapter 5 paragraph 5.3. 
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2.4.4 Liability for distributions made in contravention of Act 
Despite the existence of separate provisions regulating repurchases and 
dividends,128 the liability of directors for unlawful distributions is regulated in a single 
section.129 This approach could be a useful interim improvement to the current 
South African situation where directors can be held liable for unlawful repurchases, 
but not for unlawful dividends.130  
Directors under whose administration any wilful or negligent violation of the 
provisions on purchase or redemption of own shares or on the declaration of 
dividends take place, are jointly and severally liable to the corporation. In the event 
of the corporation’s dissolution or insolvency, they are also directly liable to its 
creditors. Liability is for the full amount of the dividend unlawfully paid or for the full 
amount paid to purchase or redeem the shares, together with interest.131 Liability is 
imposed for any violation of the provisions relating to share repurchases or 
redemptions and dividends and not only, as is the case in South Africa, for 
non-compliance with the financial restrictions.132 
The liability extends for six years after the payment of the dividend or the 
purchase or redemption of the stock,133 double the period applicable to liability for 
unlawful repurchases in South Africa.134 
A director, who was absent when the board resolution was taken, or who 
dissented from it, will be exonerated if she caused her dissent to be noted in the 
books containing the minutes. 135  The position of non-consenting directors in 
Delaware is thus more certain than in South Africa.136 
It is expressly provided that a director who in good faith relies on the records of 
the corporation or on information, opinions, reports or statements supplied by 
others in order to determine whether a dividend or repurchase or redemption of 
_________________________________________________________________  
128  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160 and s 170 respectively. 
129  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174. 
130  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 6.4.1 and 5.6. 
131  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174(a). 
132  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.1. 
133  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174(a). 
134  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.2. 
135  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174(a). In case the director was absent, she must ensure 
that her dissent is noted immediately upon becoming aware of the resolution. 
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stock would comply with the financial restrictions, will be fully protected from 
liability.137 The information must relate to the value and amount of assets and 
liabilities and/or the net profits or any other facts pertinent to the determination of 
surplus or other funds that may be distributed. Although the liability imposed on 
directors for unlawful distributions is not limited to instances where the unlawfulness 
resulted from non-compliance with the financial restrictions, it seems that the 
protection regarding reliance on information supplied by others, applies only in 
respect of the financial situation of the corporation. 
A director who is liable under this provision is entitled to a contribution from her 
co-directors who voted for or concurred in the unlawful dividend, stock purchase or 
redemption.138 When a director is liable under this section, she is also entitled, to 
the extent of the amount paid by her, to subrogation of the corporation’s right 
against stockholders. 139  This differs from the position in South Africa where 
directors may recover certain distributions140 from shareholders on behalf of the 
corporation through a derivative procedure.141 
Only stockholders who received the dividend or payment for the sale or 
redemption of their stock with knowledge of facts indicating that the dividend, 
purchase, or redemption was unlawful are liable.142 In South Africa, by comparison, 
all shareholders are potentially liable to refund the director, but a court order is 
required.143 
In Delaware, creditors are not entitled to bring proceedings against 
stockholders who received an unlawful distribution, but they may proceed against 
the directors if the corporation is insolvent.144 Apparently, only the corporation can 
enforce the liability of stockholders, although the directors may rely on the principles 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
136  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.1.1. 
137  Delaware General Corporation Law s 172. 
138  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174(b). 
139  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174(c). 
140  Consideration for the repurchase of shares, see Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.2.1. As to other 
‘payments’ see Chapter 5 paragraph 5.6. 
141  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 5.4.1.3 and 6.4.2.1. 
142  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174(c).  
143  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.2. 
144  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174(a). 
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of subrogation.145 The relative merit of this approach, which differs from the South 
African provisions in several respects, is considered later.146 
2.5 Dividends 
2.5.1 Kinds of payments regulated 
Section 170 of the Delaware General Corporation Act regulates the payment by a 
corporation of ‘dividends upon the shares of its capital stock’. The statute does not 
define the term ‘dividend’ and it bears its ordinary meaning of a distribution to 
stockholders of a share of the earnings of the corporation.147 A stock dividend is not 
strictly speaking a dividend, as it does not involve the distribution of corporate 
assets to stockholders.148 However, it is expressly stated that dividends may be 
paid in ‘shares of the corporation’s capital stock’, thus apparently including the 
issuing of bonus shares in the meaning of ‘dividend’.149 It is interesting to note that 
the concept of ‘payment to shareholders’ in section 90(3) of the South African 
Companies Act does not include the issue of capitalisation shares.150 
2.5.2 Financial restrictions 
Directors may declare dividends out of surplus151 or, if there is no surplus, out of its 
net profits in the fiscal year in which the dividend is declared and/or the preceding 
fiscal year. 152  Dividends paid out of current profits are known as ‘nimble 
dividends’.153 
If the corporation’s capital has been diminished by a devaluation of assets or 
by losses or otherwise, to an amount less than the aggregate amount of capital 
_________________________________________________________________  
145  Delaware General Corporation Law s 174(c). 
146  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.10.4. 
147  See Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 170:5. 
148  Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 170:5. 
149  Delaware General Corporation Law s 173. 
150  See Chapter 5 paragraph 5.1.3. 
151  Surplus must be calculated in accordance with s 154 and s 244. 
152  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170. These are so-called ‘nimble dividends’. For criticism 
against the payment of nimble dividends, see Eisenberg Corporations 1257. 
153  For criticism against the payment of nimble dividends, see Eisenberg Corporations 1257. 
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represented by the issued and outstanding stock of all classes having a preference 
upon the distribution of assets, the directors may not declare and pay dividends out 
of current profits without first making good the deficiency in the amount of capital 
represented by the preferred shares. 154  This rule protects the interests of 
preference shareholders by ensuring that the corporation cannot distribute 
dividends to its ordinary shareholders if its assets are insufficient cover the amount 
of its preferred share capital. The effect of this rule is also that the creditors enjoy 
the benefit of a margin above mere solvency equal to the extent of the corporation’s 
preferred capital. 
In the case of corporations that exploit ‘wasting assets’, including natural 
resources and patents, the protection of creditors is eroded by a further exception. 
In calculating net profits from which nimble dividends may be paid, the depletion of 
the assets can be ignored.155 
Directors and committee members are fully protected in relying in good faith 
on the corporation’s records and on information, opinions and reports presented to 
the corporation as to the value and amount of the corporation’s assets, liabilities 
and net profits, the existence of a surplus or other funds from which dividends may 
be declared and which may be used for the redemption or purchase of the 
corporation’s shares.156 
Dividends may be paid in cash, property or shares of the corporation.157 In the 
last instance, an amount must be designated as capital in respect of the shares 
being declared as dividend. In the case of par value shares this amount must be at 
least equal to the aggregate par value of the shares.158 
_________________________________________________________________  
154  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170(a).  
155  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170(b). This exception is criticised by Folk Delaware 
General Corporation Law 170:3 – 170:4 for being formulated too broadly in that it allows the 
disregarding of depletion that is not causally linked to the corporation’s exploitation of the 
wasting assets. 
156  Delaware General Corporation Law s 172. 
157  Delaware General Corporation Law s 173. 
158  Delaware General Corporation Law s 173. Such designation is not required in the case of a 
stock split or division. 
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2.5.3 Timing for application of financial restrictions 
The time when the financial restrictions have to be applied in general is discussed 
elsewhere.159 However, it is provided that the directors may ‘declare and pay’ 
dividends out of surplus or current profits.160 This seems to imply that there must be 
a surplus available both at the time of declaration and at the time of actual payment. 
The express regulation of dividends paid by way of certain debt instruments support 
this conclusion. Such a note, debenture or obligation 161  will be valid and 
enforceable, provided the corporation could have lawfully paid the dividend at the 
time the note, debenture or obligation was given.162 Unless this exception applies, 
the corporation has to have the necessary surplus at the time of actual payment. 
2.5.4 Status of claim in respect of authorised but unpaid dividends 
It would seem that the shareholder will be entitled to enforce payment of a declared 
dividend only on condition that the corporation has the required surplus at the date 
of enforcement.  
2.5.5 Authorisation 
The declaration and payment of dividends is a matter for the discretion of the 
directors, subject to the provisions of the certificate of incorporation.163  
2.6 Share repurchases 
2.6.1 Power to acquire shares 
Corporations are given a general power to ‘purchase, redeem, receive, take or 
otherwise acquire, own and hold, sell, lend, exchange, transfer or otherwise 
dispose of, pledge, use and otherwise deal in and with’ their own shares.164 
Repurchases and redemptions are expressly recognised as separate ways of 
_________________________________________________________________  
159  See paragraph 2.4.3 above. 
160  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170. 
161  It is suggested that the word ‘obligation’ in this context refers to a debt instrument. 
162  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170(a). 
163  Delaware General Corporation Law s 170(a). 
164  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(a). 
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acquiring shares, although the same financial restrictions 165  apply to both 
procedures. The holding of treasury shares and the corporation’s disposing of and 
dealing in them is also regulated.166  Although the Delaware General Corporation 
Law does not define the term ‘repurchase’, it has a very wide meaning that includes 
any acquisition by the corporation for consideration, except redemptions.167  
Because the Delaware General Corporation Law does not regulate the 
procedure for repurchases,168 it is also silent on different kinds of repurchases. The 
courts distinguish between selective repurchases or discriminatory tender offers 
and pro rata self-tender offers.169 This distinction is relevant to directors’ duties and 
is considered elsewhere.170 
2.6.2 Financial restrictions for repurchases 
A corporation may not purchase or redeem its own shares for cash or other property 
when its capital is impaired or when such purchase or redemption would cause any 
impairment of its capital. 171  The capital impairment test does not rely on a 
previously published balance sheet and a corporation is thus free to revalue its 
assets and liabilities in establishing whether a repurchase or redemption is 
possible.172 The only question is whether a surplus exists and the directors are thus 
not required to adopt a resolution setting out the surplus.173 Moreover, directors 
may rely on the opinions of experts as to the value of assets and liabilities.174 
By way of exception, a repurchase or redemption out of capital is allowed in 
respect of preference shares or, if there are no preference shares, any shares, 
_________________________________________________________________  
165  Set out in the first proviso to s 160(a) and discussed in paragraph 2.6.2 below. 
166  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(b) – (c). 
167  See Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 160:7.  
168  See paragraph 2.6.3 below. 
169  See Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 160:12 – 160:14. 
170  See paragraph 2.6.3 below. 
171  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(a)(1). See also paragraph 2.4.2 above. 
172  Klang v Smith’s Food & Drug Centers, Inc Supreme Court of Delaware, 1997 702 A.2d 150 at 
154 (confirming Morris v Standard Gas & Electric Co Del Ch, A.2d 577 (1949). The court stated 
that unrealised appreciation reflected real economic value. See also Folk Delaware General 
Corporation Law 160:5 – 160:7; Cox & Hazen Corporations 577. 
173  Eisenberg Corporations 1255; Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 160:6.  
174  Delaware General Corporation Law s 172, see paragraph 2.4.4 above. 
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provided the shares are retired and the capital reduced simultaneously.175 The 
shares are thus redeemed or repurchased out of a surplus created through the 
capital reduction. 
Clearly, protection of the priority interests of preference shareholders lies at 
the heart of the hierarchy envisaged in this provision, namely that ordinary shares 
may be so repurchased only if there are no preference shareholders. This rule is 
similar in effect to the English common-law principles relating to formal reductions 
of share capital.176 
When shares are repurchased out of capital, creditors will be protected by the 
fact that a capital reduction is subject to compliance with a liquidity requirement.177 
The amount of the consideration a corporation may pay when repurchasing 
redeemable shares is restricted. A corporation may not purchase shares that are 
redeemable at the option of the corporation, for more than the price at which they 
can ‘then’ be redeemed.178 This measure protects not only the creditors, but also 
the remaining shareholders of the corporation. A similar provision may be useful in 
South Africa.179  
2.6.3 Procedure and other requirements 
The Delaware legislation contains no procedural requirements for repurchases. 
This is in contrast with South Africa where sections 85 and 87 of the Companies Act 
regulate various aspects of the procedure. 180  There is no requirement that 
shareholders should approve a repurchase of shares by their corporation or that 
repurchases should as far as possible be proportionate. In fact, it has been held that 
a corporation may purchase shares privately without making a pro rata offer to all 
stockholders of that class.181 
_________________________________________________________________  
175  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(a)(1) proviso. The share capital can be reduced 
under s 243 and s 244. See paragraph 2.2.6 above for a discussion of capital reductions. 
176  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.1. 
177  See paragraph 2.2.6 above. 
178  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(a)(2). 
179  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.8. 
180  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3. 
181  Martin v American Potash & Chemical Corp 33 Del Ch 234, 92 A2d 295. Even a purchase made 
with the purpose of eliminating a difficult shareholder is acceptable. 
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The courts have formulated a number of restrictions on the powers of directors 
of companies acquiring their own shares. These restrictions address some of the 
concerns of shareholder protection that South Africa addresses in legislation.  
The most important non-financial restriction formulated by the courts is the 
proper purpose doctrine.182 According to this principle, the proper purpose for a 
repurchase must be to benefit the corporation. A repurchase made in order to 
benefit the directors in their position, power or profit is for an improper purpose.183 
However, the fact that a repurchase incidentally maintains the directors’ control 
does not indicate an improper purpose. 184  Further, if directors believe on 
reasonable grounds that the threat to incumbent management is also a threat to the 
future of the corporation’s policies or effectiveness, they will be protected by the 
business judgment rule. 185  This ‘difference in policy’ exception to the proper 
purpose doctrine is particularly relevant where shares are purchased from a single 
shareholder believed to be a threat to the corporation.186 Directors who approve a 
repurchase in a sudden emergency to protect the corporation from serious injury 
may also be excused.187  
The proper purpose doctrine also addresses the potential abuse of selective 
or non-proportionate repurchases. These are allowed provided the directors are not 
acting out of a sole or primary purpose to maintain their position.188 
_________________________________________________________________  
182  The courts also developed the financial restriction of capital impairment which was later taken 
up in the legislation, see In re International Radiator Co 92 A 255 (Del Ch 1914). See also Folk 
Delaware General Corporation Law 160:5. 
183  Potter v Sanitary Co of America 194 A 87 (Del Ch 1937). 
184  Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 160:8. 
185  This exception was formulated in Kors v Carey 158 A2d 136 (Del Ch 1960). It was also used in 
Cheff v Mathes 199 A2d 548 (Del 1964). These two decisions are discussed in Hartnett 
“Greenmail” 1281 – 1282, who criticises the application of the business judgment rule in this 
context and points out (1287ff) that there has been a shift in the application of the business 
judgment rule in Delaware, restricting its operation to protecting disinterested directors who 
have informed themselves of all material information about the decision. See also Kaplan & 
Young “Corporate Eminent Domain” 72 – 73 for a discussion of these and other cases. 
186  See Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 160:8 – 160:9; Clark Corporate Law 631. 
187  See Bennett v Propp 187 A 2d 405 (Del 1962), although in this case a director was held to have 
breached his fiduciary duties because the repurchase was made before there was a real threat 
to existing corporate policy. See also Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 160:10 – 160:11; 
Hartnett “Greenmail” 1283. 
188  Unocal Corp v Mesa Petroleum Co 493 A 2d 946 (Del 1985). See also Folk Delaware General 
Corporation Law 160:13 – 160:14. Sommer “Whom Should the Corporation Serve?” 49 argues 
that the court in Unocal equated the interests of the corporation with the interests of the 
shareholders in receiving an adequate price and did not consider corporate policy as such.  
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Contrary to the position in South Africa,189 in Delaware an adjustment of 
capital accounts does not necessarily follow upon an acquisition of own shares. The 
capital can be reduced subject to compliance with additional requirements.190 
There is no requirement that voting shares should remain in issue after a 
repurchase, although such a requirement is laid down in respect of redeemable 
shares.191 The reason for this inconsistency is unclear. 
2.6.4 Liability for unlawful repurchases 
Liability for unlawful repurchases is regulated by a provision that applies to 
distributions in general. This is discussed elsewhere.192  
2.6.5 Enforceability of contracts for the acquisition of shares 
The status of a claimant who sold shares to the corporation and has not been paid 
is not regulated in the legislation. While it appears that purchases and contracts 
made in contravention of the capital impairment restriction are void,193 the timing 
rule for promissory notes, debentures and other obligations applies the restrictions 
at the time of delivery of the debt instrument. The Delaware law in this regard 
appears to be vague and uncertain. If the contract is void, it would appear that the 
seller, who may not even have been aware of the fact that she was contracting with 
the corporation, would have no claim for the purchase price, but would be treated 
exactly the same as the existing shareholders who did not purport to sell their 
shares to the corporation. In insolvency proceedings, the claim of a 
vendor-shareholder is subordinated to the claims of all other unsecured 
creditors.194  
_________________________________________________________________  
189  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.3.3. 
190  See paragraph 2.2.6 above. 
191  Delaware General Corporation Law s 151(b), discussed in paragraph 2.6.8 below. 
192  See paragraph 2.4.4 above. 
193  See Folk Delaware General Corporation Law 160:7. 
194  See Robinson v Wangeman 75 F 2d 756 (5th Cir 1935). 
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2.6.6 The status of repurchased shares 
Repurchased and redeemed shares are regarded as issued but not outstanding 
shares. The corporation in effect holds them as treasury shares.195 The corporation 
may resell treasury shares redeemed or purchased out of surplus and not retired, at 
any price fixed by the directors, even below their par value.196 Treasury shares held 
by a corporation shall not be entitled to vote and will not be counted for quorum 
purposes.197 
Rather than holding shares in treasury, a corporation can also decide to retire 
the shares or even to cancel them completely.198 
2.6.7 Repurchases through subsidiaries 
The Delaware General Corporation Law does not regulate the acquisition of shares 
by a subsidiary in its parent corporation. However, the legislation does exclude 
voting rights in respect of shares held by another corporation of which the first 
corporation holds a majority of the shares entitled to vote in the election of directors 
of that other corporation. 199  This exclusion of voting rights in respect of 
cross-holdings indicates that a subsidiary may indeed acquire and hold shares in its 
parent corporation. In the absence of any specific regulation of the acquisition of 
shares by a subsidiary it seems that a subsidiary can acquire shares without 
complying with any financial or other restrictions. 
2.6.8 The redemption of shares 
Any class or series of shares may be redeemable at the option of the corporation or 
of the holders of such stock or on the happening of a specified event.200 Shares 
_________________________________________________________________  
195  In Wall v United States 164 F2d 462 the court held that stock of a corporation purchased by it 
and kept in its treasury is redeemed in the sense that it no longer constitutes any liability of the 
corporation but represents nothing more than an opportunity to acquire new assets by a reissue. 
See also Fletcher Cyclopedia 5150 note 1. 
196  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(b). 
197  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(c).  
198  See footnote 26 above, where the difference between ‘retire’ and ‘cancel’ in relation to shares is 
explained.  
199  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(c). Such shares also do not count for quorum 
purposes. 
200  Delaware General Corporation Law s 151(b). It is possible to have ordinary redeemable shares.  
  
   
184 
may be redeemed for cash, property, or rights, including securities of the same or 
another corporation.201 The capital impairment test applies,202 but capital may in 
certain circumstances be used on condition that the capital is reduced 
simultaneously and on condition that the rights of preference shareholders are 
respected.203 
A corporation may not redeem shares unless their redemption is authorised 
by section 151(b) of the Delaware General Corporation Law and unless it does so in 
accordance with that section and the certificate of incorporation.204 Section 151(b) 
provides that except in certain very limited instances,205 there should after the 
redemption be shares left in issue that have full voting powers. Strangely, there is 
no similar requirement regarding remaining shares that should be left in issue after 
a repurchase.206  
Shares can be called for redemption by giving notice of their redemption and 
depositing or setting aside a sum sufficient to pay the redemption price. In such a 
case, the shares are deemed not to be outstanding shares and will not be taken into 
account for purposes of voting or determining the total number of shares entitled to 
vote.207  
2.7 Evaluation and conclusions on Delaware 
Delaware bases its contribution and distribution rules on the concept ‘stated capital’ 
while South Africa uses ‘issued share capital’ which could be reflected either in a 
share capital account or in a stated capital account.208 The term ‘stated capital’ is 
also used in South Africa, but in a narrower sense.209 
_________________________________________________________________  
201  Delaware General Corporation Law s 151(b)(2). 
202  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(a) proviso 1, see also paragraphs 2.4.2 and 2.5.2 
above. 
203  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(c), see paragraph 2.5.2 above. 
204  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(a)(3). 
205  These relate to regulated investment companies and to corporations holding licences or 
franchises from governmental agencies. A consideration of these exceptions falls outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
206  See paragraph 2.6.3 above. 
207  Delaware General Corporation Law s 160(d). 
208  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4. 
209  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.2. 
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Delaware allows par value as well as no par value shares.210 Corporations 
have to state their authorised capital in respect of par and no par value shares 
respectively.211 The minimum issued capital is one share with full voting powers.212 
The legal capital system in Delaware is rather flexible since directors may 
determine the par value of shares and decide how much of the consideration for par 
value or no par value shares will be capital. This principle is subject only to the 
requirement that a figure at least equal to the par value and some amount in respect 
of no par value shares, must be stated as capital.213 Premiums received on shares 
are not automatically allocated to reserve accounts, but are regarded as surplus 
available for distribution.214 The directors may determine that any part of a share 
premium will be regarded as stated capital.215 There is thus no strict correlation 
between consideration received and capital, unlike the position in South Africa 
where the composition of share capital accounts, share premium accounts and 
stated capital accounts is closely regulated.216 The variation of capital is possible 
through increases, decreases and capitalisation.217 Directors may also, subject to 
the par value limitation and the corporation’s liquidity, transfer amounts from stated 
capital to surplus and vice versa, thus varying the share capital.218 The directors 
may resolve to reduce the share capital, but this is subject to a solvency test.219 An 
acquisition of own shares will not automatically result in a reduction of capital.220 
The directors determine capital contributions, unless this power is reserved for 
the shareholders. In the case of par value shares, the consideration must be at least 
equal to the nominal value of the shares, although the shareholders can consent to 
issues below par value.221 While shareholders are liable to the company for the 
_________________________________________________________________  
210  See paragraph 2.2.3 above. 
211  See paragraph 2.2.1 above. 
212  See paragraph 2.2.2 above. 
213  See paragraph 2.2.4 above. 
214  See paragraph 2.2.4 above. 
215  See paragraph 2.2.4 above. 
216  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4. 
217  See paragraph 2.2.5.1 above. 
218  See paragraph 2.2.5.2 above. 
219  See paragraph 2.2.6 above. 
220  See paragraph 2.2.6 above. 
221  See paragraph 2.3.1 above. 
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agreed consideration only, they may be liable to creditors for the difference 
between the par value and the value of the consideration given.222 Delaware allows 
various forms of capital contributions, but corporations may not accept future 
services as consideration.223 There are no additional requirements for non-cash 
capital contributions.224 Partly paid shares are permitted and the liability for the 
outstanding amount is expressly regulated.225 
Distributions, including redemptions and repurchases, may be made out of 
surplus.226 Dividends may also be paid out of ‘current’ profits, but the net assets of 
the corporation should then exceed the amount of the preferred capital.227 These 
dividends are known as ‘nimble dividends’. 
Shares may be redeemed or repurchased out of surplus. The Delaware 
legislation does not prescribe any authorisation requirements or other formalities.228 
However, the courts have formulated certain guidelines for the protection of 
shareholders, particularly in the case of selective repurchases.229  
Delaware also allows redemptions or repurchases out of capital, provided a 
capital reduction takes place.230 The reduction of capital is subject to compliance 
with a solvency test. The prior rights of preference shareholders are protected by 
the rule that only preferred shares may be repurchased or redeemed out of capital, 
unless there are no preferred shares, in which case ordinary shares may be 
repurchased or redeemed out of capital.231 This rule accords with the English 
common-law principles on reductions of capital.232 
 Delaware does not distinguish between repurchases and redemptions in 
relation to the funds from they may take place.233 However, the price that may be 
_________________________________________________________________  
222  See paragraph 2.3.1 above. 
223  See paragraph 2.3.2 above. 
224  See paragraph 2.3.3 above. 
225  See paragraph 2.3.4 above. 
226  See paragraph 2.4.2, paragraphs 2.5.2 and 2.6.2 above. 
227  See paragraph 2.5.3 above. 
228  See paragraph 2.6.3 above. 
229  See paragraph 2.6.3 above. 
230  See paragraph 2.6.2 above. 
231  See paragraph 2.6.2 above. 
232  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.6.1. 
233  See paragraph 2.6.8 above. 
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paid for a repurchase where the corporation has the option to redeem the shares is 
regulated. 234  This protects not only the creditors, but also the remaining 
shareholders. South Africa could consider introducing a similar rule.  
Delaware allows treasury shares and does not regulate the price or procedure 
for resale of these shares by the corporation.235 There is no regulation of the 
acquisition of shares in a parent company by its subsidiary, although the holding of 
such shares is addressed through a neutralisation of voting rights.236 
It may at first glance appear as if Delaware applies stricter financial 
restrictions to corporate distributions than South Africa does, because it insists on 
the maintenance of stated capital. However, the way in which stated capital is 
determined, coupled with the ease with which the capital may be reduced subject to 
compliance with a solvency test, leads to a result that is not very different from the 
South African restrictions.  
The stated capital system as implemented in Delaware illustrates the 
artificiality that is often attributed to the legal capital system. This is largely the result 
of inroads made into the assumption that the consideration received for shares 
should not be returned to shareholders. The discretion afforded to directors to 
decide what amount will be reflected as stated capital in respect of no par value 
shares, coupled with the absence of regulation of premiums received on par value 
shares, may mean that there is little practical difference between what would qualify 
as surplus and the amount that could have been distributed under the South African 
solvency test. When the Delaware system is compared to the way in which legal 
capital systems are implemented in member states of the European Union, it 
becomes obvious that many of the objections levelled at the maintenance of capital 
principle are criticisms of the way in which the system has been implemented in 
jurisdictions such as Delaware rather than criticisms of the theoretical basis of the 
doctrine. 
From the perspective of creditor protection, Delaware’s relatively slack 
distribution regime nevertheless offers creditors at least the same level of protection 
_________________________________________________________________  
234  See paragraph 2.6.2 above. 
235  See paragraph 2.6.6 above. 
236   See paragraph 2.6.7 above. 
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as solvency-based systems. This is because a net assets test applies to nimble 
dividends. 
Shareholders in Delaware are protected by general principles of 
proportionality, by the fiduciary duties of directors and by the fact that at least a part 
of the capital they contributed will have to be maintained by the corporation. There 
are several statutory provisions to safeguard the rights of preference shareholders 
whenever the stated capital is to be impaired.  
South Africa can possibly benefit from the implementation of three principles 
found in Delaware law. The first is the rule that a corporation may not purchase its 
own shares for more than the price at which it can redeem them at that stage. 
Although directors’ fiduciary duties will probably prevent them from repurchasing 
shares for more than their redemption price, the procedural and financial 
differences between the two procedures in South Africa could influence the 
decision. In view of the uncertainties involved, it may be preferable to regulate this 
aspect. Secondly, the timing rule for distributions by way of promissory notes can 
also serve as an example for South Africa in formulating a timing provision. 
Finally, the principle that preference shareholders should enjoy protection 
whenever capital is returned to ordinary shareholders, that finds expression in the 
restrictions on nimble dividends and on repurchases and redemptions out of capital, 
can serve as an example for South Africa.   
3 CALIFORNIA 
3.1 Introduction 
California was the first state in the USA to move away from the legal capital 
regime.237 It is an important comparative jurisdiction in the USA not only because of 
this innovation, but also due to its size and commercial significance.238  The 
California General Corporation Law of 1977, also known as the California 
Corporations Code, 239  employs economic concepts to protect creditors. 240  Its 
_________________________________________________________________  
237   Manning Legal Capital 176; Eisenberg Corporations 1261; Marsh California Corporation Law 
218. 
238  Eisenberg Corporations 107. 
239  Chapter 682 of the Statutes of 1975, hereinafter referred to as the ‘California Corporations 
Continued 
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approach greatly influenced the 1984 MBCA, although the financial restrictions 
under the MBCA are not as strict as those of California. California prescribes the 
economic equivalent of the earned surplus test while the MBCA allows distributions 
subject to the economic equivalent of the capital-impairment test.241   
When the legal capital doctrine still applied in California, share repurchases 
and dividends were regulated differently.242 Shares could be repurchased only out 
of earned surplus243 while dividends could be declared out of any form of surplus.244 
The dividend rule was further relaxed by the fact that nimble dividends, that is, 
dividends paid out of current profits, were allowed. In addition, a wasting asset 
exception allowed qualifying companies to pay dividends without making provision 
for the depreciation of certain assets.245 
The idea behind the new approach was to restore to creditors the protection 
that had gradually been eroded, while at the same time allowing flexibility 
depending on the present financial position of the corporation.246  
The California Corporations Code of 1977 introduced a single definition of 
‘distribution’ encompassing repurchases and dividends.247 Distributions may be 
made out of retained earnings or alternatively when the corporation’s assets 
exceed its liabilities by 25 per cent and its current assets are at least equal to its 
current liabilities.248   
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Continued 
Code’. 
240  Eisenberg Corporations 1261. 
241   See Kummert “State Statutory Restrictions” 282 – 284 for a brief comparison between the 
California Code and the MBCA.  
242  Marsh California Corporation Law 19. 
243  A number of exceptions allowed repurchases out of paid-in surplus or even out of capital. These 
exceptions included repurchases from dissenting shareholders and the redemption of 
redeemable shares. See Marsh California Corporation Law 1123 – 1124. 
244  If a corporation had issued preference shares, paid-in surplus could be used for dividends on 
the preference shares only. However, if there were only one class of ordinary shares, dividends 
could be paid out of paid-in surplus. 
245  Marsh California Corporation Law 1122. A similar exception still applies in Delaware, see 
paragraph 2.5.2 above. 
246  Marsh California Corporation Law 47; see also 1115 – 1118 for an overview of the development 
and gradual erosion of the financial restrictions in California. 
247  See paragraph 3.4.1 below. 
248  See paragraph 3.4.2 below. 
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The Code applies to all corporations, including close corporations, 
incorporated in California as well as to pseudo-foreign corporations.249 
3.2 Structure of share capital 
3.2.1 Authorised capital 
The articles of incorporation must state the total number of shares a corporation is 
authorised to issue.250 The abolition of authorised capital was considered during the 
reform process, but eventually retained because of historical tradition. 251  If a 
corporation is authorised to issue more than one class of shares or if any class is to 
have more than one series, the total number of shares of each class and series 
must be stated in the articles of incorporation.252 It is possible for a corporation to 
create blank or unclassified stock in respect of which the board of directors can 
determine the terms at a later stage.253 
Pre-emptive rights apply only if expressly granted in the corporation’s articles 
of incorporation.254 
3.2.2 Minimum capital 
It is not an express requirement of the California Corporations Code that a 
corporation should have one or more shares in issue. However, the requirement 
_________________________________________________________________  
249  California Corporations Code ss 500 – 505. See also Marsh California Corporation Law 18; 
Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 900 par 32. A pseudo-foreign corporation is a 
corporation doing business in California and with most of its business done and shareholders 
resident in California, see footnote 9 above. 
250  California Corporations Code s 202(d) – (e).  
251  Marsh California Corporation Law 218. Whereas the prior law based the registration fee for 
corporations on their authorised capital a flat filing fee is now charged. 
252  California Corporations Code s 202(e). If a class is divided into more than one series, it is also 
permissible to state the total number of shares of the class and provide in the articles that the 
directors may fix the number of shares of any series in that class. 
253  California Corporations Code s 202(e)(3). See also paragraph 3.2.5 below. 
254  California Corporations Code s 204. Pre-emptive rights were developed by American courts in 
the 19th century, see Gray v Portland Bank 3 Mass 364 (1807) and were universally recognised 
in America as an ‘inherent attribute’ of stock ownership early in the 20th century, see Miles v 
Safe Deposit & Trust Co 259 US 247, 252, 42 A CT (1922). However, this principle has since 
been tempered so that pre-emptive rights will usually not apply automatically. 
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that a corporation cannot issue or redeem redeemable shares unless it has one or 
more common shares outstanding which is not redeemable, implies this.255  
3.2.3 Kinds of shares 
Shares do not have a par value.256 However, shares are deemed to have a par 
value of one dollar each for purposes of any statute or regulation levying a tax or fee 
based on the capitalisation of a corporation.257 If any other statute or regulation 
applying to a particular corporation requires its shares to have a par value, the 
board may determine a par value in order to satisfy the requirements of the statute 
or regulation.258  
3.2.4 Share capital and reserve accounts 
There is no reliance on share capital or reserve accounts in the formulation of the 
contribution or distribution rules.259  
3.2.5 The variation of share capital 
The number of authorised shares may be increased or reduced by amendment to 
the articles of incorporation. 260  A corporation may also change, exchange, 
reclassify or cancel any shares.261 Blank stock can be classified by the directors.262 
A corporation has to make consequential changes to its articles when its 
authorised capital is reduced following a repurchase or redemption of shares.263 
3.2.6 The reduction of issued capital 
There is no provision for the formal reduction of issued capital. 
_________________________________________________________________  
255  California Corporations Code s 402(c). 
256  Marsh California Corporation Law 215 points out that a par value is not prohibited, but the Act 
does not refer to par value. 
257  California Corporations Code s 205. 
258  California Corporations Code s 205. 
259  Marsh California Corporation Law 217 – 218. See also California Corporations Code s 114. 
260  California Corporations Code s 900. 
261  California Corporations Code s 900. 
262  California Corporations Code s 202(e)(3), see also Marsh California Corporation Law 215. 
263   California Corporations Code s 510(b), see also paragraph 3.6.6 below. 
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3.3 Capital contribution 
Shares may generally be issued for the consideration determined by the board,264 
but the articles may confer on shareholders the right to determine the consideration 
for which shares may be issued.265  
3.3.1 Size of capital contribution 
The judgment of the directors as to the value of the consideration for shares is 
conclusive unless fraud is proved.266 
Shares may be issued without consideration as a share dividend, upon a 
stock split, reverse stock split, reclassification of outstanding shares into shares of 
another class, exchange of outstanding shares for shares of another class or other 
change affecting outstanding shares.267  
The articles of incorporation may also provide for the levying of assessments 
on shares.268 Such assessments are over and above the outstanding consideration 
on partly paid shares.269 The procedure is that the board levies an assessment and 
notifies the shareholders. It determines a date for payment and a date upon which 
shares on which the assessment remains unpaid become ‘delinquent’ as well as a 
date for the sale of delinquent shares. The assessment is regarded as a lien on the 
shares. If on the date of the sale no bidder offers to pay the amount due on the 
shares, they are forfeited to the corporation.270 
3.3.2 Form of capital contribution 
The consideration for the issue of shares may consist of money, labour done, 
services rendered to or for the benefit of the corporation or in its formation or 
reorganisation, debts or securities cancelled and tangible or intangible property 
_________________________________________________________________  
264  California Corporations Code s 409(a)(1). 
265  California Corporations Code s 204(a)(8). If shareholders are to determine the consideration, 
the determination has to be done by approval of the outstanding shares, s 409(c). 
266  California Corporations Code s 409(b). 
267  California Corporations Code s 409(a)(2). 
268  California Corporations Code s 204(a)(1) and s 423. 
269  California Corporations Code s 423. 
270  California Corporations Code s 423(i). 
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actually received by the corporation or its wholly owned subsidiary.271 Promissory 
notes of the purchaser are not acceptable consideration, unless adequately 
secured by collateral other than the shares acquired.272 Future services cannot 
constitute payment for shares.273  
3.3.3 The regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
When non-monetary consideration is accepted, the directors have to adopt a 
resolution stating their determination of the fair value to the corporation of such 
consideration.274 
3.3.4 Timing of capital contributions 
The full agreed consideration has to be paid prior to or concurrently with the 
issuance of shares, unless the shares are issued as partly paid, in which case the 
consideration has to be paid in accordance with the agreement of subscription or 
purchase.275 When shares are issued as partly paid,276 they will be subject to call 
for the remaining consideration.277 The share certificate or, for uncertificated shares, 
the initial transaction statement, must state both the amount paid and the 
outstanding amount.  When a dividend is declared on fully paid shares, a dividend 
proportional to the consideration paid has to be declared on partly paid shares of 
the same class.278  
_________________________________________________________________  
271  California Corporations Code s 409(a)(1). Payment in future instalments is allowed for 
employee stock purchase plans, s 408(a). 
272  California Corporations Code s 409(1)(a). An exception in s 408(a) makes promissory notes 
acceptable for employee stock option plans. The issue of shares for no or for unauthorised 
consideration will not necessarily be invalid or void, see Marsh California Corporation Law 396 
and Division 8 of the Commercial Code. 
273  California Corporations Code s 409(a)(1). Since corporations can have partly paid shares, 
services may be rendered and the payment due then subsequently used against further 
payments. 
274  California Corporations Code s 409(e). See Marsh California Corporation Law 399 – 400 for a 
discussion of the correct approach to valuation of assets in this context. 
275  California Corporations Code s 410(b). 
276  Partly paid shares are, however, rarely used, see Marsh California Corporation Law 402. 
277  California Corporations Code s 409(d). 
278  California Corporations Code s 409(d).  
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The subscriber or person to whom shares are originally issued is liable to the 
corporation for the full consideration agreed on.279 Shares are usually issued as 
fully paid and the shareholder will then not be liable for any further payments. 280  
The California Corporations Code regulates the position of a transferee of 
partly paid shares extensively. A transferee of shares for which the full agreed 
consideration has not been paid and who acquired them in good faith and without 
knowledge that they were not paid in full or to the extent stated on the certificate or 
initial transaction statement, is liable only for the amount shown by the certificate or 
statement to be unpaid.281 A transferee of partly paid shares, who acquired those 
shares with actual knowledge that the agreed consideration had not been paid to 
the extent stated on the certificate or statement, is personally liable to the 
corporation for the unpaid amount.282 It appears anomalous that no liability is 
imposed on a transferee of shares issued as fully paid, but in respect of which the 
full consideration has, to the knowledge of the transferee, not been received. Only 
the original subscriber or holder will be liable for the unpaid amount.283 
The claim in respect of outstanding consideration belongs to the corporation 
and a creditor of the corporation may generally not enforce this claim. However, if a 
creditor has obtained final judgment against the corporation and execution has 
been returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the creditor may institute action to 
enforce the liability of the shareholder to the corporation to pay the amount due on 
the shares.284 Other creditors may intervene and join all shareholders with partly 
paid shares in the action.285 It is expressly provided that shareholders and creditors 
who have a right or remedy against any promoter, shareholder, director, officer or 
the corporation based on fraud or illegality in connection with the sale or issue of 
shares or securities, will retain such right or remedy. Likewise, the corporation 
retains any right of rescission, cancellation or otherwise because of fraud or 
_________________________________________________________________  
279  California Corporations Code s 410. 
280  See Marsh California Corporation Law 401. 
281  California Corporations Code s 411. 
282  California Corporations Code s 412. 
283  See California Corporations Code s 410. 
284  California Corporations Code s 414(a). 
285  California Corporations Code s 414(b). A receiver may be appointed for the benefit of the 
respective parties to the action. 
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illegality practiced on it in connection with the issue or sale of its shares or other 
securities.286  
3.4 Distributions 
3.4.1 Kinds of payments regulated 
The phrase ‘distribution to its shareholders’ is defined as 
‘the transfer of cash or property by a corporation to its shareholders without 
consideration, whether by way of dividend or otherwise, except a dividend in 
shares of the corporation, or the purchase or redemption of its shares for cash 
or property, including the transfer, purchase or redemption by a subsidiary of 
the corporation’287 
The definition also sets out what is not regarded as a distribution, namely: 
• complying with a court order for the rescission of the issuance of shares 
• the rescission by a corporation of the issuance of its shares, if the board 
determines that it is reasonably likely that the holders of the shares could 
legally enforce a claim for the rescission, that the rescission is in the best 
interests of the corporation and that the corporation is likely to be able to 
meet its liabilities (except those for which payment is otherwise 
adequately provided) as they mature 
• the repurchase by a corporation of its shares issued in terms of section 
408 if the board determines that the repurchase is in the best interests of 
the corporation and that the corporation is likely to be able to meet its 
liabilities (except those for which payment is otherwise adequately 
provided) as they mature.288 
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286  California Corporations Code s 415. 
287  California Corporations Code s 166. 
288  California Corporations Code s 166. 
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Although a rescission of the issuance of shares is not a distribution and the financial 
restrictions consequently do not apply to it, a claim for restitution is subordinated to 
the claims of general creditors.289 
Shares issued in terms of section 408 are shares issued to directors or 
employees of a corporation pursuant to an employee stock option or stock 
purchase plan.290  
It is notable that the acquisition of shares of dissenting shareholders under the 
appraisal remedy is subject to the financial restrictions applicable to share 
repurchases.291 The rights of creditors enjoy priority over the rights of dissenting 
shareholders.292  
3.4.2 Financial restrictions 
The financial restrictions on distributions are set out in sections 500 to 503 of the 
Code. The first two of these provisions contain the restrictions aimed at the 
protection of creditors while the remaining two sections preserve the preferences of 
preferred classes of shareholders. Section 500 contains two alternative 
balance-sheet restrictions, namely the retained earnings test and the asset-liability 
ratios test. Section 501 contains an equity solvency or liquidity test. Section 502 and 
section 503 respectively entrench the liquidation preferences and dividend 
preferences of preferred classes of shareholders. A number of exceptions to all or 
some of these restrictions are set out in sections 503.1, 503.2 and 504. 
3.4.2.1 The retained earnings test. 
Section 500 prohibits the making of any distribution to shareholders unless one of 
two alternative balance-sheet tests is satisfied. The first alternative test may be 
termed the ‘retained earnings test’ and is set out in section 500(a). A distribution 
_________________________________________________________________  
289  11 USC (Bankruptcy Code) s 510(b). See Marsh California Corporation Law 1163. 
290  Marsh California Corporation Law 1164 states that although the purpose of this exclusion was 
to facilitate the reacquisition of shares issued to outgoing executives, the provision allows any 
reacquisition from employees or directors which is regarded to be in the best interests of the 
corporation. 
291  California Corporations Code s 1306. 
292  Marsh California Corporation Law 1174 explains that an exception was made under the earlier 
Californian legislation in respect of appraisal payments, but that the drafters of the present 
legislation made a policy decision against this approach. 
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may be made if the amount of the retained earnings of the corporation immediately 
prior to the distribution equals or exceeds the amount of the proposed 
distribution.293 The amount of retained earnings must be determined in accordance 
with generally accepted accounting principles. 294  The retained earnings test 
achieves the same effect as an earned surplus test, in both instances the original 
investment of shareholders is left intact.  
3.4.2.2 The asset-liability ratios test 
As an alternative to the retained earnings test, the corporation can satisfy the 
asset-liability ratios tests which is set out in section 500(b)(1) and (2).  
This balance-sheet test requires a comparison of the levels of a corporation’s 
assets and liabilities. The two ratios apply cumulatively and must be satisfied 
immediately after the distribution. 
The first ratio that must be satisfied is the ratio of total assets to total liabilities, 
which must be at least 1,25 to 1.295 This means that the total assets must exceed 
the total liabilities by 25 per cent or more. For this purpose, assets exclude goodwill, 
capitalised research and development expenses and deferred charges. The reason 
for the exclusion of these assets is that they are illiquid and, as their value depends 
on the continued existence of the corporation, would be worthless upon 
liquidation.296 On the liabilities side, deferred taxes, deferred income and other 
deferred credits are excluded.297 
The second ratio that must be satisfied is that the current assets must be at 
least equal to current liabilities. 298 The ratio is thus 1:1. However, if the average of 
the earnings of the two preceding fiscal years was less than the average of the 
_________________________________________________________________  
293  California Corporations Code s 500(a). The amount of a distribution payable in property is 
determined on the basis of the value at which the property is reflected in the corporation’s 
financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, s 500(d). 
294  Marsh California Corporation Law 1132. The application of this test to repurchases paid for by 
way of promissory notes is discussed in paragraph 3.5.2 below. 
295  California Corporations Code s 500(b)(1). 
296  Marsh California Corporation Law 1136. The reason these are usually included in a balance 
sheet is to reflect the flow of income in an income statement. 
297  Marsh California Corporation Law 1136 explains that although these items are included in a 
balance sheet to reflect the flow of income in the income statement accurately, they do not 
reflect actual liabilities to pay over money and are thus not considered for purposes of the 
asset-liability ratios test.   
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interest expense for those two years, the current assets have to be at least equal to 
1,25 times the current liabilities.299 This higher ratio of current assets to current 
liabilities is intended to protect creditors against the increased risk of default by a 
corporation that could not cover its interest costs by its earnings.300 
The meaning of current assets and current liabilities depends on classification 
according to generally accepted accounting principles. A corporation that does not 
classify its assets into current and fixed assets under generally accepted 
accounting principles is exempted from the current assets to current liabilities ratio 
test.301 
Profits derived from an exchange of assets may not be regarded as part of 
current assets unless the assets received are currently realisable in cash.302 In 
certain instances, future income streams may be taken into account in determining 
current assets.303  
The asset-liability ratios test is based on the assumption that the asset margin 
will cushion creditors against the risk of default. Financial ratios can be a useful tool 
in the prediction of corporate distress and failure.304  It is an innovative solution that 
simulates restrictions often imposed by sophisticated lenders such as banks.305 It is 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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298  California Corporations Code s 500(b)(2). 
299  California Corporations Code s 500(b)(2) proviso. 
300  See Marsh California Corporation Law 1138.  
301  California Corporations Code s 500(b)(2). 
302  California Corporations Code s 500(b)(2) first proviso. 
303  California Corporations Code s 500(b)(2) second proviso. This exception allows the inclusion of 
net amounts that the board of a corporation has determined in good faith may reasonably be 
expected to be received from customers during the 12-month period which is used to calculate 
current liabilities pursuant to existing contractual relationships that obligate those customers to 
make fixed or periodic payments. Future costs reasonably expected by the corporation to be 
incurred in performing those contracts have to be taken into account if they have not been 
included under current liabilities. The same rule applies to public utilities that will receive 
payments pursuant to service connections with customers, see Marsh California Corporation 
Law 1142. 
304  See Ben-Dror “Distribution Rules” 376 and also the authority he refers to in note 62 on 387. 
Ben-Dror discusses the results of an empirical study showing that the two ratios in the California 
Corporations Code can be manipulated and do not adequately predict financial distress (390ff). 
The study also shows that satisfaction of the alternative test of retained earnings does not 
indicate continuing financial stability (407), leading Ben-Dror to recommend that the tests 
should be applied cumulatively rather than alternatively (413). The best protection, according to 
Ben-Dror, would be the application of a more sophisticated model of bankruptcy prediction, 
taking into account additional ratios and distinguishing between corporations operating in 
different industrial categories (413).   
305  The same ratio of assets to liabilities was used in s 1907 of the previous California Corporations 
Continued 
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more difficult to evade this test than many of the restrictions traditionally imposed in 
legal capital regimes.306  
3.4.2.3 The equity solvency test 
A further test that has to be satisfied, in addition to one of the alternative tests of 
section 500, is set out in section 501. No distribution may be made if the corporation 
or subsidiary making the distribution is, or would as a result of it be, likely to be 
unable to meet its liabilities, except those whose payment is otherwise adequately 
provided for, as they mature.307 This test amounts to an equity solvency or liquidity 
test. It is difficult to think of circumstances where a corporation would satisfy the 
asset-liability ratios test, but not the liquidity test. However, this may happen if the 
current assets to current liabilities ratio is excluded due to the fact that the 
corporation does not distinguish between fixed and current assets.308 Clearly, when 
a distribution is made out of retained earnings, the liquidity test may effectively 
increase the protection offered to creditors. 
Rather than relying on the frame of mind of the directors in assessing liquidity, 
the provision requires an objective assessment of the corporation’s financial 
situation, namely whether or not it is ‘likely to be unable to pay its debts’.309 Since 
not only directors, but also shareholders, may be held liable for unlawful 
distributions a more objective test is preferable.310  
3.4.2.4 Preferential dividend and liquidation distributions   
Unlike the South African Companies Act, the California Corporations Code 
expressly protects the rights of preferred classes of shareholders when a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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Code to restrict the distribution of a surplus created by way of a reduction of capital, Marsh 
California Corporation Law 1137.   
306  See Clark Corporate Law 623. Kummert “State Statutory Restrictions” 285 concludes that the 
asset-liability ratios test is more cost-effective to apply than the retained earnings test.  
307  California Corporations Code s 501.  
308  See paragraph 3.4.2.2 above.  
309  An equity solvency or liquidity test also applied under s 1501 and s 1708 of the previous 
California Corporations Code, but these sections prohibited distributions where there was 
‘reasonable ground for believing’ that the corporation would be unable to pay its debts. Marsh 
California Corporation Law 1152 observes that the change from a subjective to an objective test 
is unlikely to affect the outcome of the majority of cases. 
310  See Marsh California Corporation Law 1152. 
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distribution is made to classes enjoying a lower priority. Section 502 provides that, 
after giving effect to the distribution, the excess of assets over liabilities should be at 
least equal to the liquidation preference of all shares having a preference over the 
class of shares to which the distribution is made.311  
In terms of section 503, no distribution may be made unless the retained 
earnings of the corporation immediately prior to the distribution equal or exceed not 
only the intended distribution, but also the amount of any arrear cumulative 
dividends of preferred classes of shares.312 It is interesting to note that section 502 
relies on a certain level of assets while section 503 requires provision for arrear 
dividends out of retained earnings. These provisions apparently offer preference 
shareholders minimal protection compared to the type of restrictions commonly 
found in the terms of issue of preference shares.313  
3.4.2.5 Exceptions 
Sections 503.1 and 503.2 contain exceptions where certain redemptions and 
repurchases may be made without complying with any of the financial restrictions. A 
corporation may, in order to carry out a prior agreement to that effect, purchase or 
redeem the shares of a deceased shareholder out of the net proceeds314 of an 
insurance policy on the life of the shareholder.315 Similarly, the financial restrictions 
do not apply to the purchase or redemption of the shares of a disabled shareholder 
out of the proceeds of disability insurance.316 The inclusion of similar exceptions 
could be useful also for South Africa.317  
_________________________________________________________________  
311  Eisenberg Corporations 1245 – 1247. The adjustment rule that applies in respect of the 
calculation of assets and liabilities where a distribution is made by way of repurchase, is 
discussed in paragraph 3.5.2 below. 
312  California Corporations Code s 503. In cases of repurchase, the retained earnings must be 
calculated in accordance with the proviso discussed in paragraph 3.5.2 below.  
313  See Marsh California Corporation Law 1155 – 1157 who points out that usually the terms of 
issue of preference shares would prohibit the payment of dividends to lower ranking classes 
while the preference dividend is in arrears, thus ensuring better protection than the statutory 
requirement of merely having sufficient retained earnings. 
314  The provision requires that the total amount of all premiums paid by the corporation for the 
insurance must be deducted from the proceeds. The balance of the proceeds, including the part 
of it that represents the premium paid, will become part of the corporation’s assets and could be 
available for purposes of other distributions, see Marsh California Corporation Law 1161. 
315  California Corporations Code s 503.1. 
316  California Corporations Code s 503.2. 
317  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.10.2. 
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The exceptions provided for in section 504(a) are instances where section 500, 
the provision imposing the alternative tests of retained earnings and asset-liability 
ratios, do not apply. The other financial restrictions, namely the equity solvency test 
and the restrictions protecting preference shareholders, still apply. A dividend 
declared by a regulated investment company or by a real estate investment trust is 
exempt from section 500 to the extent that the dividend is necessary to maintain the 
status of the corporation as such an investment company or trust.318 
Under section 504(b) the purchase or redemption by an open-end investment 
company of shares that are redeemable at the option of the shareholder, qualifies 
as an exception to the financial restrictions and accompanying procedural and 
liability provisions for repurchases.319     
3.4.3 Timing for application of financial restrictions 
The financial restrictions have to be satisfied at the time of the distribution. The time 
of a distribution is set out in the definition of distribution.320 In the case of a dividend, 
it is the date of its declaration and not the record date or payment date.321  
When a corporation repurchases or redeems its shares, the time of the 
distribution is the date the corporation, whether or not pursuant to a contract of an 
earlier date, transfers cash or property. If shares are repurchased on instalments, 
each instalment will be subject to the financial restrictions. 
However, where a debt obligation that is a security is issued in exchange for 
shares being redeemed or repurchased, the date of distribution is the date when the 
corporation acquires the shares.322 In the case of a sinking fund payment, the time 
_________________________________________________________________  
318  California Corporations Code s 504(a). See Marsh California Corporation Law 1157 – 1160 for 
a discussion of these corporations. In order to retain their status under the Internal Revenue 
Code, they have to declare a prescribed percentage of their taxable income as dividends. 
These corporations are closely regulated by other legislation restricting the level of debt they 
may incur, and according to Marsh it will only be in unusual circumstances that they will not 
satisfy the restrictions imposed by California Corporations Code s 500. 
319  See Marsh California Corporation Law 1160. Once again, these corporations are strictly 
regulated by other legislation that adequately protects the rights of creditors and other classes 
of shareholders. 
320  California Corporations Code s 166. 
321  Marsh California Corporation Law 1165 explains that there will usually be a maximum of two to 
three months between the date of declaration and the date of payment. In most cases, the 
corporation’s financial position would thus not have changed much. 
322  California Corporations Code s 166. 
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of transfer of cash or property is when it is transferred to a trustee for the holders of 
preferred shares to be used for the redemption of the shares or when the 
corporation physically segregates the cash or property in trust for that purpose.323 
The basic timing rule for repurchases corresponds with the South African 
provisions that require satisfaction of the solvency and liquidity test at the time 
payment is made.324 However, in California the date of declaration of a dividend 
rather than the date of actual payment is used. Although the South African provision 
provides stronger protection for creditors, the Californian provision is probably 
easier to work with and provides more certainty for directors and shareholders. 
South Africa could also consider inserting specific timing rules for distributions by 
way of debt instruments.325 
3.4.4 Status of claim in respect of authorised but unpaid dividends 
The position of the shareholder following the declaration of a dividend seems to 
depend on the terms of the declaration.326 Although the courts have viewed the 
declaration of a dividend as creating an enforceable debt,327 this may depend on 
whether or not a future record date is determined.328 In view of the fact that the 
financial restrictions have to be satisfied on the date of declaration329 it would seem 
that the right of a shareholder to enforce a dividend does not depend on the 
financial position of the corporation at the date of enforcement.330  
3.4.5 Liability for unlawful distributions 
Shareholders are liable in terms of section 506(a) for non-compliance with the 
restrictions on distributions. 331  It may appear that liability is imposed for 
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323  California Corporations Code s 166. 
324  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.2. 
325  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.2. 
326  See Marsh California Corporation Law 1198.  
327  Meyers v El Tejon Oil and Refining Co 29 Cal 2d 184 at 188. 
328  Smith v Taecker 133 Cal App 351 at 352. 
329  California Corporations Code s 166, see also paragraph 3.4.3 above. 
330  This does not preclude the possibility that a dividend may be set aside as a fraudulent 
conveyance, see paragraph 1 above. 
331  This provision refers to non-compliance with any of the provisions of ss 500 – 511 of the 
California Corporations Code. 
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non-compliance with non-financial restrictions as well. However, section 506(b), 
which states when and by whom proceedings to enforce liability may be brought, 
refers to non-compliance with sections 500 to 503 only.332 These sections contain 
the financial restrictions. 
Similarly, directors are liable under the express statutory provision only for 
making distributions contrary to the financial restrictions.333  
3.4.5.1 Directors 
Directors who ‘approve’ the making of any distribution to shareholders to the extent 
that it is contrary to the financial restriction, are jointly and severally liable to the 
corporation for the benefit of creditors and shareholders.334 It is not only directors 
who vote in favour of a distribution who are taken to approve of it. A director who is 
present at a meeting where a distribution is approved and abstains from voting is 
also considered to have approved the making of the distribution.335 Directors who 
vote against the distribution, or are absent from the meeting, are thus not liable.  
The liability of directors in respect of unlawful distributions is subject to section 
309 of the California Corporations Code. The effect of this is that directors will only 
be liable if they did not act in good faith or with the required degree of care.336 A 
director may rely on information presented by others such as employees, 
independent accountants and board committees the director believes to be 
reliable.337 A director will be liable for unlawful distributions only if she acted at least 
negligently.  
The amount recoverable from the director is the amount of the illegal 
distribution, but not exceeding the liabilities of the corporation owed to 
non-consenting creditors at the time of the violation and the injury suffered by 
non-consenting creditors. Non-consenting creditors are creditors who did not 
_________________________________________________________________  
332  See further discussion in paragraph 3.4.5.1 below. 
333   California Corporations Code s 316(a)(1). 
334  California Corporations Code s 316(a)(1). 
335  California Corporations Code s 316(b). 
336  California Corporations Code s 309(a), (c). 
337  California Corporations Code s 309(b). 
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consent to the distribution. If creditors consented to a distribution that could not 
lawfully be made under the financial restrictions, the directors will not be liable.338 
Creditors whose claims arose before the making of the distribution and who 
have not consented to it may enforce liability in the name of the corporation where 
the unlawful distribution amounted to a contravention of the creditor protection 
restrictions set out in section 500 and section 501.339 The preferred shareholders 
who have not consented to the distribution may enforce liability where the 
distribution violated the preference shareholder protection restrictions of section 
502 and section 503.340 
A director sued for approving an unlawful distribution may join all the other 
directors who are liable and may compel contribution from them.341 A director is 
also entitled to subrogation of the rights of the corporation and may thus recover the 
distribution from shareholders who received it.342 Since the director’s right depends 
on the right of the corporation, distributions can be recovered from shareholders 
only if they had knowledge of facts indicating the impropriety of the distribution.343 
The director’s right of recovery against shareholders is curtailed in view of the 
stricter test for imposing liability on shareholders. Compared to the South African 
recovery provision for repurchases, a director’s right of recourse is thus more 
restricted on a practical level.344  
It is also an offence for a director to concur in any vote or act of the board in 
making an illegal distribution if she acts ‘knowingly and with dishonest or fraudulent 
purpose’ and either with the design of defrauding creditors or shareholders or of 
giving a false appearance as to the value of stock, thereby defrauding subscribers 
or purchasers.345 
_________________________________________________________________  
338  See Marsh California Corporation Law 1183. 
339  California Corporations Code s 316(c). 
340  California Corporations Code s 316(c). 
341  California Corporations Code s 316(e). 
342  California Corporations Code s 316(f)(1). 
343  See California Corporations Code s 506(a) and the discussion in paragraph 3.4.5.2 below. 
344  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.1.3. 
345  California Corporations Code s 2253. 
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3.4.5.2 Shareholders 
Any shareholder who receives a distribution made in violation of the financial 
restrictions ‘with knowledge of facts indicating the impropriety thereof’ is liable to the 
corporation. Liability is for the amount received by her or the fair market value of 
property received by her, together with interest and certain costs, up to the amount 
of the corporation’s liabilities to non-consenting creditors at the time of the violation 
and the injury suffered by non-consenting shareholders.346  
A shareholder will be regarded as having knowledge of the ‘impropriety’ of a 
distribution if she knows of facts indicating that the distribution is unlawful.347 
Action to enforce liability of shareholders may be instituted in the name of the 
corporation.348 A shareholder who is sued may compel contribution from other 
shareholders who are liable.349 If section 500 or section 501 has been violated, any 
one or more creditors whose debts or claims arose prior to the time of the 
distribution and who did not consent to the distribution may bring the action. Where 
section 502 or section 503 has been violated, action may be instituted by one or 
more holders of preferred shares outstanding at the time of the distribution and who 
have not consented to it. 
Creditors need not obtain judgment against the corporation prior to instituting 
action against a shareholder or director and preferent shareholders need not rely on 
the derivative action procedure provided elsewhere in the California Corporations 
Code350 in order to institute the action in the name of the corporation.351 
_________________________________________________________________  
346  California Corporations Code s 506(a). 
347  See England v Christensen 243 Cal App 2d 413; 52 Cal Rptr 402 (1966) where it was held that 
the shareholder need not have known that the distribution was unlawful but only what the 
corporation’s financial situation was.  
348  California Corporations Code s 506(b). According to Marsh California Corporation Law 1179 
this reference to non-consenting creditors and shareholders implies that the obtaining of 
consent could be used as a mechanism to limit or exclude the liability of shareholders.  
349  California Corporations Code s 506(c). 
350  California Corporations Code s 7710. 
351  California Corporations Code s 506(b). It is possible that persons other than those mentioned in 
s 506(b) could institute proceedings based on the illegality of a distribution in violation of the 
limitations. Tiedje v Aluminum Taper Milling Co Inc 46 Cal 2d 450; 296 P 2d 554 (1956), which, 
according to Marsh California Corporation Law 1189 should still apply under the new statute, 
granted a former shareholder who had sold her shares to the corporation in ignorance of the 
fact that the contract violated the financial restrictions on distributions an order for the rescission 
of the contract and for restitution. 
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The possible liability of a shareholder under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act352 is expressly retained.353 
The Californian provision thus distinguishes between non-compliance with the 
creditor-protection restrictions of sections 500 and 501 and the preference 
shareholder-protection restrictions of sections 502 and 503. Creditors and 
shareholders may either sue to enforce the liability of shareholders who received 
the distribution or of directors who approved it. Any recovery made in such an action 
will be for the benefit of the corporation and not for the specific creditors or 
shareholders who instituted the action.354 
3.5 Dividends 
3.5.1 Kinds of payments regulated 
Included in the definition of distribution is ‘the transfer of cash or property by a 
corporation to its shareholders without consideration, whether by way of dividend or 
otherwise, except a dividend in shares of the corporation’. 
Rather than relying on the link between the shareholding and the payment,355 
this provision depends on the feature that the transfer to a shareholder is ‘without 
consideration’.356 Dividends and any other payments, including disguised dividends 
in the form of salary payments to shareholders who have not rendered services, will 
be regarded as distributions.357 A transfer of assets without consideration and an 
informal liquidation coupled with a distribution of assets will also qualify.358 
_________________________________________________________________  
352  Chapter 1 (commencing with section 3439) of Title 2 of Part 2 of Division 4 of the Civil Code. 
353  California Corporations Code s 506(d). See paragraph 1 above for a discussion of the Uniform 
Fraudulent Transfer Act. 
354  This is because s 506(b) allows the proceedings to be instituted ‘in the name of the corporation’. 
355  As for example the South African provision which requires the payment to be made ‘by reason 
of’ the shareholder’s shareholding, see Chapter 5 paragraph 5.1.2. 
356   Marsh California Corporation Law 1126. 
357  De Martini v Scavenger’s Protective Association 3 Cal App 2d 691; 40 P 2d 317 (1935); Kohn v 
Kohn 95 Cal App 2d 708; 214 P 2d 71 (1950), see Marsh California Corporation Law 1126. 
358  Oilwell Chemical and Materials Co v Petroleum Supply Co 64 Cal App 2d 367; 148 P 2d 720 
(1944). 
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A transfer of cash or property by a subsidiary of the corporation is also 
regarded as a distribution.359 The wording of the definition seems to imply that it will 
be regarded as a distribution by the parent corporation rather than by the 
subsidiary. 360  There is no further reference to a subsidiary in the provisions 
imposing the financial and other restrictions. 
3.5.2 Financial restrictions 
A corporation or its subsidiary may not make any distribution, including dividends 
and other payments, to the corporation’s shareholders unless it complies with the 
financial restrictions set out in sections 500 to 503.361 
3.5.3 Authorisation 
The power to declare dividends rests with the board of directors. Declaration of a 
dividend is usually done through a resolution of the directors at a board meeting.362 
The board may delegate the final authority to declare dividends to the executive 
committee or any other committee of the board, but then subject to the restriction 
that the rate or periodic amount must have been set forth in the articles or 
determined by the board.363 
When a dividend is not chargeable to retained earnings, shareholders have to 
be notified of this fact.364 The notice has to explain the accounting treatment of the 
dividend. Either the notice has to accompany the dividend or it should be given 
within three months after the end of the fiscal year in which the dividend is paid.365 
Shareholders need this information in order to determine their liability for tax.366 
_________________________________________________________________  
359  California Corporations Code s 166. 
360  The definition of ‘distribution’ is quoted in paragraph 4.1 above. 
361  See paragraph 3.4.2 above. 
362  California Corporations Code s 311. 
363  California Corporations Code s 311(f). 
364  California Corporations Code s 507. 
365  California Corporations Code s 507. It will not always be clear whether a dividend paid during a 
fiscal year will ultimately be covered by retained earnings or whether it will constitute or include 
a return of capital, see Marsh California Corporation Law 1200.  
366  See Marsh California Corporation Law 1200. A similar provision existed in the previous 
California Code where it had the function of identifying dividends paid out of a capital reduction 
surplus.  
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3.6 Share repurchases                                          
3.6.1 Power to acquire shares 
Corporations are given the express power to ‘issue, purchase, redeem, receive, 
take or otherwise acquire, own, hold, sell, lend, exchange, transfer or otherwise 
dispose of, pledge, use and otherwise deal in and with’ their own shares and other 
securities.367 This power is subject to section 510, which regulates the status of 
reacquired shares. 368  ‘Reacquires’ means for purposes of section 510 that a 
corporation purchases, redeems, acquires by way of conversion to another class or 
series or otherwise acquires its own shares, or that issued and outstanding shares 
cease to be outstanding.369 
Not all reacquisitions of shares amount to distributions. It is only the purchase 
or redemption of shares for cash or property that is regarded as a distribution. 
Furthermore, a purchase of shares issued pursuant to section 408 is not regarded 
as a distribution if the board has determined that the repurchase is in the best 
interests of the corporation and that the corporation is likely to be able to meet its 
liabilities as they mature.370 This exception relates to stock purchase and option 
plans for employees or directors of the corporation. 
The California Corporations Code distinguishes between redemptions and 
purchases, although the same financial restrictions apply to them. No distinction is 
made in the code between selective and proportionate repurchases.371  
3.6.2 Financial restrictions 
The financial restrictions applicable to distributions in general are discussed 
above.372 
_________________________________________________________________  
367  California Corporations Code s 207(d). 
368  This provision is further discussed in 3.6.6 below. 
369  California Corporations Code s 510(d). 
370  California Corporations Code s 166(c). Any director who is or would be party to the transaction 
may not vote. 
371  As in Delaware, the courts apply general principles, primarily fiduciary obligations of directors 
and majority shareholders. See, for example Heckmann v Ahmanson 168 Cal App 3d 119, 214 
Cal Rptr 177 (1985) where directors had to account for a greenmail payment. See also 
paragraph 2.6.3 above.  
372  See paragraph 3.4.2 above. 
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However, when the restrictions are being applied to a repurchase or a 
redemption, adjustments have to be made so that amounts outstanding on other 
repurchases or redemptions can be disregarded.    
The first such adjustment applies when the retained earnings test is applied. 
The amount of the retained earnings must be increased by all amounts previously 
deducted from it with respect to obligations incurred in connection with repurchases 
and that are reflected on the balance sheet, to the extent that they remain unpaid 
immediately before the distribution.373 Conversely, the liabilities must be reduced 
by all amounts that had previously been added to it in respect of obligations 
incurred in connection with repurchases and reflected on the balance sheet, to the 
extent that they will remain unpaid after the distribution.374 The purpose of this 
provision is to ensure that assets and liabilities are not duplicated.375 
Similar adjustments for distributions by way of repurchases or redemptions 
are prescribed for the determination of assets and liabilities when applying the 
preference shareholder restrictions of section 502 and section 503.376 
3.6.3 Procedure and other requirements 
The power to authorise the repurchase of shares rests with the board of 
directors.377 The board may delegate the final authority to authorise a repurchase to 
the executive committee or any other committee of the board, but then subject to 
the restriction of a price range that has been set out in the articles or determined by 
the board.378 
_________________________________________________________________  
373  California Corporations Code s 500(d). 
374  California Corporations Code s 500(d).  
375  This rule, which became necessary as a result of an accounting treatment of promissory notes, 
is explained in Marsh California Corporation Law 1133, based on an earlier version of s 500(d) 
while the amendment thereof in 1994 is explained in detail at 1134ff. 
376  See California Corporations Code s 502 proviso and s 503 proviso. 
377  California Corporations Code s 311. 
378  California Corporations Code s 311(f). 
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3.6.4 Liability for unlawful repurchases 
The California Corporations Code does not provide separately for liability in respect 
of unlawful repurchases. The liability provisions for distributions in general thus 
apply.379 
3.6.5 Enforceability of contracts for the acquisition of own shares 
The enforceability of share repurchase contracts depends on satisfaction of the 
financial restrictions at the time of actual payment or transfer. The shareholder will 
not become a creditor of the corporation unless the purchase is permitted in terms 
of the financial restrictions.380  
The position of a shareholder who exercised her appraisal right and who has 
not been paid is expressly regulated.381 Should the corporation be unable to pay 
without violating the financial restrictions on distributions, the shareholder will be 
regarded as a creditor entitled to payment subject to compliance with the financial 
restrictions. If the corporation is liquidated the claim is subordinated to the claims of 
all the other creditors of the corporation.   
3.6.6 The status of repurchased shares 
When a corporation reacquires its own shares, those shares are restored to the 
status of authorised but unissued shares, unless the articles prohibit their 
reissue.382 The term ‘reacquires’ means that a corporation acquires its own shares 
whether through a repurchase, redemption, acquisition through conversion to 
another class or series, or otherwise, or because issued and outstanding shares 
cease to be outstanding.383 
Where the articles prohibit the reissue of acquired shares, the articles have to 
be amended upon acquisition to reflect the fact that the shares cannot be issued 
again. If all the authorised shares of a class or series are reacquired, that class or 
_________________________________________________________________  
379  See paragraph 3.4.4 above. 
380  California Corporations Code s 402(d). 
381  California Corporations Code s 1306. 
382  California Corporations Code s 510(a). 
383  California Corporations Code s 510(d). 
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series is automatically eliminated.384 If all the issued shares of a class or series are 
reacquired, the directors may either reduce the number of authorised shares by the 
number of acquired shares or may decide to eliminate the class or series by also 
cancelling the authorised but unissued shares of that class or series.385 If only some 
of the issued and outstanding shares of a class or series are reacquired, the 
number of authorised shares must be reduced by the number of reacquired 
shares.386 
If the articles only prohibit the reissue of reacquired shares as shares of the 
same series, the directors may either cancel the reacquired shares387 or restore 
them to the status of authorised but undesignated shares of the class to which they 
belong.388 If all the authorised shares of a series are reacquired, the series is 
eliminated.389 If all the issued and outstanding shares of a series, but not all the 
authorised shares of the series are reacquired, the board may either eliminate the 
series or reduce the number of authorised shares of that series by the number of 
reacquired shares.390 
The provisions of section 510 are subject to any contrary or inconsistent 
provision in the articles and can be avoided by making a different arrangement in 
the articles.391 
California previously recognised treasury shares, that is, shares that were 
issued by the corporation, but were reacquired and thus no longer outstanding. The 
requirement that reacquired shares be restored to the status of authorised and 
unissued shares, or eliminated as authorised shares,392 abolished the concept of 
_________________________________________________________________  
384  California Corporations Code s 510(b)(1). 
385  California Corporations Code s 510(b)(2). 
386  California Corporations Code s 510(b)(3). 
387  California Corporations Code s 510(c)(1)B. 
388  California Corporations Code s 510(c)(1)A. 
389  California Corporations Code s 510(c)(1). 
390  California Corporations Code s 510(c)(2). 
391  California Corporations Code s 510(e). 
392  California Corporations Code s 510(b). 
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treasury shares.393 It is not clear why corporations are still given the power to own 
or hold their own shares.394  
3.6.7 Repurchase through subsidiaries 
The basic distribution rule covers distributions made by a corporation or its 
subsidiary.395 There are no further indications in the California Corporations Code 
regarding application of the financial and other restrictions to this situation. 
However, a subsidiary may not vote shares it holds in its parent corporation.396 
3.6.8 The redemption of shares 
A corporation may provide in its articles for one or more classes or series of shares 
that are redeemable, in whole or in part, at the option of the corporation or upon the 
happening of a specified event or events.397 Section 402(b) allows the articles to 
provide how a selection should be made in the event of a partial redemption. This 
opens the door for discrimination between shareholders of the same class or series.  
Redeemable preference shares could also be redeemable at the option of the 
holder of the shares or upon the vote of at least a majority of the outstanding shares 
of the class or series to be redeemed. 398  However, ordinary or common 
redeemable shares are not allowed to be redeemable at the option of the 
shareholder.399 
Any redemption is subject to the provisions governing distributions. 400  A 
corporation may create a sinking fund or similar provision or enter into an 
_________________________________________________________________  
393  See Marsh California Corporation Law 1202 for a brief overview of the problems associated 
with treasury shares. See also Ballantine “Treasury Shares” 538 – 541. 
394  California Corporations Code s 207(d), referred to in paragraph 3.6.1 above. Since this power is 
subject to California Corporations Code s 510 which can in turn be varied by the articles as 
provided for in s 510(e), it can possibly be argued that corporations may hold treasury shares. 
However, s 510(a) provides for mandatory cancellation as issued shares, leaving to the articles 
only the question of whether the shares will be able to be reissued or not. 
395  California Corporations Code s 166. See 3.4.1 above. 
396  California Corporations Code s 703(b). 
397  California Corporations Code s 402. Common shares will usually be redeemable only if there 
are more than one class or series of them. In exceptional circumstances where there is only one 
class of common shares, these could also be redeemable, s 402(c).  
398  California Corporations Code s 402(a). 
399  California Corporations Code s 402(a). 
400  California Corporations Code s 402(d), read with ss 500 – 511.  
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agreement for the redemption or purchase of its shares, but unless the redemption 
is permitted by the financial restrictions, the holder of shares to be redeemed shall 
not become a creditor of the corporation.401  
The procedure for redemption is set out in section 509 and the articles of 
incorporation. It is possible for a corporation to deposit funds for the redemption of 
shares with a bank or trust company, upon which date the shares shall be regarded 
as redeemed and no longer outstanding. The timing provision states that the 
distribution will be deemed to have been made when the cash or property is 
transferred to the trustee or segregated in trust.402 
3.7 Evaluation and conclusions on California 
The California Corporations Code uses economic concepts to protect creditors 
against distributions.403 
The articles of incorporation must state the number of authorised shares, but 
do not mention an amount of capital.404 Shares, which do not have a par value,405 
may be issued at any consideration determined by the directors, unless the articles 
give this power to the shareholders.406 Future services and promissory notes of the 
purchaser are not acceptable forms of consideration. 407  Where non-monetary 
consideration is accepted, the directors have to declare its fair value in a 
resolution.408 Partly paid shares are allowed, but are not popular.409  
The California Corporations Code contains a single definition of distribution 
that encompasses repurchases, redemptions and dividends.410 A corporation may 
make distributions out of earned surplus or alternatively, on condition that assets 
will exceed liabilities by a prescribed ratio once the distribution has been made.411 
_________________________________________________________________  
401  California Corporations Code s 402(d). See also paragraph 3.6.5 above. 
402  California Corporations Code s 166. 
403  See paragraph 3.1 above. 
404  See paragraph 3.2.1 above. 
405  See paragraph 3.2.3 above. 
406  See paragraphs 3.3 and 3.3.1 above. 
407  See paragraph 3.3.2 above. 
408  See paragraph 3.3.3 above. 
409  See paragraph 3.3.4 above. 
410  See paragraph 3.4.1 above. 
411  See paragraphs 3.4.2, 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2 above. 
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In addition to this, a liquidity or equity solvency test applies.412 It is significant that 
this test is based on an objective standard. The rights of preferred classes of 
shareholders are also protected.413 
The timing rule for distributions differs from the South African position in 
various respects, the most important being that separate principles apply to 
dividends and repurchases.414 In relation to dividends, it provides more certainty 
than the South African approach, but offers less protection to creditors. In 
accordance with the timing rule, a shareholder obtains an enforceable claim when a 
dividend is authorised.415 Nevertheless, there is some uncertainty as to whether the 
shareholder will indeed be able to enforce this right if the financial restrictions are 
not satisfied at the time of payment.416 
There are important differences between the liability provisions in the 
California Corporations Code and those in South Africa. First, California imposes 
the same liability on shareholders and directors regardless of whether a distribution 
takes the form of a dividend or an acquisition of shares417 whereas in South Africa 
there is a difference in the liability of directors depending on whether a repurchase 
or a dividend is involved. 418 Secondly, shareholders in California are liable only if 
they knew of facts indicating that the distribution was unlawful.419 Shareholders 
must be alerted to the fact that a proposed dividend is to be paid otherwise than out 
of retained earnings.420 Thirdly, shareholders and directors in California are also 
liable to preference shareholders,421 but this is because the rights of preference 
shareholders are taken into account for purposes of the stricter financial restrictions 
in California. 422  South Africa could benefit from streamlining its provisions on 
_________________________________________________________________  
412  See paragraph 3.4.2.3 above. 
413  See paragraph 3.4.2.4 above. 
414  See paragraph 3.4.3 above. 
415  See paragraph 3.4.4 above.  
416  See paragraph 3.4.4 above. 
417  See paragraph 3.4.5 above. 
418  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 5.6 and 6.4. 
419  See paragraph 3.4.5.2 above. 
420  See paragraph 3.5.3 above. 
421  See paragraphs 3.4.5.1 and 3.4.5.2 above. 
422  See paragraph 3.4.2.4 above. 
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liability for unlawful distributions to achieve consistency for different types of 
distributions.423 
Despite the existence of separate procedures for redemptions and 
repurchases,424 both are subject to the same financial restrictions.425 This avoids 
the kind of anomalies present in the South African legislation. The financial 
restrictions apply also to payments under the appraisal remedy, thus favouring the 
interests of creditors over those of shareholders.426 
The California Corporations Code does not set out the procedure for 
repurchases.427 Repurchased shares generally have to be restored to the status of 
authorised but unissued shares.428   
Although the definition includes a distribution by a subsidiary, there is no 
further statutory regulation of such distributions, except a prohibition on the 
exercise of voting rights in respect of shares held in the parent company.429 
To conclude, the Californian Corporations Code can serve as an example for 
South Africa in a number of respects. Apart from the introduction of a single 
definition of distribution and the consistent treatment of redemptions and 
repurchases, its provisions regulating the liability of shareholders and directors for 
unlawful distributions can be singled out. Its sophisticated financial restrictions, 
including the asset-liability ratio tests, are stricter than the present South African 
solvency and liquidity test.  
4 THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT 
4.1 Introduction 
The American Bar Association first published a Model Business Corporation Act in 
1950.430 The Model Business Corporation Act was amended from time to time431 
_________________________________________________________________  
423  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.10.4. 
424  See paragraphs 3.6.3 and 3.6.8 above. 
425  See paragraphs 3.4.1 and 3.6.1 above. 
426  See paragraph 3.4.1 above. 
427  See paragraph 3.6.3 above. 
428  See paragraph 3.6.6 above. 
429  See paragraph 3.6.7 above. 
430  Model Business Corporation Act Official Text with Official Comment xxii. An earlier effort was 
Continued 
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and a complete revision was published in 1984. The 1984 MBCA is characterised 
by the elimination of legal capital concepts such as par value, stated capital and 
treasury shares. It contains relatively little regulation of consideration for shares and 
a single definition of distribution. Distributions are subject to liquidity, solvency, and 
the protection of liquidation preferences.432  
By 2005, 29 states had adopted all or substantially all of the provisions of the 
1984 MBCA while four states still based their legislation on the 1969 MBCA.433 
Delaware, New York and California are the most important states, from a corporate 
law perspective, that do not base their statutes on the MBCA.434 
4.2 Share Capital Structure 
4.2.1 Authorised capital 
The MBCA requires the articles of incorporation to state the classes of shares and 
the number of shares of each class that a corporation is authorised to issue.435 
Although shares are not required to have a par value, and no amount of share 
capital is mentioned, the concept of authorised capital remains a feature of the 
MBCA. This can be contrasted with the position in New Zealand 436  and in 
England437 where the concept of authorised capital has been removed altogether. 
It is expressly required that a corporation must authorise at least one class of 
shares with unlimited voting rights and at least one class entitling its holders to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Continued 
the promulgation by the commissioners on uniform state laws of a Uniform Business 
Corporation Act (1928) but this model was never widely accepted. It was renamed the Model 
Business Corporation Act in 1943 and was eventually withdrawn in 1958. 
431  The financial provisions were amended substantially in 1979 to 1980. (Kummert “State 
Statutory Restrictions” 242 note 274 gives 8 December 1979 as the date on which the 
Committee adopted these amendments.) These new provisions, which did away with the legal 
capital system, were taken over and developed further in the complete revision of the MBCA in 
1984, see Manning Legal Capital 177; Cox & Hazen Corporations 565. 
432  MBCA s 6.40, discussed in paragraph 4.4.2 below. 
433  See MBCA Official text with Official Comment xix notes 1 and 2 for lists of these states. 
434  Cox & Hazen Corporations 35. 
435  MBCA s 6.01(a). 
436  See Chapter 3 paragraph 2.1. 
437  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.1. 
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receive the net assets of the corporation upon dissolution.438 The same class of 
shares can satisfy both these requirements.439  
The MBCA abolished the distinction between common and preferred 
shares.440  Instead, it refers to shareholders whose ‘preferential rights are superior’ 
to those of the shareholders receiving a distribution.441  
The preferences, limitations and relative rights of each class of shares have to 
be described in the articles of incorporation prior to the issuance of shares of that 
class.442 It is not compulsory to set out the terms of each class of shares in the 
original articles of incorporation. A corporation can thus issue ‘blank stock’.443 The 
power to determine the terms of an unissued class or series of shares may be 
delegated to the board of directors.444 However, before shares of any such class 
may be issued, the terms of issue of those shares have to be set out in an 
amendment to the articles of incorporation.445 
Pre-emptive rights do not generally apply under the MBCA, but are reflected 
as an optional provision that a corporation may include in its articles of 
incorporation.446 If a corporation elects to have pre-emptive rights and does not 
expressly set out the extent of these rights, the default rules of MBCA s 6.30 
apply.447 These rules entitle the shareholders to a proportionate pre-emptive right, 
on uniform terms and conditions, in respect of further shares to be issued.448 These 
rights apply only to shares issued for cash consideration.449  
_________________________________________________________________  
438  MBCA s 6.01 
439  MBCA s 6.01. One or more of these shares must also be issued and outstanding, see s 6.03 
and paragraph 2.2 below.  
440  The Official Comment explains that there is no longer a significant distinction between the two 
kinds of shares, in view of the many permutations possible among classes of shares. The 
terminology was abolished to reflect this flexibility.  
441  See, for example, MBCA s 6.40(c)(2). For the sake of convenience, however, I will refer to 
preferred and unpreferred or common shares.  
442  MBCA s 6.01(b). 
443  See Cox & Hazen Corporations 486.  
444  MBCA s 6.02(a). 
445  MBCA s 6.01(b). 
446  MBCA s 6.30(a) read with s 2.02. See also Rock, Kanda & Kraakman “Significant Corporate 
Actions” 148 where it is explained that in lieu of pre-emptive rights, shareholders are protected 
by onerous fiduciary duties. 
447  MBCA s 6.30(b)(1). 
448  MBCA s 6.30(b)(1). 
449  MBCA s 6.30(b)(3)(iv). 
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Pre-emptive rights also do not apply in respect of shares issued as 
compensation to the corporation’s directors, officers or employees, or to satisfy 
their conversion or option rights.450 Also excluded are shares authorised in the 
articles of incorporation that are issued within six months of incorporation.451  A 
shareholder may waive her pre-emptive right.452 Non-voting preferential shares do 
not have pre-emptive rights. 453  Shares with general voting rights but with no 
preferential distribution rights do not have pre-emptive rights in respect of shares 
with preferential distribution rights, except if the preferential shares are convertible 
into or have a right to acquire shares without preferential rights.454 
If shares that are subject to pre-emptive rights are not acquired by the 
shareholders, they may be issued to anyone within a period of twelve months, but 
not at a consideration lower than that set for the pre-emptive rights.455 Offers after 
expiry of twelve months or at a lower price are once again subject to pre-emptive 
rights.456 
In conjunction with the regulation of substantial non-cash issues, which I 
discuss in relation to non-cash consideration, 457  pre-emptive rights play a 
significant role in preserving the relative equity interests of shareholders.   
4.2.2 Minimum capital 
Section 6.03 requires that a corporation must have ‘outstanding’458 at all times one 
or more shares that together have unlimited voting rights and one or more shares 
entitled to receive the net assets of the corporation upon dissolution.459 The Official 
Comment to section 6.03 of the MBCA explains that these shares will have the 
residual equity financial interests in the corporation. 
_________________________________________________________________  
450  MBCA s 6.30(b)(3)(i) – (ii). 
451  MBCA s 6.30(b)(3)(iii). 
452  MBCA s 6.30(b)(2). 
453  MBCA s 6.30(b)(4). 
454  MBCA s 6.30(b)(5). 
455  MBCA s 6.30(b)(6). 
456  MBCA s 6.30(b)(6). 
457  See paragraph 4.3.3 below. 
458  That is, the share must have been issued and not reacquired by the corporation, see MBCA s 
6.03(a). 
459  MBCA s 6.03(c). 
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4.2.3 Kinds of shares 
Shares are not required to have a par value,460 but the articles may set forth a par 
value for authorised shares or classes of shares.461 Should a par value be stated in 
the articles, this value might be relevant with regard to the contractual relationships 
arising from the articles, but will have no legal significance beyond that.462 
A corporation may issue redeemable or convertible shares that are 
redeemable or convertible at the option of the corporation,463 the shareholder, or 
upon the occurrence of a designated event.464 Any kind of share may be made 
redeemable or convertible, including shares in the class having unlimited voting and 
distribution rights.465  
Shares may be redeemable or convertible for shares, debt instruments, other 
property or cash.466 Upstream conversions, that is, conversions for classes of 
shares that have priority over the converted class, as well as conversions for debt 
securities, are allowed. This is regarded as a logical consequence of allowing the 
redemption of shares at the option of shareholders, because conversion into 
preferred classes or debts is less risky for the remaining shareholders than a 
redemption.467 Shares that are redeemable for debt and shares convertible into 
debt securities have the same practical effect.468 Redemptions and conversions are 
distributions and are subject to the financial restrictions set out in section 6.40 of the 
MBCA.469 
Issued shares remain ‘outstanding’ until they are reacquired, redeemed, 
converted, or cancelled. 470  The reacquisition, redemption or conversion of 
_________________________________________________________________  
460  See the Official Comment to s 6.21 of the MBCA. 
461  MBCA s 2.02(b)(2)(iv). 
462  See the Official Comment to s 2.02. 
463  Also known as ‘callable shares’, see Official Comment to s 6.01(c). 
464  MBCA s 6.01(c)(2)(i). 
465  See the Official Comment to s 6.01(c). However, the minimum outstanding shares rule of 
MBCA s 6.03(c) applies.   
466  MBCA s 6.01(c)(2)(ii). The practical effect of a conversion for cash and a redemption appear to 
be the same. 
467  See the paragraph 3(d) of the Official Comment to s 6.01(c).    
468  See paragraph 3(d) of the Official Comment to s 6.01(c). 
469  See paragraph 4.4.2 below. 
470  MBCA s 6.03(a) 
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outstanding shares is subject to the requirement that at least one share that has 
unlimited voting rights and that is entitled to receive the net assets upon dissolution, 
remains outstanding.471 
4.2.4 Share capital and reserve accounts 
Apart from the disclosure of the authorised capital in the articles of incorporation, 
there is no mention of share capital accounts, surplus accounts or reserves. The 
consideration received for shares need not be valued in money and need not be 
reflected in separate accounts.472 A corporation could have such accounts for 
accounting purposes, but their existence is irrelevant for the distribution rules.473  
4.2.5 The variation of share capital 
4.2.5.1 Variations without shareholder approval 
The board of directors may amend the articles without shareholder approval in 
certain circumstances. 474  These include increasing the issued and authorised 
shares of its single class of shares into a greater number of whole shares of that 
class.475 The board may likewise increase the number of authorised shares of its 
single class of shares to allow the issuance of shares as a share dividend.476 
However, if there is more than one class of shares outstanding, the subdivision 
must be approved by shareholder vote.477  
The incorporators or board of directors can also amend the articles of 
association, including the statement of authorised shares, before any shares have 
been issued.478 
_________________________________________________________________  
471  MBCA s 6.03(c). 
472  The Official Comment to MBCA s 6.21 explains: ‘bookkeeping details are not the statutory 
responsibility of the board of directors’. 
473  See Manning Legal Capital 185. 
474  MBCA s 10.02. 
475  MBCA s 10.02(4). This is a subdivision of shares. 
476  MBCA s 10.02(4).  
477  MBCA s 10.04(a)(1). 
478   MBCA s 10.05. 
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The board may further effect consequential changes to the total authorised 
capital following a reacquisition of shares and may delete a class of shares 
following a repurchase when the corporation’s articles prohibit its reissue.479 
Where blank stock has been authorised, the directors may also amend the 
articles in order to determine the preferences, limitation and rights of the shares.480 
4.2.5.2 Variations subject to shareholder approval 
Shareholder approval is required for variations of authorised and issued shares that 
have the potential of affecting their relative rights.481 Where class rights are varied, 
voting must take place in separate voting groups.482   
A corporation may reclassify its shares into shares of another class,483 change 
the rights attaching to shares,484 or change shares into a different number of shares 
in the same class through subdivision or consolidation.485 It may also create new 
classes of shares with distribution or liquidation rights prior to or superior to existing 
classes,486 increase the rights of existing classes so that they will have preference 
over other existing shares,487 limit or deny existing pre-emptive rights,488 or cancel 
or vary rights to accumulated but undeclared distributions.489 
4.2.6 The reduction of issued capital 
The MBCA does not provide for a formal reduction of capital. However, after a 
distribution certain adjustments to a corporation’s articles of incorporation may be 
required.490 
_________________________________________________________________  
479  MBCA s 10.02(6) – (7). 
480  MBCA s 6.02, read with s 10.02(6). 
481   MBCA s 10.04 requires prior approval, because shareholders are entitled to vote on a 
‘proposed’ amendment. No special majority is prescribed. 
482  MBCA s 10.04. A voting group comprises a class or classes of shares that are similarly 
affected. 
483  MBCA s 10.04(a)(1) – (2). 
484  MBCA s 10.04(3). 
485  MBCA s 10.04(a)(4). 
486  MBCA s 10.04(5). 
487  MBCA s 10.04(6). 
488  MBCA s 10.04(7). 
489  MBCA s 10.04(8). 
490  See paragraph 4.2.5.1 below. 
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4.3 Capital contributions  
4.3.1 Size of capital contribution 
The directors have to determine that the consideration received or to be received in 
respect of the issue of shares is adequate. 491  However, a formal adequacy 
resolution is not necessary, and it can be inferred from a board decision to issue 
shares for a particular consideration that the board has determined that 
consideration to be adequate. The board is further not required to determine the 
specific value of non-cash consideration. 492  Upon receipt of the authorised 
consideration, the shares become fully paid and non-assessable.493 Directors who 
abuse their power in making an adequacy determination may be liable for breach of 
the prescribed standard of conduct.494 
A shareholder is not liable to the corporation or its creditors with respect to the 
shares, except to pay the consideration for which the shares were authorised to be 
issued (in the case of subscriptions after incorporation) or specified in the 
subscription agreement (in the case of pre-incorporation subscriptions). 495  A 
shareholder is not personally liable for the acts or debts of the corporation, except 
that she may become liable because of her own acts or conduct or if the articles 
provide otherwise.496 Limited liability of shareholders is thus the point of departure. 
Shares may also be issued for no consideration, in the form of share 
dividends.497 Share dividends have to be issued pro rata to holders of a class or 
_________________________________________________________________  
491  MBCA s 6.21(c).  
492  See the Official Comment to s 6.21. 
493  MBCA s 6.21(d). This means that shareholders will have no further liability in respect of those 
shares and cannot be held liable under the ‘watered stock’ principles that apply in legal capital 
jurisdictions, see the Official Comment to s 6.21. 
494  MBCA s 8.30. This is a general provision on directors’ liability and, in addition to the general 
formulation of directors’ duties, contains a number of rules detailing issues such as the effect of 
reliance on the opinions of others. 
495  MBCA s 6.22(a). Manning Legal Capital 180 note 4 points out that technically s 6.21(c) requires 
the board to make a determination of adequacy prior to the issuance of shares, which 
determination will conclude any enquiry as to the liability of the purchaser to pay more. It could 
thus be argued that a shareholder who purchased shares in the absence of such a timely 
determination would thus not, in terms of s 6.22(a), have paid the consideration for which the 
shares were ‘authorised’ to be issued.  
496  MBCA s 6.22(b). 
497  MBCA s 6.23(a). 
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series. Shares of one class or series may not be issued as a share dividend to 
holders of another class or series, unless the articles allow this or it is approved by a 
majority of the votes entitled to be cast by holders of the class to be issued, or if the 
class to be issued has no shares outstanding.498 The purpose of these restrictions 
is to protect existing holders of the class to be issued against a dilution of the value 
of their shares. Share dividends are not regarded as distributions, as they do not 
involve a transfer of property by the corporation to its shareholders.499 
4.3.2 Form of capital contributions 
The MBCA distinguishes between the subscription for shares before and after 
incorporation. The purpose is to regulate the legal nature and enforceability of 
agreements for subscription entered into before incorporation at a time when there 
is not yet a board of directors or corporation with which to contract. 500  In a 
pre-incorporation subscription, the shares will be fully paid once the corporation 
receives the consideration specified in the subscription agreement. If the 
agreement does not specify the terms of payment, the directors may determine 
these terms. A call by the directors must generally be uniform as far as practicable 
as to all shares of the same class or series.501 Unlike section 6.21 of the MBCA, 
which deals with subscriptions after incorporation, section 6.20 does not contain a 
list of acceptable forms of consideration. However, it is expressly provided that the 
corporation can enforce an obligation to pay money or property like any other debt, 
or that the corporation may rescind the agreement and sell the shares.502 It appears 
from the Official Comment to section 6.20 that if the consideration is not money or 
property, then it cannot be enforced like any other debt and the corporation has to 
resort to the second alternative, namely to rescind the contract. The implication is 
thus that consideration other than money or property, such as services, will also be 
acceptable in respect of pre-incorporation subscriptions.  
_________________________________________________________________  
498  MBCA s 6.23(b). 
499  MBCA s 1.40(6). 
500  See the Official Comment to MBCA s 6.20. 
501  MBCA s 6.20(b). The agreement may provide for unequal treatment. 
502  MBCA s 6.20(d). 
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Section 6.21 of the MBCA regulates subscriptions for shares after 
incorporation. The board may authorise the issue of shares at the consideration it 
determines, unless the articles have reserved this power for the shareholders.503 
The consideration may consist of any tangible or intangible property or benefit to 
the corporation, including cash, promissory notes, services performed, contracts for 
services to be performed, or other securities of the corporation.504 The nature of 
acceptable consideration is not restricted.  
The MBCA also expressly authorises corporations to issue rights, options or 
warrants for the purchase of shares of the corporation upon the terms determined 
by the board.505 
Interestingly, it is expressly provided that the expense of selling or 
underwriting an issue of shares and of organising or reorganising the corporation 
may be paid out of the consideration received for shares.506 The Official Comment 
admits that this is a remnant of the old concepts of par value and stated capital, but 
that it was nevertheless retained to show that original capitalisation could be used 
to pay the expenses of formation and of raising capital.507 
4.3.3 The regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
Before shares are issued, the board of directors must determine that the 
consideration is adequate. This requirement applies in general, not only when 
non-cash consideration is involved. The board need not determine the cash value 
of non-cash consideration.508 
In order to protect shareholders against a significant dilution of the value of 
their shares, shareholder approval is required for certain non-cash issues. Advance 
shareholder approval is required if a corporation is issuing new shares or securities 
convertible into shares or into rights exercisable for shares for a consideration other 
_________________________________________________________________  
503  MBCA s 6.21(a). 
504  MBCA s 6.21(b). 
505  MBCA s 6.24. The Official Comment to s 6.24 explains that corporations have the inherent 
power to do so, but that in view of the economic importance of such instruments, it was 
desirable to include specific authorisation. A second objective is to establish the supremacy of 
the board of directors in determining the terms and consideration. 
506  MBCA s 6.28. 
507  Official Comment to s 6.28. 
508  See paragraph 4.3.1 above. 
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than cash or ‘cash equivalents’509 and the voting power of the shares will comprise 
more than 20 per cent of the voting power of the outstanding shares immediately 
before the transaction.510 In applying this provision, the total number of shares to be 
issued in a transaction or series of integrated transactions is relevant.511 Approval 
must be given by majority vote at a meeting with a quorum of at least a majority of 
the votes entitled to be cast on the matter.512 
A similar rule has been proposed for South Africa in the Companies Bill, 
although its scope will be different from the MBCA provision.513  
4.3.4 Timing of capital contribution 
Shares need not be fully paid when they are issued. They will, however, only be 
regarded as fully paid and non-assessable when the corporation receives the 
consideration. 514  The MBCA does not regulate the rights and obligations of 
transferees of unpaid shares.515 
Shares issued for future services or benefits or for promissory notes may be 
placed in ‘escrow’ or the corporation could make other arrangements to restrict their 
transfer.516 Distributions to shareholders may be credited against the outstanding 
purchase price until the services are performed, the benefit is received or the note is 
paid. The application of this provision seems problematic if services or benefits are 
involved and no specific monetary value has been determined as consideration. 
The Official Comment to this provision does not address this problem. If the 
_________________________________________________________________  
509  Cash equivalents are liquid short-term investments like certain Treasury Bills, investment grade 
commercial paper and money-market funds, see paragraph 3 of the Official Comment to s 6.21. 
510  MBCA s 6.21(f). 
511  This is defined as a series of transactions where one is conditional upon one or more of the 
others, MBCA s 6.21(2)(ii).  
512  MBCA s 6.21(f)(1). 
513  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.1. 
514  MBCA s 6.21(d); s 6.20(c). 
515  It is left to s 8-202 and s 8-301 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which protects the position of 
a good faith purchaser for value. 
516  According to the Official Comment to s 6.21 the corporation is not obliged to do this. If no 
restriction is placed on such shares they will be regarded as validly issued as far as the 
adequacy of consideration is concerned. 
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shareholder defaults, the corporation may cancel the shares as well as the 
distributions that have been credited in whole or in part.517 
4.4 Distributions 
4.4.1 Kinds of payments regulated 
The definition of a distribution is set out in section 1.40(6) of the MBCA. A 
distribution is a direct or indirect transfer of money or other property (except its own 
shares) or incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of its 
shareholders in respect of any of its shares.518 The definition further states that a 
distribution may be in the form of a declaration or payment of a dividend; a purchase, 
redemption, or other acquisition of shares; a distribution of indebtedness;519 or 
otherwise. 520  In addition to the reacquisition and redemption of shares, a 
conversion of shares is regarded as a distribution.521 Payments under the appraisal 
remedy are also not excluded from the definition and will be subject to the financial 
restrictions. 
Share dividends or bonus issues are regulated separately522 and are not 
regarded as distributions. 
The Official Comment explains that the intention of the inclusion of ‘indirect’ 
transfers is to cover transactions such as a purchase by a subsidiary of shares in its 
parent corporation. 523  The MBCA does not have a separate provision for 
repurchases in a group. The reference to indirect transfers will also cover any other 
transaction that has the effect of a distribution, such as a hidden dividend or 
repurchase. 
_________________________________________________________________  
517  MBCA s 6.21(e).  
518  MBCA s 1.40(6). 
519  Such as a promissory note or debenture, see paragraph 3 of the Official Comment to s 1.40. It 
is the creation of the indebtedness which constitutes the distribution, not the date of payment 
under the debt instrument. 
520  Liquidation distributions are also included. 
521  MBCA s 6.03(b). In view of the fact that the liquidation preferences of preferent classes of 
shares have to be taken into account as part of the financial restrictions, it makes sense to 
subject conversions to the requirements for distributions, see paragraph 4.4.2 below. 
522  MBCA s 6.23. 
523  See paragraph 3 of the Official Comment to s 1.40. 
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4.4.2 Financial restrictions 
Although the financial restrictions applicable to distributions have been termed a 
‘single unitary’ or ‘single uniform’ test,524 the test comprises two separate elements 
that must both be satisfied. These phrases allude to the fact that the same 
restrictions apply to all kinds of distribution.  
The first element is an equity solvency test or, as such a test is known in South 
Africa, a liquidity test. No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect the 
corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual 
course of business.525 This test is a codification of the principle set out in Wood v 
Dummer526 and it is a feature of the distribution rules of most states, regardless of 
whether or not they have adopted a legal capital system.527 No period is prescribed 
during which the corporation should remain able to satisfy its debts. The test has an 
objective format independent of any particular individual’s opinion or belief. 
Although in another subparagraph reference is made to a determination by the 
board of directors,528 the test itself does not rely on the board’s view. It is clear, 
however, that the test requires a prediction based on facts and circumstances 
prevailing at the time when the distribution is made. The test cannot be applied with 
the benefit of hindsight. The equivalent South African provisions529 ask if there is 
‘reason to believe’ that a company will not be able to pay its debts. Despite the 
different wording of the MBCA and the South African provisions, I submit that they 
have the same effect.530  
The Official Comment expands on the equity solvency test.531 It explains that 
a going concern will usually satisfy this test and that no particular enquiry will be 
necessary. However, when the corporation is in financial distress specific attention 
should be given to the issue of liquidity. Reasonable assumptions may then be 
_________________________________________________________________  
524  Official Comment to s 1.40, paragraph 3 and Official Comment to s 6.40, paragraph 1. 
525  MBCA s 6.40(c)(1). 
526  30 Fed Cas 435 (CCD Me 1824) (No 17944). 
527  See Manning Legal Capital 63 – 65, Cox & Hazen Corporations 562. 
528  MBCA s 6.40(d). 
529  South African Companies Act s 85(4)(a) and s 90(2)(a). 
530  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.1.1. 
531  Official Comment on MBCA s 6.40 paragraph 2. See also Murphy “Equity Insolvency” 850ff for 
a discussion of the test as introduced by the 1980 revisions to the 1969 MBCA. 
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made about the likely future course of business, including that the demand for the 
corporation’s products or services will continue or increase and that long-term debt 
will be refinanced. A cash flow analysis may be useful in certain instances.  
The second element of the financial restrictions is an ‘adjusted net worth test’. 
The word ‘adjusted’ refers to the fact that preferential dissolution rights of preferred 
classes of shareholders are added to the corporation’s ordinary liabilities.532 The 
test is based on the corporation’s balance sheet and concerns solvency in the 
bankruptcy sense. A corporation may not make a distribution if after giving it effect 
the corporation’s total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus 
the amount that would be needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time 
of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution of shareholders 
whose preferential rights are superior to those receiving the distribution.533 The 
articles of a corporation can exclude liquidation preferences from the test.534 
Certain debts are ignored when determining the liabilities of a corporation for 
purposes of the solvency (adjusted net worth) and liquidity (equity solvency) test in 
section 6.40(c).535 Where a corporation has issued an indebtedness, including one 
issued as a distribution, and the principal sum and interest has been made payable 
only if and to the extent that the corporation could then make a distribution to 
shareholders, it is not regarded as a liability.536 This arrangement gives effect to the 
agreed subordination. The relative priority of the ‘subordinated’ indebtedness and 
the distribution being contemplated is not altogether clear. If there are sufficient 
funds to pay the existing indebtedness, the amount would actually be due and 
payable. Nevertheless, it appears that the corporation can opt to make a new 
distribution rather than repay the indebtedness.537 In South Africa, an indebtedness 
that is subject to a similar subordination arrangement could be regarded as a 
_________________________________________________________________  
532  If upon dissolution the preferred classes are also entitled to arrear dividends, such dividends 
will form part of the liquidation preference, see the Official Comment to s 6.40 par 5. 
533  MBCA s 6.40(c)(2). 
534  MBCA s 6.40(c)(2). 
535  MBCA s 6.40(g), first part. 
536  MBCA s 6.40(g). 
537  This issue will have to be determined according to the exact terms of the agreement between 
the corporation and the shareholder/creditors. As explained in paragraph 4.4.4 below the 
shareholder is in the position of an ordinary creditor with respect to the amount of the 
distribution due to her.  
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contingent liability, but its validity and valuation are uncertain and it may be a good 
idea to regulate the effect of such agreements by statute.538  
The directors may base a determination that a distribution is not prohibited 
either on financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting practices and 
principles that are reasonable in the circumstances or on a fair valuation or other 
method that is reasonable in the circumstances.539 This provision applies with 
respect to both elements of the financial restriction, but it is particularly relevant to 
the net worth test, which necessarily involves a valuation of assets and liabilities. It 
is not required that an accounting system based on generally accepted accounting 
principles should be followed, although it will always be regarded as a reasonable 
valuation method. 540  Any system that is reasonable in the circumstances is 
acceptable.541  
The MBCA provides expressly that in the course of discharging their duties, 
directors may rely in good faith on information and opinions provided by third parties 
such as officers or employees, professional advisers and board committees.542 
Financial statements and other financial data prepared or presented by such other 
persons are expressly included as information the directors may rely on. However, 
this provision deals with director liability only, and does not determine whether a 
distribution is lawful or unlawful.543  
4.4.3 Timing for the application of the financial restrictions 
No distribution may be made unless the corporation will satisfy the financial 
restrictions of solvency and liquidity ‘after giving it effect’.544 Section 6.40(e), read 
with section 6.40(g), of the MBCA sets out when the effect of a distribution has to be 
measured, identifying the date on which the financial restrictions must be satisfied. 
The factors that influence the time of measurement include the nature of the 
distribution involved, the manner and time of payment and the priority or ranking of 
_________________________________________________________________  
538  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.2.  
539  MBCA s 6.40(d). 
540  Official Comment on s 6.40, paragraph 4. 
541  See paragraph 4 of the Official Comment on s 6.40. See also Manning Legal Capital 186. 
542  MBCA s 8.30(d) – (e). 
543  The liability of directors for unlawful distributions is discussed below in paragraph 4.4.6. 
544  MBCA s 6.40(c). 
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a debt incurred by reason of a distribution. The MBCA employs a so-called 
‘one-time’ test, that is, a test that is applied to a distribution only once, either on the 
date of payment or on another date, but not at more than one stage of the same 
distribution.545   
Section 6.40(e) sets out separate timing provisions for distributions by way of 
the reacquisition of shares, 546  distributions of indebtedness, 547  and other 
distributions.548 By way of exception, section 6.40(g)549 creates a further timing rule 
for certain distributions. Since the exception could apply to all the instances set out 
in section 6.40(e), it is convenient to discuss it first. 
Any indebtedness of a corporation, including indebtedness issued as a 
distribution, is not regarded as a liability in applying the financial restrictions if it is 
stipulated that payments in respect of the indebtedness will be made only if and to 
the extent that the corporation could then make a distribution.550 If the indebtedness 
is in respect of a distribution, the financial restrictions apply to each payment in 
respect of the principal sum and interest, on the date of actual payment.551 The 
prerequisite to applying this timing rule is the consensual subordination of the 
shareholder’s claim in respect of the distribution to the claims of ordinary trade 
creditors with which the claim would otherwise have ranked equally.552 Because the 
shareholder-creditor is willing to be ranked as a shareholder, this exception has the 
effect that the solvency test need not be satisfied when the distribution is authorised, 
but only once payment is to take place. This provision enables corporations to make 
distributions they would not otherwise have been able to make. It is particularly 
useful for reacquisitions with a deferred purchase price in a corporation with a low 
net worth, but good projections.553  
_________________________________________________________________  
545  See also Clark Corporate Law 638 on the distinction between ‘one-time’ and ‘two-time’ tests.  
546  MBCA s 6.40(e)(1). 
547  MBCA s 6.40(e)(2). In the case of a distribution of indebtedness in respect of a reacquisition of 
shares, subparagraph (1) applies. 
548  MBCA s 6.40(e)(3). 
549  MBCA s 6.40(g), second paragraph. The first part of s 6.40(g) is discussed in paragraph 4.4.2 
above. 
550  MBCA s 6.40(g). 
551  MBCA s 6.40(g). 
552  The ranking of an indebtedness distributed as a distribution is governed by s 6.40(f). See also 
paragraph 4.4.4 below. 
553  Official Comment to s 6.40 par 8(d). 
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The exclusion from liabilities applies to any subordinated debt, not only to debt 
incurred as a distribution.554 
The timing rule set out in this exception achieves the same effect as the South 
African timing principle for repurchases, namely measurement of each payment 
and statutory subordination of outstanding payments.555 I nevertheless note some 
important differences. The subordination in the MBCA is voluntary, allowing more 
flexibility. More importantly, under the MBCA these subordinated claims may be 
disregarded as liabilities when other distributions are being considered.556 In South 
Africa such claims may not be disregarded, but could possibly be valued at lower 
than their face value.557 
Distributions by way of purchase, redemption or other acquisition of the 
corporation’s shares must be measured at the earlier of: 
• the date money or other property is transferred or debt incurred by the 
corporation 
• the date the shareholder ceases to be a shareholder with respect to the 
acquired shares.558 
The effect of this rule is that the test must be satisfied on the purchase date, 
regardless of whether payment is made or the corporation remains indebted to the 
vendor in respect of the purchase price.559 It is not easy to think of circumstances 
when the second option, ceasing to be a shareholder, will occur before the first 
option, the date a debt is incurred or payment made.560  
_________________________________________________________________  
554  See the introductory words of MBCA s 6.40(g). 
555  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.2.  
556  See also paragraph 4.4.2 above. This arrangement is criticised by Schulman & Lesser 
“Installment Repurchases” 1540 for not addressing the problem of overdue instalments that 
satisfied the test on the maturity date and in addition because the corporation can continue to 
make other distributions without taking into account the subordinated distribution. 
557  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.1.4. 
558  MBCA s 6.40(e)(1). The application of this requirement to specific instances of reacquisitions is 
explained further in the Official Comment.  
559  See Schulman & Lesser “Installment Repurchases” 1531. 
560  It may refer to instances where redeemable shares are to be redeemed out of a sinking fund 
kept in trust on behalf of the shareholders, see paragraph 3.4.3 above. 
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In the case of any other distribution of an indebtedness,561 the effect must be 
measured on the date the indebtedness is distributed.562  It is interesting to note 
that the timing rule for reacquisitions refers to the date the debt is incurred while this 
rule speaks of the distribution of the indebtedness. The difference between these 
two phrases is not clear. The distribution of an indebtedness seems to be a more 
appropriate term for this kind of distribution, which is not ‘incurred’ in the ordinary 
sense of word, as opposed to a reacquisition where there is a causa for a debt. In 
the absence of a causa, the debt arises out of the document such as a promissory 
note. 
Although it can be argued that creditors are not properly protected by this rule, 
which allows payments at a later stage when the corporation is insolvent or unable 
to pay its debts,563 the Official Comment to section 6.40 explains that creditors are 
not worse off. This is because the company satisfied the test and could thus have 
actually paid the debt on the date it was incurred.564 Further, the Official Comment 
states that the purpose of the MBCA is to regulate the validity of distributions from 
the perspective of corporate law, leaving it to the federal Bankruptcy Code565 and 
state fraudulent conveyance law to protect creditors by impeaching distributions 
made in certain circumstances.566   
In all other cases, the effect of a distribution must be measured on: 
• the date of authorisation of the distribution, if payment occurs within 120 
days after the date of authorisation, or 
• the date payment is made if it occurs more than 120 days after date of 
authorisation.567 
This rule applies to distributions that involve neither a reacquisition of shares nor 
the issuing of an indebtedness. It introduces a rather practical measure by imposing 
a time limit of 120 days after authorisation within which a payment may be made 
_________________________________________________________________  
561  That is, other than in respect of an acquisition of shares. 
562  MBCA s 6.40(e)(2). 
563  See Clark Corporate Law 638. 
564  This view is supported by Schulman & Lesser “Installment Repurchases” 1532 – 1535. 
565  11 USCA. See s 548 regarding dispositions without value. 
566  See paragraph 3 of the Official Comment on the MBCA s 6.40. 
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without the need to reassess the corporation’s financial situation at the time of 
payment. The rule is based on the premise that the financial situation of the 
corporation would in most instances be relatively stable for such a short period and 
creditors are thus unlikely to suffer prejudice. The corporation has the advantage of 
certainty. 
Payments after the 120 day limit will have to be subjected to the solvency test 
again. The provision refers to the actual date of payment and not to the time when a 
distribution becomes due or payable. In order to understand this provision a 
distinction must be drawn between a distribution that has been authorised but not 
paid and the distribution of an ‘indebtedness’ by the corporation.  
A 120-day rule is being proposed for South Africa under the Companies Bill. 
However, the ambit of this proposed rule differs from the rule in the MBCA in 
important respects.568   
4.4.4 Status of claim in respect of authorised but unpaid distributions 
Unless payment of the distribution is subordinated subject to satisfactions of the 
financial restrictions, the shareholder acquires a status equal to that of general 
unsecured creditors at the time when the corporation incurs an indebtedness to that 
shareholder.569  
4.4.5 Authorisation 
Distributions are authorised by the board of directors, subject to any restrictions in 
the articles of incorporation and, of course, the financial restrictions.570 
4.4.6 Liability for unlawful distributions 
The MBCA imposes liability for unlawful distributions on directors.571 This liability is 
the only specific instance of liability imposed on directors in addition liability for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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567  MBCA s 6.40(e)(3). 
568  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.6. 
569  MBCA s 6.40(f). 
570  MBCA s 6.40(a). 
571   MBCA s 8.33. 
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breaching the general standards for director conduct set out in section 8.30.572 The 
focus on director liability as the primary consequence of unlawful distributions has 
historical reasons.573 The Official Comment also makes it clear that the possible 
liability of shareholders is best determined under fraudulent conveyance or 
bankruptcy laws. 574  The right of a corporation to the return of an unlawful 
distribution from shareholders is not regulated in the MBCA, but will depend on the 
general principles in the specific state.575 The clear trend among states is that 
shareholder liability to the corporation will also depend on the knowledge of the 
shareholder.576  
A director who votes for or assents to a distribution made in violation of section 
6.40 of the MBCA or the corporation’s articles of incorporation may be held 
personally liable to the corporation for the amount of the unlawful distribution.577 It 
will have to be proved that the director did not comply with the general standards of 
conduct for directors set out in section 8.30.578 After having stated that directors 
owe their corporations a duty of good faith and of reasonable care, the provision 
expressly entitles directors to rely on information, opinions, report or statements, 
including financial statements and other financial data, prepared or presented by 
officers or employees, professional advisers and committees of the board. The 
director may so rely provided she reasonably believes that person to be competent 
and provided she does not have knowledge making such reliance unwarranted.579 
In determining whether distributions may be made, directors will very often have to 
rely on financial information presented or prepared by others. This provision thus 
limits the liability of directors in respect of unlawful distributions to a reasonable 
level.  
_________________________________________________________________  
572  MBCA s 8.30 covers the duty of good faith, duty of reasonable care and allows reasonable 
reliance on others. It is often described as the business judgment rule. 
573  Manning Legal Capital 187.  
574  See Official Comment to MBCA s 6.40, paragraph 3. 
575  Cox & Hazen Corporations 571. 
576  Cox & Hazen Corporations 571. 
577  MBCA s 8.33(a). 
578  MBCA s 8.33(a). 
579  The Official Comment to s 8.33 refers to this as ‘warranted reliance’. 
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Proceedings to enforce directors’ liability must be instituted within two years of 
the date on which the effect of the distribution was measured or, in case of a 
violation of the articles of incorporation, within two years of such violation.580 
A director who is held liable is entitled to a contribution from every other 
director who could be held liable for the unlawful distribution.581 The pro rata portion 
of the amount of an unlawful distribution may be recouped from each shareholder 
who received it knowing that it was unlawful.582 Proceedings by a director to enforce 
a contribution from co-directors or a recoupment from shareholders must be 
instituted within a year after the final adjudication of the directors’ liability.583 
In addition to the possible liability of shareholders in respect of a recoupment 
by a director, shareholders could be liable under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act and the Bankruptcy Act for unlawful distributions received. I briefly discuss this 
aspect elsewhere.584  
Unlike the position in South Africa,585 the MBCA regulates the liability of 
directors for all kinds of unlawful distributions in a coherent manner. Directors can 
be held liable only if they allowed a distribution to be made while they did not comply 
with the standard of conduct expected of them. A prerequisite for the recovery by 
directors from shareholders is the shareholders’ knowledge of the unlawfulness of 
the distribution. In this sense, the liability thus appears to be narrower than in South 
Africa.586 A consideration of these differences could guide the review of the South 
African provisions in this regard. 
4.5 Dividends 
The definition of a distribution includes any ‘transfer of money or other property or 
incurrence of indebtedness by a corporation to or for the benefit of its shareholders 
in respect of any of its shares’.587 A dividend is expressly mentioned as an example 
_________________________________________________________________  
580  MBCA s 8.33(c)(1). 
581  MBCA s 8.33(b)(1). 
582  MBCA s 8.33(b)(2). 
583  MBCA s 8.33(c)(2). 
584  See paragraph 1 above. 
585  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 5.6 and 6.4.2. 
586  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4.1.3. 
587  See s 1.40(6). See paragraph 4.4.1 above. 
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of a distribution. A share dividend is not a distribution.588 The term ‘dividend’ in its 
narrow sense refers to a distribution of earnings and profits, but in its wider sense it 
includes distributions in partial liquidation.589 
I have analysed the financial restrictions and other principles applicable to 
dividends as distributions in relation to distributions in general and will not repeat 
them here.590 
4.6 Share repurchases 
4.6.1 Power to acquire shares 
A corporation has a general power to acquire its own shares.591 The provision does 
not distinguish between different kinds of acquisitions, but it is wide enough to 
encompass acquisitions by way of repurchase, redemption or any other method. 
There is no separate provision that regulates the redemption of shares.592 
4.6.2 Financial restrictions 
It is expressly provided that the reacquisition, redemption or conversion of shares is 
subject to the financial restrictions of section 6.40.593 The definition of ‘distribution’ 
also makes specific reference to the ‘purchase, redemption, or other acquisition of 
shares’.594  
The right to reacquire shares is subject to the qualification that one or more 
shares should remain outstanding that together have unlimited voting rights and 
entitlement to receive the net assets on dissolution.595 
It is not required that the articles of incorporation authorise the acquisition or 
that shareholders should approve of it. The general position is thus that the board of 
directors has the power to authorise the reacquisition of shares. 
_________________________________________________________________  
588  The definition in s 1.40(6) excludes a transfer of the corporation’s own shares. 
589  See Hamilton Corporations 870. 
590  See paragraph 4.4.2 above. 
591  MBCA s 6.31. 
592  The creation of redeemable shares is provided for in s 6.01(c)(2). See paragraph 4.6.6 below. 
593  MBCA s 6.03(b). The financial restrictions are discussed in paragraph 4.4.2 above. 
594  Section 1.40(6). Also see paragraph 4.4.1 above. 
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4.6.3 Procedure and other requirements 
The MBCA does not prescribe the procedure when a corporation wants to acquire 
its shares.  
Securities exchanges usually prescribe requirements for the reacquisition of 
shares listed on that exchange.596 These requirements include notification and 
equal treatment of shareholders.597 The federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
as amended598 regulates tender offers by a corporation for the purchase of its own 
shares in the context of defensive tactics including greenmail.599  
For unlisted corporations the procedure and further requirements are 
governed by the applicable state law and would usually depend on whether the 
corporation involved is a closely held or a public corporation.600 
It is generally accepted that a corporation can selectively repurchase or 
redeem its shares. This can give rise to conflicts of interest, abuse of power by 
management or controlling shareholders, and unequal treatment of different 
classes of shares. 601   The courts have formulated several specific fiduciary 
limitations on share repurchases.602 
In public corporations the fiduciary duties of the management are relevant in 
addressing the problem of repurchases motivated by improper considerations 
(such as to avoid a takeover). The courts in most states apply the ‘primary purpose 
test’ formulated by the Delaware Supreme Court in Cheff v Mathes.603  This test 
enquires whether the primary purpose of the directors was to further what they 
honestly believed to be in the interest of the corporation. When the interests of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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595  MBCA s 6.03(b) – (c). See paragraph 4.2.2 above. 
596  See Henn & Alexander Laws of Corporations 943. 
597  See, for example the Securities and Exchange Commission’s going-private rules, rule 13e-3 
and Schedule 13E-3. For a discussion of federal protection measures in going private 
transactions, see Kofele-Kale “Unfinished Business” 625. 
598  15 USCA s 78a et seq. The provisions under consideration were introduced by the Williams Act 
of 1968. 
599  See Securities Exchange Act 1934, s 13(d), (f), s 14(d) – (e). Hartnett “Greenmail” 1301 argues 
that the federal regulation is ineffective as a result of restrictive interpretation by the courts. See 
also s 13(e) which deals with proper disclosure to shareholders in a repurchase.  
600  Clark Corporate Law 633. 
601  Cox & Hazen Corporations 582; Clark Corporate Law 633. 
602  Cox & Hazen Corporations 582 – 583; Rock, Kanda & Kraakman “Significant Corporate 
Actions” 150. 
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different classes of shares are involved, the directors have to act primarily in the 
interest of the ordinary shareholders.604  Takeover legislation in several states 
address the issue of greenmail, although this approach has been criticised for 
fragmenting markets.605 
In closely held corporations,606  many states recognise the existence of a 
fiduciary duty of utmost good faith owed by the controlling shareholders to the 
minority shareholders. 607  The existence of such a duty and the rule that 
shareholders should all have an equal opportunity to have their shares repurchased 
or redeemed, was formulated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in 
Donahue v Rodd Electrotype Co.608 Selective repurchases or redemptions require 
the consent of the other (non-controlling) shareholders. The equal opportunity rule 
in close corporations does not apply in Delaware, though.609  
4.6.4 The status of repurchased shares 
Shares reacquired by the corporation constitute authorised but unissued shares.610 
The articles of incorporation may prohibit the reissue of such acquired shares, and 
then the shares must be cancelled and the number of authorised shares must be 
reduced by the number of shares acquired.611 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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603  199 A 2d 548 (Del 1964). 
604  Zahn v Transamerica Corp 162 F2d 36 (3d Cir 1947). 
605  See Hartnett “Greenmail” 1292 – 1294. 
606  In Donahue v Rodd Electrotype Co 367 Mass 578, 328 N E 2d 505 the court identified three 
characteristics of a close corporation, namely a small number of shareholders, no ready market 
for its stock, and substantial majority shareholder participation in its management, direction and 
operations. 
607  Pepper v Litton 308 US 295 (1939); Zahn v Transamerica Corp 162 F2d 36 (3d Cir 1947). 
According to Hamilton Corporations 447 more than 25 states recognise the existence of such a 
duty in the context of selective repurchases. See also Hertig & Kanda “Related Party 
Transactions” 126; Kaplan & Young “Corporate Eminent Domain” 67. 
608  367 Mass 578, 328 N E 2d 505. 
609  Nixon v Blackwell 626 A 2d 1366, 1380 (Del 1993). See also Hamilton Corporations 451 – 452 
where the possible development of the ‘entire fairness’ test as a protection measure for 
minorities in closely held corporations is alluded to. ‘Entire fairness’ is used where the 
controlling shareholder is involved in self-dealing transactions, see Sinclair Oil Corporation v 
Levien 280 A 2d 717 (Del SC 1971). See also Hertig & Kanda “Related Party Transactions” 
126. 
610  MBCA s 6.31(a). 
611  MBCA s 6.31(b). See paragraph 4.2.5.1 above. 
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4.6.5 Repurchases through subsidiaries 
The MBCA does not contain specific provisions regulating the acquisition by a 
subsidiary of shares in its parent corporation. It appears that a subsidiary may 
acquire any number of shares in its parent corporation. 
A wholly owned or majority owned subsidiary 612  may generally not vote 
shares held in its parent.613 
4.6.6 The redemption of shares 
The redemption of shares is a distribution and is treated in the same way as 
repurchases and other acquisitions.614  
4.7 Evaluation and conclusions on the MBCA 
Following the lead of California, the revised MBCA of 1984 abolished the concept of 
stated capital and introduced economic concepts to regulate distributions to 
shareholders.615 
The articles of incorporation must set out the classes and numbers of 
authorised shares, and it is possible to have unclassified shares or blank stock.616  
Pre-emptive rights apply only to companies that elect to have them.617 The concept 
of authorised shares has been retained,618 and although directors may have the 
power to make certain alterations to the articles without shareholder approval, it is 
clear that whenever the interests of existing shares are affected shareholder 
approval is required. This includes an increase in authorised shares once any 
shares have been issued. Another example of this is that directors may subdivide 
_________________________________________________________________  
612  In determining whether a corporation is a parent company for this purpose, regard is had to the 
shares entitled to vote for directors, s 7.21(b). A corporation can be a subsidiary of another 
corporation because of other circumstances, see Cox & Hazen Corporations 111 for a 
discussion of definitions. 
613  MBCA s 7.21(b). This provision recognises that there could be special circumstances when 
such a subsidiary could indeed vote the shares in its parent corporation. See Cox & Hazen 
Corporations 348 for a discussion voting rights in respect of treasury shares and shares held by 
a subsidiary. 
614  See paragraph 4.5.1 above. 
615  See paragraph 4.1 above. 
616  See paragraph 4.2.1 above. 
617  See paragraph 4.2.1 above.  
618  See paragraph 4.2.1 above. 
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shares when there is only one class of shares, but need shareholder approval when 
it has more than one class of shares.619 
The kind of consideration a corporation may accept for its shares is not 
limited,620 but the directors have to determine that the consideration is adequate.621 
Certain non-cash issues that have the potential of disturbing the relative equity 
interests in the corporation are subject to shareholder approval.622 
There is a comprehensive definition of the term ‘distribution’. It includes 
repurchases, redemptions, dividends as well as conversions of shares into 
preferred classes of shares or debt securities.623 All distributions are subject to an 
equity solvency test and a balance sheet test.624  The equity solvency test is 
comparable to the South African liquidity test while the balance sheet test is similar 
to the South African solvency test. In addition to these tests designed to protect 
creditors, it is required that sufficient assets should remain to cover the preferential 
rights of classes of shareholders preferred to the class to which a distribution is 
being made.625 
The MBCA contains a detailed provision setting out the time of measurement 
of various distributions.626 The general rule is that the financial restrictions apply 
when a distribution is made or a debt in respect of it is incurred, even though actual 
payment is deferred.627 
It is interesting to note the interaction between the time of measurement and 
the status of the shareholder’s claim for payment in respect of a distribution. If the 
financial restrictions are satisfied when the distribution is authorised, the claim of 
the shareholder will rank equal with claims of ordinary unsecured creditors.628 The 
philosophy behind this approach is that, since the amount due could have been 
distributed and paid at that stage, the creditors will not be worse off if the 
_________________________________________________________________  
619  See paragraphs 4.2.5.1 and 4.2.5.2 above. 
620  See paragraph 4.3.1 above. 
621  See paragraph 4.3.2 above. 
622  See paragraph 4.3.3 above. 
623  See paragraph 4.4.1 above. 
624  See paragraph 4.4.2 above. 
625  See paragraph 4.4.2 above. 
626  See paragraph 4.4.3 above. 
627  See paragraph 4.4.3 above. 
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corporation does not pay immediately, but holds on to the money until a later stage. 
The position is the same as if the shareholder had received payment and then 
advanced the money back to the corporation on loan as an ordinary creditor.629  On 
the other hand, if the shareholder is prepared to have each payment subjected to 
the financial restrictions, effectively subordinating her claim to those of ordinary 
creditors, the test need not be satisfied when the distribution is authorised.  
South Africa can perhaps learn from the timing provision in the MBCA, 
especially in view of the uncertainty about the possible dual imposition of the test.630 
The MBCA addresses the ranking of claims in respect of all distributions631 
and this could provide an example for regulation in South Africa where claims in 
respect of reacquisitions are automatically subordinated to the claims of other 
creditors and the position in respect of dividends is uncertain.632  
Directors who allow the making of an unlawful distribution in violation of the 
standards of conduct expected of them, are liable.633 The MBCA does not impose 
direct liability on shareholders, but directors can recoup unlawful distributions from 
shareholders who received them with knowledge of their impropriety.634 
With the introduction of the new distribution rules, treasury shares were 
abolished. Reacquired shares have to be restored to the status of authorised but 
unissued shares, unless the articles of incorporation require them to be cancelled 
completely.635 
The financial restrictions imposed by the MBCA are very similar to the South 
African restrictions. An important difference is that the MBCA requires provision to 
be made for the preferential rights of preferred classes of shareholders. Similar 
protection for holders of preference shares should be considered for South Africa.  
The MBCA rules on distributions have several other advantages over the 
fragmented South African provisions. Apart from the comprehensive definition of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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628  MBCA s 6.40(f). 
629  Official Comment to s 6.40, par 8 (c). 
630  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.2.  
631  See paragraph 4.4.4 above. 
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‘distribution’ and the single set of financial restrictions, it contains a timing provision 
and a single liability rule.  
5 EVALUATION AND CONCLUSION 
In the United States of America, the regulation of corporations falls within the 
jurisdiction of individual states.636 I chose to analyse the share capital, contribution 
and distribution rules in two individual states generally regarded as important 
jurisdictions for corporate law, namely Delaware and California.637 I also considered 
the provisions of the MBCA, which serves as the basis for corporate law in many 
states.638  
In the state of Delaware, the traditional legal capital doctrine still applies. The 
concept of stated capital, which at first glance resembles the South African concept 
‘issued capital’, forms the basis of the regulation of distributions.639 
I illustrated that there is very little correlation between the consideration paid 
for shares and the amount of the stated capital.640 Although an amount equal to the 
par value of a share must be regarded as stated capital, share premiums received 
by a corporation are not automatically regarded as part of its share capital or 
non-distributable reserves. In the case of no par value shares, the directors decide 
how much of the consideration will be share capital.641 A corporation may reduce its 
capital provided that it is able to pay its debts as they mature.642 Shares may also 
be repurchased or redeemed out of capital if the stated capital is reduced 
simultaneously.643 
The Delaware General Corporation Law does not contain a definition of 
‘distribution’. Repurchases and redemptions may be made provided the stated 
capital is not impaired, while dividends may be paid out of surplus.644 Despite the 
_________________________________________________________________  
636  See paragraph 1 above. 
637  See paragraphs 2 and 3 above. 
638  See paragraph 4 above. 
639  See paragraph 2.2.1 above. 
640  See paragraphs 2.2.4 and 2.7 above. 
641  See paragraph 2.2.4 above. 
642  See paragraph 2.2.6 above. 
643  See paragraph 2.6.2 above. 
644  See paragraph 2.4.1 above. 
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difference in wording, this means that a corporation may make distributions out of 
the excess of assets over stated capital. In addition, ‘nimble dividends’ are 
allowed.645 These are dividends paid out of ‘current’ profits rather than out of 
surplus. 
I argued that the practical effect of the Delaware legislation is similar to that of 
the South African solvency and liquidity restrictions, although two steps may be 
required to achieve that effect in Delaware. When a corporation wants to make a 
distribution that would impair its stated capital, it may reduce its stated capital 
subject to compliance with a liquidity test and then proceed to make the 
distribution.646 This principle gives effect to the creditors’ purported reliance on the 
stated capital. 
Although I do not regard the Delaware approach in general as suitable for 
South Africa, I think that two provisions of its Code could be considered for 
implementation in South Africa. The first is the rule that a corporation may not 
repurchase its own shares for a higher price than that at which it can redeem those 
shares at that stage. 647  This provision protects the interests of remaining 
shareholders. It also prevents a misapplication of company funds and thus works to 
the advantage of creditors too. Secondly, I identified the timing rule for distributions 
by way of promissory notes, debentures or other obligations as a possible addition 
to the South African distribution provisions. 648  However, there are more 
comprehensive timing provisions in the Californian legislation 649  and in the 
MBCA650 and these should also be considered. 
The second jurisdiction I considered in this chapter is California. The 
California Corporations Code regulates distributions based on two alternative 
economic concepts, namely earned surplus and the ratio of debt to equity.651  
Although the concept of stated capital is not used, the California Corporations 
Code nevertheless limits the types of acceptable consideration and prescribes the 
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645  See paragraph 2.5.2 above. 
646  See paragraph 2.5.2 above. 
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valuation of non-cash consideration. 652  The purpose of these measures is to 
protect shareholders rather than creditors. 
California uses a single definition of ‘distribution’ that includes repurchases 
and dividends.653 All distributions are subject to the same financial restrictions. First, 
all distributions are subject to compliance with an equity solvency test.654 Secondly, 
one of two alternative balance sheet tests must be satisfied. The first is the retained 
earnings test, which is similar in effect to an earned surplus test in that the original 
contributions of shareholders may not be distributed. As an alternative to the 
retained earnings test, distributions may be made if the assets of the corporation 
exceed its liabilities by a prescribed ratio once the distribution has been made.655 
The debt/equity ratios offer better protection to creditors than the South African 
solvency requirement, because they require an additional cushion of assets from 
which creditors can be paid. Two ratios are involved: that of total assets to total 
liabilities (certain illiquid assets are disregarded), and that of current assets to 
current liabilities.656  
Like its South African counterpart, the Californian equity solvency test is an 
objective test. The Californian formulation, which considers whether the 
corporations is ‘likely to be unable’ to pay its debts may be preferable than the 
South African reference to a reasonable belief. 
The timing rule for distributions in California differs from the South African 
position in various respects.657 South Africa should consider a timing provision 
along the lines of the Californian provision, which distinguishes between dividends 
and other distributions and also expressly regulates debt instruments and sinking 
fund payments.658 
A feature of the Californian distribution rules is that the rights of preferred 
classes of shareholders are protected when a distribution is made to lower ranking 
classes. The retained earnings of the corporation, even if the distribution is to be 
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652  See paragraph 3.3.1 to paragraph 3.3.3 above. 
653  See paragraph 3.4.1 above. 
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made under the alternative debt/equity ratio test, must be sufficient to cover both 
the dividend and liquidation preferences of the preferred shareholders.659 The 
South African legislation contains no similar principle and the possibility of 
introducing statutory protection for shareholders with rights preferent to those of the 
shareholders to whom a distribution is to be made should be considered. 
California provides a good example of a sophisticated approach to liability for 
unlawful distributions. It clearly delineates the respective liability of directors and of 
shareholders and differentiates between non-compliance with creditor protection 
measures and rules protecting shareholders.660 The South African provision can be 
improved by employing similar distinctions. 
Despite the existence of separate procedures for share redemptions and 
share repurchases, both are subject to the same financial restrictions.661 This 
avoids the kind of anomalies present in the South African legislation. 
To conclude, the Californian Corporations Code can serve as an example for 
South Africa in a number of respects. Apart from the introduction of a single 
definition of distribution and the consistent treatment of redemptions and 
repurchases, its provisions regulating the liability of shareholders and directors for 
unlawful distributions can be singled out. Its sophisticated financial restrictions, 
including the asset-liability ratio tests, are stricter than the present South African 
solvency and liquidity tests.662 
Although it does not represent a specific jurisdiction, I analysed the provisions 
of the MBCA of 1984. Its provisions have been adopted in the corporation laws of 
the majority of states, making it fairly representative of American law. 
Like the California Corporations Code, the MBCA replaced the legal capital 
approach with one relying on economic concepts.663  
As a logical result of the abolition of stated capital and par value, shares may 
be issued for any kind of consideration.664  Non-cash consideration should be 
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declared adequate by the directors, although it need not be valued.665 Shareholders 
cannot generally rely on pre-emptive rights, as these are available only when 
expressly included in a corporation’s articles. However, the concept of authorised 
capital has been retained.666 Shareholders must generally approve amendments to 
the articles in respect of authorised capital.667 Shareholders also enjoy protection 
against unfair non-cash issues through the requirement of advance shareholder 
approval for substantial non-cash issues.668  
I explained that the MBCA subjects all distributions to uniform financial 
restrictions. Any transfer of money, property or an obligation is regarded as a 
distribution if it is made in respect of a share. 669  Repurchases, redemptions, 
dividends and conversions of shares into preferred classes of shares or into debt 
securities are treated similarly.670 The financial restrictions comprise an equity 
solvency test, a balance sheet test, and the requirement that assets equal to the 
dividend and liquidation preferences of preferred classes of shareholders should 
remain.671 Although South Africa also subjects some distributions to the equivalent 
of an equity solvency and a balance sheet test, it does not impose a requirement of 
providing for dividend or liquidation preferences. Many of the anomalies arising 
from the separate regulation of different types of distributions in South Africa672 will 
be solved by the adoption of a uniform standard for all distributions. 
I considered the time when the effect of a distribution is measured under the 
MBCA.673 The time of payment is used in certain circumstances, while the time of 
authorisation or creation of an indebtedness is used in other instances. It is also 
possible to manipulate the time of measurement through a subordination 
_________________________________________________________________  
665  See paragraph 4.3.2 above. 
666   See paragraph 4.2.1 above. 
667   See paragraph 4.2.5 above. However, directors may increase the authorised capital if no 
shares have been issued.  
668   See paragraph 4.3.3 above. 
669  See paragraph 4.4.1 above. 
670  See paragraph 4.4.1 above. 
671  See paragraph 4.4.2 above. 
672  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4. 
673  See paragraph 4.4.3 above. 
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agreement, thus allowing flexibility. I observed that the status of claims in respect of 
outstanding distributions determine the time of measurement.674 
I considered liability of directors and shareholders for unlawful distributions. 
The grounds for director liability under the MBCA are wider than in South Africa, but 
the prerequisites for imposing liability, which are set out with more clarity than in 
South Africa, are stricter. 675  The MBCA requires knowledge on the part of a 
shareholder who receives an unlawful distribution before that shareholder will be 
liable to return the distribution.676 
I conclude with general observations on the differences between the South 
African and American regulation. In each of the American systems, all distributions 
are subject to the same basic financial restrictions. The inclusion of a restriction to 
safeguard the preferential dividend and liquidation rights of preferred classes of 
shareholders is a feature common to all three systems.  
The financial restrictions achieve creditor protection in a consistent or neutral 
way in relation to different distributions. Creditors also benefit from the protection of 
the prior rights of preferred shareholders because it has the effect of ensuring a 
margin over solvency. In all these systems an equity solvency or liquidity test apply 
to distributions, which recognises the creditor’s right to receive payment when due.   
Except for the statutory protection of preferred shareholders through the 
financial restrictions, shareholder interests in repurchases are not regulated in any 
detail. The legislation does not prescribe rules for pro rata and selective 
acquisitions respectively, but the courts have developed fiduciary limitations in this 
regard. The acquisition of shares by a subsidiary corporation in its parent is not 
regulated by the legislation, although voting restrictions are imposed on shares held 
by certain subsidiaries. Federal regulation provides protection against selective 
repurchases on markets while several states have also enacted takeover legislation 
addressing defensive repurchases. 
Shareholders also do not enjoy strong statutory protection when further 
shares are issued, although certain protection mechanisms apply to non-cash 
capital contributions. The protection of shareholders against a dilution of their 
_________________________________________________________________  
674  See paragraph 4.4.4 above. 
675  See paragraph 4.4.6 above and compare Chapter 5 paragraph 6.4. 
676  See paragraph 4.4.6 above. 
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interests when further shares are issued relies on the concept of authorised capital 
but is weaker than in South Africa, because authorised capital can generally be 
increased by an ordinary majority vote. As in South Africa, shareholders have 
pre-emptive rights only if the articles expressly include them. 
An assessment of the overall level of protection enjoyed by creditors and 
shareholders in America is difficult. While different state systems have been 
investigated, the effect of federal legislation relating to securities and bankruptcy 
and the provisions of other uniform legislation such as the Uniform Fraudulent 
Transfer Act and the Uniform Commercial Code should also be taken into account, 
as should court-imposed equitable subordination.677  
It appears that the level of creditor protection is higher than in South Africa 
because creditors benefit by the greater margin required satisfying rights of 
preferential shareholders. In Delaware this margin is further increased by the 
amount of the stated capital and in California by the asset-liability ratio test or 
alternatively by the retained earnings test. 
Shareholder interests are better protected as far as the financial implications 
of distributions are concerned, because of the provision for liquidation preferences.  
However, shareholders seem to enjoy less protection than South African 
shareholders when further shares are authorised and issued. Similarly, shareholder 
interests are not clearly protected by state legislation against disproportionate 
distributions. Although proportionality or fair treatment is not required by statute, the 
courts have developed general principles over many years.  
 
_________________________________________________________________  
677  See Gelb “Undercapitalization Factor” 1; Dye “Inadequate Capitalization” 823, 843. 
CHAPTER 5 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter on South Africa analyses the regulation of share capital and of 
distributions to shareholders under the Companies Act of 19731 and the common 
law. The purpose is to evaluate the role of the share capital rules in the protection 
of shareholders and creditors respectively, and to assess the effectiveness of the 
distribution rules in safeguarding the interests of these two groups. 
Attention is given to the implications of the grafting of modern distribution 
rules, based on solvency and liquidity, onto an Act designed to facilitate the 
operation of the common-law capital maintenance doctrine. These modern 
distribution rules were introduced in 1999.2 The resultant anomalies and 
uncertainties are discussed in detail. 
The continued need for comprehensive regulation of the share capital 
structure of a company is evaluated. This involves an enquiry as to whether the 
burden of complying with these complex provisions is offset by a concomitant 
benefit to either shareholders or creditors, or both. The availability of alternative 
protective measures is an important factor in this equation. However, I focus on 
measures that relate specifically to the share capital or share capital structure of 
companies. An assessment of the impact of contractual undertakings exacted by 
creditors, or of minority shareholder remedies, for example, falls outside the scope 
of this thesis.  
Apart from the tension between the reformed distribution rules and the pre-
existing rules governing share capital structure, there are internal inconsistencies 
in the regulation of distributions. These arise because certain kinds of distributions 
to shareholders, notably the redemption of shares, are subject to restrictions 
based on the capital maintenance doctrine while others are subject to solvency 
and liquidity only. Moreover, the procedures for and consequences of different 
_________________________________________________________________  
1  Act 61 of 1973, hereafter the ‘Act’. Unless the contrary is indicated, all references to sections 
in this Chapter are to sections of this Act. 
2  By the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999.  
 250 
kinds of distributions vary. An answer is sought as to whether there are any 
substantive differences in the effect various kinds of distributions may have on 
shareholders or creditors that could justify these disparate approaches. 
The extent to which these issues will either be solved or aggravated under 
the Companies Bill 2008,3 resulting from the comprehensive company law review 
process,4 is considered.5 Reference will also be made to the draft Companies Bill 
published by the Department of Trade and Industry in February 2007 in certain 
instances.6 
The structure of this chapter follows that of the earlier chapters in the 
comparative study. However, in relation to each of the five main sections, namely 
share capital structure, capital contributions, distributions, dividends and other 
payments, and share repurchases, the current legal position is outlined, followed 
by a consideration of the Companies Bill.  Specific criticisms against the provisions 
of the Act or the Companies Bill are addressed when the particular provision is 
considered. Each main section culminates in an evaluation and conclusion which 
takes into account the comparative perspectives. Overall conclusions and 
recommendations are reserved for the final chapter. 
Although consideration was given to discussing the Companies Bill either in a 
separate chapter or in a separate section at the end of this chapter, the proposals 
it embodies often address criticisms against the current position. It thus makes 
sense to evaluate the present provisions in the light of these proposals rather than 
in vacuo. While the provisions of the Companies Bill are still open to changes in 
the course of the legislative process, it is unlikely that there will be a major shift in 
the basic approach that has thus far emerged from the Policy Framework and the 
two versions of the draft legislation. I hope that my criticism against specific draft 
clauses will contribute to the improvement of the proposed legislation.  
Integrating the discussion of the Companies Bill into the main body of this 
chapter poses definite challenges, particularly as a result of diverging approaches. 
_________________________________________________________________  
3  [B 61—2008], tabled in Parliament on 27 June 2008, available at www.pmg.org.za/bill (2008-
06-27), hereafter ‘Companies Bill’. 
4  See South African Company Law for the 21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Reform GN 
1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004. 
5  Whenever reference is made in this chapter to a ‘clause’, it is to a clause in this Companies 
Bill 2008, unless indicated otherwise. 
6  For a discussion of the share capital and distribution rules in this draft Bill, see Jooste 
Continued 
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While the Act regulates the share capital structure in considerable detail, the 
Companies Bill devotes little attention to this topic. The first discussion of 
provisions of the Companies Bill is thus encountered only after a very lengthy 
discussion of present problems caused by, among others, the dual system of par 
value and no par value shares, the regulation of share premium accounts, and 
references to the reduction of share capital. Further, the Companies Bill regulates 
distributions in a uniform way while the Act provides separate procedures and 
requirements. To facilitate comparison, yet eliminate repetition, certain provisions 
of the Companies Bill that apply to distributions in general are discussed in 
sections dealing with specific kinds of distributions rather than under more general 
headings. For example, liability for unlawful distributions is discussed in relation to 
share repurchases because that is where the focus of the current regulation of 
liability lies. Where necessary, further cross references and explanations will 
indicate where specific issues are discussed in the course of this chapter. 
1.1 Overview of the development of share capital and distribution rules  
South African company law is found in both the Act and the common law. The Act 
applies to all companies registered under it or under its predecessor,7 as well as to 
external companies with a place of business in the Republic.8 The 1926 and 1973 
Companies Acts were based on English legislation and the English common law 
rules applicable to companies have been accepted into South African company 
law in as far as they do not conflict with South African law.9 
The main distinction between different types of companies incorporated 
under the Companies Act is between a company ‛having a share capital’10 and a 
company ‛not having a share capital and having the liability of its members limited 
by the memorandum of association’.11 A company having a share capital may be 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
"Companies Bill 2007" 710ff. 
7 Act 46 of 1926. 
8 Section 2(2).  
9 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 19. The 1973 Companies Act contained a number of 
innovations compared to the English legislation, see Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 24 for 
an outline. 
10 Section 19(1)(a). 
11 Section 19(1)(b). This kind of company is referred to in the Act as a company limited by 
guarantee. 
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either a public or a private company and may have shares of par value or shares 
of no par value.12 It is clear from the negative formulation of the description of a 
company limited by guarantee that the point of departure of the Companies Act is 
a company having a share capital. It is also true that the vast majority of 
companies incorporated under the Act are indeed companies having a share 
capital.13 Companies limited by guarantee will not be considered further, because 
they do not have a share capital. All further references to companies in this 
chapter will thus be to companies having a share capital, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
The capital maintenance doctrine which was developed by English courts in 
the nineteenth century was accepted as part of South African company law. The 
idea that the paid-up share capital of a company served as a guarantee fund to 
which creditors looked for payment was confirmed by the then Appellate Division 
in Lewis v Oneanate (Pty) Ltd & Another.14 However, in 1999 the Companies 
Amendment Act 37 of 1999 introduced amendments which ‛changed dramatically 
the capital maintenance rule and the perceived protection it afforded [creditors]’.15 
Although these amendments brought about significant changes in the regulation of 
distributions to shareholders, the provisions underpinning the concepts of 
authorised and issued capital and the capital maintenance principle were not 
amended. This has given rise to certain anomalies and the amendments have 
been described as ‛unsystematic efforts to eliminate the capital maintenance 
principle’.16 
It is thus not surprising that the reform of the share capital provisions is a 
theme of the company law reform project which is currently under way. 
Unfortunately neither the policy document, South African Company Law for the 
_________________________________________________________________  
12 Section 19(2). A company limited by guarantee is deemed to be a public company, s 19(3). 
The difference between par value shares and no par value shares is considered in paragraph 
2.3 below. 
13 As at 24 November 2003 there were 415 990 active companies having a share capital (public 
and private companies together) and 16 570 active companies limited by guarantee. Only 85 
of the companies limited by guarantee were not s 21 companies. See 
www.cipro.co.za/about_us/registration_stats.asp (2008-01-28).  
14 1992 (4) SA 811 (A) at 818. 
15 Capitex Bank Ltd v Qorus Holdings Ltd & Others 2003 (3) SA 302 (W) at 306.  
16 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 4-58; 5-113; 5-274. For further criticism of 
the lack of cohesion between the old and new provisions, see Cassim “Reform of Company 
Law and Capital Maintenance” 284, Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 323. 
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21st Century – Guidelines for Corporate Reform,17 nor the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Companies Bill 200818 articulate in any detail the 
considerations that informed the proposals regarding share capital and 
distributions.19  
2 STRUCTURE OF SHARE CAPITAL 
Many provisions in the Companies Act deal directly or indirectly with the share 
capital of a company having a share capital. Chapter V of the Act carries the 
heading ‛Share Capital, Acquisition by Companies of Own Shares, Shares, 
Allotment and Issue of Shares, Members and Register of Members, Debentures, 
Transfers, and Restrictions on Offering Shares for Sale’.20 The sub-heading for 
sections 74 to 82 is ‛Share Capital’. These sections set out the basic structure of 
the share capital accounts of a company depending on whether it has par value or 
no par value shares or both these types of shares. They deal with the variation of 
capital and with conversions of par value shares into no par value shares and vice 
versa. They also regulate aspects of the minimum consideration for which shares 
may be issued. Most of these provisions relate to the contribution or raising of 
share capital.21 Distributions to shareholders are regulated both by sections 85 to 
90 and certain other provisions.22 Some provisions dealing with or referring to 
share capital can be found elsewhere in the Act.23  
2.1 Authorised capital 
The Companies Act employs the concept of authorised capital in relation to 
companies having a share capital. Section 52(2) requires the memorandum of a 
company to state the amount of the share capital with which it is proposed to be 
_________________________________________________________________  
17  GN 1183 in GG 26493 of 23 June 2004, hereafter ‘Policy Framework’. 
18  This appears at the end of the Companies Bill 2008. 
19 This lack of explanation of the policy issues in the Policy Framework is also noted by Cassim 
“Reform of Company Law and Capital Maintenance” 283.  
20 The heading was amended by s 5 of Act 37 of 1999. Previously it read: ‘Share Capital, 
Reduction of Capital, Shares, Allotment and Issue of Shares, Members and Register of 
Members, Debentures, Transfers, and Restrictions on Offering Shares for Sale’. 
21 However, s 76(3) and s 79 regulate specific kinds of distributions.  
22  See s 76(3) and s 79. 
23 See, for example, s 52(2), considered in paragraph 2.1 below. 
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registered and the division thereof into shares of a fixed amount,24 or the number 
of shares if the company is to have shares of no par value.25 This amount of share 
capital or number of shares is known as the authorised share capital of a 
company.26 Although the concept ‘authorised capital’ is not used in section 52(2), 
section 75(1)(h) contains a reference to a reduction of authorised capital.27 In the 
case of par value shares, the authorised capital is expressed as an amount of 
money, divided into shares with a particular par or nominal value. When no par 
value shares are used, the authorised capital is a specific number of shares 
without any reference to a total amount of capital or a value per share.28 Since a 
company may have both par and no par value shares,29 the authorised capital can 
also be a combination of an amount of money and a number of shares. The fact 
that allowance has to be made for the two different concepts of par value and no 
par value shares also affects further provisions dealing with authorised and issued 
share capital, and leads to anomalies, some of which will be considered below in 
the context of the different kinds of shares.30 
The function of the authorised capital is firstly to determine the maximum 
number of shares that the company may issue without altering its share capital as 
provided for in section 75.31 The statement of authorised capital thus protects the 
interests of existing shareholders, because it limits the potential disturbance of the 
proportionate interests of shareholders which could result from the issue of further 
shares. Creditors have no interest in the statement of authorised capital, because 
the company is under no obligation to issue all its authorised shares. 
A second function of the statement of authorised capital is to determine the 
prescribed fee that is payable to the Registrar upon registration of the company.32 
The fee, which is payable in addition to the general prescribed fee of section 63(1), 
is R5 for each R1000 or part thereof of the nominal capital and R5 for each 1000 
_________________________________________________________________  
24 Section 52(2)(a)(i), in relation to par value shares. 
25 Section 52(2)(a)(ii).  
26 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-1. 
27 This provision is discussed in paragraph 2.6.1 below. 
28 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-1. 
29 Section 74. See paragraph 2.3 below for a discussion of these types of shares. 
30 See paragraph 2.3 below. 
31 A purported allotment of shares beyond the number of authorised shares will be void, Moosa v 
Lalloo & Another 1957 (4) SA 207 (N). 
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no par value shares or part thereof.33 
While authorised capital constitutes an upper limit on the number of shares 
that directors may issue, the power of directors to allot and issue shares is in any 
event curtailed by the requirement of shareholder approval.34 Any issue of shares 
must be approved by an ordinary resolution. The approval may either be a specific 
authority or a general authority. The latter is only valid until the next annual 
general meeting, but may be revoked at any time.35  
Until the amendments brought about by the Corporate Laws Amendment Act 
24 of 2006, the Act did not provide for pre-emptive rights when shares are issued. 
The model articles in Table B of Schedule 1 provides for pre-emptive rights in the 
case of a sale of shares by a shareholder in a private company.36 Directors were 
thus free to issue the further shares to anyone, provided they were acting in terms 
of the shareholder approval. The fiduciary duties imposed on directors oblige them 
to exercise their powers for a proper purpose. This principle is particularly relevant 
to share issues.37 
The Corporate Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2006 appears to have introduced 
pre-emptive rights on share issues through a back door. It inserted definitions of 
‘widely held’ and ‘limited interest’ companies into the Act.38 One of the alternative 
characteristics of a widely held company is the unrestricted transferability of its 
shares,39 which in turn depends on the absence of an ‘effective right of pre-
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
32 Section 63(2).  
33 See paragraph 2.3 below for further discussion of the effect of the nature of shares on the fee 
payable in respect of authorised capital.   
34  Section 221. 
35  Allotments to directors are subject to the additional requirements of s 222. The basic effect of 
s 222 is that each particular allotment or issue has to be approved in advance, so that a 
general power cannot be used to issue shares to directors, see s 222(1)(a). This additional 
precaution does not apply when shares are issued to directors in proportion to their existing 
shareholdings or on the same terms and conditions as have been offered to members of the 
public or in terms of an underwriting contract, see s 222(1)(b) – (d). 
36  See articles 21 – 24 of Table B in Schedule 1 to the Act.  
37  See Kiggundu Share Capital 31 – 48.  
38  See s 1(6)(a) and (d), inserted by s 1(h) of the Corporate Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2006. 
The purpose of this distinction is the imposition of different governance and financial 
disclosure standards on these two kinds of companies, see the amendments to various 
sections in Chapters X and XI of the Act, brought about by ss 24 to 47 of the Corporate Laws 
Amendment Act 24 of 2006.  
39  See s 1(6)(a)(i). The others are that it is permitted to offer shares to the public, that it has 
decided by special resolution to be a widely held company or that it is a subsidiary of a widely 
held company, s 1(6)(a)(ii) – (iv). 
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emption’.40 Companies lacking all the alternative characteristics of a widely held 
company are limited interest companies. This means that one of the prerequisites 
to being a limited interest company is the existence of an effective right of pre-
emption in respect of the transfer of shares. For some reason, which is not 
immediately clear, section 1(6)(e) deems an effective right of pre-emption 
contained in the articles of a limited interest company also to operate when the 
company offers shares created in terms of section 75(1) to any non-shareholder. 
This deeming provision is not required for purposes of the definition, as the 
definition refers to unrestricted ‘transfer’ only. It is an independent provision 
introducing a substantive rule that an issue of newly created shares will be subject 
to the company’s existing pre-emptive rights on share transfers, ‘with the 
necessary changes’. 
Although there is merit in providing pre-emptive rights in respect of the issue 
of shares,41 the way in which this has been done must be questioned, especially in 
view of the interim nature of the Corporate Laws Amendment Act and the incisive 
reform process that was underway. There are also a number of substantive 
criticisms. 
First, the deeming provision is limited to shares created through a variation of 
share capital as envisaged in section 75(1) and does not cover an issue of shares 
that were originally authorised in the articles or of shares that were acquired by the 
company and restored to the status of authorised but unissued shares. Secondly, 
it applies only when the shares are offered to non-shareholders, leaving the 
company free to issue and allot all the shares to one or more selected 
shareholders. 
Thirdly, it makes the deemed pre-emptive rights dependent on the level of 
protection afforded by the particular company in respect of transfers by 
shareholders, provided the existing pre-emptive rights meet the minimum standard 
of effectiveness. Article 22 of the model articles for private companies in Table B 
of Schedule 1 which gives each shareholder an equal right to acquire shares being 
sold by a shareholder qualifies as ‘effective’. Articles 21 to 24 apply whenever a 
shareholder proposes to sell any of her shares and are thus more effective than 
_________________________________________________________________  
40  See s 1(6)(c). 
41  See paragraph 2.9.1 below. 
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the minimum requirement in section 1(6)(c) (ii) which applies only to sales to non-
shareholders.42 On the one hand, companies that have ‘over-effective’ pre-emptive 
rights for transfers will now be subject to similarly stringent pre-emptive rights 
when they issue shares created under section 75(1), regardless of whether their 
articles provide for pre-emptive rights to issues43 or contain pre-emptive rights to 
issues that conform to the minimum standard of effectiveness outlined in the Act. 
One the other hand, the provision makes no allowance for more comprehensive 
pre-emptive rights in respect of further issues that may already be contained in the 
articles of companies. The implication seems to be that the deeming provision 
replaces any existing pre-emptive rights with respect to further issues.  
Fourthly, it is not clear whether the ‘necessary changes’44 that must be made 
in order to apply the rules on ‘sales’ by shareholders to ‘offers’ by the company 
would include reading in a qualification that the offer must be for cash 
consideration. I think that this deeming provision undermines the contractual 
underpinnings of internal relationships in companies. Private companies should 
have been given the opportunity to provide for minimum standards of pre-emptive 
rights in respect of further issues and, if they indeed have stronger pre-emptive 
rights for further issues, these should have been respected.45  
The level of protection afforded by an ‘effective right of pre-emption’ and 
consequently also of the deemed pre-emptive rights on new issues needs further 
consideration. It is clear that the primary purpose is to discourage external 
shareholders rather than to encourage preservation of the relative interests of 
existing shareholders. This is why selective issues to existing shareholders will not 
trigger the pre-emptive rights. It is also evident from the fact that the provision 
does not afford pre-emptive rights in proportion to the relative shareholding or 
voting power of the shareholders.  
Public listed companies are subject to pre-emptive rights under the JSE 
_________________________________________________________________  
42  However, even if existing pre-emptive rights apply regardless of whether the shares are being 
sold to shareholders or non-shareholders, only offers to non-shareholders will be subject to 
the deeming provision. 
43  As is the case with the model articles in Table B. 
44  See s 1(6)(e). 
45  Criticism can also be expressed against the exclusive focus on pre-emptive rights as a 
restriction on the transferability of shares. Section 20(1)(a) permits any form of restriction. 
Private companies with alternative restrictions may have to amend their articles in order to 
avoid being classified as widely held companies.  
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Limited Listings Requirements when further shares are issued for cash.46 Such 
issues have to be implemented by way of rights offers to existing shareholders in 
proportion to their existing holdings.47 The Registrar may, with the prior approval of 
the JSE Limited, permit a company to dispense with this requirement in certain 
limited instances.48 The shareholders may also waive pre-emptive rights.49 
2.2 Minimum share capital 
The Act does not prescribe a minimum authorised or issued capital expressed in 
monetary terms. There is a minimum capital in the sense that each subscriber to a 
company has to take up at least 1 share, but the minimum consideration is not 
prescribed.50 The memorandum has to state the number of shares to be taken up 
by each subscriber.51 The subscribers to the memorandum have to take up their 
shares at incorporation.52 
Although the existence of a share capital is used to determine the nature of a 
company,53 the size of this share capital can be negligible.54 Many companies are 
incorporated with a nominal share capital which is insignificant as a form of actual 
finance and are financed through loans.55 The Companies Act impliedly sanctions 
this practice. An example is found in section 172 which regulates the issue of a 
certificate to commence business. One of the requirements for such a certificate in 
_________________________________________________________________  
46  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 3.30. 
47  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 3.30. 
48  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 3.31. 
49  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 3.32. 
50 See Delport “Capital Rules” 408. Although the minimum legal tender is 1 cent (see s 15 of the 
Reserve Bank Act 90 of 1998), each share need not be taken up separately and the 
consideration need not even consist of money.  The share capital of a company could 
arguably be a fraction of a cent. See Re Australia and Pacific Technology Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 
478; Re Scandinavian Bank plc [1988] Ch 87 and Re Cultus Gold NL (1987) 12 ACLR 433 on 
nominal values comprising or including fractions of minimum legal tender. In the case of a 
company limited by guarantee it is required that each subscriber undertake to contribute at 
least R1, s 52(3)(b). The minimum guarantee fund will thus be R7, see s 32 read with s 19(3).  
51 Section 52(2)(b). 
52 Section 103(1). 
53 See s 19(1)(a), referred to in paragraph 1.1 above. 
54  See Re Australia and Pacific Technology Ltd (1994) 13 ACSR 478 at 480 – 481 where the 
Supreme Court of Victoria raised the possibility that the par value could be so minimal that the 
shares could actually be described as having no par value. See also Baxt “Par Value Shares” 
515 – 516. 
55  Ex parte De Villiers & Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in Liquidation) 
1993 (1) SA 493 (A) at 503; Ex parte Strydom NO: In re Central Plumbing Works (Natal) (Pty) 
Continued 
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the case of a company with a share capital is a statement by each director that in 
her opinion the capital of the company is adequate for the purposes of the 
company and its business or, if she thinks it is not adequate, the reasons for this 
and the manner in which and sources from which the company is to be financed 
and the extent thereof.56 The fact that the procedure is only required in the case of 
a company with a share capital is significant - it indicates that the reference to 
‛capital’ is to share capital. This clearly recognises that although a company must 
have a share capital, it need not rely on this share capital and could instead be 
financed by debt. The Registrar is not given a power to refuse to issue such a 
certificate on the basis of inadequate share capital. It is not clear to what extent 
the Registrar scrutinises these statements before granting a certificate to 
commence business. There is also no express sanction for directors who make 
false or unsubstantiated statements.57  
The model articles of association provided in Schedule 1 of the Act limit the 
borrowing powers of a company to half of its share capital except with the 
permission of the general meeting.58 Companies that have adopted these articles 
will thus generally have to maintain a certain debt-equity ratio. However, although 
a limitation on borrowing powers will provide protection to creditors and 
shareholders,59 the primary focus of protection in the model articles is the 
shareholders, who are free to authorise a higher level of debt. 
2.3 Kinds of shares 
The share capital of a company can be divided into par value and no par value 
shares.60 However, all the ordinary shares or all the preference shares must 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
Ltd 1988 (1) SA 616 (D) at 623. 
56 Section 172(3)(a). The company will not be able to exercise borrowing powers until the 
certificate has been issued. It may, however, issue debentures. 
57  Delport “Capital Rules” 409 suggests that a remedy can be based on common-law fraud. 
58 Table A art 60, Table B art 61. The JSE Limited Listings Requirements oblige listed 
companies to disclose their borrowing powers and to provide an explanation if it exceeded the 
limits of its borrowing powers within the past three years, see paragraphs 7.A.12 and 7.A.13. 
59 Delport Verkryging 58.  
60 Section 74. Banks may not have no par value shares, see s 79(1)(a) of the Banks Act 94 of 
1990. This regime is likely to continue under the new Companies Act, see item 6(1) of 
Schedule 7. 
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consist of either the one or the other.61 This dual system is implemented through a 
number of other provisions dealing with different aspects of share capital and 
membership rights associated with each of these types of share. 
The option of having shares without par value was first introduced in South 
Africa in the 1973 Companies Act.62 The Van Wyk de Vries Commission was 
specifically instructed to investigate the desirability of allowing no par value 
shares.63 The Commission referred to the Gedge Report64 and the Jenkins 
Report65 in England.66 It concluded that in most respects there was not much 
practical difference between the two systems. The only difference was that a no 
par value share would not have the label of a fixed amount attached to it. Such a 
label or indication of value was thought to be misleading since there need not be 
any relationship between the par value and the inherent value of a share67 and 
also because it could be misleading to express dividends as a percentage of par 
value rather than of capital invested.68 
Despite its conviction that no par value shares could do no harm and should 
be introduced as an alternative, the Van Wyk de Vries Commission nevertheless 
thought it wise to impose certain restrictions ‛at least until the new system was 
known in practice’.69 These restrictions did not enjoy the further attention of the 
legislature.70 This may be because the new system never really became widely 
used in practice.71 
The first restriction was that all ordinary shares must be of one kind and all 
_________________________________________________________________  
61 Section 74 proviso.  
62  See Louw “Aandele Sonder Pari-waarde” 53 – 55 for an overview of the history of no par value 
shares. 
63 Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act (RP 45 of 1970), hereafter 
‘Van Wyk de Vries Main Report’, 34.01. 
64 Report of the Committee on Shares of No Par Value (Cmnd 9112) of 1954, hereafter ‘Gedge 
Report’, see 34.05 and 34.14 
65 Report of the Company Law Committee (Cmnd 1749) of 1962, hereafter ‘Jenkins Report’. 
Although the Jenkins Committee recommended the introduction of no par value shares, they 
were never introduced in England. See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.3. 
66 See Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.05, 34.06 and 34.15. 
67 Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.10. 
68 Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.11. 
69 See Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.13.  
70  Van der Linde “Par-value or No-par-value” 477 
71  See Delport Verkryging 20 – 21 note 32 where reference is made to a press release by the 
Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law in 1985 in which the success and usefulness 
of no par value shares was said to be debatable. 
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preference shares of one kind.72 The explanation given for this rule was that 
confusion could arise if part of the capital consisted of par value shares and part of 
no par value shares.73 The Commission probably had in mind the establishing of 
relative voting rights of shareholders. The second restriction that was 
recommended in view of the Commission’s self-admitted cautious approach to the 
introduction of no par value shares was the regulation of the minimum issue price 
of subsequent issues of no par value shares. 74  
Although the Commission was not asked to report on the desirability of 
retaining par value shares, it referred to several disadvantages of par value shares 
and indicated that some of these disadvantages required further investigation at a 
later stage.75 The report mentioned the fact that the no discount rule did not offer 
shareholders any protection against the subsequent issue of shares at a lower 
premium than they had paid, or at a price lower than the current value of the 
shares. 
An analysis of the Van Wyk de Vries Report reveals that the Commission 
considered only the type of no par value share that was recommended by the 
Gedge Commission, namely shares where the full consideration or issue price had 
to be transferred to the stated capital account, thus leaving the company no room 
to allocate any part of the consideration to surplus or reserves. The Gedge 
Commission considered no par value systems in various jurisdictions, including 
America where a number of different systems were used.76 In some systems 
corporations were free to allocate any portion of the consideration to stated capital 
and reserves;77 in others they could allocate a prescribed maximum percentage of 
the consideration to a paid-in surplus account.78 However, these alternatives were 
not considered by the Van Wyk de Vries Commission. 
Shares without par value are rarely used in South Africa.79 Although the par 
_________________________________________________________________  
72 Section 74 proviso. 
73 See Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.13.  
74 See s 82, discussed in paragraph 3.1.2 below. 
75  Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.16 – 34.18. 
76  See paragraph 13 of the Gedge Report. 
77 See s 154 of the Delaware General Corporation Law of 1967, discussed in Chapter 4 
paragraph 2.2.4. Amounts allocated to reserves constitute paid-in surplus and can be 
distributed freely to shareholders. 
78 See also Manning Legal Capital 41. 
79 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 223 note 1. See also McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 43.    
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value concept has been criticised as potentially misleading,80 this has not deterred 
companies from using par value shares to the almost complete exclusion of no par 
value shares.81 
The reason for the unpopularity of no par value shares in South Africa has 
not been established empirically.82 Perhaps some deductions can be made by 
comparing the provisions regulating the various aspects of par and no par value 
shares.83  
2.3.1 Comparison of par and no par value shares 
Despite an attempt to ensure neutrality between these two types of shares - which 
probably also removed most of the advantages of no par value shares - various 
differences remain. The one essential difference between par and no par value 
shares, namely the presence or absence of an indicator of value, translates into a 
number of consequential differences. As will appear from the discussion below, 
the South African dual system does not succeed in achieving neutrality between 
par value and no par value shares. In many respects the current no par value 
share is more restrictive than a par value share. 
2.3.1.1 Statement of authorised capital 
In the case of par value shares the authorised capital is expressed as an amount, 
divided into shares of a specific amount.84 Authorised capital thus reflects the par 
value of the shares.  
When no par value shares are used, the authorised capital will not be 
reflected as an amount.85 However, once the shares are issued the full 
_________________________________________________________________  
80 McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 43 note 3; Policy Framework 2.2.3. 
81  The unpopularity of no par value shares is noted by Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 223; 
Delport Verkryging 20 – 21; McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 43. 
82 McLennan reports that he asked a couple of practitioners, but to no avail, see McLennan 
“Abolition of Par-value” 43. 
83  This analysis of the differences between par value and no par value shares is largely based on 
an earlier article by this writer, see Van der Linde “Par-value or No-par-value” 477 – 484.  
84  Section 52(2). 
85 As regards the statement of authorised capital, it seems as if there was some confusion as to 
exactly how the authorised capital of a company having no par value shares should be stated. 
In paragraph 34.08 of the Van Wyk de Vries Main Report it is said that in a case where the 
capital is divided into no par value shares, the company would declare its capital to be “R1 
000, divided into 100 shares”. In as much as the impression could be created that the total 
authorised capital of a company having no par value shares would also be stated, this is 
Continued 
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consideration or issue price will be reflected in the stated capital account.86 The 
requirement that the consideration for no par value shares should be reflected in a 
stated capital account has been described as a remnant of the par value system,87 
but this is not entirely accurate. The stated capital account is rather the equivalent 
of the aggregate of issued share capital, made up of the aggregate par value, and 
the share premium account in order to reflect the total issue price. This is clearly 
illustrated by the conversion provisions, discussed below. 
2.3.1.2 Conversions 
When par value shares are converted into no par value shares, the full issue price 
of the par value shares (the par value plus the premium) must be transferred to the 
stated capital account.88 Upon a conversion of all ordinary or preference (or both) 
par value shares into no par value shares the whole of the ordinary or preference 
share capital, as well as the whole of the share premium account or part thereof 
contributed to it by the shares being converted, must be transferred to the stated 
capital account.89 The requirement that the part of the share premium account that 
was contributed by the shares being converted should be transferred to the stated 
capital account will apply when the company had both ordinary and preference par 
value shares and only one type is being converted or where only some shares of a 
class were issued at a premium.90 It is not clear how it should be determined which 
part of the share premium account was ‛contributed’ by the shares being 
converted if the share premium account has previously been ‛applied’ as provided 
for in section 76(3).91  
If no par value shares are converted into par value shares, the whole of the 
stated capital account or the part thereof contributed by the shares so converted 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
wrong and not borne out by section 52(2)(a)(ii) as proposed by the Commission in the same 
report. This proposed provision required only the number of shares to be stated. The 
conflicting explanation in the report may have resulted from earlier thoughts on the 
implementation of the new system. 
86  Section 77(1). 
87  Louw “Aandele Sonder Pari-waarde” 58. 
88 Section 78. 
89 Section 78(1). Fractions may be rounded off, but material reductions have to be carried over to 
a non-distributable reserve, see s 78(3) which is discussed in paragraph 2.4.5 below. 
90 The proviso to s 74 makes it impossible to convert only some classes of ordinary or 
preference shares. 
 264 
must be transferred to the share capital account.92 If the stated capital account has 
been applied as provided for in section 77(3), the determination of the part of that 
account that can be said to have been contributed by the shares being converted 
may be problematic. The par value of the converted shares will be determined by 
dividing the stated capital contributed by each class of converted shares into the 
number of shares in that class. A company converting its no par value shares into 
par value shares is not allowed the flexibility of determining a lower par value for 
the new par value shares and allocating the balance of the stated capital account 
to the share premium account. The reason for this rigidity is not clear. 
2.3.1.3 Stated capital and share premium account 
Since the stated capital account is to some extent the equivalent of the share 
capital account plus the share premium account,93 it is important to compare the 
purposes for which a share premium account can be applied with the possible 
applications of the stated capital account. Both can be used to defray preliminary 
expenses. The fact that the stated capital account can be so used, while the share 
capital account cannot, reflects the fact that stated capital could have a ‛premium’ 
element because it reflects the total consideration received for no par shares. If 
par value shares are issued at par, preliminary expenses may not be covered out 
of the share capital account. This could be regarded as a disadvantage of par 
value shares that are issued at par. 
2.3.1.4 Minimum issue price 
Another important difference between par and no par value shares is the way in 
which the minimum issue price payable to the company is regulated. Par value 
shares may not be issued for a consideration lower than their par value,94 unless a 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
91 This provision is discussed in paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 below. 
92 Section 78(2). Fractions may be rounded off in terms of s 78(3), and any material reductions 
have to be placed in a non-distributable reserve. The implications of this reserve are dealt with 
in paragraph 2.4.5 below. 
93 See Van der Linde “Par-value or No-par value” 480. The full consideration for no par value 
shares is reflected in the stated capital account while the full consideration for par value 
shares is reflected in the share capital account plus, if the shares were issued at a premium, 
the share premium account.   
94 Ooregum Gold Mining Co of India Ltd v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL). See also Etkind & Others v 
Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W). 
 265
discount has been approved by the court in terms of section 81. No par value 
shares may be issued at any price, but section 82 requires an issue at a price 
below the average issue price of the class to be sanctioned by special resolution. 
At first glance these two rules may appear similar in nature. However, their 
objectives differ substantially.95 The rule for no par value shares offers more 
protection to existing shareholders because the total consideration payable by the 
new shareholders is regulated. The company’s freedom to determine an issue 
price, which is traditionally regarded as an advantage of no par value shares, is 
thus restricted considerably by section 82. A company that issues shares with a 
very low par value at a premium thus has far more freedom in determining an 
issue price than a company issuing no par value shares. Shareholders of par 
value shares enjoy only limited protection in this regard because share premiums 
they may have paid are not required to be taken into account when the company 
determines the issue price of further shares of that class. Although these 
differences and the resultant anomalies were considered by the Van Wyk de Vries 
Commission and identified as an issue that required further attention,96 the 
improvement of the rule in respect of par value shares was left for future review. 
2.3.1.5 Apportionment of shareholding 
The allocation of membership participation rights such as the right to vote or to call 
a meeting could differ depending on whether the members hold par value or no 
par value shares. Voting rights of par value shareholders in public companies are 
determined according to the nominal value of their shares, while holders of no par 
value shares have one vote in respect of each share.97 Since only the nominal 
value is taken into account in determining the voting rights of par value 
shareholders, shareholders who subscribed for shares at a premium may have 
voting rights that are disproportionately small in relation to their actual investment 
in the company. A public company could thus manipulate the relative voting rights 
of different classes of shares by the ratios between nominal values and share 
premiums. This could be unfair to shareholders who paid large premiums. The 
_________________________________________________________________  
95  See paragraph 3.7.1 below. 
96 Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.16 – 34.18. 
97 Section 195(1). 
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situation for no par value shares is also that there is no correlation between the 
capital actually contributed (by the shareholder or by the class in the aggregate) 
and voting rights. 
Where a company has par value as well as no par value shares, the 
apportionment issues are further complicated. It is probably this concern which lay 
behind the requirement that all the ordinary shares or all the preference shares 
must be of one kind. There would be no problem if a company has only one class 
of ordinary shares and one class of non-voting preference shares. However, when 
preference shares have voting rights either because such rights have not been 
excluded by the articles or because of the operation of section 194, problems arise 
regardless of whether the preference shares or the ordinary shares are the no par 
value shares. The Act does not make provision for establishing the relative 
weighting of voting rights attaching to par and no par value shares in the same 
company.98 Section 195(1)(a) states that a member will have a certain proportion 
of the total votes in the company, determined according to the ratio between the 
nominal value of her shares and the total nominal value of all the shares issued by 
the company. The ‛total votes in the company’ in this provision can by necessary 
implication only refer to votes held in respect of shares having a nominal value. 
There is no room in this equation for the inclusion of further votes in respect of no 
par value shares. It would appear as if a company would have to determine the 
total number of votes attaching to its par value shares and then add to that total 
one vote for each no par value share.99 The alternative would be to interpret the 
reference in section 195(1)(a) to the nominal value of shares to include the book 
value of no par value shares, but this interpretation would not make sense against 
the background of the ‘one share one vote’ principle that applies to no par value 
shares. In any event, neither of these solutions accord with the literal meaning of 
section 195(1)(a). 
In relation to the right to call a general meeting, the Companies Act uses at 
least three different criteria relating to share capital, namely the holding of certain 
percentages of the company’s ‛capital’, ‛issued share capital’ and ‛shares issued’. 
_________________________________________________________________  
98  James “Arranging a Company’s Capital” 39 states that in relation to the capital contributed, the 
one vote allocated to each no par value share could amount to more than the voting right to 
which a par value share is entitled, but does not suggest how the relative weighting is to be 
established. See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 7-52 – 7-52-1. 
99 If ordinary as well as preference shares are voting. 
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Although these provisions appear to be neutral between par and no par value 
shares, their application is far from clear. The right to request a general meeting is 
afforded to members who together hold at least 5 per cent of the ‛capital’ of the 
company which confers the right to vote.100 The inclusion of the reference to voting 
rights could create the impression that this provision relies solely on voting rights. 
However, since it refers to the holding of ‛capital’, another possible interpretation is 
that regard must be had to the share capital contributed by the members in 
respect of the voting share capital. Where the company has par value as well as 
no par value shares that confer the right to vote, there may be a problem 
apportioning the capital held by the different shares.101  
It is not clear whether only the nominal value contributed should be taken into 
account as ‘capital’, or also the premium that a shareholder paid. On the one hand 
it can be argued that the share premium is not really share capital but only treated 
as if it is, and that only the amounts of the share capital account and stated capital 
account are relevant. Such an interpretation will favour holders of no par value 
shares in comparison with holders of par value shares who paid the same 
consideration, but in the form of a low par value and a high premium. On the other 
hand, in Sage Holdings Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd & Others102 the court 
indicated that ‘capital’ referred to the ‘funds invested’ in the company or the ‘full 
issue price’ of shares.103 This statement has lead commentators to argue that the 
share premium account also has to be taken into account in determining the 
percentage of equity share capital held.104 Although the remarks in Sage Holdings 
Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd & Others were obiter, and further related to a 
definition of subsidiary which has since been amended, they may still be relevant 
for purposes of section 226(1A)(b)(ii), which uses a similar test to determine when 
a director will be deemed to control another company for purposes of the 
prohibition of loans. The remarks are also relevant for the provisions that refer to 
_________________________________________________________________  
100 Section 181(1)(a). 
101  This problem is unlikely to arise in practice, since the voting rights of preference shares, which 
in this scenario will be either all the par value or all the no par value shares, are usually 
excluded.  
102 1982 (1) SA 337 (W). 
103  At 353. However, the court also stated that these amounts would be reflected in the share 
capital account and stated capital account of a company, which is obviously not accurate of 
the shares have been issued at a premium. 
104  See Oosthuizen “Sage Holdings” 74; Brooks “Share-capital Related Determinants” 103.  
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the holding of a certain percentage of share capital. 
While the interpretation in Sage Holdings Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd & 
Others would solve the problem of balancing the total contributions of no par value 
shares and low par value shares issued at a high premium, it would create far 
greater problems in apportioning the rights of par value shareholders among 
themselves. The question would arise whether a particular shareholder who 
acquired shares at a premium would be ‛holding’ more of the share capital than a 
shareholder who acquired shares at par. A possible solution would be to work with 
the average price paid by all the holders of that class, but the Act makes no 
provision for such a step. Further, the effect of an application of the share premium 
account on the capital held by holders of par value shares would be uncertain. The 
suggestion of the court in Sage Holdings Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd & Others 
would also have to apply to companies that do not have shares without par value, 
but have different classes of par value shares. It is submitted that this 
interpretation cannot be supported. The share premium account should thus not 
be taken into account in determining capital held.  
Members holding not less than ten per cent of the ‛issued share capital’ may 
demand that voting at a meeting takes place by way of a poll.105 The difficulty of 
allocating rights between par and no par value shares once again raises its head. 
It seems that the emphasis is placed on the issued capital, although in this 
instance it is not limited to equity capital. The intention was clearly to look at 
something more than voting rights, because a poll can also be demanded by 
members who hold ten per cent of the voting rights, giving rise to the same 
difficulty of determining the total voting rights in the company.106  
A meeting to consider the appointment of an inspector can be called by 
members holding not less than 5 per cent of the ‛shares issued’.107 This seems to 
be a reference to the number of shares only, regardless of whether they are par 
value or no par value shares and regardless of whether they are voting shares or 
not. 
A consideration of the possible reasons why different standards are set for 
exercising these rights falls outside the scope of this thesis.  However, it is clear 
_________________________________________________________________  
105 Section 198(1)(b)(iii).  
106  Section 198(1)(b) (ii). Alternatively, at least 5 members may demand a poll, s 198(1)(b)(i). 
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that where a company has voting par value as well as voting no par value shares, 
the relative equity interests of these shares are not treated on a consistent basis.   
2.3.1.6 Prescribed fee on authorised capital 
A distinction is made between par and no par value shares in determining the 
prescribed fee payable on a company’s authorised capital. The fee, which is 
payable in addition to the general prescribed fee of section 63(1), is R5 for each 
R1000 or part thereof of the nominal capital and R5 for each 1000 no par value 
shares or part thereof. The two bases upon which the fee is calculated may in 
particular instances influence a company’s decision to use either par value or no 
par value shares.108 Shares with a low par value which are to be issued at a high 
premium will hold obvious advantages over no par value shares which will 
eventually be issued for a very low consideration, for example, for 1 cent each.109 
Conversely, no par value shares which will be issued for a relatively high 
consideration will prove to be more economical than shares with a correspondingly 
high par value.110 
The basis for the calculation of the fee when a company increases its capital 
by further no par value shares differs from that pertaining to initial no par value 
shares. The fee payable for the increase in authorised no par value shares is 
calculated with reference to the average issue price of all the existing no par value 
shares.111 The number of further shares is then multiplied by this average price 
and a fee of R5 is payable for every R1 000 or part thereof.112 This provision in 
_________________________________________________________________  
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107 Section 257. 
108  See Jooste “No-par-value shares” 228. 
109 For example: the prescribed fee on an authorised capital of 1 million no par value shares 
which will be issued at 1 cent each to raise R10 000, will be R5 000. However, if  the 
authorised capital is R10 000, divided into 1 million shares with a par value of 1 cent each, the 
fee will be R50 only. It is interesting to note that the difference in stamp duties between par 
and no par value shares has also been identified as a factor tipping the scale in favour of the 
use of par value shares in the USA, see Manning Legal Capital 30. 
110 For example: the prescribed fee on an authorised capital of R1 million divided into 10 000 
shares with a par value of R100 each, will be R5 000. However, the fee on 10 000 no par 
value shares, which will be issued at R100 each to give stated capital of R1 million, will be 
R50 only.  
111 Section 75(3)(b)(i). No provision is made for determining the average issue price of a 
particular class of no par value share. 
112 Section 75(3)(b)(ii). 
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effect gives a fictitious ‘nominal value’ to no par value shares.113 It seems to be 
based on the assumption that the shares will be issued at approximately the 
average issue price. In view of the fact that this provision makes no allowance for 
different classes of no par value shares, this assumption can be disputed. If the 
company issues the new no par value shares at a lower price - either because 
different classes are involved, or because the issue was sanctioned under section 
82, it will be paying a higher fee than that payable for comparable par value 
shares. 
Another point of criticism against the calculation of the fee upon an increase 
in authorised no par value shares is that no exception seems to be made for a 
subdivision of shares where the company will not receive any further 
consideration.114 The fee would be payable on the original average issue price of 
the existing shares, multiplied by the number of ‛new’ shares. Compared to par 
value shares, where the fee for an increase of shares is determined with reference 
only to the par value of the new shares,115 even if the new shares are of the same 
class as existing shares that were issued at a considerable premium, the 
discrepancy between the fees for par and no par value shares becomes very 
prominent. Logically, the fee for an increase in no par value shares should have 
been determined on the basis of the number of shares only. Special provision 
should be made for an exemption in respect of a subdivision of existing shares. 
The use of the average issue price of all the no par value shares, without regard to 
different classes, detracts from the flexibility of no par value shares.  
2.3.1.7 The concept of average issue price. 
In addition to forming the basis of the prescribed fee on an increase of authorised 
capital, the average issue price of no par value shares is used for purposes of 
certain other provisions of the Act. As will be explained below, section 82 regulates 
the issue of no par value shares at a price lower than the average issue price.116 
Fortunately this provision distinguishes between different classes of no par value 
shares. Likewise, section 85(6) provides for the adjustment of the stated capital 
_________________________________________________________________  
113 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-18. 
114 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-18. 
115 Section 75(3)(a). 
116 See paragraph 3.1.2 below. 
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account following a share buy-back with reference to the average issue price of 
the particular class of shares.117 
When no par value preference shares are redeemed out of profits, it is 
required that an amount equal to the ‛book value’ of the redeemed shares be 
transferred to a capital redemption reserve fund.118 The book value is defined as 
the part of the stated capital account contributed by the shares being redeemed.119 
It is not clear how this provision will be applied if no par value shares of the same 
class were issued at different prices and not all the shares are to be redeemed.120  
2.3.1.8 Dividends per share 
The size of dividends declared is expressed as a percentage of the par value of a 
share or, in the case of no par value shares, as a fixed amount per share.121 If a 
par value share is issued at a premium, reflecting the earnings in relation only to 
the nominal value, rather than to the total capital invested in the company, gives a 
distorted view of the profitability of the company.122 However, even in respect of no 
par value shares the perceived profitability of the shares can be deceiving unless 
the return is expressed as a percentage of the current value of the share. 
2.3.2 Evaluation of dual system of shares 
The differences alluded to above may provide an explanation for the unpopularity 
of no par value shares. It appears that no par value shares as currently regulated 
in the Act are not perceived as flexible but are in fact more onerous than par value 
shares in a number of respects. A consideration of these differences can assist 
any decision on the types of shares that should be used in a reformed company 
law system and the way in which these shares should be regulated. The legal 
implications resulting from the choice of a particular type of share do not depend 
as much on the name given to that share as on the way in which the legislation 
regulates it.  
_________________________________________________________________  
117 See paragraph 6.3.3 below. 
118 Section 98(1)(b). 
119 Section 98(6). 
120 See paragraph 6.8 below for a discussion of redemptions. 
121 Van Dorsten Dividends 21. 
122 Louw “Aandele Sonder Pari-waarde” 56 
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The lack of clarity on the relative voting rights of holders of par value shares 
and of no par value shares in the same company undermines the principle of 
proportionate voting rights. It is impossible to give effect to section 195 of the Act 
where a company has voting preference shares of another kind than its ordinary 
shares.123 
In public companies, par value shares that are initially issued at a premium 
allow for considerable flexibility in arranging the voting and other rights of 
shareholders. They can be exploited to affect the balance between different 
classes of par value shares envisaged by the Act.124 This device can also be used 
by private companies to mask unequal voting rights. 
The application of provisions that are dependent on contributions to issued 
share capital also disadvantages holders of par value shares relative to holders of 
no par value shares. This is because the full consideration paid in respect of no 
par value shares is taken into account, but any premium paid on par value shares 
is disregarded. 
It is submitted that, irrespective of the relative merits of par value and no par 
value shares,125 the current dual system is unworkable. 
2.4 Share capital and reserve accounts 
The consideration received by a company for the issue of its shares is required to 
be reflected in specific accounts.126 The Companies Act contains a number of 
provisions aimed at ensuring the accuracy of these accounts. A company has to 
report on these accounts annually.127 The Act thus requires disclosure of the 
capital structure of a company.128 In a capital maintenance system, the capital 
accounts reflect what may not be returned to shareholders. However, as pointed 
out by the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act these 
accounts are no longer of direct concern to creditors, but only for shareholders.129 
_________________________________________________________________  
123 See paragraph 2.3.1.5 above. 
124 See paragraph 2.3.1.5 above. 
125 An issue which is considered in paragraph 2.9.3 below. 
126 Sections 75 – 77.  
127 Schedule 4 article 8. 
128 See Delport Verkryging 49. 
129 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-16. 
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In some respects the share capital accounts can be construed as a notional 
liability which signifies the rights of shareholders to the ‛return of capital’ by sharing 
in the net assets of the company upon dissolution. These accounts reflect the 
entitlement of shareholders inter se and are particularly important if a company 
has different classes of shares.130 
2.4.1 Share capital account 
The nominal value of the issued par value shares must be reflected as issued 
share capital in respect of each class of par value shares. Although there is no 
express provision to this effect, this requirement can be inferred from the 
provisions of the Companies Act that regulate the conversion of par value shares 
into no par value shares and vice versa.131 Section 78(1)(a) refers to ‛ordinary or 
preference share capital’ and indicates that there should be separate accounts in 
respect of ordinary and preference shares, Section 78(2) expressly refers to a 
‛share capital account’ and requires it to reflect the consideration received in 
respect of no par value shares if they are subsequently converted into par value 
shares. It can thus be inferred that the consideration originally received on par 
value shares should also be reflected in a share capital account, except for any 
premium which has to be reflected in a share premium account as required by 
section 76(1).132 This inference is supported by the requirements for the 
adjustment of capital accounts following a variation of capital133 or a repurchase of 
shares134 as well as from the requirements for a company’s balance sheet.135 It 
also appears from form CM14A of the Companies Administrative Regulations, 
which has to be submitted following a repurchase of shares, that the total issued 
_________________________________________________________________  
130 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-16. 
131 Section 78. 
132 The share premium account is discussed below. 
133 Section 75. See paragraph 2.5 below. 
134 Section 85(5), discussed in paragraph 6.3.3 below. 
135 Schedule 4 paragraph 8(1)(c). The balance sheet has to set out the authorised and issued 
share capital, classes of shares, number of issued shares and their par value if any, amount of 
issued capital in respect of each class of shares, share premium account, preliminary 
expenses etc charged against share premium or against stated capital in the accounting 
period. Shares issued during the accounting period, classes, number, aggregate nominal or 
stated value and consideration received, paragraph 8(1) and (2). The corresponding amounts 
for the previous year must also be given. 
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capital of a company is made up of issued paid-up capital,136 stated capital and 
share premium account. In some instances the Companies Act uses the concept 
‛issued share capital’ to refer to the account(s) in which the par value is 
reflected.137 
When par value shares are issued at a discount in accordance with section 
81,138 the share capital account nevertheless reflects the par value of the shares 
and not the discounted price.139 The structure of the provisions on issued capital, 
for example the requirement in section 85(5) that the par value of shares acquired 
by the company be deducted from the share capital account, implies that the par 
value rather than the discounted consideration has to be reflected. This is also 
borne out by the requirement that details of any discount ‛that has not been written 
off’ must appear in any prospectus subsequently issued by the company.140  
The Companies Act does not contain any provision for the application, as 
opposed to the ‘decrease’ or adjustment,141 of a share capital account. Unlike the 
share premium account and stated capital account, it may not be used for writing 
off preliminary expenses and expenses and commission incurred in creating or 
issuing the shares.142 The share capital account will thus at all times reflect the 
aggregate par value of the issued shares. 
Although section 79 allows capital to be used in the payment of interest, the 
amount of the paid-up capital is not thereby reduced.143 It also appears that the 
issued capital will not be reduced by commissions paid in terms of section 80.144 
As in the case of a discount under section 81, details of the commission or 
discount must be disclosed.145 
_________________________________________________________________  
136 Usually referred to as the ‘share capital account’. 
137 See s 85(5); Schedule 4 paragraph 8; Form CM14A. 
138 As to which, see paragraph 3.1.1 below. 
139 Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 328. The discount is treated as a fictitious asset. 
140 Section 81(3). 
141 See paragraph 6.3.3 below. 
142 Compare s 77(3). 
143 Section 79(2)(d). 
144 Commissions are discussed in paragraph 3.5 below. 
145 Section 80(1)(c). In this case disclosure is also required in a statement or circular when there 
is no prospectus. 
 275
2.4.2 Stated capital account 
The full proceeds of an issue of no par value shares is required to be reflected in a 
stated capital account.146 This rule applies also to non-cash consideration.147 The 
value of the non-cash consideration, as determined by the directors, must be 
transferred to the stated capital account.148 There are indications that a separate 
stated capital account is envisaged for each class of no par value shares.149 
The stated capital account may be applied in writing off the preliminary 
expenses of the company or the expenses of and commission on the creation or 
issue of no par value shares.150 This exception to the principle that paid-up capital 
should always be reflected as such in the appropriate account was probably 
introduced to make the alternative option of no par value shares viable.151 In the 
case of par value shares, these costs could be written off against any share 
premium account.152 
2.4.3 Share premium account 
The regulation of the share premium account has been criticised as being out of 
step with the provisions currently regulating distributions to shareholders.153 It has 
also been said that the share premium account has always been an anomaly, 
even under the capital maintenance system.154 A brief exposition of the history of 
the share premium account could throw some light on these allegations. I will then 
discuss the composition of the share premium account, after which I will consider 
the status and application of the share premium account. I will also analyse the 
possible justifications for the regulation of share premiums, both within a capital 
maintenance system and a system based on solvency and liquidity. An important 
issue here is whether shareholders who contributed a premium should enjoy any 
protection when it comes to the application of the share premium account. 
_________________________________________________________________  
146 Section 77(1). 
147 See further paragraph 3.3 below on the regulation of non-cash consideration. 
148 Section 77(2). 
149 See paragraph 2.3.1.3 above. 
150 Section 77(3). 
151 De Wet & Yeats Handelsreg 563. 
152 See s 76(3). 
153 See Wainer “Problems and Doubts” 133. 
154 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-23. 
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2.4.3.1 History of the regulation of share premiums 
Until the predecessor of section 76 was introduced in 1952,155 premiums received 
on the issue of shares were regarded as distributable surplus.156 Creditors could 
rely on the maintenance of the par value share capital of a company, but had no 
interest in any excess consideration received by the company.157 
The introduction of the share premium account and the limitations imposed 
on its distribution in effect meant that the capital maintenance principle was 
extended to premiums received by the company. As a result, dividends could 
strictly speaking be paid only if the company’s net assets exceeded its paid-up 
share capital as well as the amount reflected in its share premium account. 
Further, the capital reduction provisions were expressly made applicable to the 
share premium account.158 The share premium account could, however, be 
applied for certain purposes for which the share capital account could not be 
used.159  
In the Companies Act of 1973 the share premium provisions were re-enacted 
as section 76. An amendment was necessary in 1974 to extend the application of 
the provision to pre-existing share premium accounts created under the previous 
Act.160 In 1992 two provisos to section 76(3)(c)  were inserted to limit the extent to 
which the share premium account may be applied to provide for a premium on the 
redemption of shares.161 
Until 2001,162 section 76(1) provided that the provisions relating to the 
_________________________________________________________________  
155 Section 86 quat of the 1926 Companies Act, inserted by s 71 of the Companies Amendment 
Act 46 of 1952. It was introduced on the recommendation of the Millin Commission, see 
Verslag van die Kommissie van Ondersoek insake die Wysiging van die Maatskappywet (UG 
69) of 1948 par 114, following the recommendation of the Cohen Committee in England, see 
Report of the Committee on Company Law Amendment (Cmnd 6659) of 1945 par 108. 
156 Ex parte Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa Ltd 1977 (4) SA146 (W) at 149. See also 
Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-20. 
157  At that stage all shares were par value shares, see paragraph 2.3 above. 
158  This is significant in view of the role that the existence of formal reduction provisions played in 
the early development of the capital maintenance principle, see Chapter 1 paragraph 2. 
159  Section 86quat(2) of the 1926 Companies Act. It could be applied to pay up capitalisation 
shares, to write off formation costs and commissions, or to provide a premium on redemption 
of shares. 
160  In this regard, subs (5) was inserted by s 5 of the Companies Amendment Act 76 of 1974. 
161  By s 3 of the Companies Amendment Act 82 of 1992. See paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 below for a 
discussion of these provisos. 
162  Before being amended by the Companies Amendment Act 35 of 2001. 
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reduction of the share capital163 applied to the share premium account. The 
heading of the section read (as it still does) ‛Premiums received on issue of shares 
to be share capital, and limitation on application thereof’. The share premium 
account could thus only be applied for the purposes outlined in the Act and the 
provisions regarding reduction of capital applied to it.164 The annual duty which 
was at some stage payable by companies on the amount of their capitalisation165 
applied also to the share premium account.166 
Although section 76(3) was amended in 1999 by the insertion of paragraph 
(d),167 subsection (1) was not amended until 2001.168 Its interpretation during the 
period when it still referred to the provisions on reduction of capital was 
uncertain.169 Some writers argued that the share premium account could be 
written off freely as the common-law position had been restored,170 a view that 
was criticised by others.171 
In 2001 the legislature removed the reference in section 76(1) to the obsolete 
reduction of capital provisions, replacing it with a reference to ‛the provisions of 
this Act relating to the share capital of a company’ and adding the words ‛as if the 
share premium account were paid-up share capital of the company’.172 The 
heading of the section was not changed, however, and still refers to a limitation on 
the application of premiums. 
_________________________________________________________________  
163 That is, s 83 to s 90 of the Companies Act prior to its amendment in 1999. 
164 See s 76(3) prior to its amendment in 1999 by s 6 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 
1999. See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-25.  
165 Section 174, repealed by s 8 of the Companies Amendment Act 31 of 1986. 
166 See Ex parte Trencor Ltd 1977 (2) SA 396 (C) for an example of an unsuccessful application 
by a company to reduce its share premium account in order to reduce the annual fee on share 
capital that was levied at the time under s 174. See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham 
Companies Act 5-24 note 1. 
167  By s 6 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. See paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 for a 
discussion of s 76(3)(d). 
168  By s 9 of the Companies Amendment Act 35 of 2001. 
169 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-24, Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 
337. 
170 Butler “Nuwe Statutêre Bevoegdheid” 288.  
171 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-25 in the original issue. Wainer “Problems 
and Doubts” 134. 
172  Section 9 of the Companies Amendment Act 35 of 2001.  
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2.4.3.2 Composition  
Any premium received on par value shares must be reflected in an account called 
the share premium account.173 Where par value shares are issued for assets and 
no consideration has been recorded, the assets have to be valued and any excess 
value over the amount of the par value must be transferred to the share premium 
account.174 This requirement regarding non-cash consideration would thus also 
apply where shares are issued in exchange for shares in another company, as is 
often the case in mergers and amalgamations of companies.  
Unlike the English Companies legislation, which provides for relief in the case 
of mergers, takeovers and group reconstructions,175 the South African Companies 
Act does not provide any exception or relief in such instances. Until the repeal of 
sections 83 and 84 of the Companies Act176 companies involved in such 
transactions often approached the court for a reduction of the share premium 
account.177 If par value shares are retained in the new South African legislation, a 
relief similar to that provided for in the English Companies Acts of 1985 and 
2006178 could be considered for South Africa. 
2.4.3.3 Status of share premium account 
It is provided that the ‛provisions relating to the share capital of a company’ apply 
to the share premium account ‛as if it was paid-up share capital’, except as set out 
in section 76 itself.179 The exceptions to the principle established in subsection (1) 
are then set out in subsection (3) which lists the possible purposes for which the 
share premium account may be applied.180  
_________________________________________________________________  
173 Section 76(1). 
174 Section 76(2). Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act argues that the valuation rather 
than any recorded value will be conclusive, see 155 – 156. 
175 As to which see paragraph 2.4 of Chapter 2. 
176 By s 8 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
177 See Ex parte National Packaging Co Limited 1965 (1) SA 542 (W), decided under the 
predecessor of s 84, s 48 of the 1926 Companies Act, where a holding company was allowed 
to reduce its share premium account to pay for shares in its subsidiaries. See also Blackman, 
Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-24. 
178  See the English Companies Act 1985 s 131 and s 132 and the English Companies Act 2006, s 
611, s 612 and s 614, discussed in Chapter 2 paragraph 2.4. 
179 Section 76(1). 
180  These exceptions that allow application of the share premium account are discussed in 
paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 below. 
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The status of the share premium account thus has to be assessed both with 
reference to the rules that could apply to the account as if it was paid-up share 
capital as well as to the exceptions or possible applications of the account. These 
two aspects will be addressed in turn. 
2.4.3.3.1 Share capital provisions applicable to the share premium account 
Apart from the expressly regulated applications of the share premium account, the 
provisions of the Act ‛relating to the share capital of a company’ apply to the share 
premium account ‛as if it was paid-up share capital’.181 The significance of the 
reference to provisions relating to share capital on the one hand, and paid-up 
share capital on the other, is uncertain. It seems to require that only the share 
capital provisions that could apply to paid-up or issued capital should be applied to 
the share premium account. It would thus have been simpler to state that the 
provisions of the Act relating to paid-up share capital will apply to the share 
premium account. 
Although section 76(1) states that the provisions ‛relating to the share capital 
of a company’ apply to the share premium account as if it was paid-up share 
capital, it is not at all clear to which provisions this refers.182 In addition to the 
specific provisions in Chapter V of the Act under the subheading ‛Share capital’, 
various other provisions that refer to share capital are found throughout the Act.  
2.4.3.3.1.1 Provisions under the heading ‛Share capital’ 
The heading of Chapter V includes the term share capital and ‛Share capital’ is 
used as the subheading to sections 74 to 82.183 Each of these sections will be 
analysed to see in which way they could apply to the share premium account. 
Section 74 deals with the division of share capital into par value and no par 
value shares and can clearly not be applied to the share premium account.184  
_________________________________________________________________  
181 Section 76(1). 
182 Jooste “Can Share Capital be Reduced” 297 notes this uncertainty, but does not offer any 
suggestions as to which provisions may be involved. 
183 The repealed s 83 and s 84 appeared under the heading ‘Reduction of Capital’. See Du 
Plessis “Statute Law” par 351 regarding the legal effect of headings on the interpretation of 
statutes.  
184 See paragraph 2.3 for a discussion of this provision. 
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Section 75 regulates the variation of share capital.185 The authors of 
Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act raise the possibility that the 
prescribed fee for increases in share capital186 could, as a result of the 
amendment, now have become payable on the share premium account as well.187 
Such an interpretation will have the effect that the fee payable on initial par value 
shares188 will be calculated on a different basis than on increased par value share 
capital, which was not the case under the earlier formulation of this provision.189 
In view of the fact that the prescribed fee is payable when the authorised 
capital of a company is increased and not when its issued capital is increased 
through the issue of shares, it is submitted that such an interpretation will be 
unworkable because the premium, if any, that will eventually be paid on each 
share will not necessarily be known when the par value shares are authorised, but 
only when the shares are issued.190 Moreover, section 76(1) expressly refers to 
the provisions relating to paid-up share capital, not authorised capital.  
The provisions of section 75 are all related to shares as such rather than to 
‛share capital’ and it is thus suggested that there is no scope for the application of 
section 75 to the share premium account. 
Section 76 provides for the share premium account and is thus applicable to 
this account from the outset. 
Section 77 provides that the proceeds of no par value shares are to be stated 
capital. It clearly finds no application to the share premium account. 
Section 78 deals with the conversion of par value share capital into no par 
value share capital and vice versa.191 It sets out how the capital accounts of a 
company must be adjusted upon such a conversion. Apart from the express 
requirement in section 78(1)(b) that the share premium account in respect of 
converted shares must be transferred to the stated capital account, none of the 
other provisions of this section can apply to the share premium account. 
_________________________________________________________________  
185  See paragraph 2.5 below. 
186 See s 75(3). 
187 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-25. 
188 In terms of s 63(2), see paragraph 2.3.1.6 above. 
189 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-25. 
190 In fact, where non-cash consideration is involved, the amount to be reflected in the premium 
will be known only once the consideration has been valued, s 76(2). 
191 See paragraph 2.5.3 below. 
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Section 79 permits the payment of interest on shares from paid-up share 
capital.192 It could be argued that such interest may, as a result of the amendment 
in 2001, also be paid out of the share premium account. However, since section 
79 does not provide for the reduction of the share capital account or stated capital 
account,193 the amount reflected in the share premium account cannot be reduced 
by the amount of such interest. Such an application would also conflict with section 
76(3). 
The payment of commissions on the issue of shares is regulated by section 
80. Section 80(3) relates to the issued share capital of a company because it 
provides that a company may not use its ‘shares or capital money’ to pay 
commissions and discounts except as allowed under section 80(1). However, this 
provision cannot apply to the share premium account, in view of the specific 
exception provided in section 76(3)(b) in respect of commissions and discounts. 
Section 81, which regulates the issue of par value shares at a discount, can 
clearly not apply to the share premium account. Neither can section 82 which 
regulates the issue price of no par value shares. 
2.4.3.3.1.2 Other provisions of Chapter V 
Although the heading of Chapter V includes the words ‛share capital’ none of the 
subheadings except the one to sections 74 to 82, which have been considered in 
the previous paragraph, contain a reference to share capital. Despite this, it is 
necessary to consider whether any of the other provisions in Chapter V of the 
Companies Act can be said to deal with share capital or issued share capital and 
so qualify as ‛provisions relating to the share capital of a company’ for purposes of 
section 76(1). Sections 85 to 90 regulate distributions to shareholders and have 
replaced some of the provisions that previously related to the reduction of capital 
and applied to the share premium account. However, these provisions apply to 
distributions regardless of the source of the funds used and can thus not be 
regarded as share capital provisions in the strict sense of the word. Although 
section 85(5) and (6) regulate the adjustment of accounts reflecting issued share 
capital, their ambit is restricted to the issued share capital as reflected in the share 
_________________________________________________________________  
192 See paragraph 5.7 below. 
193 See s 79(2)(e).  
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capital and stated capital accounts. 
It could be argued that section 85(5) allows the par value of repurchased 
shares to be deducted from the share premium account - after all, it requires the 
‛issued capital’ to be reduced by the aggregate par value of the shares. Such an 
interpretation would, however, be out of step with the structure of the share capital 
account as outlined in the Act as a whole. Moreover, the specific regulation in 
respect of the share premium account and capital redemption reserve fund in 
section 85(7)194 is a strong indication that section 85(5) should not be understood 
as allowing the share premium account to be reduced also by the par value of the 
repurchased shares. 
Section 85(7) seems to apply to the share premium account. It provides that 
a premium on repurchase may be paid out of statutory non-distributable reserves 
of the company, apparently duplicating section 76(3)(d) and section 98(4). The 
uncertainty regarding the meaning of ‛statutory non-distributable reserves’ is 
discussed elsewhere.195 If this is indeed a reference to the share premium account 
and capital redemption reserve account, which seems to be the correct 
interpretation, section 85(7) applies to these accounts not by virtue of the 
reference in section 76(1) and section 98(1) to provisions that apply to paid-up 
share capital, but because it expressly and directly applies to the share premium 
account. 
It stands to reason that section 98 cannot apply to the share premium 
account because it is not a provision relating to share capital. Its purpose is to 
treat the capital redemption reserve fund ‘as if’ it was share capital except in the 
instances set out in section 98(4).196  
2.4.3.3.1.3 Provisions outside Chapter V that refer to share capital 
Various provisions refer to share capital, although they do not regulate share 
capital. The question thus arises whether these can be said to be provisions 
‛relating’ to share capital that have become applicable to the share premium 
account following the amendment of section 76(1). 
_________________________________________________________________  
194  And also in s 76(3) and s 98(4). 
195  See paragraph 6.3.4 below. 
196  The same principle applies in the opposite direction, so that s 76 cannot be applied to the 
capital redemption reserve fund, see paragraph 2.4.4 below. 
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Section 180 allows two or more members of a company who together hold at 
least ten per cent of the company’s ‛issued share capital’ to convene a general 
meeting of the company. It could be asked whether section 76(1) requires the 
share premium account to be regarded as issued share capital for purposes of this 
section, thus enabling shareholders who paid a premium to reach this threshold 
faster. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the amendment of section 
76(1) has changed the relative positions of shareholders who have paid premiums 
and those, usually of another class, who have not. It is unlikely that such a result 
was intended and it is suggested that section 180 should be regarded as a 
provision relating to membership rights rather than to share capital. 
Section 181(1)(a) provides that members holding at least 5 per cent of the 
‛capital’ conferring the right to vote can compel the board of directors to convene a 
general meeting. A shareholder in a public company cannot vote in respect of the 
premium contributed, because section 195 requires the voting rights to be 
determined according to the par value of each share in relation to the share capital 
account, which obviously reflects only the par value of each share. Section 
181(1)(a) can thus not apply to the share premium account. 
Section 198 allows members who are entitled to vote and who in total hold at 
least ten per cent of the ‛issued capital’ of the company to demand that voting 
takes place by way of a poll.197 This provision differs from section 180 as the 
entitlement to vote and the holding of issued capital are formulated as separate 
criteria that both have to be met. However, the considerations that apply to section 
180 also apply to this provision.  
Section 342, which deals with the application of assets in a winding-up, does 
not expressly refer to share capital, but requires surplus assets to be divided 
among members according to their ‛rights and interests in the company’. Section 
342 can probably not be described as a provision relating to the share capital of a 
company, although the rights and interests of shareholders may depend on their 
share in the capital of the company. In this regard it is important to note that the 
effect of section 76(1) is also not to regard a share premium as share capital 
contributed to the company. In the absence of a specific arrangement in this 
regard, a shareholder who contributed a premium would not have any right to the 
_________________________________________________________________  
197 Section 198(1)(b)(iii). On the other possibilities for demanding a poll, see s 198(1)(b)(i) – (ii). 
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return of the premium upon liquidation or to share in the surplus on the basis of 
such a premium. 
2.4.3.3.1.4 Evaluation of ‛provisions relating to share capital’  
In attempting to identify the provisions of the Act that could possibly apply to the 
share premium account as if it were paid-up share capital, I considered various 
provisions. The first group of provisions comprised those provisions that are 
expressly identified in the Companies Act as provisions relating to the share 
capital of a company. In this regard it was illustrated that none of the provisions 
under the heading ‛Share capital’ could apply to the share premium account, 
except those provisions that in any event applied to the share premium account 
prior to the amendment of section 76(1). Thus the replacement of the phrase 
‛provisions relating to the reduction of share capital’ with ‛provisions relating to the 
share capital’ has not had any effect.  
It has also been shown that sections 85 to 90 do not contain any provisions 
regulating share capital that could apply to the share premium account for 
purposes of section 76(1). Section 85(7) applies to the share premium account 
because it is a statutory non-distributable reserve,198 and not as a result of it being 
made applicable by virtue of section 76(1). In fact, section 85(7) does not apply to 
paid-up share capital in general. 
An analysis of other provisions that refer to share capital revealed no 
provision that could apply to the share premium account by virtue of the reference 
in section 76(1). These provisions deal primarily with membership rights attached 
to share capital, like voting rights and the right to convene meetings. It was shown 
that membership rights were not based on contributions to the share premium 
account, thus excluding the application of these provisions to the share premium 
account. 
I thus conclude that there are no provisions relating to share capital that 
could apply to the share premium account ‘as if it were share capital’. Although the 
2001 amendment of section 76(1) succeeded in removing the clearly obsolete 
reference to the reduction of capital, the replacement phrase has no meaning or 
effect.  
_________________________________________________________________  
198  See paragraph 2.4.3.3.1.2 for a discussion of the uncertainty in this regard. 
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2.4.3.3.2 Application of the share premium account 
The share premium account may be applied for the purposes as set out in section 
76(3)(a) to (d). A consideration of these possible applications of the share 
premium account forms an integral part of the interpretation of the principle to 
which they are supposed to be exceptions, namely that the share premium 
account is regarded as paid-up share capital for certain purposes.  
The meaning of ‛applied’ was considered in Ex parte National Packaging Co 
Ltd199 in the context of the predecessor of section 76, section 86 quat of the 1926 
Companies Act. The court said that it meant that the account could be used 
without first having to apply for reduction of capital in respect of the share premium 
account. When the share premium account is applied for one of the specified 
purposes, the amount standing to the credit of the account is thus reduced. 
First, the amount reflected in the share capital account may be reduced by 
the amount required to pay up unissued shares of the company to be issued to 
members as fully paid capitalisation shares.200 The amount deducted from the 
share premium account will be added to the company’s share capital account or 
stated capital account, depending on whether the capitalisation shares have a par 
value or not.201 The effect of this type of application of the share premium account 
is thus to convert share premium to ordinary paid-up capital. Such a step could 
obviously not prejudice creditors.202 
Secondly, the share premium account may be applied in writing off the 
preliminary expenses of the company, or the expenses of, or commission paid or 
discount allowed on, the creation or issue of any shares of the company.203 It is 
not clear which expenses qualify as preliminary expenses, but presumably they 
should be related to the formation of the company. Expenses incurred in 
connection with the creation and issue of shares could include the cost of 
obtaining authorisation to issue further shares, the cost of a prospectus if the 
shares are being offered to the public and, possibly, the prescribed fee payable in 
_________________________________________________________________  
199 1965(1) SA 542 (W) at 543. 
200 Section 76(3)(a). 
201 It is not clear whether such capitalisation shares could also be issued at a premium, but since 
any such premium would have to be transferred to the share premium account, the account 
would then not really be ‘applied’ towards the new premium. 
202  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-26. 
203 Section 76(3)(b). 
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terms of section 63(1) or section 75(3). The reference to commission or discount 
on the creation or issue of shares seems to be to commissions paid in terms of 
section 80 and discounts allowed under section 81.204 It has been argued that this 
application cannot really disadvantage creditors, since the expenses, commissions 
and discounts are not saleable assets.205  
The third purpose for which the share premium account may be applied, is to 
provide for the premium payable on the redemption of redeemable preference 
shares.206 Unlike the applications provided for in section 76(3)(a) and (b), a 
redemption premium amounts to a distribution to other shareholders and should 
thus be more strictly regulated. Two provisos, which were inserted in the Act in 
1992,207 limit the extent to which the share premium account may be so applied. 
The motivation for these provisos seems to be that shareholders who contributed 
a premium should enjoy some protection against the return of that premium to 
other shareholders.208 The first proviso states that the share premium account may 
only be applied to provide for a premium on the redemption of redeemable 
preference shares if the premium is payable according to the terms of issue of the 
shares. The terms of issue must have appeared in the articles of the company 
prior to the allotment and issue of the shares, unless the court sanctioned their 
insertion into the articles at a later date.209 Although this proviso does not require 
the premium to have been contributed by the redeemable preference shares, it at 
least ensures that the shareholders who contributed the premium will have 
advance warning of this potential application of the premium. The second proviso 
applies where ordinary shares have been converted into redeemable shares that 
are redeemable at a premium. Only the portion of the share premium account that 
_________________________________________________________________  
204 These are discussed in paragraphs 3.5 and 3.1.1 below. 
205  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-26. However, this observation is 
limited to the application of the share premium account. It will be seen below that the creditors 
are to an extent protected by the limitation on the payment of commission and discounts, as it 
prevents funds from leaving the company, see paragraphs 3.1 and 3.5. 
206 Section 76(3)(c). 
207 By s 3 of Act 82 of 1992. These provisos do not apply to redeemable preference shares 
issued on or after 1 July 1992, the commencement date of the Companies Amendment Act 82 
of 1992, see s 76(3)(c)(iii). Presumably they will also not apply when ordinary shares have 
been converted into redeemable preference shares prior to this date. 
208 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-26. Prior to the 1992 amendment, the 
share premium account could even be applied to provide for the premium payable on the 
redemption of debentures. 
209 Section 76(3)(c)(i). 
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reflects a premium arising on the original issue of the ordinary shares, may be 
applied to the redemption premium.210 This proviso implies that the terms of 
conversion should provide for redemption at a premium. The stricter limitation in 
respect of the contribution of the premium that applies to converted shares is the 
only measure that really protects shareholders in respect of the premium they 
contributed.211 It is not clear why the proviso was not made applicable to (non-
redeemable) preference shares that are converted into redeemable preference 
shares. This results in an anomaly. 
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act state that it 
is difficult to apply the first proviso to converted shares because they could not 
have been issued with an entitlement to a premium upon redemption.212 I think 
that there is no need to apply the first proviso to converted shares, as it appears 
that the two provisos are alternatives. The first applies only to shares originally 
issued as redeemable and the second only to converted shares.  
The fourth possible application of the share premium account is to provide for 
the payment of a premium in the case of an acquisition of shares in accordance 
with section 85.213 This option was added in 1999 when it became possible for 
companies to repurchase their shares.214 A premium upon repurchase amounts to 
a distribution to the shareholder whose shares are being acquired and has the 
same effect as the redemption of shares at a premium. It is strange that no 
provision was made to protect the interests of shareholders who contributed the 
premium. A proviso similar to that which applies to converted redeemable shares 
and limits the premium to the premium originally contributed by the shares would 
have been logically consistent.215 It also seems anomalous that the share premium 
account cannot be applied to provide for the premium over par when shares are 
repurchased in terms of a court order under section 252. 
_________________________________________________________________  
210 Section 76(3)(c)(ii). 
211  Trichardt & Brincker “Capital in Company Law” 148 argue that similar restrictions should apply 
to applications of the share premium account for all redemptions. 
212 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-26. 
213 Section 76(3)(d). 
214 Section 6 of Act 37 of 1999. 
215  See also the argument in note 211 above which was made in a different but comparable 
context. 
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2.4.3.3.3 Conclusion on status of share premium account 
It appears that the requirement of treating the share premium account as issued 
capital for purposes of the share capital provisions of the Act has no effect on the 
share premium account. Only those provisions which expressly refer to the share 
premium account can apply. The reference to the share capital provisions of the 
Act was inserted to replace the outdated reference to the reduction of share 
capital, but has no effect or consequence. 
Nevertheless, the wording of section 76(1) indicates that the applications 
referred to in subsection (3) are intended to be exceptions. It provides that ‛except 
as provided in this section’ the provisions of the Act relating to share capital will 
apply to the share premium account as if it was paid-up share capital of the 
company. Subsection 76(3) refers back to subsection (1) when it states that 
‛notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1)’ the share premium account 
may be applied for certain purposes. As could be expected from an exception, 
subsection (3) is couched in permissive terms and provides that the share 
premium account ‛may’ be applied for the purposes listed. Until 1999 this meant 
that, except under a formal reduction of capital, the company could not make a 
distribution to shareholders if its assets did not exceed the amounts reflected in its 
various capital accounts and non-distributable reserves. 
The relaxation of the capital maintenance rule216 has the effect that the 
company need no longer retain assets equal to the amounts reflected in the capital 
accounts.217 Although this represents a significant change, the provisions relating 
to the keeping and adjustment of share capital and reserve accounts of a company 
have remained relatively unchanged. Companies are not free to adjust their capital 
accounts as they please, despite the fact that they can make distributions out of 
assets representing share capital. The new provisions providing for the adjustment 
of capital accounts when repurchased shares are cancelled218 and for the 
application of the share premium account219 are clear indications that the 
legislature regards the keeping of these accounts as important. Section 76(3) 
_________________________________________________________________  
216  By the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
217  Section 90 allows distributions out of capital without adjustments to the capital accounts, see 
paragraph 5.1 below. 
218 Section 85(5) and (6). 
219 Section 76(3)(d) and s 85(7). 
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enjoyed the attention of the legislature in 1999 when it introduced the new regime. 
It was not repealed, but amended by the addition of subparagraph (d). There is 
thus no reason to deviate from the presumption that the legislature does not enact 
unnecessary or purposeless provisions. It is submitted that an interpretation that 
the share premium account may be applied or reduced freely, clearly cannot claim 
to give effect to section 76(3). 
Despite the regulation of the share premium account, a company is free to 
make distributions while it has insufficient assets to cover the total value of its 
share capital accounts and statutory non-distributable reserves, including the 
share premium account. The company will, of course, have to comply with the 
solvency and liquidity tests of section 90(2).220 This is because there is a 
difference between the actual assets or funds of the company and the amounts 
reflected in a particular account. Accounts may be adjusted only as provided in the 
Act, a principle that applies consistently to the share capital account, stated capital 
account, share premium account, and capital redemption reserve fund.221  
2.4.3.4 Justification of share premium account 
2.4.3.4.1 Under capital maintenance 
It can be argued that the purpose of the share premium account is to protect 
creditors, who are entitled to rely on the total consideration received for issued 
shares.222 Another explanation is that it aims to protect shareholders who paid the 
premium against distribution of that premium to other shareholders.223  
Assuming that creditors should be protected by the paid-up capital of a 
company, creditors could benefit from limitations imposed on the distribution of the 
share premium account. However, the share premium account can be reduced 
through several applications. Apart from paying up unissued shares to be issued 
as capitalisation shares224 and writing off preliminary expenses and expenses for 
_________________________________________________________________  
220 See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 337; Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-
25. 
221 The capital redemption reserve fund is discussed below. 
222 De Wet and Yeats Handelsreg 560.  
223 Shearer (Inspector of Taxes) v Bercain Ltd [1980] 3 All ER 295 at 300 – 301. 
224 Section 76(3)(a). 
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or commission on the creation and issue of shares,225 the share premium account 
can also be applied to provide for the premium when shares were being 
redeemed.226 While the first two applications do not affect the rights of creditors,227 
the third use results in a direct conflict of interest between the preference 
shareholders to whom a distribution is being made and the creditors (if they can be 
said to have an interest in the share premium account in the first place). This is 
also true of the further application introduced in 1999,228 namely to provide for the 
premium payable when shares are repurchased by the company in terms of 
section 85.229 In this case, however, creditors will be protected by the solvency 
and liquidity requirements of section 85(4).230 
To say that the purpose of regulating the share premium account is to protect 
the shareholders who contributed the premium is also problematic, since the 
shareholders who contributed the premium do not enjoy any preference or right in 
respect of the share premium account, unless the articles provide otherwise.231 It 
is only in the case of converted redeemable preference shares that a premium 
may not be paid out of premiums contributed in respect of other shares.232 
2.4.3.4.2 Under the new distribution rules 
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act conclude that 
there are two reasons for the retention of section 76.233 Firstly, it allows companies 
to write off expenses as provided for in section 76(3)(b). While it cannot be 
disputed that the account can be applied in this way, it does not explain why such 
expenses cannot be written off against any other accounts of the company. If a 
company did not need to create a share premium account in the first place, and 
_________________________________________________________________  
225 Section 76(3)(b). 
226 Section 76(3)(c). Until 1992 it could also be used to provide a premium on the redemption of 
debentures, see Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-26. 
227 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-26. 
228 By s 6 of Act 37 of 1999. 
229 Section 76(3)(d). See also s 85(7). 
230 See paragraph 6.2 below. 
231 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-21; Jooste “Can Share Capital be 
Reduced” 295; Oakbank Oil Co v Crum (1882) 8 App Cas 65 (HL); Birch v Cropper (1889) 
App Cas 525 (HL). 
232  See paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 above. 
233 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-27. 
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could instead reflect premiums in a surplus account, it could write off expenses 
against that surplus account. There is no real connection between a contributed 
share premium and section 76(3)(b) expenses, commissions and discounts, 
especially as it is not required that the expenses should relate to the particular 
class of shares that contributed the premium.234 
The second reason identified by the authors of Blackman, Jooste & 
Everingham is that section 76 protects holders of non-redeemable shares.235 This, 
they argue, is because section 76(3)(c)  restricts the premium payable when 
shares are redeemed. This explanation is not persuasive, because section 
76(3)(c)  is merely enabling, so premiums can also be paid out of other funds. The 
provisos to section 76(3)(c)  do not limit the premium that can be paid, but only the 
extent to which it can be funded from the share premium account. The 
shareholders who contributed to the share premium account do not usually enjoy 
any liquidation preference on the return of the premium they paid, so the 
restrictions on the share premium account cannot benefit them. In any event, the 
protection can be circumvented by repurchasing rather than redeeming shares, 
because no similar limitations apply to repurchases.236  
The authors postulate that a share premium account might be useful if a 
company also has no par value shares but has stipulated that only par value 
shareholders will share in the share premium account upon dissolution. Although 
this is a valid observation, it is not a cogent reason for retaining the statutory 
regulation of share premium accounts. In those instances when the articles of a 
company confer special liquidation rights on certain shareholders in respect of the 
share premium account, these rights need not depend on the existence of a 
provision similar to section 76. The company could reflect the premium in any kind 
of account and regulate its application in its articles. 
2.4.3.4.3 Evaluation of justification of share premium account 
The protection of creditors and of shareholders has been suggested as justification 
for the regulation of share premiums. 
_________________________________________________________________  
234 Such a limitation is imposed in England, see Chapter 2 paragraph 2.4. 
235  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-27. 
236  See paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 above. 
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But any potential protection afforded to creditors is substantially eroded by 
the exceptions that allow application of the share premium account when paid-up 
capital cannot be used. In particular, the application of the share premium account 
to provide for a premium on the redemption of shares, infringes the rights of 
creditors. I think that creditors will be better protected by a consistent application of 
the financial restrictions of solvency and liquidity to all distributions. 
In similar vein, I submit that the low level of protection that shareholders 
enjoy in respect of the share premium account does not justify the retention of the 
share premium account as it is currently regulated in the Act. This lack of 
protection can be attributed to the fact that shareholders who contributed a 
premium do not enjoy any membership or financial rights with regard to those 
premiums, unless the articles provide otherwise. 
It can also be argued that shareholders who contributed a premium should 
not have a preferent right in respect of that premium. For purposes of this 
argument it is necessary to distinguish between premiums payable on the initial 
issue of shares of a class and premiums payable only on a subsequent issue of 
shares of a previously issued class. In the latter case the premium reflects the rise 
in value of the shares since the earlier issue. The new shareholders pay the 
premium because they acquire a right to share in the (distributable) reserves that 
have been built up in the company on the basis of the contributions made by the 
existing shareholders.237 In such circumstances it would be unfair to grant the new 
shareholders a stake in the premium they contributed.  
Where shares are issued at a premium from the outset, the shareholders 
could indeed claim that they should enjoy certain rights based on the total 
contribution they made in comparison to shareholders in other classes and that the 
premium they contributed should not be distributed to other classes of 
shareholders. However, the regulation of the relative entitlements of different 
classes of shares is a matter for the constitution of the company. 
As regards creditors, it could be argued that they should not be entitled to 
rely on a premium contributed upon a subsequent issue of shares of a previously 
issued class, because they cannot rely on the built-up profits of the company 
either. 
_________________________________________________________________  
237 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-20 – 5-21 
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When a particular class of shares is issued at a premium from the outset, 
creditors should be entitled to rely on this premium, because it is actually a 
disguised capital contribution, possibly made to reduce the prescribed fee on 
capitalisation. But I think that here, too, creditors are better protected by the 
solvency and liquidity requirements which should ideally apply to all distributions. 
Different considerations seem to apply depending on the reason why or 
circumstances under which a premium was charged. This distinction was touched 
upon in Henry Head & Co v Ropner Holdings Ltd238 where reference was made to 
the difference between an initial premium and a subsequent premium resulting 
from the excess value of a company’s already existing assets over the nominal 
value of its shares. However, this distinction was rejected by the court.239 
I suggest that there is insufficient justification for the regulation of share 
premiums.  
2.4.4 The capital redemption reserve account 
When a company redeems shares out of distributable profits, it has to transfer to 
an account called the capital redemption reserve fund, an amount equal to the 
nominal value of redeemed par value shares or the book value of no par value 
shares.240 The explanation for this requirement is that the capital redemption 
reserve fund will replace the amounts by which the share capital account or stated 
capital account will be reduced upon cancellation of the redeemed shares.241  
The provisions of the Act relating to share capital will apply to the capital 
redemption reserve fund as if it was share capital, except as provided in section 
98.242 This provision is similar to section 76(1) which purports to treat the share 
premium account as paid-up share capital.243 It is not clear why the share capital 
provisions apply to the capital redemption reserve account ‛as if it was share 
capital’ rather than ‛paid-up share capital’ as is the case with the share premium 
_________________________________________________________________  
238  [1952] Ch 124; [1951] 2 All ER 994 at 997. 
239  See also Pitts “Share Premium Account” 334. 
240 Section 98(1)(b). 
241 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-272. 
242 Section 98(1)(b), as amended by s 12 of Act 35 of  2001. The provision previously stated that 
the provisions regarding reduction of capital applied to the capital redemption reserve fund as 
if it was share capital of the company. See Jooste “Can Share Capital be Reduced” 297 – 298. 
243 Compare s 76(1) and s 98(1)(b). 
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account. It is suggested that this difference does not have any practical 
implications. The discussion of the status of the share premium account and the 
interpretation difficulties thus apply similarly to the capital redemption reserve 
fund.244 This means that apart from section 98 itself, there are no provisions in the 
Act that could apply to the capital redemption reserve account.  
The capital redemption reserve fund can be applied in paying up unissued 
shares to be issued as fully paid up capitalisation shares or to provide for the 
premium payable on the acquisition of shares under section 85.245 It is not clear 
why the capital redemption reserve may be used for a premium on shares 
acquired under section 85 but not for a premium when shares are redeemed.246  
2.4.5 The section 78(3) reserve account 
Section 78 regulates the adjustment of capital accounts when par value share 
capital is converted into no par value share capital or vice versa.247 It allows for the 
rounding off of fractional amounts, but requires material reductions to be ‛placed’ 
to non-distributable reserves.248 The Act contains no further provision regarding 
the status or application of such a reserve.  
2.5 The variation of share capital 
The concept of authorised capital contributes to the rather intricate provisions 
regulating the variation of capital found in section 75. It is not always clear whether 
a particular subsection of section 75 involves authorised or issued share capital, or 
both. Although a subdivision or a consolidation of par value shares in terms of 
section 75(1)(c) or (e) can take place in respect of issued or unissued shares, they 
will not affect the share capital accounts but only the statement of the company’s 
_________________________________________________________________  
244 See paragraph 2.4.3.3 above. 
245 Section 98(4). This second possible application was introduced by s 15 of the Companies 
Amendment Act 37 of 1999. Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 337 incorrectly state that the 
capital redemption reserve fund may be applied only to provide for capitalisation shares, but 
contradict this in note 88 on the same page.  
246  The share premium account can be used for a premium in both these instances. As I already 
argued in paragraph 2.4.3.3.1.2 above, ss 76 and 98 cannot be described as provisions 
relating to share capital. For this reason, any argument that the wider applications or 
exceptions provided for in s 76(3) could have become applicable to the capital redemption 
reserve fund following the amendments in 2001 must fail. 
247 See paragraph 2.3.1.2 above. 
248 Section 78(4). 
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authorised capital. A subdivision of no par value shares under section 75(1)(d) or a 
consolidation of such shares in terms of section 75(1)(i) will not affect the stated 
capital account, but will amount to a change in authorised capital. 
Variations under section 75 may be made if authorised by the company’s 
articles of association and approved by a special resolution.249 
Any variation of capital that involves a change to the company’s 
memorandum must be approved by special resolution or in the way prescribed by 
a special condition in the memorandum.250 Any variation involving a variation of 
rights attaching to any class of shares is subject to a variation of class rights 
clause in the company’s articles and to the right of recourse provided for section 
102.251 
2.5.1 Increase and decrease 
Section 75(1)(a) provides that a company may increase its share capital by new 
shares of such amount, or increase the number of its no par value shares, as it 
thinks expedient. This provision deals exclusively with an increase of authorised 
capital.252  
The authorised capital can be decreased by cancelling unissued par or no 
par value shares under section 75(1)(h). Section 75(2) states that such a 
cancellation is not regarded as a reduction of capital within the meaning of the 
Act.253 This is because the shares have not been issued and the capital reduction 
provisions previously contained in sections 83 and 84 of the Act, related to the 
reduction of issued capital. Although sections 83 and 84 have now been repealed, 
the cross-reference to a ‛reduction of capital within the meaning of this Act’ was 
not removed when other obsolete references to the reduction of issued capital 
were removed.254 
Section 75(1)(b) concerns no par value share capital only. It allows an 
_________________________________________________________________  
249  Section 75(1). 
250 Section 56. Section 75 is expressly made subject to s 56. 
251 This section provides a right of recourse to dissenting shareholders whose class rights are 
varied. See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-5. 
252 See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 338; Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-
5. 
253 Section 75(2). 
254 See the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999; Companies Amendment Act 35 of 2001. 
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increase in issued capital by way of a transfer of reserves or profits to the stated 
capital account. The variation could be done either with or without a distribution of 
shares. This means that the number of issued no par value shares could either be 
increased, and issued as capitalisation shares, or be left intact. An increase in the 
number of no par value shares beyond the number of authorised no par value 
shares will also result in an increase in authorised capital and should thus be 
subject to s 75(3)(b) which requires a calculation of the book value of the existing 
issued shares and payment to the Registrar of the prescribed fee in respect of the 
number of new shares.255 The authors of Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies 
Act argue that the prescribed fee will not be payable because the increase in 
stated capital is not due to a fresh issue of shares.256 However, this interpretation 
is not supported by the language of s 75(3)(b) which clearly sets out to levy the fee 
on authorised rather than issued capital.257 
Where no distribution takes place, or if previously authorised but unissued 
shares are distributed, the authorised capital is not increased, the book value need 
not be recalculated, and no fee is payable.258  
2.5.2 Consolidation and subdivision 
A consolidation of shares under section 75(1)(c)  will also amount to an alteration 
of authorised capital. In the case of par value shares, it will affect the fixed amount 
(par value) into which the nominal capital is divided, while in the case of no par 
value shares, it will reduce the authorised capital or number of no par value 
shares. It is interesting to note that as regards no par value shares reference is 
made to the number of the 'issued' no par value shares. However, as regards par 
value shares, reference is made to any part of the company’s share capital that 
can be divided into shares of larger amount than the 'existing' shares. Since the 
concept ‛share capital’ is used to refer to the authorised capital,259 and since 
_________________________________________________________________  
255  For example: 100 no par value shares have been issued and the book value is R1 000. The 
company now increases the number of no par value shares to 200. The fee will now be 
payable in respect of the 100 new shares at the book value of R10 each. 
256  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 152-3. 
257  The argument does, however, illustrate why the fee should rather not have been made 
payable in these circumstances. 
258 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-6.  
259 See s 74 and s 75(1)(a). 
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authorised but unissued shares could be described as ‛existing’ it thus seems as if 
unissued shares can also be consolidated.260 In such a case the issued share 
capital is thus not affected. This interpretation means that unissued par value 
shares may be consolidated, but not unissued no par value shares. If there are 
unissued no par value shares of a particular class, there will thus remain a larger 
number of no par value shares than would have been the case if the consolidation 
was done after issue.  
A subdivision of no par value shares under section 75(1)(d) amounts to an 
increase in authorised capital but not an increase in stated capital. As in the case 
of a consolidation, only issued no par value shares can be subdivided. However, it 
seems that issued no par value shares can also be subdivided under section 
75(1)(a), as this latter provision is not limited to authorised but unissued shares. 261 
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act argue that 
no par value shares cannot really be subdivided because such a subdivision in 
effect entails the issue of further shares for no consideration.262 While it is no 
doubt an accurate observation that no consideration is given, I suggest that the 
provision must be taken to sanction such an issue by implication.   
A subdivision of par value shares under section 75(1)(e) will also affect the 
statement in the memorandum of the division of the capital into shares of a fixed 
amount. However, although the description of the authorised capital will change, 
there will not be an increase in the total amount of such authorised capital. As in 
the case of a subdivision of no par value shares, the issued share capital - in this 
case as reflected in the share capital account - will not be affected. It is not 
required that par value shares must have been issued before they can be 
subdivided. 
The subdivision of issued no par value shares will affect the minimum price at 
which the remaining authorised shares of the same class may be issued without a 
special resolution as required by section 82.263 The average issue price will be 
determined by dividing the increased number of subdivided shares into the total 
_________________________________________________________________  
260 This is also implied by Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-6 where it is stated 
that in the case of issued shares, the share register will have to be altered. 
261 See Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 152. 
262 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-6. 
263 See paragraph 3.1.2 below. 
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stated capital for that class of shares.264  
There seems to be some uncertainty regarding the application of section 
75(3) to the consolidation and subdivision of shares. Section 75(3)(a) establishes 
the basis for calculation of the fee upon an increase in par value shares while 
section 75(3)(b) applies to an increase in no par value shares.265 A subdivision of 
par value shares will not increase the amount of the authorised capital, and no fee 
will thus be payable under section 75(3)(a).266 
It is not clear whether section 75(3)(b) applies to a subdivision of no par 
value shares. Applying section 75(3)(b) to a subdivision of no par value shares will 
have the undesirable effect that the fee on the increase in the number of no par 
value shares is calculated on the average value of the no par value shares prior to 
conversion while the company’s stated capital will remain intact.267 The authors of 
Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act argue that subsection (3)(b), which 
requires payment of the prescribed fee, cannot apply in cases of an increase in the 
number of no par value shares under subsection (1)(d) because the stated capital 
is not increased.268 The same is argued in respect of the issue of capitalisation 
shares following a transfer from reserves under subsection (1)(b), because the 
increase in stated capital is due to the transfer and not to the issue of new 
shares.269 It stands to reason that the fee is not payable if reserves are transferred 
and no new shares are issued, because subsection (3)(b) requires the fee to be 
paid only when the number of no par value shares is increased. But when the 
number of no par value shares is increased, the Act clearly requires the fee to be 
paid. The argument that the fee is payable only where subsequent to the variation 
there is an increased number of issued shares, issued at a consideration which 
can increase the stated capital account through a fresh injection of capital, is not 
supported by the word of section 75(3)(b). That the correct interpretation gives rise 
to an undesirable state of affairs cannot be disputed, but the current principle is 
that the nominal value of par value shares or the number of no par value shares is 
_________________________________________________________________  
264 See s 82(1). 
265  See paragraph 2.3.1.6 above. 
266 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-18. 
267  See the example in note 255 above. 
268 See Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 152 – 153. This issue is not dealt with in 
Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act. 
269 Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 152 – 153.  
 299
taken into account in determining the fee. The Act does not make the fee 
dependent on the price at which the shares are eventually issued. 
2.5.3 Conversion of types of shares 
The conversion of par value share capital into stated capital consisting of no par 
value shares and vice versa is regulated by section 75(1)(f) and section 75(1)(g). 
Section 75(1)(f) provides that share capital consisting of par value shares may be 
converted into ‛stated capital’ constituted by shares of no par value.270 Likewise 
section 75(1)(g) provides for the conversion of ‛stated capital’ constituted by no par 
value shares (not par value shares as such) into share capital consisting of shares 
having a par value. Since stated capital is the amount represented by the 
proceeds of the issue of no par value shares,271 the use of this term is unfortunate. 
It may create the impression that only issued no par value shares may be 
converted and not also unissued no par value shares, which, although they form 
part of the (authorised) share capital of the company, are not represented in the 
stated capital account. Such an interpretation would not accord with section 75(4) 
which clearly contemplates the existence of unissued shares that have been 
converted under section 75(1)(f) and (g). In this regard, the formulation of section 
78(1), which refers to ‛share capital’ must be preferred. It is suggested that the 
term stated capital in section 75(1)(f) and (g) should be understood as (authorised) 
‛share capital’.  
2.5.3.1 Conversion of par value share capital into stated capital 
Where par value shares are converted into no par value shares as envisaged by 
section 75(1)(f), section 78(1) requires that ‛the whole of the ordinary or preference 
share capital, as the case may be, and the whole of the share premium account or 
that part thereof contributed by the shares so converted’ must be transferred to the 
_________________________________________________________________  
270 However, existing companies with partly paid par value shares may not convert their shares 
into no par value shares, s 75(1)(f) proviso. Since all the ordinary or all the preference shares 
would have to be converted simultaneously (s 74 proviso),  such companies would not be able 
to do a conversion until the outstanding amounts had been paid. The opposite provision which 
allows conversion from no par value into par value does not require a similar limitation since 
existing companies could not have no par value shares. No par value shares were introduced 
at the same time partly-paid shares were abolished. 
271 Section 77(1). Note that the heading of this section reads ‘Proceeds of issue of shares of no 
par value to be stated capital’. 
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stated capital account. A company can either convert all its ordinary shares, all its 
preference shares or all its ordinary and preference shares into no par value 
shares. If the company issued both ordinary and preference shares at a premium, 
and is converting only one of these types into no par value shares, it will have to 
transfer to stated capital only the relevant part of the share premium account 
which was contributed by the shares being converted. While there is logic in this 
requirement, it may not always be easy to determine which part of the share 
premium account relates to the shares being converted. The application of the 
share premium account does not necessarily preserve the initial relationship 
between the premium contributed and the class of shares on which it was paid.272  
2.5.3.2 Conversion of stated capital into par value share capital 
Section 78(2) regulates the conversion of no par value shares into par value 
shares under section 75(1)(g). It requires that the whole of the stated capital 
account or, if only either ordinary or preference no par value shares are being 
converted, the part of the stated capital account contributed by the shares being 
converted, be transferred to the share capital account. There is no option to 
transfer a part of the stated capital to the share premium account and the 
implication is thus that the par value of the converted shares will have to 
correspond with the average value of the no par value shares transferred. It may 
also be difficult to identify the part of the stated capital account that was 
contributed by the shares that are to be converted. The stated capital account can 
for instance be applied in writing off preliminary expenses of the company in which 
case the correlation between the consideration received for the shares and the 
amount reflected in the stated capital account will not be preserved. When there 
are ordinary as well as preference no par value shares and only one of these are 
being converted, it may be difficult to determine which part was contributed by the 
shares being converted. It may be a solution to apportion any application of the 
stated capital account that does not relate to a specific issue of shares between 
the different issues according to the aggregate value of each issue.  
Section 78(3) provides for the creation of a statutory non-distributable 
reserve in respect of fractions and fractional surpluses and amounts that arise 
_________________________________________________________________  
272 See paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 above. 
 301
when no par value shares are converted to par value shares and is considered 
elsewhere.273 
2.5.3.3 Reconversions 
Section 75(4) was introduced in 1992 to counter the avoidance of the prescribed 
fee on authorised capital.274  It applies where par value shares have been 
converted into no par value shares and are subsequently converted back into par 
value shares. Any unissued shares in existence at the time of the second 
conversion must either be cancelled under section 75(1)(h)275 or the company will 
be liable to pay to the Registrar R5 for each R1000 or part of it by which the 
nominal share capital will after the second conversion exceed the nominal capital 
before the first conversion.276 There is no corresponding provision for conversion 
and reconversion of no par value shares, arguably because few companies started 
out with no par value shares and thus manipulated the fee structure the other way 
round. In theory, the same result could be achieved by converting no par value 
shares into par value shares, subdividing them into shares with lower par value 
and then reconverting them to no par value shares. 
It is not certain whether the initial conversion or the reconversion will be 
covered by section 75(3)(a). Although the initial conversion will result in an 
increase in the number of no par value shares and the reconversion in an increase 
in the number of no par value shares, the implication of subsection (4) is that 
subsection (3)(a), which provides for increases in par value shares, would not 
otherwise apply to the reconversion. It is made applicable only in respect of 
unissued shares, confirming that the fee is not payable on conversions as such.  
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273  See paragraph 2.4.5 above. 
274 Section 2 of the Companies Amendment Act 82 of 1992. 
275 Section 75(4)(b) 
276 An example can illustrate this. A (Pty) Ltd has 3 R1 par value shares of which 2 have been 
issued at a premium of 50c each. It converts them into no par value shares and transfers R3 
to stated capital (R1.50 per share). It reconverts those shares to par value shares, but now 
each share has a par value of R1.50 (The stated capital of R3 divided by the two issued 
shares.) The remaining unissued share now has a par value of R1.50, which is more than the 
previous authorised capital. Unless the unissued share is cancelled, the company will have to 
pay the prescribed fee.  
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2.5.4 Evaluation of variation of share capital 
The rules on the variation of share capital are complex. To a considerable extent, 
this is caused by the need to accommodate both par value and no par value 
shares. Closer analysis reveals that the provisions are primarily focused on book 
entries in the share capital accounts and payment of the prescribed fee due to the 
Registrar. 
This complexity would be justified if it contributed to the protection of either 
creditors or shareholders. But the only modicum of creditor protection is found in 
section 75(1)(f) which prevents the conversion of existing partly paid par value 
shares277 into no par value shares. The interests of shareholders do not feature, 
as the variation of class rights is regulated in a separate provision.278  
I think that these rules should be simplified. If necessary, a different basis 
should be found for the calculation of the Registrar’s prescribed fee, for example, 
the consideration actually received by the company when it issues shares. This 
would also solve the problems that arise when no par value shares are 
subdivided.279 
2.6 The reduction of issued capital 
Apart from providing for the increase of share capital and for its variation, the Act 
used to contain specific reduction of capital provisions. These were contained in 
sections 83 to 90 of the Companies Act, but were removed and replaced by the 
Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999.280 The reason for the removal of the 
reduction provisions was not set out in the Explanatory Memorandum.281 It can be 
surmised that the two procedures were regarded as having become redundant in 
view of the newly introduced provisions. The Explanatory Memorandum obviously 
regarded share repurchases as a way of reducing capital. It stated that in modern 
company law systems ‛...companies may reduce capital, including the acquisition 
of their own shares’. The stated purpose of the amendments was to give 
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277  These would be shares that were in existence when the 1973 Act came into operation, see 
paragraph 3.4 below. 
278  Section 102.  
279  See paragraph 2.5.2 above. 
280 Sections 83 and 84 were repealed by s 8 of this Act, while the remaining sections were 
replaced by the new provisions on share repurchases and payments to shareholders. 
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companies greater flexibility in arranging their financial affairs.282 However, there is 
some academic debate as to whether this objective has been achieved. Jooste 
argues that it has not, and that a general enabling provision for the reduction of 
capital should be introduced.283 In order to assess the situation, a brief comparison 
of the old reduction of capital provisions and the ways in which capital can be 
reduced under the Act as it presently stands, is necessary. 
2.6.1 The pre-1999 reduction of capital procedures 
The Act provided two alternative procedures. Under section 83 a company with no 
creditors or that could give security for the payment of all its creditors within twelve 
months of the reduction, could reduce its paid-up capital by special resolution and 
without the sanction of the court.284 The section 83-procedure could not be used if 
the company wanted to make payments in the future or in installments. It could 
also not be used for non-proportionate reductions of capital.285 The company’s 
articles had to authorise the reduction of its capital. A company that did not satisfy 
the requirements of section 83 could reduce its paid-up capital with court approval 
under section 84. If the reduction of capital involved a payment to shareholders of 
paid-up capital, creditors could object to the reduction.286 
Certain motivations for reductions were referred to in the provisions, although 
they were expressly stated to be without prejudice to the generality of the power to 
reduce capital.287 A company could reduce its capital in order to return capital in 
excess of the wants of the company288 or to cancel paid-up capital that was lost or 
had become useless for the purposes of the company.289 In the latter case the 
reduction would not involve a payment to the shareholders but a simple write-off in 
the accounts. It is important to bear in mind that the reduction of capital provisions 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
281 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Amendment Bill, 1999 (B17D-99). 
282 Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Amendment Bill, 1999 (B17D-99), see also 
Jooste “Can Share Capital be Reduced” 299. 
283 Jooste “Can Share Capital be Reduced” 300. 
284 Section 83 prior to its repeal by s 8 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
285  Section 83(1) prior to its repeal by s 8 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
286 Section 85 prior to its substitution in 1999 by s 9 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 
1999. 
287 Section 84(1) prior to its repeal by s 8 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
288 See Ex parte Vlakfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 1970 (2) SA 180 (T) at 183. 
289 Section 84(1) prior to its repeal by s 8 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
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applied also to the statutory non-distributable reserves. It was thus possible, in 
addition to the various applications provided for in section 76(3) and section 98(4), 
to write off amounts from these accounts.290 
The adjustment of share capital accounts was not prescribed in the reduction 
provisions. However, section 87 required the special resolution to be in the 
prescribed form and to set out the then existing share capital, particulars of the 
proposed reduction and the resultant state of the share capital of the company.291 
A resolution to reduce share capital was also taken to be a special resolution for 
the amendment of the company’s memorandum.292 A reduction of capital also 
amounted to a variation of shareholders’ rights.293 Preference shareholders could 
not be denied the right to vote on a resolution proposing a reduction of capital.294  
The effect of a reduction of capital on the proportionate interests of 
shareholders was one of the important factors a court had to consider when asked 
to sanction a reduction.295 Certain principles of fairness between shareholders, 
particularly preserving their rights to a return of capital on dissolution, evolved 
through case law. In the case of unwanted capital, shares which would rank first 
as to a capital distribution on winding-up would have to be cancelled first.296 
However, where lost capital was being cancelled, ordinary shares were first in 
line.297 As a general rule shares of the same class would have to be treated 
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290 And it was often resorted to, at least when companies still had to pay a fee on capitalisation, 
see In re X Ltd 1982 (2) SA 471 (W); Ex parte Anglo-American Corporation of SA Ltd 1977 (4) 
SA 146 (W); Ex parte Trencor Ltd 1977 (2) SA 396 (C). However, the reduction was refused in 
the last case. See also Cilliers & Benade Korporatiewe Reg 2 ed 334. 
291 Forms CM13 and CM14 were used. Form CM14 contained separate columns for authorised 
and issued capital, and also provided for reduction of the share premium account. These 
forms were replaced by Form 14A, which is a return of acquisition of own shares, see 
Government Notice R762 of 18 June 1999. 
292 Section 87(2) prior to its substitution by s 11 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-12 correctly point out that not all reductions 
of capital would require an amendment to the memorandum. This is so because shares could 
revert to the status of authorised but unissued shares and also because reductions could be 
restricted to the statutory non-distributable reserves which are not reflected in the 
memorandum. 
293 Jooste “Can Share Capital be Reduced” 295, Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 
5-11. 
294 Section 194(1)(b). 
295 Ex parte Vlakfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 1970 (2) SA 180 (T) at 183. Proportionate reductions 
could be done under s 83, provided the creditor-related requirements were also satisfied. 
296 See Levin v Felt and Tweeds Ltd 1951 (2) SA 401 (A) at 411; Cilliers & Benade 
Maatskappyereg 4 ed 155. See also De Wet & Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 583. 
297 Levin v Felt and Tweeds Ltd 1951 (2) SA 401 (A) at 411. 
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equally. 
It is thus clear that, except if only non-distributable reserves were affected, a 
reduction of capital would involve either a cancellation of particular shares or a 
reduction in the amount reflected as paid-up in respect of a particular class of 
shares. In the case of no par value shares, either the number of shares or the 
average or book value of the shares would be reduced. In the case of par value 
shares, the number of shares would have to be reduced or the par value of all the 
shares in the class would have to be reduced. Some reductions of capital would 
thus also require the variation of share capital as envisaged in section 75.298  
The interests of creditors were protected by their right to object to a reduction 
of capital involving payment to shareholders.299 The court would only sanction a 
reduction of capital if satisfied that that every creditor had either consented to the 
reduction or had received payment or security for payment.300 
2.6.2 The present position regarding reduction of capital 
It is accepted that the Companies Act now provides three ways in which a 
company can reduce its paid-up capital.301 They are: 
• a repurchase of shares under section 85 
• a redemption of redeemable preference shares under section 98 
• a repurchase of shares ordered by court under section 252(3).302 
When a company acquires its shares in terms of section 85, the repurchased 
shares are cancelled upon acquisition and revert to the status of authorised but 
unissued shares.303 The Act prescribes the adjustments that have to be made to 
the company’s share capital accounts upon an acquisition of its own shares.304 
The issued or paid-up capital of a company is thus reduced through a repurchase 
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298 See paragraph 2.5 above. 
299  Section 85(1) prior to its substitution by s 9 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
300  Section 86(2) prior to its substitution by s 10 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. 
See also Ex parte Vlakfontein Gold Mining Co Ltd 1970 (2) SA 180 (T) at 183. 
301 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-2. 
302 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-15. Jooste “Can Share Capital be 
Reduced” 294. 
303 Section 85(8). 
304 Section 85(5) and (7); see paragraph 6.3.3 below. 
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of shares. This is the case regardless of whether the company purports to be 
using profits or share capital as the source of funding for the repurchase. It is a 
logical consequence of the way in which capital accounts are constituted. 
In the case of the redemption of redeemable preference shares, the share 
capital accounts logically have to be reduced by the amounts reflected in respect 
of the redeemable shares. However, in view of the requirements regarding the 
sources from which shares may be redeemed, the company’s total issued capital 
will either not be reduced, or the difference will be represented by a capital 
redemption reserve.305 There is a possible exception to this principle that the total 
capital and reserves should be maintained: where shares are to be redeemed out 
of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares, and the new shares are issued at a 
premium it seems that the full issue price, including the premium, can be used to 
pay for the redemption.306 This would mean that not all the cancelled capital will be 
replaced. It would also be out of step with section 76 which clearly attempts to limit 
application of the share premium account in providing for premiums only when 
shares are redeemed or acquired.307 These anomalies are avoided if section 
98(1)(a) read with section 98(2) is interpreted to refer to the nominal value of the 
new issue only.  
One of the orders a court can make following a personal action against 
oppression of a shareholder, is that the company purchase the shareholder’s 
shares.308 It is also expressly provided that when it orders the purchase of the 
shares by the company, the court can order it to reduce its capital ‛accordingly’.309 
This reinforces the logical relation between the reacquisition of shares and a 
reduction of capital. 
The options for applying the share premium account and capital redemption 
reserve fund have been retained and extended to include providing for a premium 
when shares are acquired under section 85.310 It seems that these reserves can 
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305 See paragraph 6.8 below.  
306  Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 230 note 66.  
307  See s 76(3)(c) and (d). 
308 Section 252(3). 
309 Section  252(3). 
310 Section 76(3)(d) added by s 6 of Act 37 of 1999 and s 98(4) as amended by s 15 of Act 37 of 
1999. 
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be reduced only through these applications.311 Another possible reduction, 
apparently overlooked by Jooste and the authors of Blackman, Jooste & 
Everingham Companies Act, is a reduction of the stated capital account to provide 
for costs, expenses and commissions on the creation or issue of no par value 
shares.312 
2.6.3 Comparison of old and new position regarding reduction of capital  
2.6.3.1 Kinds of reductions possible 
The repeal of the capital reduction provisions raises the question of whether a 
company is still able to reduce its capital to the same extent as before. In 
particular, can a company reduce its capital by cancelling lost capital? Jooste 
raised and rejected the possibility that a company could achieve such a reduction 
by altering its memorandum in terms of section 56(4).313 
I submit that a company can nevertheless achieve similar reductions through 
an acquisition of its shares under section 85, including a cancellation of lost 
capital. Although section 85 is often said to provide for repurchases or buy-backs, 
it in fact refers to the ‛acquisition’ of shares.314 A company could thus acquire its 
own shares without consideration and cancel them to reflect lost capital. The 
solvency and liquidity requirements of section 85(4) do not apply where the 
company acquires shares without payment.315 The possibilities can be enhanced 
through variations of share capital under section 75. For example, a company 
could subdivide its existing par value shares,316 followed by a proportionate 
acquisition of the subdivided shares in order to reduce its share capital account to 
the desired level.  
The repealed provisions permitted a reduction of statutory non-distributable 
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311 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-274-1; Jooste “Can Share Capital be 
Reduced” 298; Wainer “Problems and Doubts” 134. Also see paragraph 2.4.3.3.3 above. 
312 Section 77(3). See paragraph 2.4.2 above. 
313 Jooste “Can Share Capital be Reduced” 298. 
314 See paragraph 6.1.1 for a discussion of the meaning of this concept. 
315 The solvency and liquidity test is discussed in more detail in paragraph 4.1 below. 
316 It is accepted that a subdivision of par value shares does not trigger s 75(3)(a) and that the 
company will not become liable for the prescribed fee on an increase in capital, see paragraph 
2.5.2 above. 
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reserves.317 Section 85(7) allows limited application of non-distributable reserves 
when shares are acquired.318 However, I think it is now possible to reduce the 
share premium account and capital redemption reserve to a greater extent than 
previously by applying them to issue capitalisation shares. Subsequent acquisition 
of these shares under section 85 would then reduce the share capital accordingly. 
This is an indirect and perhaps cumbersome way of achieving a general reduction 
of these reserves. The company may have to increase its authorised capital to 
provide for the capitalisation shares and may become liable for the prescribed fee 
in terms of section 75(3). Although this will have adverse cost implications, it may 
well be cheaper than the court application under the old procedure. I submit that a 
special resolution for the increase of share capital and a special resolution for the 
acquisition of the capitalisation shares can be taken at the same meeting, as 
envisaged in section 62, provided that the capitalisation shares are actually issued 
between the two resolutions. It is not possible under section 85(1) to approve the 
acquisition of shares that have not yet been issued.319  
One method of capital reduction is no longer possible. Previously, it was 
accepted that a company could use the repealed reduction provisions to reduce its 
capital to nil.320 According to Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act such a 
reduction would have been used when a company having a share capital was 
being converted into a company limited by guarantee or a section 21 company.321 
Section 23 provides for such conversions, but requires that the share capital be 
‛cancelled’. It is not possible under the repurchase provisions to acquire all the 
shares of a company.322 Has it now become impossible to convert a company with 
share capital into a guarantee company?  
Section 23 refers to a cancellation of capital, not to a (formal) reduction. I 
think that the legislature never meant to require a separate reduction of capital 
under the repealed sections 83 to 90 for conversions. The conversion provisions 
seem able to operate independently of the reduction of capital provisions. In a 
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317  See paragraph 2.6.1 above. 
318  See paragraph 2.6.2 above. 
319  See paragraph 6.1.1 below. 
320 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-12 and the authority there quoted, Re 
Anglo American Insurance Co Ltd [1991] BCLC 564. 
321 See Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 41. 
322 Section 85(9). See paragraph 6.3.2 below. 
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conversion, creditors are protected by the notice requirements323 and by the fact 
that the conversion does not affect the obligations and liabilities of the company,324 
while shareholders are protected by the special resolution requirement. If this 
argument is accepted, conversions can still take place despite the fact that a 
company cannot acquire and cancel all its shares. Unless this interpretation is 
correct, conversions of companies having a share capital into companies limited 
by guarantee have become impossible. 
2.6.3.2 Protection of creditors and shareholders when capital is reduced 
Considered from the perspective of creditors, it could appear that they enjoy less 
protection under the new provisions because they are not given the right to object 
or insist on payment or security. This right, which was available if a reduction 
involved a payment to shareholders,325 has to be compared to the protection 
creditors enjoy in terms of section 85(4) when a company makes a payment for 
the acquisition of its shares. If the company satisfies the solvency and liquidity 
test, the risk of loss to creditors is remote. Further, in the event of an unlawful 
payment for the acquisition of shares, creditors can recover payment from the 
shareholders who received payment, and the directors would be liable to restore 
any unrecovered amount to the company.326 
I think that the protection under the share repurchase provisions is adequate, 
although not as strong as under the old procedure which has been criticised, it is 
submitted validly, as an over-protection of creditors.327  
From the point of view of dissenting shareholders it appears that they do not 
enjoy the same protection as before when their interests were considered by a 
court. Shareholders are protected by the requirements of authorisation in the 
articles and a special resolution. Provision is also made for the proportionate 
treatment of shareholders, although this applies only to some acquisitions.328 In 
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323 Notice in the Gazette is required, s 26(1), and in the case of a public company, also notices to 
all creditors, s 26(2). 
324 Section 29. 
325 See paragraph 2.6.1 above.  
326 Section 86, see paragraph 6.4 below. 
327  By the Company Law Review in England, see The Strategic Framework URN 99/654 
(February 1999) 5.4.5 and Chapter 2 paragraph 2.6.  
328 Section 87(2). See paragraph 6.3.2.1 below. 
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appropriate circumstances the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers may also apply, with the result that its disclosure and other procedural 
requirements will apply and that majority votes could be excluded.329 
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act attempt to 
justify the lower level of protection of shareholders in a repurchase by contrasting 
the consensual basis of repurchases with the compulsory nature of reductions.330 
However, I submit that share acquisitions can indeed be forced on dissenting 
shareholders if the company is acting in pursuance of a specific approval.331 
Further, any shareholder whose shares are not being acquired can be equally 
disadvantaged in relation to shareholders whose shares are being acquired. The 
consensual principle is thus not an acceptable explanation for reducing the 
protection of shareholders. The fair treatment of shareholders in a repurchase is 
considered in more detail elsewhere.332 
2.6.4 Interpretation of remaining references to reduction of share capital 
An interesting issue that arises is how the remaining references in the Act to the 
reduction of capital should be interpreted. One such reference appears in section 
194(1)(b), which provides that holders of preference shares retain the right to vote 
on resolutions affecting their rights or interests, including a resolution for the 
reduction of capital. Does this mean that preference shareholders have the right to 
vote when an acquisition of own shares is proposed? This would qualify as a 
resolution that affects their rights or interests.333 It makes sense to interpret the 
reference to reduction as a reduction through a repurchase. As regards the 
redemption of redeemable preference shares, no resolution of the company in 
general meeting is required. It appears that directors can make the decision if 
shares are redeemable at the option of the company. The question of voting rights 
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329  See the definition of ‘acquisition’ in Section B 1 of the Securities Regulation Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers, and rule 29(a)(ii), (iv) and 29(b), considered in paragraph 2.6.3.2 
above. 
330 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-15 – 5-16. The authors suggest, however, 
that a company could still freeze out shareholders by converting ordinary shares into 
redeemable shares and then redeeming them.   
331 Also see paragraph 6.3 below. In the case of a pro rata offer through an offering circular, 
which is required in the case of a general authorisation, shares would only be acquired from 
shareholders who offer to sell their shares, s 87(4). 
332 See paragraph 6.3 below. 
333 See paragraph 6.3.1.2 below. 
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of preference shareholders cannot arise in the context of reductions by court order 
under section 252. It is uncertain whether preference shareholders will have the 
right to vote when statutory non-distributable reserves are reduced through the 
various applications. Although a formal reduction of these reserves under the 
repealed reduction of capital provisions seems to have entitled preference 
shareholders to vote, the position regarding application of reserves as set out in 
section 76(3) and section 98(4) is problematic. Previously, such applications were 
not regarded as reductions of capital and so preference shareholders were not 
entitled to vote unless they could show that their rights or interests were 
affected.334 I interpret the reference in section 194(1)(b) to a reduction of capital as 
covering only an acquisition of shares under section 85. It should be replaced with 
a direct reference to an acquisition of shares.335  
Section 252, which provides for a statutory personal action of members in 
cases of oppression, contains two references to the reduction of capital. The first 
appears in section 252(2)(b) and refers only to a reduction of capital under section 
83.336 Clearly this provision has become obsolete and should be replaced with a 
reference to an acquisition of shares under section 85. This will oblige 
shareholders who wish to institute a personal action to do so within six weeks after 
the passing of the special resolution authorising the acquisition.337 
A more general reference to reduction of capital is found in section 252(3). 
This subsection provides that when a court orders the company to purchase the 
shares of a member, it can order the company to reduce its capital ‛accordingly’. 
This confirms that a repurchase of shares amounts to a reduction of capital and by 
ordering the company to reduce its capital, the court obliges the company to make 
the necessary adjustments to its capital accounts. This provision could never have 
referred to the capital reduction provisions of section 83 to 90 because they were 
separate procedures involving resolutions, notifications, objections and court 
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334 This would only be the case if the articles provided for proportionate interests in the share 
premium account. 
335 See paragraph 6.3.1.2 below regarding which shareholders can vote on a repurchase. 
336 The function of the provision is to set a time limit for instituting an action following certain 
corporate actions. 
337 Section 252(2)(c) provides that shareholders aggrieved by a variation of class rights have to 
institute an action within six weeks of the resolution of the class meeting. It is not wide enough 
to cover all instances of share repurchases or all shareholders who might want to object to a 
repurchase. 
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approval. When a court orders a company to repurchase its shares in terms of 
section 252(3), it would not make sense to require separate compliance with the 
formal reduction provisions. So this reference cannot be regarded as an outdated 
reference to the repealed reduction procedure. It would have been preferable to 
set out the adjustments in more detail or to have referred to the adjustment 
requirements set out in section 85(5) and (6).338  
It is interesting to note that the Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers also refers to a reduction of capital.339 These provisions were drafted 
before companies could acquire their own shares.340 However, as they are 
formulated in very wide terms, they are clearly applicable to reductions of capital 
through an acquisition of own shares. These provisions are discussed in more 
detail in relation to share repurchases.341 
2.7 Loss of capital 
One of the grounds for winding-up of a company is if 75 per cent of its issued 
share capital has been lost or has become useless for the business of the 
company.342 This seems to be the only provision of the Act concerned with the 
question whether share capital is represented by assets.343 This ground is aimed 
at the protection of shareholders, not creditors, as is evident from the fact that the 
court will refuse the order if the majority of shareholders are in favour of the 
company continuing to operate.344  
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338 It should perhaps also have been provided that a company can apply its share premium 
account to provide for a premium when the court has ordered a company to purchase its 
shares under section 252. 
339  Rule 29(a)(ii), (b). 
340  It has not been amended and is thus still in the form it was cast in 1991. 
341  See paragraph 2.6.3.2 above. 
342 Section 344(e). The application may be made by any party entitled to apply for the winding-up 
of a company, including a member, see s 346(2).  
343 The share capital as reflected in the various accounts cannot be ‘lost’.  
344  For examples of the application of this ground for winding-up, see Alpha Bank Bpk v 
Registrateur van Banke 1996 (1) SA 330 (A) and De Jager v Karoo Koeldranke & Roomys 
(Edms) Bpk 1956 (3) SA 594 (C). Also see Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 503. Creditors 
are not necessarily affected, since the loss of share capital is not an indication that the 
company is unable to pay its debts, see Ex parte De Villiers NNO: In re Carbon Development 
(Pty) Ltd) in Liquidation) 1993 (1) SA 493 (A) . 
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2.8 Capital structure under the Companies Bill 
Chapter 2 part D of the Companies Bill 2008 is entitled ‛Capitalization of Profit 
Companies’ and regulates the authorisation and issue of shares, consideration for 
shares, distributions to shareholders as well as certain other specific applications 
of company funds, such as financial assistance for the subscription for or purchase 
of shares and financial assistance to directors and related persons. It has already 
been explained that neither the Policy Framework nor the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Companies Bill 2008 contains much detail on the policy 
issues.345 The Explanatory Memorandum contains two paragraphs in this regard. 
First, it is said that in order to promote efficiency, par value shares and nominal 
value should be replaced with a ‛capital maintenance regime based on solvency 
and liquidity’.346 Secondly, shareholders should be protected through the 
requirement of shareholder approval for certain share issues, for financial 
assistance to directors, and for the purchase of own shares.   
2.8.1 Authorised capital  
The concept of authorised capital is retained by the Companies Bill in the sense 
that the classes of shares and the number of each class of shares that the 
company is authorised to issue must be set out in its memorandum of 
incorporation.347 The memorandum must set out the preferences, rights and 
limitations applicable in respect of each class of shares.348 Unclassified or ‘blank’ 
shares, which may later be classified by the board, may also be authorised.349 The 
authorised capital can be increased or decreased by a special resolution of the 
shareholders amending the memorandum of incorporation350 or by the board of 
directors acting in terms of an authorisation to that effect in the memorandum of 
incorporation of the company.351  
_________________________________________________________________  
345  See paragraph 1.1 above. 
346  See Explanatory Memorandum to the Companies Bill 2008, under the heading ‘Company 
Finance’. 
347  Clause 36(1)(a).  
348  Clause 36(1)(b)(ii). 
349  Clause 36(1)(c). 
350  Clause 36(2)(a). 
351  Clause 36(2)(b) read with (3). The board has to file a notice of amendment to the 
memorandum of association when it has acted in pursuance of its authority to vary the 
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The Companies Bill dispenses with the requirement of shareholder approval 
by ordinary resolution whenever shares are issued.352 Instead, it targets two 
specific problem areas and prescribes shareholder approval by special resolution 
in these two instances. The first is the issue of shares to directors and officers, 
future directors and officers, or related persons. The issue must be approved by 
special resolution except in certain specific circumstances.353  
The issue of further shares in a class that will substantially influence the 
voting rights within that class, is the second instance. Where further shares are 
issued in a transaction or series of integrated transactions and the voting power of 
the new shares amounts to more than 30 per cent of the voting power of all the 
existing issued shares of that class immediately before the transaction or series of 
transactions, the issue must be approved by special resolution of the 
shareholders.354 
Although it may be a good idea to subject substantial issues to shareholder 
approval, the proposed provision is problematic. It is restricted to a specific class 
of shares and pays no regard to the total voting power in the company. A simple 
example will illustrate its limitations. Say a particular class of shares has ten per 
cent of the total votes in the company. The voting power that the new shares will 
have once they are issued, expressed as a percentage of the voting power of the 
shares immediately before the issue, is 33 per cent.355 This means that the issue 
will trigger the provision. Shareholder approval is thus necessary despite the fact 
that the voting power of each shareholder has been diluted by only 3,3 per cent. 
However, if the company has only one class of shares, and has issued 10000 
shares in that class, a further 4285 shares can be issued without a special 
resolution of the shareholders. The voting power of the new shares will be just 
under 30 per cent356 of the voting power of the shares immediately before the 
issue. Shareholder approval is not required for this issue, although each 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
authorised capital of the company, clause 36(4). 
352  See s 221 of the Act, discussed in paragraph 2.1 above. 
353  Clause 41(1). The exceptions include issues in accordance with pre-emptive rights, issues in 
proportion to the director’s shareholding and issues pursuant to public offers, see clause 
41(2). 
354  Clause 41(3). The concept ‘series of integrated transactions’ is defined in clause 41(4)(b). 
355  13,3 / 103.3 = 13% 
356  Approval is required when the voting power is more than 30 per cent. 
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shareholder’s rights have been diluted by 30 per cent.  
It is also not certain whether the provision is intended to apply to the issue of 
shares of a new class. The voting power of the new class prior to the issue would 
be nil, so that any new issue would constitute an infinite increase in the voting 
power of that class. It could, however, be argued that the provision presupposes 
some existing voting power and would thus apply only where shares of the same 
class have been issued previously.   
This provision bears some similarity to section 6.21(f) of the MBCA, with the 
crucial difference that the latter provision looks at the total voting power of all the 
issued shares of the company. Another difference is that the MBCA sets a much 
lower level of 20 per cent.  
Another problem is that this provision pays regard only to voting power. 
Distribution rights of further shares can also dilute the interests of shareholders. A 
company can issue an unlimited number of non-voting shares, entitled to 
distributions, without having to obtain shareholder approval.  
The Companies Bill also proposes pre-emptive rights when private 
companies issue further shares.357 Pre-emptive rights represent a default option in 
the Companies Bill and a company may exclude or limit these rights in its 
Memorandum of Incorporation.  
In certain circumstances pre-emptive rights are excluded, for example when 
shares are being issued for future consideration.358 This proposal is less onerous 
than the position in England where pre-emptive rights are compulsory for public 
companies.359 However, the JSE Limited Listings Requirements provide for pre-
emptive rights in respect of listed shares and will probably continue to do so.360 
The forms of consideration for shares that will trigger or exclude pre-emptive 
rights under the Companies Bill differ from the position in other jurisdictions. In 
New Zealand pre-emptive rights apply regardless of the nature of consideration 
involved.361 In England such rights apply to cash consideration only, which would 
_________________________________________________________________  
357  Clause 39.  
358  Clause 39 refers to issues in terms of clause 40(5) – (7), which deals with unpaid or partly paid 
shares. Another notable exclusion relates to employee share schemes. 
359  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.1. 
360  See JSE Limited Listings Requirements paragraph 3.30, discussed in paragraph 2.1 above. 
361  See Chapter 3 paragraph 2.1. 
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include an undertaking to pay cash in the future,362 but not to issues for non-cash 
consideration. If the provision in the Companies Bill is enacted, pre-emptive rights 
will apply both to issues for cash and for non-cash consideration, unless the 
consideration is to be transferred in the future. A company can avoid the operation 
of pre-emptive rights by simply agreeing to issue shares for future consideration. 
On the other hand, if shares are issued for non-cash consideration, transferable 
upon issue of the shares, pre-emptive rights will apply. This does not make sense. 
Pre-emptive rights are often excluded in the case of non-cash consideration in 
order to facilitate share exchanges in mergers and amalgamations. There seems 
to be no logic behind linking pre-emptive rights to the time when the consideration 
will be given. I suggest that this proposal needs reconsideration. If it is decided 
that pre-emptive rights should apply to cash consideration only, as is the case in 
England, a definition of ‛cash’ should be inserted. 
2.8.2 Minimum issued capital 
Although no minimum issued share capital is prescribed, the Companies Bill 
expressly states that there should always be at least one share in issue to at least 
one person other than a company that is part of the same group of companies to 
which the company belongs.363 This provision will prohibit the shares of a 
subsidiary from being held exclusively by the holding company and its 
subsidiaries. Despite this, the Companies Bill recognises the notion of a wholly 
owned subsidiary, although the definition depends on the holding company holding 
or controlling ‘all of the general voting rights’ in the subsidiary rather than on 
shareholding.364 This requirement seems absurd especially as the definition of 
‘wholly owned subsidiary’ will not be satisfied if the outside shareholder carries any 
general voting right in respect of the share. A wholly owned subsidiary would have 
to issue at least one non-voting share to a token outside shareholder in order to 
comply with the minimum issued capital requirement. The intention may have 
been to prohibit all the shares in a holding company from being held by one or 
more of its subsidiaries, but this situation is in any event precluded by the limit 
_________________________________________________________________  
362  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2.  
363  Clause 35(3)(b). 
364  Clause 3(1)(b). 
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placed on shares that may be held by subsidiaries.365 
The motivation behind the requirement that at least one share must be in 
issue, is presumably to facilitate the running of the company366 and to prevent its 
informal liquidation and dissolution.367 However, this purpose may not be 
achieved, as the provision as currently formulated does not require the issued 
share to have any particular attributes like being entitled to vote and to receive the 
net assets on liquidation.  
A company is required to have at least one class of authorised shares that 
confer the right to vote on every matter to be decided by shareholders and at least 
one class entitled to receive the net assets on liquidation.368 However, it is not a 
requirement that any of these shares should have been issued.369  
2.8.3 Types of shares 
The Companies Bill proposes a system of compulsory no par value shares.370 
However, par value shares issued by pre-existing companies continue to have 
their assigned par value for the time being.371 The Minister has to make 
regulations regarding the transitional status and conversion of par value shares 
and capital accounts.372 These regulations have to preserve the rights of 
shareholders as far as possible.373  
It seems that authorised but unissued par value shares are not covered by 
this provision, as it refers to par value shares that have been ‛issued’.374 The effect 
on authorised but unissued par value shares is unclear, but presumably a 
company will not be able to issue them as par value shares. I think the company 
_________________________________________________________________  
365  Clause 48(3)(a), as to which see paragraph 6.9.6 below. 
366  Compare s 6.03(b) – (c) of the MBCA, see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
367  See Van der Linde “A Company’s Purchase of its Own Shares” 69.  
368  Clause 37(3)(b). 
369  Compare clause 35(3)(b). 
370  Clause 35(2). 
371  Schedule 7 Item 6(2). 
372  Schedule 7 Item 6(3). These regulations have to be made in consultation with the Minister of 
Finance and have to take effect when the Act comes into operation.  
373   Schedule 7 Item 6(3)(a). To the extent that this is possible in view of the purpose of transition, 
the regulations have to provide for compensation by the company to the shareholders who 
lose any such rights, see Schedule 7 Item 6(3)(b).  
374  This is apparently not an oversight, since the transitional provision also requires the shares to 
be held by a shareholder immediately before the date on which the new Act comes into 
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should be allowed to treat them as the same number of authorised no par value 
shares.   
2.8.4 Capital accounts  
The Companies Bill does not regulate the way in which the consideration received 
for shares should be reflected in the company’s share capital accounts.375 In fact, 
it does not appear necessary for the board to determine the specific monetary 
value of consideration received for the issue of shares.376 
Clause 51(6) of the Companies Bill, 2007 required an adjustment to the 
stated capital account following a repurchase of shares and thus implied that the 
full consideration received would have to be reflected in a stated capital account. 
In comments on this Bill submitted to the Department of Trade and Industry, I 
pointed out that this was an anomaly as it implied that a company should have a 
stated capital account reflecting the consideration received. This requirement is 
not repeated in the Companies Bill of 2008. 
2.8.5 Variation of share capital 
The Companies Bill contains a provision regarding the variation of share capital.377 
Unlike the current Act which regulates the consequences of variations in 
considerable detail, the draft clause enables a company by special resolution to 
amend its capital or to delegate certain powers in this regard to the board of 
directors.378 Because share capital accounts are not regulated, the variation 
provision is far less complex than section 75 of the Act.379 
Directors will enjoy more discretion than under the present Act. This is in line 
with the increased discretion in respect of the authorisation of further shares.380 
_________________________________________________________________  
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operation, see Schedule 7 item 6(2).  
375  This is in line with the MBCA.  
376  Clause 40(2). See the similar position under the MBCA, discussed in Chapter 4 paragraph 
4.2.1. 
377  Clause 36(2).  
378  The power to vary authorised but unissued share capital can be delegated to the board, 
clause 36(2) read with clause 36(3). 
379  See paragraph 2.5 above. 
380  See paragraph 2.8.1 above. 
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2.9 Evaluation of capital structure 
2.9.1 Evaluation of the concept authorised capital 
Both the Act and the Companies Bill rely on the concept of authorised capital. The 
need to state a company’s authorised capital in its constitutive documents can be 
questioned. Creditors are not protected by the statement of authorised capital, 
since not all the authorised shares need to be issued. Neither is the investing 
public protected by the limit on the number of shares a company may issue, 
because apart from the relative ease with which the authorised capital may be 
increased, it does not limit the amount that can be raised from the public. In the 
case of par value shares the company can raise additional funds by issuing the 
shares at a premium, and in the case of no par value shares there is no indication 
of the maximum consideration for which they may be issued. Unsophisticated 
creditors or investors may be misled into believing that the authorised capital 
determines the assets of the company, especially when these shares have a par 
value.381 
The advantage of authorised capital is the degree of protection it offers to 
existing shareholders against the dilution of their relative stakes in the company. 
The level of protection a shareholder enjoys is determined by two factors. First, it 
depends on the ratio between issued and unissued shares. If a company has a 
very high number of authorised but unissued shares, the stakes of existing 
shareholders can be substantially eroded without an increase in authorised capital. 
The second factor is the ability of a shareholder to influence any decision to 
increase the authorised capital. The current Act gives a shareholder who is unable 
to block a special resolution no protection through the statement of authorised 
capital. The Companies Bill retains the special resolution requirement, but also 
provides as an alternative that the Memorandum of Incorporation may delegate 
the power to increase the authorised capital to the board of directors. This 
delegation will increase flexibility but at the same time decrease the protection of 
shareholders. 
_________________________________________________________________  
381 This argument is sometimes used to support proposals for the abolition of the par value 
concept, see paragraph 2.8.3 below. Creditors will be able to determine the extent of the 
company’s issued capital from its financial statements, because Schedule 4 to the Act requires 
the balance sheet of a company to set out certain details of its issued capital, see Part 1 B 
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The desirability of retaining authorised capital cannot be assessed in isolation 
from other measures that also serve to protect the relative interests of 
shareholders. These other measures recognise that only an actual issue of shares 
will affect shareholder interests and so limit the power of directors to issue shares. 
Two such measures can be distinguished, namely shareholder approval and pre-
emptive rights. 
Both the Companies Act and the Companies Bill require shareholder 
approval for the issue of shares, although in the latter case this is restricted to 
substantial issues and issues to directors.382 While the Act requires an ordinary 
resolution, which can be a general approval unless the shares are issued to 
directors, the Companies Bill prescribes a special resolution for the instances 
where approval is required. I prefer the approach of the Companies Bill that 
identifies particularly risky issues and subjects them to stricter requirements, while 
directors are afforded more discretion in issuing shares in other cases. I submit 
that this will give more meaningful protection to shareholders. However, the 
percentage set for substantial issues, namely those involving at least 30 per cent 
of the voting rights of the existing shares, is a relatively high threshold in 
comparison to that of the MBCA.383 Further, I have illustrated through examples 
that the current proposal of looking at the voting power of a specific class in 
isolation makes little sense, and that regard should be had to the total voting 
power in the company.384  
While the Corporate Laws Amendment Act 24 of 2006 introduced ‘deemed’ 
pre-emptive rights into the Act, these pre-emptive rights apply only to certain 
further share issues and various aspects of their application are uncertain.385 I 
argued that the new rules may be effective in excluding external shareholders but 
not in protecting shareholders against a dilution of their relative interests.386 The 
Companies Bill makes provision for pre-emptive rights in respect of further share 
_________________________________________________________________  
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382  See paragraph 2.8.1 above. 
383  See paragraph 2.8.1 above. 
384  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.5 for the suggested wording. 
385  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
386  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
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issues in private companies.387 The provision embodies a default option which can 
be excluded in the Memorandum of Incorporation,388 while the current Act does 
not permit the disapplication of the deeming provision. The proposed pre-emptive 
rights in the Companies Bill do not afford existing shareholders a ‘top-up’ 
opportunity, that is, the right to take up shares that are not subscribed for by their 
fellow shareholders. The current deemed pre-emptive rights in a company with 
Table B articles will be more successful in excluding external shareholders 
because all the available shares must be divided among the shareholders who are 
willing to take them. A top-up provision could be particularly useful in a private 
company premised upon family control.389  
Pre-emptive rights as contained in the Companies Bill will improve the 
protection of shareholders in private companies in relation to the control aspect of 
their shareholding in the company and will constitute an improvement on the 
current position which treats all shareholders equally.390 These rights may not 
succeed in preserving relative distribution entitlements, but that would be difficult 
to apply across class structures where distribution entitlements of some classes 
are fixed and others residual in nature. 
Listed companies that issue further shares for cash are likely to continue to 
be subject to pre-emptive rights under the JSE Limited Listings Requirements, 
requiring pro rata treatment of shareholders in substantial further cash issues.391 If 
this is the case, it makes little sense to exclude pre-emptive rights in public 
unlisted companies. For this reason I submit that pre-emptive rights should be 
made applicable to all companies as default option.392 However, a top-up provision 
should apply only to private companies in view of the additional motivation of 
maintaining a closed circle of shareholders.  
Most of the other jurisdictions surveyed also use the concept of authorised 
_________________________________________________________________  
387  These pre-emptive rights in respect of further issues by the company must not be confused 
with restrictions on the transferability of shares by shareholders which often take the form of 
pre-emptive rights. As is the case under the present s 20(1)(a), the Companies Bill simply 
requires a private company to restrict the transferability of its shares without prescribing how 
this should be done, see clause 1 s v ‘private company’ and clause 8(2)(b). 
388  See paragraph 2.8.1 above. 
389  In this regard, see the proposal in Chapter 6 paragraph 7.5. 
390  See also Delport “Capital Rules” 412. 
391  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
392  See the proposal in Chapter 6 paragraph 7.5.  
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capital. This is the case even in systems that have abolished the traditional legal 
capital or maintenance of capital systems.  
Delaware,393 California394 and American states that have adopted the 
MBCA395 rely on the concept of authorised capital. The authorised shares may be 
increased by majority vote and separate class votes are required if the new shares 
will rank prior to the particular class.396 Shareholder approval is not generally 
required for share issues, although the MBCA requires it for substantial non-cash 
issues. Pre-emptive rights apply only if expressly included in a corporation’s 
constitution. However, state legislation usually provides a standard set of opt-in 
pre-emptive rules which a corporation can simply incorporate by reference. Listed 
companies may be subject to federal regulation applying pre-emptive principles to 
cash issues. Several stock exchanges also prescribe shareholder approval for 
substantial non-cash issues. 
The exceptions are New Zealand, and, when the relevant part of CA 2006 
comes into operation, England.397 These systems do not rely on authorised 
capital. In New Zealand the constitutive documents of a company contain no 
reference to share capital. Directors have the power to issue shares, unless this 
power is restricted in the articles. The greater discretion given to directors in New 
Zealand is offset by a specific duty to consider the fairness of an issue to existing 
shareholders. In England shareholder approval is necessary for the issue of 
shares, but the power to issue shares may be delegated to the directors for a 
limited period. Pre-emptive rights apply in England and in New Zealand. While the 
extent of pre-emptive rights in England is narrower in that only cash issues are 
involved, public companies may not exclude these rights. In New Zealand issues 
for any kind of consideration are subject to pre-emptive rights, but these rights can 
be excluded by all companies. Moreover, certain issues of shares are deemed to 
constitute an alteration of class rights and must be approved by separate classes 
or interest groups, and are further subject to the appraisal remedy. Shareholders 
in New Zealand thus enjoy particularly strong protection against the dilution of their 
_________________________________________________________________  
393  See Chapter 4 paragraph 1.2.1. 
394  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.1. 
395  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.2.1. 
396  This is a broad generalisation, see Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.2.1, 3.2.1 and 4.2.1 for small 
differences in the requirements. 
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equity interests, despite the absence of authorised capital. 
I have shown that the proposed pre-emptive rights are more limited than 
those applicable in New Zealand and in England.398 Further, the Companies Bill 
requires shareholder approval in exceptional circumstances only, exposing 
shareholders to the risk of a relatively substantial erosion of their equity interests. 
In view of this, I recommend that the notion of authorised capital should indeed be 
retained.  
The possibility of including a provision, based on the example in the English 
Companies Act of 1985,399 to the effect that any reference to capital on the 
stationery and order forms of a company must be to its paid-up capital, was 
considered. But if no par value shares are used there is little danger of investors 
and creditors being misled, as the statement of authorised capital will not involve 
an amount of money, but will merely mention the number of no par value shares of 
each class.  
If companies are no longer required to have or disclose an authorised capital, 
an alternative basis must be found for the fee which is currently payable under 
section 63(1). The way in which the fee is currently calculated causes distortions 
between par value and no par value shares.400 It may thus in any event be 
preferable to calculate the fee based on actual issued capital. If a system of 
compulsory no par value shares is adopted, a fee based on the capital raised by 
each company should be easy to implement. At this stage the Companies Bill 
does not provide for a fee on share capital. 
2.9.2 Evaluation of minimum capital 
The Act does not prescribe a minimum amount of issued capital, but requires the 
subscribers to the memorandum to take up at least one share each. However, 
there is no general statutory requirement that a share should always remain in 
issue.401 The draft Bill expressly requires at least one share to be in issue, 
_________________________________________________________________  
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397 See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.1. 
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399  See CA 1985 s 351(2), discussed in Chapter 2 paragraph 2.1. 
400  See paragraph 2.3.1.6 above. 
401  See paragraph 2.2 above.  
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although the formulation of this provision has been criticised.402  
With the exception of England, which prescribes a minimum issued and paid-
up capital for public companies in the interest of creditors, all the jurisdictions 
regulate the minimum capital purely in the interest of the proper functioning of the 
company. As is the case in South Africa, the legislation in England, New Zealand, 
Delaware and California does not expressly prescribe the attributes of the initial 
minimum issued shares.403 However, express restrictions are found in South 
Africa, Delaware and California regarding the kind of shares that should remain in 
issue following certain acquisitions of shares.404 In contrast, it is a statutory 
requirement under the MBCA that there should at all times be at least one or more 
issued shares that together have unlimited voting rights and the right to the net 
assets of the corporation upon dissolution. This latter approach is preferable as it 
avoids uncertainty and also facilitates simplification of the requirements for 
repurchases or redemptions. In view of the criticisms against the proposed 
provision of the Companies Bill, an alternative provision will be recommended.405 
2.9.3 Evaluation of kinds of shares 
The dual system of par value and no par value shares as currently regulated in the 
Act has been criticised elsewhere.406 
This is aptly illustrated by comparison with Delaware, the only other 
jurisdiction surveyed that provides for a dual system of par and no par value 
shares. Although the capital maintenance or legal capital doctrine still applies in 
Delaware, its regulation of how the consideration received for par value and no par 
value shares should be reflected in share capital and reserve accounts differs from 
South African law in important respects.407 In Delaware it is not required that the 
full consideration received for no par value shares should be reflected as stated 
capital. Neither is share premiums regulated, although the board of directors has 
_________________________________________________________________  
402  See paragraph 2.8.2 above. 
403  See paragraph 2.2 above; Chapter 2 paragraph 2.2; Chapter 3 paragraph 2; Chapter 4 
paragraphs 2.2.2 and 3.2.2. 
404  See paragraph 6.3.2 below and Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.2.3 and 3.2.2.  
405  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.4 and the proposed provision entitled ‘Requirement to have 
shareholders’. 
406  See paragraph 2.3.2 above. 
407   See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.4. 
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the discretion to reflect any portion of a premium as share capital. 
New Zealand is the only jurisdiction to have adopted a compulsory no par 
value system.408 In California and under the Model Business Corporations Act 
shares need not, but may, have a par value.409 Although companies may attach a 
par value to their shares, this value will have no legal significance. In England only 
par value shares are allowed.410  
It is disappointing that the South African debate surrounding the nature of 
shares seems to have focused primarily on one of the disadvantages of par value 
shares, namely the artificiality and ‛historical insignificance’ of the par value 
assigned to a share which is perceived as potentially misleading to investors and 
creditors.411 One of the arguments against par value shares is that they serve no 
purpose in a system which requires shares to be fully paid up upon issue, because 
the only function of par value was to indicate the outstanding liability of 
shareholders in a system of unpaid or partly paid shares.412 This argument does 
not withstand closer scrutiny. Although the par value may be used to determine 
liability to creditors, a shareholder is liable to the company for the total issue price 
of her shares, including any premium payable. If unpaid or partly paid shares were 
allowed, the outstanding liability to the company would thus not be determined 
with reference only to the nominal value of the share. It would also be possible to 
allow unpaid or partly paid no par value shares, in which case the outstanding 
liability would be determined with reference to the agreed consideration only.413 
Par value shares are also criticised because existing shareholders are not 
properly protected against the dilution of the value of their shares.414 While the 
criticism against the current section 81 is justified,415 the problem cannot be 
attributed to the par value system as such. Better protection for par value 
shareholders could have been enacted by taking into account the full issue price of 
_________________________________________________________________  
408 See Chapter 3 paragraph 2. 
409 See Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.2.3 and 3.2.3. 
410 See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.3. 
411 See McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 43 note 3; Policy Framework 2.2.3. 
412  McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 43. 
413 In South Africa partly paid shares were abolished at the same time that no par value shares 
were introduced, but these decisions were not interdependent. See paragraph 3.3 below on 
the time when consideration must be received by the company. 
414  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-39. 
415 See paragraph 3.1.1 below. 
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shares, that is, the nominal value as well as any premium.416 
McLennan concludes that, apart from some complex and meaningless 
provisions, there is no harm in par value shares. He nevertheless suggests that 
South Africa should allow only no par value shares.417 He provides no detailed 
suggestions as to how the no par value shares should be regulated. As South 
Africa already allows no par value shares, a discussion of the extent to which the 
current no par value share provisions, many of which were designed to 
approximate the position of par value shares, should be retained or varied in a 
new system would have been useful. 
The Policy Framework418 alludes to the relationship between par value and 
the share premium account. The suggestion that the ‛outdated distinction between 
share premium and par value’ should be abandoned,419 is far from clear. Although 
the document points to one of the main problems associated with par value 
shares, namely the regulation of the share premium account, it is submitted that 
this is not a problem inherent in par value shares as such, as can be seen from the 
Delaware experience. 
I submit that the designation of shares as either par value or no par value 
shares has little relevance for creditors in a system which subjects distributions to 
solvency and liquidity. The focus should rather be on the protection of 
shareholders.  Par value shares allow a company considerable freedom to arrange 
the voting and distribution rights of different classes of shareholders 
disproportionately to the consideration paid in respect of those shares. Although 
companies should not be denied the flexibility of treating different classes of 
shareholders differently, this should be done openly and not through a 
manipulation of par values. For this reason, I suggest that no par value shares are 
preferable. 
The no par value shares proposed in the Companies Bill will not be subject to 
the problems currently experienced with no par value shares. It is a challenge to 
convert current par value shares into no par value shares, particularly in 
_________________________________________________________________  
416 As was suggested in the Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.16 – 34.18. See also paragraph 
3.1.1 below. 
417  McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 43. The author does not give any examples of the complex 
and meaningless provisions. 
418  See Policy Framework 2.2.3. 
419 Policy Framework 2.2.3. 
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companies that presently have par value as well as no par value shares.420 
Nevertheless, it is suggested that the elimination of the problems caused by the 
current dual system is a necessary step in the future regulation of share capital.  
2.9.4 Evaluation of share capital accounts 
Some of the most complex provisions in the Act regulate the share capital and 
non-distributable reserve accounts of a company. While these provisions were 
necessary while the capital maintenance doctrine was applied, their justification 
has to a large extent fallen away. Despite this, the legislature has preserved the 
share capital structure as supported by the share capital and statutory non-
distributable reserve accounts, requiring adjustments to be made when there is a 
variation or reduction of capital.421 It is equally clear that the intention is not that 
the amounts standing to the credit of these accounts should necessarily be 
represented by assets.422  
Although shareholders may have an interest in share capital accounts which 
reflect their equity interests, this is not true of the share premium account. Yet I 
have illustrated that the regulation of the share premium account is the most 
problematic aspect in the share capital structure of companies.423 The 
uncertainties about the legal implications of the share premium account and the 
interpretation of section 76 clearly warrant the reconsideration of such an account 
under a reformed Companies Act.424 The share premium account does not serve 
any useful purpose as it protects neither shareholders nor creditors.425 
The interpretation of statutory exceptions such as those in sections 76(3), 
77(3) and 98(4) has become problematic since the capital maintenance principle 
was abolished.426 The share premium account cannot be singled out as an 
anomaly. The problem extends to the comprehensive regulation of share capital 
and non-distributable reserve accounts in a system that no longer attaches 
_________________________________________________________________  
420  Guidance can be sought from the transitional provisions that applied in New Zealand and 
Australia when these jurisdictions abolished par value shares. 
421  See paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6.2. 
422  See paragraph 4.1 below. 
423  See paragraph 2.4.3 above. 
424  See paragraph 2.4.3.3 above. 
425  See paragraph 2.4.3.4.3 above. 
426 See paragraph 2.4.3.3.3 above. 
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significance to these accounts.  
Obviously, most of the problems surrounding the share premium account will 
be removed if par value shares are abolished.427 Attention will have to be given to 
transitional provisions that would apply to existing share premium accounts. 
England is the only other jurisdictions surveyed that regulates share capital 
accounts, including share premium accounts. However, the fact that the English 
approach remains based on capital maintenance, raises the question whether 
capital accounts need to be regulated in a system based on solvency and liquidity.   
The Companies Bill does not regulate the way in which the consideration 
received for shares should be reflected in the company’s accounts.428 In fact, it 
does not even seem necessary for the board to determine the specific monetary 
value of consideration received for the issue of shares.429 I support this approach 
because the accounts reflect only the internal entitlements of shareholders. 
2.9.5 Evaluation of the variation of share capital 
As is the case with the regulation of share capital accounts, the complexity of the 
variation of capital provisions is not justified by their purpose. The imposition of a 
fee on authorised capital accounts for much uncertainty.430 The variation of share 
capital provisions pay little direct attention to the protection of creditors and 
shareholders, although variation of class rights principles may be relevant.431 
The Companies Bill does not regulate share capital accounts and 
consequently also not their variation. However, it contains an enabling provision 
allowing the variation of share capital by special resolution of the shareholders or 
by the directors if the memorandum so provides.432 The extended powers of 
directors that the Companies Bill proposes can potentially be used to the detriment 
of existing shareholders. This risk is offset by the flexibility that will be afforded to 
_________________________________________________________________  
427 See Cassim “Reform of Company Law and Capital Maintenance” 286. 
428  See paragraph 2.8.4 above. 
429  Clause 40(2). See the similar position under the MBCA, USA Chapter paragraph 4.2.1. 
430  See paragraph 2.5 above. 
431  See paragraph 2.5.4 above. Fiduciary duties may also play a role in the protection of 
shareholders where the main purpose of a variation of capital is to force out minority 
shareholders. An example of such a variation is a consolidation of shares (a ‘reverse stock 
split’) accompanied by a cancellation or redemption of fractional shares, see Kaplan & Young 
“Corporate Eminent Domain” 68. 
432  See paragraph 2.8.5 above. 
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directors to make important financing decisions without undue delay and 
formalities. The exercise of directors’ powers will, after all, depend on an express 
delegation in the memorandum of the company and will be subject to the 
standards of conduct required of directors including the duty to exercise powers for 
their proper purpose. 
Also, dissenting shareholders may in appropriate circumstances rely on the 
proposed appraisal remedy.433 However, it would seem that an increase of 
authorised shares will not trigger appraisal as it would not amount to a change in 
the preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of existing shares, although it 
may affect the interests of the shareholders. Appraisal will also not be available if 
the power to vary share capital has been given to the directors, because then 
there is no resolution of the general meeting that the dissenter could have voted 
against. 
I support the proposals of the Companies Bill with regard to variation of 
capital, but recommend that the appraisal remedy should also be made available 
in respect of capital increases that may affect existing classes.  
2.9.6 Conclusion on reduction of capital  
The relative merits of a formal reduction of capital procedure and the reduction of 
capital through an acquisition of own shares have been considered earlier.434 The 
difficulties regarding the interpretation of references to the reduction of capital in 
the Act have also been highlighted.  
Of the other legal systems that have been surveyed, New Zealand, California 
and the Model Business Corporations Act of the USA do not regulate share capital 
accounts and therefore do not have reduction of capital provisions. In both 
England and Delaware provision is made for the reduction of capital as a 
procedure independent of share repurchases. 
In England a repurchase or redemption of shares will generally result in the 
adjustment of the share capital account to reflect the shares that have been 
cancelled.435 However, a capital redemption reserve will then have to be created if 
_________________________________________________________________  
433  See clause 164. 
434  See paragraph 2.6.3 above. 
435 Unless the shares are to be held by the company as treasury shares, see Chapter 2 
paragraph 5.6. 
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profits have been applied to the redemption or repurchase. The total non-
distributable funds or ‘capital’ will remain the same. The only exception is when 
private companies repurchase their shares out of capital, resulting in a reduction of 
capital. The reason for the retention of the court-sanctioned capital reduction 
procedure is that repurchases in that jurisdiction have limited scope as a capital 
reduction mechanism.436  
In Delaware repurchases do not automatically result in adjustments to the 
company’s stated capital. This is a result of the low level of correspondence 
between stated capital and the consideration received on the issue of shares.437 
The Delaware General Corporation Law sets out all the different possible 
reductions of capital in one provision, including optional reductions following a 
repurchase of shares.438 Different financial restrictions apply to repurchases and to 
reductions of stated capital. A repurchase is a form of distribution and has to be 
funded out of surplus.439 Reductions of stated capital are subject to compliance 
with a liquidity test.440 
It is suggested that South Africa does not need a separate reduction of 
capital procedure. The need for separate procedures regulating repurchases and 
reductions of capital in England and Delaware can be explained by the fact that 
they have retained the capital maintenance principle in respect of distributions. 
The absence in the Companies Bill of any reference to reduction of capital, 
and of a requirement pertaining to adjustment of capital accounts following 
repurchases is in line with the underlying principle of non-regulation of share 
capital accounts and cannot be faulted.  
3 CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
Shareholders are liable only for the amount outstanding on their shares. Limited 
companies are thus sometimes referred to as companies limited by shares.441 This 
terminology is no longer used in South Africa because shares are required to be 
_________________________________________________________________  
436 See Chapter 2 paragraph 5.3.5. 
437 See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.4. 
438 See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.6. 
439 See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.5.2.  
440 See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.6. 
441 The 1926 Companies Act, which allowed partly paid shares, referred to a company limited by 
shares, see s 5 of the Companies Act 46 of 1926.   
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fully paid up upon issue and there can thus not be outstanding consideration.442 
Instead, the phrase ‛company having a share capital’ is used in the Act.443 Section 
65(1) sets out the effect of incorporation and states that the liability of members to 
contribute to the assets of the company on winding up (if any) is such as is 
provided by the Act. This reference to a liability to contribute on winding-up 
pertains to the liability of members of a company limited by guarantee as set out in 
section 52(3)(b).444 Section 52(2), which can be regarded as the corresponding 
provision for companies with share capital, makes no reference to the limitation of 
liability of shareholders, but instead requires the memorandum to state the number 
of shares each subscriber undertakes to take up.  
Consideration paid for shares is also the ‛investment’ of the shareholder in 
the company on which a return in the form of dividends is expected. It is used in 
the determination of the shareholder’s equity interest in the company. The 
regulation of consideration for shares is an integral element in addressing the 
interests of shareholders. It preserves the built-in proportionality by ensuring that 
shareholders who obtain comparable equity interests do so for comparable 
consideration.  
3.1 Size of capital contribution 
The minimum capital contribution payable when shares are issued depends on 
whether the shares are par value shares or shares without a par value.445 In the 
case of par value shares, the consideration must be at least equal to their par 
value.446 Put differently, par value shares may not be issued at a discount. This 
rule has not been enacted in legislation, but a statutory exception is provided 
_________________________________________________________________  
442 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-238. See also the Van Wyk de Vries 
Main Report par 32. It is an interesting question whether s 92 also precludes the levying of 
further assessments on shares, eg on the basis of a provision in the articles. The answer 
would depend on whether the further contribution is regarded as ‘consideration’ for the shares. 
The levying of further assessments is expressly addressed in the legislation of New Zealand, 
see Chapter 3 paragraph 3.1; California, see Chapter 4 paragraph 3.3.1; and under the 
MBCA, see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.1. 
443 See s 19(1)(a). 
444 Although the Act provides for instances of personal liability of members, like s 66 which 
imposes liability where the membership of a public company falls below the prescribed 
minimum, these are not restricted to contributions on winding-up. 
445 See also paragraph 2.3 above. 
446 Ooregum Gold Mining Co of India Ltd v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL); Etkind & Others v Hicor 
Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W). 
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for.447 No par value shares, on the other hand, may be issued for any 
consideration.448 
According to the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 
the abolition of the capital maintenance doctrine raises questions about the 
continued existence of this rule.449 If the rule has no application outside the capital 
maintenance principle, a conclusion that the rule still applies in our law can, 
according to the learned authors, only be justified by reading an implied prohibition 
into the statutory exception allowing discounts in certain circumstances.450 
However, if the rule also has the purpose of protecting existing shareholders, then 
the prohibition against discount still forms part of our law.451 The authors of 
Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act support the second conclusion. 
The alternative purpose, which is unrelated to capital maintenance, thus justifies 
the conclusion that the common-law rule has been retained. The authors do not go 
into detail regarding the scope of the implied prohibition and just assume that it 
would correspond exactly with the common-law prohibition. It is at least arguable 
that any prohibition implied from the discount exception may be more limited than 
the common-law no discount rule. Since the discount exception applies only to 
existing classes of shares, the implied prohibition may also have to relate only to 
existing classes. Such a prohibition, which would protect shareholders, would 
leave a company free to issue new classes of shares at a discount.  
Although it cannot be denied that the rule against discount results in some 
protection for shareholders,452 it is clear that historically the rule is primarily linked 
to creditor protection.453 It is submitted that the rule still forms part of South African 
law despite the fact that its main purpose is aligned with capital maintenance. It is 
_________________________________________________________________  
447 In s 81, see paragraph 3.1.1 below. Section 92 does not enact the common-law rule, but is 
merely a timing provision, see paragraph 3.4 below. 
448 In certain instances, an issue price has to be approved by special resolution, see paragraph 
3.1.2 below. 
449 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-36. 
450 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-36. See paragraph 3.1.1 below for further 
discussion of the discount exception. Similar issues regarding statutory exceptions to 
common-law rules arise in relation to the share premium account and the power to acquire 
shares, see paragraphs 2.4.3 and 6.1 below. 
451 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-36. 
452 See Ex parte South African General Mining Co (Pty) Ltd 1940 PH E14 (W) which recognises 
the interests of creditors and shareholders.  
453 See Ooregum Gold Mining Co of India Ltd v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL) 145. 
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also submitted that the line of argument referred to in the previous paragraph 
cannot be supported as a way of determining whether the rule actually still applies. 
While the purpose of a rule can be relevant in a policy decision as to whether the 
rule should be retained or repealed, it cannot be used as an independent indicator 
of whether the rule has in fact been abolished or not. The presumption that the 
legislature does not change the common law more than necessary,454 points 
towards a conclusion that the no discount rule is still part of South African law. 
This conclusion is also in line with other instances where the legislature has 
retained the rules regarding the structure of share capital despite its reforms of the 
distribution rules.455 
3.1.1 The issue of par value shares at a discount 
The issue of par value shares at a discount is an exception to the common-law no 
discount rule. Strict application of the common-law principle that a shareholder is 
liable to give consideration at least equal to the par value of shares issued can, 
however, have the undesirable effect of inhibiting the raising of further capital by a 
company. When the issued shares of a company are worth less than their par 
value, the company will struggle to find subscribers for further authorised but 
unissued shares it wants to issue. The company could avoid the no discount rule 
by refraining from issuing previously authorised shares and instead creating a new 
class of shares with a lower par value. Apart from the fact that the company will 
incur additional costs to increase its authorised share capital, such a step would 
also complicate the capital structure of the company.  
A statutory exception to the no discount rule was first introduced in the 1929 
English Companies Act.456 It was also implemented in South Africa and is currently 
contained in section 81 of the Companies Act. The English provision457 was 
repealed in 1980 when the Second Company Law Directive was implemented.458 
_________________________________________________________________  
454  See Du Plessis “Statute Law” paragraph 328. 
455 See, for example, the adjustment of capital accounts following an acquisition of own shares, 
discussed in paragraph 6.3.3 and the application of the share premium account to provide for 
a premium on the repurchase of own shares, discussed in paragraph 2.4.3.3.2. 
456 See s 47 of the English Companies Act 1929 (19 & 20 Geo 5, c 23), see also the Company 
Law Amendment Committee Report Cmd 2567 (1925 – 1926) (Greene Committee) paragraph 
19. 
457  At that stage s 57 of the English Companies Act 1948 (11 & 12 Geo 6, c 38). 
458  See Schedule 4 of the English Companies Act 1980 (c 22). 
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3.1.1.1 Requirements 
A company may issue par value shares at a discount if the following requirements 
have been met: 
• the shares must be of a class already issued459 
• at least one year should have elapsed since the certificate to 
commence business was issued or since the first issue of that class of 
shares460 
• the discount must be approved by special resolution461 
• the discount must be sanctioned by the court462 
• the shares must be issued within 1 month after the date of sanction or 
within such extended time allowed by court.463 
 
Although the fact that existing shares stand at a discount in the market can be 
regarded as the main motivation for allowing discount on a further issue, it is not 
expressly required that the shares should be valued or trading at less than their 
par value.464  However, the requirements that the shares should be of a class 
already issued465 and that one year must have elapsed from commencement of 
business or issue of class of shares466 give effect to this consideration. The time 
limit also reduces the risk that a discount could prove to be unfair in view of 
subsequent changes in the financial position of the company and the value of its 
existing shares.  
The existing shareholders are protected by the requirement that the discount 
must be approved by special resolution.467 
When asked to sanction a discount, the court must have regard to all the 
_________________________________________________________________  
459 Section 81(1) introductory part. 
460 Section 81(1)(b). 
461 Section 81(1)(a). 
462 Section 81(1)(c). 
463 Section 81(1)(d). 
464 See Report of the Committee upon the Amendment of the Law under the Companies Acts 
Cmd 9138 (1918) pars 45 – 46, (Wrenbury Committee). Company Law Amendment 
Committee Report Cmd 2567 (1925 – 1926) (Greene Committee) par 19. 
465 Section 81(1). 
466 Section 81(1)(b). 
467 Section 81(1)(a). 
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circumstances of the case and make an order it thinks fit.468 The court will take into 
consideration the interests of prospective shareholders and creditors, and the 
effect on present shareholders and creditors.469 The court can impose further 
requirements.470  
3.1.1.2 Consequences of discount issues 
Every prospectus issued after a discount issue must contain particulars of the 
discount allowed or ‛so much of that discount as has not been written off at date of 
issue of the prospectus’.471  
Apart from the reference to the disclosure of the extent to which a discount 
has not been ‛written off’, the Act does not prescribe the accounting treatment of 
discounts. However, the aggregate nominal value of the shares must still be 
reflected in the share capital account.472 ‛Writing off’ would thus involve accounting 
entries to ensure that the difference between the nominal capital of the company 
and its true capital is extinguished.473 
Failure to disclose a discount in the prospectus constitutes a criminal offence 
by every director and officer who is knowingly a party to such failure.474 
Interestingly, it is not an offence to issue shares at a discount contrary to section 
81(1).  
The disclosure requirement is aimed at the protection of future shareholders. 
However, no additional disclosure is required if the offer is not an offer to the 
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468 Section 82(2). 
469 See Ex parte South African General Mining Co (Pty) Ltd 1940 PH E14 (W). See also Biala Pty 
Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (1997) 23 ACSR 725 (Fed C of A) 731. 
470 In Re ‘Air North West’ Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 1 at 143 the Australian court imposed an 
obligation on the company, for five years after the discount, to inform future shareholders of 
the discount previously given. See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-38. 
471 Section 81(3). This rule has an effect similar to the additional requirement imposed by the 
court in Re ‘Air North West’ Pty Ltd (1988) 6 ACLC 1 (see preceding note), but its operation is 
limited to public offers. 
472  See Cilliers & Benade Maatskappyereg 4 ed 140 – 141. It is also stated that the discount will 
be reflected as a fictitious asset, but this explanation is not repeated in the later work by these 
authors, Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law. 
473 In Re Melacare Industries of Australia Pty Ltd (1993) 12 ACSR 236 SC (NSW) the court said 
that the public should not be misled by the difference between nominal and true capital. In 
view of the lack of any requirement that capital funds should actually be separated from other 
funds, or that the assets should equal or exceed the amount of the share capital, this is difficult 
to understand. 
474 Section 81(4). 
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public. Although the special resolution authorising the discount will enjoy publicity, 
the extent to which the discount has been written off will not appear from the 
resolution. It seems anomalous that a statement pertaining to commission allowed 
is required as an alternative under section 80(1)c475 while no such disclosure is 
required in respect of discount allowed.  
3.1.2 The issue of no par value shares at lower issue price 
The absence of a nominal or par value means that no par value shares cannot be 
issued at a premium or a discount. The freedom of a company to issue no par 
value shares for any consideration is seen as their main advantage. However, 
section 82 limits the freedom of directors to determine the price. It requires a 
special resolution when further no par value shares of an existing class are to be 
issued at a price below a specified minimum.476 The minimum issue price is 
determined by dividing that part of the stated capital contributed by the already 
issued shares by the number of issued shares of that class.477 It is interesting that 
reference is made to ‛that part of the stated capital contributed by the already 
issued shares’. If the stated capital account has been applied as envisaged in 
section 77(3), the remaining part of stated capital contributed by the issued shares 
may be less than the capital initially contributed.478 If the stated capital account 
has not been applied, the minimum issue price will in effect be the average issue 
price.479 The Van Wyk de Vries Commission initially recommended that an issue of 
no par value shares below the immediately preceding issue price should require a 
special resolution.480 In its supplementary report the Commission concluded that 
using the immediately preceding issue price would be impracticable481 and instead 
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475 See paragraph 3.5 below. 
476 Section 82(1). 
477 Section 82(1).  
478 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-39. This has interesting implications for 
stated capital and for the book value of no par value shares. 
479 Transfers out of profits or reserves to the stated capital account under s 75(1)(b), without a 
distribution of shares, will not have an effect on the minimum issue price, as only the part of 
stated capital ‘contributed’ by the existing no par value shares must be taken into account. 
480 Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.18. 
481 The Commission did not explain why it would be impracticable, but this could be because 
some time may have lapsed since the previous issue and the market value of the shares may 
have changed in the meantime.  
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recommended the present formulation.482 
The directors have to issue a report on the reasons for the proposed lower 
issue price.483 A copy of this report must accompany the notice convening the 
meeting at which the special resolution is to be taken.484 A copy of the report must 
also be lodged with the Registrar together with the special resolution.485 
Section 82 does not apply in the case of a proportionate offer to existing 
shareholders, with or without the right to renounce in favour of others.486 It is clear 
from this exception, as well as from the fact that only a special resolution is 
required to authorise the issue of no par value shares at a lower price, that the 
protection of shareholders is the only purpose of section 82. Creditor protection is 
not an aim of section 82, because the actual consideration received will be 
reflected as stated capital.  
3.2 Form of capital contribution 
Consideration for shares may be paid in cash or kind.487 Consideration must, 
however, have a monetary value which can be reflected in the capital accounts of 
the company. While non-cash consideration is clearly acceptable, it is 
nevertheless interesting to consider the argument that the term ‛subscription’ is or 
should be restricted to instances were shares are issued for cash consideration.488 
Although this argument is usually raised in the context of offers to the public and 
concerns the meaning of the word ‛subscription’ in section 145, it may have 
implications for the nature of the consideration that a company can agree to 
accept when it issues and allots shares pursuant to subscription offers.  
The crucial question is whether an issue and allotment is in all cases 
preceded by subscription or whether shares can be issued and allotted 
independently of subscription. Proponents of the narrow interpretation of 
subscription see it as an application to take up previously unissued shares for 
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482 Van Wyk de Vries Supplementary Report 86.02. 
483 Section 82(2). 
484 Section 82(2). 
485 Section 82(3). 
486 Section 82(4). 
487 Famatina Development Corporation Ltd v Bury [1910] AC 439 (HL).  
488  See Delport “Offer to the Public” 390, Cassim “A Lost Opportunity” 272 – 273. 
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cash, but do not suggest alternative terminology to describe an agreement to take 
up shares otherwise than for cash. Nevertheless, this interpretation would imply 
that when a shareholder has agreed to ‛subscribe’ for shares, only cash 
consideration would be acceptable. 
The wider interpretation, which was favoured by the court in Gold Fields Ltd 
& Another v Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd & Others489 is based on the 
premise that the existence of various references to non-cash consideration imply 
that the legislature intended treating all agreements to take up shares in the same 
way and that the term ‛subscription’ is not inherently restricted to cash 
consideration. This interpretation, which it is submitted is correct, merely means 
that cash as well as non-cash consideration is acceptable, regardless of the name 
given to the agreement between the company and the prospective shareholder. 
‛Paid in cash’ means that there must be a liquidated sum due and 
immediately payable. Promissory notes are not cash, but if they are subsequently 
honoured and paid, it will constitute cash consideration.490 The English Companies 
Act defines cash to include a cheque accepted in good faith with no reason to 
suspect that it would not be honoured, as well as an undertaking to pay cash in the 
future.491 Similarly the MBCA refers to ‛cash equivalents’ which are short term debt 
instruments.492 It is suggested that the South African approach in this regard 
should be relaxed so that common forms of payment such as cheques and 
promissory notes will be regarded as cash rather than as non-cash 
consideration.493     
Payment otherwise than in cash can consist of property or services. The 
allotment of shares for consideration otherwise than cash, is subject to additional 
regulation under section 93.494 The courts will not easily interfere with the 
discretion of the directors to accept particular non-cash consideration as 
adequate.495 A court will interfere only if the consideration is patently inadequate or 
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489  2005 (2) SA 506 (SCA). 
490 Re Biltong Asbestos Co Ltd 1925 CPD 356 at 359 – 360. 
491 See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2. 
492  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.3. 
493  The question as to what constitutes cash is also considered in Delport “Offer to the Public” in 
relation to s 169(3). Also see s 76(1), (2), s 77(2), s 92, s 165(3). 
494 See paragraph 3.3 below.  
495 Ooregum Gold Mining Co of India Ltd v Roper [1892] AC 125 (HL) 148. See also Blackman, 
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if there are indications of fraud or mala fides on the part of the directors. The 
directors have to be satisfied that the non-cash consideration is adequate.496  
In view of the requirement that the consideration should be received by the 
company prior to the allotment and issue of the shares,497 future services are not 
acceptable consideration, because there will not be a debt presently due by the 
company which can be set off against the consideration.498 The timing provision 
thus influences the nature of the consideration that can be accepted by the 
company. An issue and allotment for an unacceptable form of consideration will be 
void.499 
One of the issues that had to be decided in Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading 
Ltd & Another500 was whether the transfer of shares and claims by a subscriber to 
a subsidiary of the issuer could be regarded as consideration for the issue of 
further shares by the holding company. The court found that the increase in the 
value of the holding company’s shareholding in its subsidiary constituted 
consideration in the hands of the holding company.501 The court further stated that 
the holding company could have arranged that the subsidiary issue further shares 
to it.502 It would seem that the court regarded the potential of the subsidiary issuing 
further shares to the holding company as tantamount to consideration received by 
_________________________________________________________________  
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Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-247. In Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 
1999 (1) SA 111 (W) it was argued that the existence of the security interest of the pledgee of 
the assets reduced their value to below the issue price of the shares. The court did not attempt 
to value the consideration, since the transaction was at arms length and for the bona fide 
commercial purpose of acquiring an assessed loss and a corporate entity with continuing 
leases and other agreements. It held that there was no reason to suspect that the R850 000 
represented by the new issue had not been met, see at 122. 
496 See Park Business Interiors Ltd v Park [1992] BCLC 1034 CS (OH) where shares were issued 
in discharge of a company’s debt in respect of pre-incorporation expenses. After incorporation 
the company agreed to refund those expenses. The court held that the company did receive 
consideration for the shares it gave, because it was obliged to pay the expenses when it 
issued the shares in satisfaction of that debt. When shares are allotted in recognition of past 
services for which the company was not obliged to pay, no consideration is received, Re 
Eddystone Marine Insurance Co [1893] 3 Ch 9. 
497 Section 92, see paragraph 3.3 below. 
498 Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) at 122, see also Re The 
Contributories of the Rosemount Gold Mining Syndicate 1905 TH 169 at 192; Middelburg 
Prospecting Syndicate Ltd v Goodwin 1906 TS 899 at 906; Re Eddystone Marine Insurance 
Co [1893] 3 Ch 9. 
499  See Bauermeister v C C Bauermeister (Pty) Ltd & Another 1981 (1) SA 274 (W) at 277. 
500 1999 (1) SA 111 (W). 
501 Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) at 121. 
502 Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) at 121. 
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the holding company. It is difficult to see how the issue by a wholly owned 
subsidiary of further shares to its holding company could make any difference to 
the situation. The consideration paid to the subsidiary by the subscriber for the 
new shares in the holding company would, on the court’s construction, already 
have increased the value of the holding company’s shareholding. Any further 
shares subsequently issued by the wholly owned subsidiary will in effect amount to 
a subdivision of shares and will not add any value to the holding company. 
Moreover, the subsidiary would in turn have to have received consideration for the 
issue of the further shares. Presumably the consideration it received from the 
subscriber to shares in its holding company (and intended as consideration for 
holding company shares) would then simultaneously be regarded as consideration 
for the shares that the subsidiary will subsequently issue to its holding company. It 
seems that this construction is rather strained and out of step with what the parties 
actually agreed upon. 
Whether an increase in the value of a holding company’s shareholding in its 
subsidiary can properly be regarded as payment to and receipt by it of ‛the issue 
price or other consideration’ as intended by section 92(1) is debatable.  The issue 
price or other consideration is determined in the subscription agreement. It is this 
price or consideration which must be received by the issuing company. Where the 
consideration agreed to by the subscriber comprises shares and claims, these 
should be transferred to the issuer. If the agreed consideration is that the 
subscriber will cause a certain increase in the value of an asset held by the issuer 
- such as its shareholding in its subsidiary – it is that increase that must be 
‛received’ by the issuer. In view of the further requirements regarding non-cash 
consideration,503 including the lodging of a copy of the contract pertaining to the 
consideration, it is important that the actual consideration that will be received by 
the issuer should be set out.504 The court, however, paid no regard to the 
requirements pertaining to non-cash consideration, despite the fact that the 
consideration as construed by it would certainly amount to non-cash consideration. 
It is further curious that the court nevertheless decided that the consideration had 
not been received by the company, since the increase in the value of the 
_________________________________________________________________  
503 See paragraph 3.3 below. 
504  See also paragraph 3.4 below regarding the timing of the consideration. 
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shareholder’s shareholding would not necessarily depend on actual transfer of the 
shares and claims, but could be brought about by the conclusion of the agreement 
giving rise to an enforceable right. There thus seems to be an inconsistency 
between the court’s view of the nature of the consideration and its application of 
the statutory principles to it. 
3.2.1 The problem with capitalisation shares 
When shares are issued by a company as fully paid-up capitalisation shares or 
bonus shares,505 the company does not receive cash or property from the 
shareholders. It has been suggested that the consideration consists of the fact that 
the shareholders give up their hope of obtaining the profits in cash and agree to 
capitalise those profits.506 The advantage that the company is said to derive is that 
it is placed in a better position to offer security to future creditors.507 However, it is 
clear that the company does not receive goods and that an accounting entry is not 
really payment.508 The issue of capitalisation shares constitutes ‛manifest non-
compliance with the principle that assets are supposed to come into the corporate 
till when shares of the company are issued’.509 Further, the construction that the 
consideration consists of the retention of distributable profits cannot be applied to 
instances when the company funds the capitalisation issue from its share premium 
account or capital redemption reserve, which would otherwise be non-
distributable.510 Since the shareholders have no specific entitlement to these 
reserve accounts and since the company will be replacing non-distributable 
reserves with share capital, it is difficult to see any consideration passing to the 
company.511 But it is also clear that this absence of consideration does not 
_________________________________________________________________  
505  In theory capitalisation shares and bonus shares are synonyms. However, the term ‘bonus 
share’ may be misleading because shareholders do not necessarily receive any financial 
benefit, see Woods “Capitalization Issues” 126. Woods suggests that the term bonus shares 
should be reserved for employee shareholder schemes.   
506 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-247. 
507 See Gibaud v CIR 1928 CPD 168 at 174.  
508 See Manning Legal Capital 47, 129. See also Osborne v Steel Barrel Co Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 
634 (CA) at 637 – 638. 
509 Manning Legal Capital 129. 
510 See CIR v Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd 1963 (3) SA 876 (A) where the court 
acknowledged the difference between capitalisation of distributable profits and capitalisation of 
a non-distributable premium.  
511 CIR v Collins 1923 AD 347 at 363 – 364; CIR v Legal and General Assurance Society Ltd 
1963 (3) SA 876 (A). It must be remembered that when CIR v Collins was decided share 
Continued 
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adversely affect the company or its creditors. 
The issue of fully paid-up capitalisation shares is referred to in three 
provisions of the Companies Act. First, section 90(3) expressly excludes such an 
issue from the definition of ‛payment’ as envisaged in section 90.512 The other two 
instances are found among the possible applications of the two statutory non-
distributable reserves. Both the share premium account513 and the capital 
redemption reserve514 may be applied in providing for capitalisation issues. While 
the Act thus expressly provides for capitalisation issues out of non-distributable 
reserves, it is silent on the capitalisation of profits for this purpose. When profits 
are used, it is clear that the company could achieve the same result by declaring 
dividends and then retaining those dividends as consideration for the issue of the 
further shares. Although it cannot be disputed that the issue of capitalisation 
shares does not harm the company or its creditors,515 it is not clear how such 
issues comply with the consideration requirement. It appears that capitalisation 
issues contravene both the common-law rule that consideration at least equal to 
the par value should pass to the company and section 92 which requires the full 
issue price or other consideration to be paid to and received by the company. 
3.3 The regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
A company is required to keep a register of allotments of shares516 and to lodge a 
return of allotments with the Registrar.517 Among other information, the register 
and the return have to state the amount paid for the shares allotted.518 Failure to 
lodge a return of allotments is a criminal offence,519 but will not affect the validity of 
the issue and allotment.520 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
premium accounts were not yet regulated, see paragraph 2.4.3.1 above. 
512 See paragraph 5.1.3 below. 
513 Section 76(3). See paragraph 2.3.3.2 above. 
514 Section 98(4). See paragraph 2.4.4 above. 
515 See Osborne v Steel Barrel Co Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 634 (CA) at 637 – 638 for an analysis of 
what happens when a company allots shares. 
516 Section 93(1). 
517 Section 93(3). 
518 Section 93(2). 
519  Section 93(5). 
520  Moosa v Lalloo & Another 1957 (4) SA 207 (N) at 220. A court can allow a company to replace 
an incorrect return with a correct one, Ex parte Northern Transvaal (Messina) Copper 
Continued 
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Additional disclosure requirements apply to non-cash consideration. The 
register as well as the return of allotment has to contain full particulars of the 
consideration and of the contract or transaction concerned.521 A copy of the 
contract in writing constituting the title of the allottee to the allotment, together with 
any contract of sale, for service or other consideration in respect of which the 
allotment was made, has to be lodged with the Registrar.522 If the contract is not in 
writing, a memorandum setting out full particulars of the contract has to be lodged. 
Moreover, while the names and addresses of all allottees have to be contained in 
the register of allotments kept at the registered office of the company,523 this 
information must in the case of non-cash allotments also be disclosed in the return 
of allotments lodged with the Registrar.524 The purpose of these provisions is to 
protect both the public and existing shareholders.525 The register of allotments can 
be inspected like the register of members.526 The return of allotments must be 
submitted as prescribed in Form CM15. Information regarding the authorised 
capital and previously issued share capital has to be set out,527 followed by 
particulars of the new issue528 and a summary of the issued capital following the 
allotment.529 Item 6 of the form applies only to the allotment of shares otherwise 
than for cash. In respect of no par value shares, item 6(a) requires disclosure of 
the issue price per share as well as the ‛deemed’ stated capital. For par value 
shares the nominal amount of each share, the premium on each share and the 
‛total amount of capital deemed to be paid-up’ have to be disclosed. It seems that 
the word ‛deemed’ is used to reflect the fact that non-cash consideration is not 
really ‛paid’ to the company. 
There is no express reference to the valuation of non-cash consideration in 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
Exploration Ltd 1938 WLD 258 at 259. Rectification of a return can also be ordered, Ex parte 
Keir & Cawder (South Africa) Ltd 1968 (2) SA 207 (T) at 208. 
521 Section 93(2) – (3). 
522 Section 93(3)(b). 
523 Section 93(2). 
524 Section 93(3)(b). 
525 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-261 and the authority there quoted. 
526 Section 93(6) read with s 113. 
527 See items 1 to 4 of Form CM 15. 
528 Form CM 15, items 5 and 6. Item 6 is relevant to shares allotted otherwise than for cash. 
529 Form CM 15 item 7. 
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either section 93 or the prescribed form for the return of allotments.530 But 
valuation is prescribed by other provisions dealing with par value and no par value 
shares respectively. Section 76(2) applies where ‛assets are acquired by the issue 
of (par value) shares of a company and no consideration is recorded’. It requires 
the assets to be valued in order that any excess over par value can be transferred 
to the share premium account. Section 77(2) requires directors to determine the 
value of non-cash consideration for no par value shares so that this value can be 
reflected as stated capital. A comparison of these valuation provisions reveals 
three significant differences between the two provisions: 
• In the case of par value shares, valuation is not required in respect of all 
forms of non-cash consideration, but only for ‛assets’. For no par value 
shares any consideration otherwise than cash must be valued. 
• Valuation in respect of par value shares can be avoided by recording a 
consideration. No such exception is provided for in respect of no par 
value shares. 
• It is not stated who should value the assets received in respect of par 
value shares. Independent or professional valuation is not required. In 
the case of no par value shares, it is expressly stated that the directors 
must determine the value of the consideration. 
3.3.1 Discrepancy between issue price and value of consideration 
If there is a discrepancy between the value of non-cash consideration and the 
issue price recorded in respect of the shares, the question arises which will be 
conclusive. The answer seems to depend on whether or not a company is obliged 
to determine an issue price. Section 92(2) requires the ‛full issue price of or other 
consideration for shares’ to have been paid to and received by the company. It 
would seem that ‛issue price’ and ‛other consideration’ are used as alternatives so 
that an issue price is not necessarily required. However, the use of the words ‛paid 
to and received by’ points in the opposite direction as other consideration would 
usually be delivered rather than ‛paid’. Further, section 92(2)(b) provides that 
allotments to intermediaries of shares that are not fully paid-up shall be void if the 
_________________________________________________________________  
530  See Form CM 15. 
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full issue price is not paid within the prescribed period. Reference is made only to 
the full issue price and not to the alternative of other consideration. Unless the 
implication is that offers to the public through intermediaries should always be 
cash offers, it seems that the term issue price must be understood as including 
non-cash consideration. The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham 
Companies Act conclude that there is always an issue price, even if the 
consideration does not consist of cash but is ‛other consideration’.531 This 
conclusion is supported by the information required to be disclosed in the 
prescribed form for returns of allotment.532 The authors of Meskin Henochsberg on 
the Companies Act, on the other hand, argue on the basis of Shearer v Bercain 
Ltd533 and Henry Head & Co Ltd v Ropner Holdings Ltd534 that the actual value of 
the non-cash consideration is conclusive.535  
I suggest that these two opinions can be reconciled by considering exactly 
what the issue price or the actual value is regarded as conclusive of. The issue 
price is an amount agreed upon contractually between the company and the 
subscriber. In order to establish whether the company will have a right to claim 
additional payment from the subscriber, this agreement must be analysed.  When 
the company places a value on an asset and agrees to accept it in lieu of cash, it 
does not have a claim against the subscriber if it later appears that the asset is 
worth less than the valuation.536  On the other hand, as far as the company’s share 
capital accounts are concerned, the valuation, or, in the case of par value shares, 
the amount recorded as consideration, must be conclusive. If an asset is given as 
consideration for the issue of shares and it appears that the asset is worth more 
than the specified issue price, the excess is clearly required to be reflected as 
either share premium or stated capital, depending on the type of share.537 
_________________________________________________________________  
531 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-239. It is not clear whether these 
authors really have in mind a price sounding in money or whether they adopt a wide definition 
of price as including a particular asset without any reference to a fixed sum of money. 
532 Form CM 15, discussed above. 
533 [1980] 3 All ER 295 (Ch). 
534 [1952] Ch 124; [1951] 2 All ER 994. 
535 Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 155 – 156. 
536 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-256; Duke Group Ltd v Pilmer (1999) 
31 ACSR 213. See Oditah “Takeovers, Share Exchanges and the Meaning of Loss” 436 – 437 
for a discussion of the possible claim a company could have against an adviser who valued 
non-cash consideration incorrectly. 
537  See s 76(2) and s 77(2). 
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3.4 Timing of capital contribution 
Although partly-paid shares were allowed under the 1926 Companies Act, section 
92(1) of the current Act provides that the full issue price or other consideration for 
shares must be paid to and received by the company prior to or upon the allotment 
and issue of those shares.538 The impact of this provision on the kinds of 
consideration that can be accepted for the issue of shares in South Africa has 
already been alluded to.539 A purported issue and allotment of shares in violation 
of this provision, is void.540 However, the court can validate an invalid allotment 
and issue of shares.541 The full issue price includes any premium payable on par 
value shares. In the case of non-cash consideration, the value of the consideration 
must satisfy the full issue price.542 However, a court will not enquire into the 
sufficiency of the consideration unless it is illusory or clearly indicative of a 
discount.543 
Although section 92 is often discussed in conjunction with the no discount 
rule, this statutory rule differs from the common-law rule. Section 92(1) is a timing 
provision prescribing when the total agreed consideration or issue price of both par 
value and no par value shares should be received while the common-law 
principle544 concerns only the extent of the consideration in relation to the par 
value of a share. 
The effect of section 92(1) is that only fully paid shares may be issued by a 
company. Prior to the introduction of this provision545 companies could issue partly 
paid shares. The Van Wyk de Vries Commission concluded that a system of partly 
_________________________________________________________________  
538 The meaning of the concepts ‘allot’ and ‘issue’ is discussed in Blackman, Jooste & 
Everingham Companies Act 5-241 – 5-246, 5-256-4 – 5-258. See also Mosely v Koffyfontein 
Mines Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 73 84 (CA); Osborne v Steel Barrel Co Ltd [1942] 1 All ER 634 (CA) at 
637 – 638. 
539 See paragraph 3.2 above. 
540 Bauermeister v C C Bauermeister (Pty) Ltd & Another 1981 (1) SA 274 (W) at 277.  
541  Section 97(1). For an example, see Ex parte Durban Deep Roodepoort Ltd 2002 (6) SA 537 
(W) where the court took into account the fact that the shares were traded on international 
stock markets, that the current holders of the affected shares could not be identified, and that 
most of the shareholders supported the validation. It is also interesting to note that in 
Bauermeister v C C Bauermeister (Pty) Ltd & Another 1981 (1) SA 274 (W) the court, despite 
holding that the allotment was void, nevertheless refused to order rectification of the register of 
members. 
542 Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) at 122. 
543 Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) at 122. 
544 See paragraph 3.1 above. 
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paid shares was unduly complex.546 It required cumbersome legislative provisions 
regulating the liability of the subscriber and of transferees of the shares.547 The 
Commission argued that the same result could be achieved by binding 
shareholders to take up further unissued shares in future.548 While it is no longer 
possible for a company to issue partly paid shares some provision is still made for 
existing partly paid shares issued before the coming into operation of the 
Companies Act of 1973.549  
In Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another550 an issue and allotment of 
shares was held to be void because the consideration had not been received by 
the company. As has already been pointed out551 the court was prepared to accept 
that the transfer of assets to a subsidiary of the issuing holding company would 
constitute consideration in the hands of the issuing company because it would 
increase the value of its shareholding in its subsidiary. However, because the 
assets had not yet been transferred to the subsidiary at the time the shares were 
issued and allotted by the holding company, the court held that section 92(1) had 
been contravened.552 A clear distinction was drawn between the sale of the assets 
and claims and their subsequent transfer by cession. The court’s approach can be 
questioned. If the consideration consists of an increase in the value of the 
shareholding in a subsidiary, the proper enquiry should be whether such an 
increase has occurred and not whether the assets have been transferred to the 
subsidiary. It is arguable that the increase in shareholding will take place as soon 
as the subsidiary obtains the right to claim transfer of the assets and not only upon 
their actual transfer. However, the court restricted its enquiry to the actual transfer 
of the shares and assets to the subsidiary.553 It is submitted that the court should 
_________________________________________________________________  
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545 In the 1973 Act, it did not appear in the 1926 Act. 
546 Van Wyk de Vries Main Report RP 45/1970 par 32. 
547 See Cilliers & Benade Maatskappyereg (1968) 152 – 155. 
548 Van Wyk de Vries Main Report RP 45/1970 par 32.  
549 See s 4(2) and s 338(2). 
550 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) 
551 See paragraph 3.2 above. 
552 Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) at 121. The discussion of 
this case by Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-241 incorrectly reflects the 
facts and the judgment. They state that the subsidiary had received the shares and that the 
only question was whether the increase in value of the subsidiary’s shares in the hands of the 
holding company was sufficient to meet the issue price of the shares.  
553 Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another 1999 (1) SA 111 (W) at 121. 
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in the first place not have accepted such a strained interpretation of consideration, 
as section 92(1) clearly requires that regard should be had to the agreed price or 
consideration, which should have been paid to or received by the company, rather 
than to any incidental benefits received by the company. 
Section 92(2) provides an exception to the requirement of section 92(1). 
When shares are issued and allotted to an intermediary with a view to them being 
offered to the public as fully paid shares, they need not be fully paid up prior to 
being allotted to the intermediary. The offer to the public must be proceeded with 
within one month of allotment and if it is not taken up in full within two months from 
the date of allotment, the allotment of any shares that have not been fully paid up 
will be void. 
3.5 The regulation of commissions 
The common law did not prohibit or regulate commission because it was regarded 
as payment for services rendered and not as a form of discount.554 A provision 
regulating the payment of commission was first introduced in England in 1908 but 
it placed no limit on the amount of commission that could be paid.555 The current 
form of the provision is derived from the recommendations of the Greene 
Committee556 which wanted to target abuses. 
Section 80 regulates the payment of commission in consideration of a person 
subscribing or agreeing to subscribe for shares of the company, or procuring or 
agreeing to procure subscriptions. Although reference is often made to 
underwriters’ commission, the section 80(1) is not restricted to underwriters and 
commission can apparently be paid to anyone in consideration of subscribing for 
shares.557 However, since commission is a payment to someone as remuneration 
for services rendered to the company, persons who do nothing more than 
subscribe for shares in response to an invitation may not be paid a commission 
_________________________________________________________________  
554 Metropolitan Coal Consumers’ Association v Scrimgeour [1895] 2 QB 604 (CA) at 606. See 
also Acutt v Seta Prospecting and Developing Co 1907 TS 799 at 818. But see Re Biltong 
Asbestos Co Ltd 1925 CPD 356 regarding a disguised discount. 
555 Section 89 of the Companies (Consolidation) Act 1908 (8 Edw 7, c 69). See Blackman, Jooste 
& Everingham Companies Act 5-32. 
556 Company Law Amendment Committee Cmd 2657 (1925 – 1926) paragraph 44. 
557  See De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 568 note 262.  
 349
under this provision.558 While section 80(1) also refers to commission paid to 
persons who procure subscriptions, the payment to a broker of brokerage which a 
company could lawfully pay prior to the introduction of this provision, is not 
affected at all by section 80.559 
A company may pay commission if so authorised by its articles.560 The 
commission may not amount to more than ten per cent of the issue price or any 
lesser rate fixed by the articles.561 The amount or rate of commission must be 
disclosed in the prospectus (in the case of an offer to the public) or in a statement 
in the prescribed form and also in any circular or notice sent out which invites 
subscription for the shares.562 The number of shares for which persons 
unconditionally agreed to subscribe at a commission must be disclosed in the 
same way.563 When disclosure has to take place by way of a statement, the 
statement must be lodged with the Registrar prior to payment of the 
commission.564 Failure to lodge the required statement with the Registrar 
constitutes a criminal offence by the company and by every director or officer who 
was knowingly a party to the default.565  
The payment of disguised commissions is prohibited by section 80(3). It 
provides that except for commission paid in terms of section 80(1) and discount 
allowed under section 81: 
no company shall apply any of its shares or capital money either directly or 
indirectly in payment of any commission, discount or allowance to any person 
in consideration of his subscribing or agreeing to subscribe, whether 
absolutely or conditionally, for any shares of the company, whether the shares 
or money be so applied by being added to the purchase price of any property 
acquired by the company or the money be paid out of the nominal purchase 
price or contract price, or otherwise. 
_________________________________________________________________  
558 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-32; see also Pennington Company Law 
406. 
559 Section 80(4). See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-34. 
560 Section 80(1)(a). 
561 Section 80(1)(b). 
562 Section 80(1)(c). 
563 Section 80(1)(d). 
564 Section 80(2). 
565 Section 80(6). 
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Although this appears to be the only provision of the Act that expressly limits the 
application of funds representing issued share capital,566 its interpretation is 
uncertain. 
The problem lies in reconciling section 80(3) with section 80(1). Meskin 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act argues that s 80(1) is permissive and does 
not contain an implied prohibition on the payment of commission otherwise than in 
accordance with it.567 The only prohibition, according to this interpretation, is the 
one in subsection (3) which prevents the payment of commission out of share 
capital. Commission can thus be paid freely, except if share capital is used - in 
which case the requirements of subsection (1) have to be met. If subsection (1) 
applied to any commission payments regardless of the source of funding, then 
subsection (3) would be unnecessary.568 This interpretation is supported by the 
fact that subsection (3) is couched in prohibitory rather than permissive terms. 
The contrary interpretation of the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham 
Companies Act, namely that any commission regardless of the source of funding 
can be paid only in compliance with subsection (1), is supported by the fact that 
the prohibition in subsection (3) is not stated before the exception and that the 
introductory sentence of subsection (1) does not expressly refer to the payment of 
commission out of share capital.569 According to this interpretation the purpose of 
subsection (3) is to make it clear that even share capital can be used to pay the 
limited commission allowed by subsection (1). Apart from the fact that it has 
always been possible for companies to pay commission,570 one would have 
expected a permissive formulation if it was indeed the purpose of the subsection. 
I support the first interpretation. Nevertheless this uncertainty is unfortunate 
because it detracts from the real purpose of subsection (3), namely to prohibit 
indirect or disguised commissions which would affect the interests of creditors and 
shareholders.571  
Another aspect of section 80 that can be criticised is subsection (5). It 
_________________________________________________________________  
566 Section 76(3) and s 98(4) have a similar effect in respect of non-distributable reserves. 
567  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 162. 
568 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-33. 
569 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-33. 
570 Metropolitan Coal Consumers’ Association v Scrimgeour [1895] 2 QB 604 (CA). 
571 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-34. 
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permits other persons such as vendors to a company and promoters of a company 
to pay commissions out of money or shares they received from the company if 
such commissions would also have been allowed if paid directly by the company. 
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act correctly point out 
that this provision seems to be unnecessary because payments in these 
circumstances would in any event amount to indirect commissions paid by the 
company. The possible application of the requirements in subsection (1) to 
payments by these persons is also problematic.572  
3.6 Capital contributions under the Companies Bill 
3.6.1 Size of capital contribution 
Shares must be issued for a consideration that the board of directors has 
determined to be adequate.573  
A determination by the board that consideration is adequate may only be 
challenged based on a breach of the standard of conduct for directors574 and 
where, in addition, the directors would be liable to the company in accordance with 
the principles of the common law relating either to breach of fiduciary duty or in 
delict.575 
The consequences of a successful challenge as to adequacy are not dealt 
with comprehensively. It seems clear that the directors will be liable, as they will be 
in breach of their duties to the company. The position of subscribers is unclear, but 
it is suggested that this will depend on whether or not the determination is 
invalidated by a successful challenge. If the determination remains valid, the 
subscriber should not be liable, as the shares will be regarded as fully paid once 
the determined consideration has been received.576 However, should the 
_________________________________________________________________  
572 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-34. However, it is interesting that the 
source of payment here is the purchase price of goods sold to the company or shares given by 
the company as payments: it is thus not restricted to shares and share capital. 
573  Clause 40(1)(a). 
574  Set out in clause 76 of the Companies Bill. 
575  Clause 40(3). It is not clear whether a breach by any single director would suffice or whether 
the whole board should be found to have breached the standard of conduct. It would seem 
that since clauses 76 and 77 refer to individuals, a breach by any of the members of the board 
would constitute sufficient ground to challenge the determination of adequacy.   
576  See clause 40(4)(a). 
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determination be invalidated - and in this regard it is significant that it is the 
determination itself which can be challenged577 - the subscriber might be liable for 
the difference between the initial invalid determination and the adequate 
consideration determined after the successful challenge. 
The fact that liability is imposed on the directors for the loss or damage 
suffered by the company does not indicate whether or not the issue is invalidated, 
because the company may suffer loss or damage either way. If the issue is 
declared void, the company will have incurred wasted expenses, especially if an 
offer to the public was involved. Should the issue be valid, the company’s loss will 
be equal to the difference between the issue price and the adequate 
consideration.578 I recommend that the consequences of a successful challenge to 
a determination should be clearly stated in the legislation. 
3.6.2 Form of capital contribution 
When shares are being issued for consideration, the consideration may comprise 
anything of value given and accepted in exchange for the shares.579 The following 
are expressly included: (a) any money, property, negotiable instrument, securities, 
investment credit facility, token or ticket; (b) any labour, barter or similar exchange 
of one thing for another; (c) any other thing, undertaking, promise, agreement or 
assurance, irrespective of its apparent or intrinsic value, or whether it is transferred 
directly or indirectly’.580 As the introductory words of the definition require 
consideration to be anything of value, it is difficult to see how something could 
qualify as consideration irrespective of its ‛intrinsic’ value. I recommend that a 
definition of consideration should not be contained in the Companies legislation.  
Alternatively, shares may be issued in terms of conversion rights pertaining 
to previously issued securities of the company,581 or as capitalisation shares.582 
_________________________________________________________________  
577  See clause 40(3). 
578  See Oditah “Takeovers, Share Exchanges and the Meaning of Loss” 436 – 437. As the 
unissued shares are not really assets in the hands of the issuing company, construing a loss is 
not without difficulties. 
579  Clause 40(1)(a). Clause 1 s v ‘consideration’ defines consideration as ‘anything of value given 
and accepted in exchange for any property, service, act, omission or forbearance or any other 
thing of value’. 
580  Clause 1 s v ‘consideration’. 
581  Clause 40(1)(b). 
582  Clause 40(1)(c). See also clause 47, discussed in paragraph 4.3 below. 
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This express regulation of the consideration issue, especially in the case of 
capitalisation shares, obviates the need to resort to an artificial explanation of 
consideration583 and is to be welcomed. 
3.6.3 The regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
The Companies Bill does not prescribe any additional requirements for non-cash 
consideration. Regardless of the form of consideration, the directors have to 
determine that the consideration is adequate. It is submitted that this requirement 
will adequately protect the existing shareholders. 
However, provision should be made for a further determination by the board 
where unpaid or partly paid shares were issued for future cash consideration, but 
the company later agrees to accept non-cash consideration instead. This situation 
is not covered by the current formulation of clause 40(5) which seems to deal only 
with the determination of the value of the consideration initially agreed on. 
The draft Companies Bill 2007584 required shareholder approval for 
substantial issues only where the consideration was something other than cash, or 
for less than market value,585 but this requirement is extended to all kinds of 
consideration in the Companies Bill of 2008.586  
3.6.4 Timing of capital contribution 
Shares are fully paid when the company has received the consideration 
determined by the board.587 However, shares do not have to be fully paid prior to 
being issued.588 Where the consideration is in the form of an instrument that is not 
negotiable by the company at the time the shares are to be issued, the 
consideration is deemed to have been received at any time only to the extent that 
the instrument is negotiable by the company.589 Where the consideration is in the 
form of an agreement for future services, future benefits or future payment, it is 
_________________________________________________________________  
583  See paragraph 3.2.1 above. 
584  Available at http://thedti.gov.za/ccrdlawreview/COMPANIESBILL07.htm (2008-02-28). 
585  See clause 38(4)(a) of the draft Companies Bill 2007. 
586  Clause 41(3), see paragraph 2.8.1 above. 
587  Clause 40(4)(a). 
588  See clause 40(5). 
589  Clause 40(5)(a)(i). 
 354 
deemed to have been received, and the shares paid up, only to the extent that the 
obligations have been fulfilled.590  
It is not clear whether this provision requires the directors to value the 
consideration. Because the adequacy of the consideration must be determined 
when the shares are issued, and since it is not required that a cash value should 
be attached to the consideration, it would seem that the directors need not value 
the consideration in monetary terms. Instead, they could determine which part or 
percentage of the agreed services or goods have been received and treat the 
shares as paid up to that extent. This can be contrasted with the position in New 
Zealand where the shares are treated as paid up, but the directors have to make a 
fresh adequacy determination when it receives further consideration.591  
The consequences of unpaid or partly paid shares are regulated extensively 
in the Companies Bill. It uses the mechanism of placing shares in ‘escrow’, a 
concept not defined in the Companies Bill. Escrow is a legal arrangement whereby 
an asset is held in custody pending fulfilment of a specified condition.592 It is 
commonly used in American real estate transactions and is also used in the MBCA 
in the context of unpaid or partly paid shares.593 It is not clear why this term is 
preferred above the established trust construction of South African law. 
The draft Companies Bill 2007 merely gave the company the power to place 
the shares in escrow or make another arrangement restricting their transfer.594 The 
company could nevertheless issue the shares directly to the subscriber.595 There 
was no general restriction on the transfer of unpaid or partly paid shares, and the 
voting and distribution rights attaching to these shares were not regulated. In 
comments that I submitted to the DTI on this draft Bill, I suggested that these 
aspects required further attention. These submissions appear to have been 
implemented in the Companies Bill. 
The Companies Bill 2008 no longer gives the company a choice: when 
shares are to be issued otherwise than as fully paid shares, the company must 
_________________________________________________________________  
590  Clause 40(5)(a)(ii). 
591  See Chapter 3 paragraph 3.3. 
592  See The Oxford Pocket Dictionary of Current English 2008 s v ‘escrow’. 
593  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.4. 
594  See clause 37(6)(b) of the draft Companies Bill 2007. 
595  Clause 37(6)(a) of the draft Companies Bill 2007. 
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issue the shares and transfer them to a third party to be held in escrow.596 The 
shares will then be transferred to the subscribing party at a later stage in 
accordance with the conditions of the escrow agreement.597 Transfer will depend 
on the extent to which the instrument has become negotiable or the obligations 
have been fulfilled.598 
The company may cancel shares placed in escrow if the instrument is 
dishonoured after it became negotiable, or if the subscribing party fails to comply 
with the outstanding obligations.599  
The Companies Bill addresses the problem regarding the restriction on the 
transfer of unpaid or partly paid shares. Clause 40(6)(d)(i) provides that while 
shares are in escrow, they may not be transferred by or at the direction of the 
subscribing party unless the company has expressly consented to the transfer in 
advance.600 This power of the company to refuse transfer will enable it to 
safeguard its interest in receiving the outstanding consideration. In the absence of 
a transfer restriction, the subscribing party would nevertheless have remained 
contractually liable to the company for the outstanding consideration, but the 
company may have experienced problems in enforcing its claim, especially if it 
were not able to cancel the shares following a transfer.601 Although it is not 
expressly stated, it would seem that a transfer without the company’s consent 
would be invalid. It would also seem that even in the event of a valid transfer, the 
shares will remain in escrow, on behalf of the transferee, until fully paid.602 In such 
a case, the company would retain its power to cancel the shares in the event of 
default by the subscribing party.603  
The membership rights in relation to shares that are in escrow are regulated 
in clause 40(6), but an escrow agreement may provide otherwise. The default rule 
_________________________________________________________________  
596  Clause 40(5)(b). The draft Companies Bill 2007 made it optional for the shares to be placed in 
escrow, see clause 37(6). 
597  Clause 40(5)(b)(ii). 
598  Clause 40(6)(d)(ii), (iii).  
599  Clause 40(6)(d)(iv). The company first has to make a demand as set out in clause 40(7). 
600  Clause 40(6)(d)(i). 
601  See clause 40(6)(d)(iv) read with 40(7). 
602  Under clause 40(6)(d)(ii), (iii) transfer is allowed only to the extent that the company has 
received consideration or the instrument has become negotiable. 
603  The power to cancel is given in respect of ‘shares that have been issued but are in escrow’, 
see the introductory sentence of clause 40(6).  
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is that the voting rights of such shares may not be exercised at all and that the 
subscribing party can also not exercise appraisal rights in respect of those 
shares.604 However, the subscribing party is entitled to pre-emptive rights and 
distributions to the extent that the instrument has become negotiable605 or the 
obligations have been fulfilled.606 The insertion of these provisions addresses the 
submissions I made to the Department of Trade and Industry in commenting on 
the draft Companies Bill 2007. As unpaid or partly paid shares may contribute to 
broad-based black economic ownership of companies, it is vital that there should 
be clarity on the measurement of the economic interest attaching to unpaid or 
partly paid shares.607 
The company may, rather than pay a distribution over to the subscribing 
party in respect of an unpaid or partly paid share, credit its amount against the 
outstanding consideration.608 
3.7 Evaluation of capital contribution 
3.7.1 Evaluation of size of capital contribution 
I argued that the common-law rule against the issue of shares at a discount 
remains part of South African law, despite the introduction of new distribution 
rules. It is not necessary to read a new implied prohibition into the exception 
provided by the Act, in view of the established common-law principle.609  
The prohibition against discount offers a marginal degree of protection to 
shareholders and also to creditors. Creditors benefit because the company will 
receive at least the par value of the shares, meaning it will start out with more 
funds than would have been the case if it gave a discount. Shareholders benefit 
because there is at least some minimum level of contribution required from other 
_________________________________________________________________  
604  Clause 40(6)(a). 
605  Clause 40(6)(b). 
606  Clause 40(6)(c)(i). 
607 See the Ownership Code, Code 100, available at www.dti.gov.za 18-03-2008. See also Luiz & 
Van der Linde “Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment” 473; Marais & Coetzee “Black 
Ownership” 518, although these articles discuss the draft codes. 
608  Clause 40(6)(c)(ii). 
609  This situation differs from that pertaining to the application of the share premium account. In 
that case, there is no common-law prohibition on the return of share premiums, but only an 
enabling statutory provision, see paragraph 2.4.3.3.3 above. 
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shareholders. However, in view of the use of shares with an insignificant par value, 
issued at a large premium, this protection is largely illusory. 
Discount on par value shares may be given with the approval of the court. 
The discount exception in section 81 was compared to the limitation on the issue 
of no par value shares at a price below their average issue price contained in 
section 82. While both provisions aim to protect existing shareholders, section 81 
also protects creditors and future shareholders. However, neither of these 
provisions is effective in preventing the uncontrolled dilution of shareholder value.  
In other jurisdictions no par value shares can generally be issued for any 
consideration determined by the directors, whose determination will be conclusive 
unless fraud was involved. New Zealand was seen to be the only jurisdiction 
always to require a formal resolution by directors regarding the fairness of the 
consideration. In California a resolution is required only when non-monetary 
consideration is accepted 
If the company prospers, the value of its shares will usually be higher than 
their issue price, as a result of growth in the company’s assets. As McLennan 
points out in relation to both par value and no par value shares, if the market value 
has risen since the shares were issued, the value of the existing shareholders’ 
holdings will still be diluted by an issue at the average price of no par value shares 
or nominal value of par value shares.610 The effect is aggravated when existing par 
value shares were issued at a premium, because section 81 does not take into 
account any premium contributed in respect of the existing shares.611 This was 
recognised by the Van Wyk de Vries Commission when it concluded that reliance 
on the nominal value of par value shares provided only illusory protection to 
shareholders.612 For this reason the Commission recommended the future 
consideration of a rule similar to section 82, taking into account the actual issue 
price inclusive of any premium, for par value shares.613 
McLennan concludes that protection against diluting the equity should not be 
_________________________________________________________________  
610 McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 41, see also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies 
Act 5-39.  
611 This will be so unless the present value of the shares happens to be equal to their par value. 
612 Van Wyk de Vries Main Report 34.16 – 18; Supplementary Report 86.02. 
613 It is not clear whether the Standing Advisory Committee ever reconsidered this issue. Section 
81 and 82 have, however, remained unchanged. 
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through legislation, but rather through the common-law shareholder remedies.614 
The fiduciary duties of directors imply that they should issue shares for the 
maximum consideration that can be obtained,615 unless good reasons exist for 
accepting a lower consideration. Such reasons could include rewarding employees 
or existing shareholders.616 Shareholders are also protected by section 221 which 
restricts the power of directors to issue and allot shares.617 
I think that existing shareholders would be better protected by a provision 
that requires a declaration by directors that an issue price is fair and reasonable in 
view of the present value of previously issued shares of that class. Alternatively, a 
special resolution can be required to sanction the issue of shares at a price 
significantly lower than their current value. It does not make sense to require an 
exact determination of the value of the shares whenever new shares are to be 
issued. For this reason a special resolution could be required for issues at a price 
known by the directors to be significantly lower than the present value of the 
shares.  
The Companies Bill requires shares to be issued for adequate 
consideration.618 This will provide more protection than is currently the case for par 
and no par value shares. ‛Adequate consideration’ is a flexible concept which 
would allow directors to take into account the company’s current financial situation 
as well as market conditions. The Companies Bill does not impose additional 
requirements regarding the minimum issue price which can be compared to 
section 82 of the current Act.619  
Clearly, the present value of existing shares will be a factor that the directors 
will have to take into account in determining the adequacy of the consideration. 
Directors will be personally liable for loss caused to the company by a 
determination in breach of the standard of conduct expected from them.620  
_________________________________________________________________  
614 McLennan “Abolition of Par-value” 41. 
615  See Delport Verkryging 405. 
616 Shearer (Inspector of Taxes) v Bercain [1980] 3 All ER 295 at 308. 
617  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
618  Clause 40(4)(a), see paragraph 7.6.2. 
619  The draft Companies Bill 2007 did refer to issues at below the fair market value of shares and 
required approval by special resolution if the issue was of a substantial number of shares, 
clause 38(4)(a). The Companies Bill 2008 requires shareholder approval for substantial issues 
regardless of the consideration involved. 
620  Clause 40(3) read with clause 77(2)(a), (b), see Chapter 5 paragraph 7.6.2. 
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I submit that the provisions of the Companies Bill 2008 provide shareholders 
with sufficient protection, especially when the restrictions on the issue of shares 
are taken into account.621 Specific provision need not be made for issues below 
the current market value of the shares. 
However, I must emphasise that the consequences of a successful challenge 
regarding the adequacy of consideration on the validity of the issue and allotment 
are not addressed in the Companies Bill.622  
There are various ways of regulating the consequences of an issue of shares 
for inadequate consideration or otherwise in violation of the requirements 
pertaining to consideration. In England, an allotment at a discount will be valid, but 
the allottee is liable for the amount of the discount.623 Similarly, where a public 
company agrees to issue shares for unacceptable consideration, the allotment will 
be valid but the allottee will be liable to pay the issue price in cash.624 The 
directors will be liable at common law for breach of their duties.625 The New 
Zealand Companies Act makes provision for criminal liability of directors should 
they fail to comply with the formalities.626 However, that Act is silent on the 
possible liability of shareholders or the validity of the issue and allotment. In 
Delaware and California the consideration determined by the directors will be 
conclusive unless fraud is involved.627 Although this is not regulated by statute, the 
implication seems to be that the issue will be valid, but that in cases of fraud the 
shareholder will be liable to pay extra consideration because the determination 
was not conclusive. The MBCA provides that a determination by the board of 
directors will be conclusive and that a shareholder who paid the determined 
consideration is not liable for any further amount.628 Although directors could be 
held liable for breaching the standard of conduct, the provision relating to the 
determination of consideration does not make the conclusiveness of the 
determination dependent on compliance with the standard of conduct. The MBCA 
_________________________________________________________________  
621  See paragraph 2.8.1 above. 
622  See paragraph 3.6.1 above. 
623  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.1. 
624  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2. 
625  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.1. 
626  See Chapter 3 paragraph 3.1. 
627  See Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.3.1 and 3.3.1.  
628  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.1. 
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thus avoids the confusion arising from the proposed provision in the Companies 
Bill which apparently allows a challenge to the determination itself. 
I submit that the provisions in the Companies Bill on adequacy of 
consideration should enjoy further attention and will make a specific 
recommendation in this regard in the final chapter.629 
3.7.2 Evaluation of form of capital contribution 
Anything of value can be given in consideration for the issue and allotment of 
shares. Although there was previously uncertainty in this regard, it is clear that the 
term ‘subscription’ includes offers to take up shares for non-cash consideration.630 
Despite this general rule, the requirement that the company should actually 
receive the full consideration when it issues the shares restricts the kinds of 
consideration that are acceptable. An undertaking to render services in the future 
is not considered a proper form of consideration in South Africa.631 This is also the 
position in California,632 Delaware,633 and for public companies in England.634 
However, the effect of this rule is less severe in these jurisdictions than in South 
Africa because unpaid or partly paid shares are permitted there.635 Also, an issue 
and allotment for an improper consideration, for example future services, will be 
void in South Africa, while in these other systems it will merely render the 
subscriber liable to pay the consideration in cash. I submit that the exclusion of 
future consideration is unduly restrictive and out of step with international practice. 
The judgment in Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another636 illustrates 
the limiting effect of the requirement on the nature of the acceptable consideration. 
I argued that although the court interpreted ‘consideration’ widely, it was not 
prepared to adopt a flexible and logically consistent interpretation of the receipt 
requirement.637   
_________________________________________________________________  
629  See Chapter 6 paragraphs 3.1 and 7.6. 
630  See paragraph 3.2 above. 
631  See paragraph 3.2 above 
632  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.3.2. 
633  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.3.2. 
634  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2. 
635  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2; Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.3.2 and 3.3.2. 
636  1999 (1) SA 511 (W). 
637  See paragraphs 3.2 and 3.4 above. 
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The Companies Bill considerably broadens the scope of what will be 
acceptable consideration. The definition of consideration includes a long list of 
options and expressly includes anything of value ‛irrespective of its apparent or 
intrinsic value’. It is recommended that the Companies Act should not contain a 
definition of consideration.638 The meaning of the concept should be clear from 
general principles of South African law. A definition of ‛cash’ should be inserted, 
though.639 
3.7.2.1 Evaluation of capitalisation issues 
Capitalisation issues clearly contravene section 92 and so are problematic from a 
consideration perspective.640 Attempts to construe a notional consideration are 
unconvincing. Nevertheless, capitalisation issues do not prejudice creditors, since 
they are actually the opposite of distributions.  
The consideration aspect of the issue of capitalisation shares is expressly 
regulated in England, New Zealand and under the MBCA. In England it is 
expressly provided that the requirement that consideration must be paid does not 
detract from the company’s power to issue capitalisation shares.641 In New 
Zealand it is provided that ‛other securities of the company’ qualify as 
consideration.642 Also, when capitalisation shares are issued from reserves of the 
company the board is not required to determine the consideration by resolution.643 
The MBCA expressly provides for the issue of shares for no consideration in the 
case of share dividends.644  
The express recognition that shares may be issued otherwise than for 
consideration is a positive feature of the Companies Bill.645 Treating capitalisation 
issues and conversions as exceptions to the rule obviates the need to resort to 
artificial explanations of consideration.646   
_________________________________________________________________  
638  See paragraph 3.6.2 above. 
639  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.6 and the suggested definition of ‘cash’. 
640  See paragraph 3.2.1. 
641 See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2.  
642  See Chapter 3 paragraph 3.2. 
643  See Chapter 3 paragraph 3.2. 
644  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.1. 
645  See paragraph 3.6.2 above.  
646  As to which, see paragraph 3.2.1. 
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3.7.3 Evaluation of regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
The regulation of non-cash consideration is of interest to shareholders because 
non-cash issues can be used to hide a dilution in the value of existing 
shareholdings. In a capital maintenance system, creditors also have an interest in 
the regulation of non-cash consideration, because it will affect the size of the share 
capital yardstick and accordingly the extent of possible distributions.  
Specific disclosure requirements apply when a company accepts non-cash 
consideration. The register of allotments has to contain details of the consideration 
and a copy of the contract or a written memorandum setting out its terms must be 
lodged with the Registrar. The consideration also has to be valued in order to be 
reflected in the share capital accounts of the company.647 I have shown that there 
are significant differences between the requirements regarding the valuation of 
non-cash consideration, depending on whether the shares involved are par value 
or no par value shares.648 There seems to be no justification for these distinctions. 
The regulation of non-cash consideration in the Act has been criticised by 
Delport for not offering creditors and shareholders meaningful protection.649 First, 
disclosure comes only once the shares have already been issued. Secondly, while 
fiduciary duties of directors are relevant, they are imprecise. Thirdly, shareholder 
actions are inadequate. I submit that these criticisms are valid. 
The South African valuation provisions are very lenient compared to the 
requirements in the other jurisdictions surveyed.650 In England, valuation by an 
independent expert is required when a public company issues shares for non-cash 
consideration.651 In New Zealand, despite the absence of any concept of nominal 
or issued share capital, the directors have to determine the present cash value of 
non-cash consideration and certify that it is at least equal to the amount credited 
as consideration for the shares.652 Delaware does not prescribe valuation, but 
shareholders can incur liability in respect of watered shares if the value of non-
_________________________________________________________________  
647  See paragraph 3.3 above. 
648  See paragraph 3.3 above. 
649  See Delport “Capital Rules” 413. 
650 See paragraph 3.3 above.  
651 See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.3. 
652 See Chapter 3 paragraph 3.3.  
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cash consideration is less than the nominal value of the shares.653 In California a 
formal resolution of directors is required when non-monetary consideration is 
accepted.654 Under the MBCA shareholder approval is required for substantial 
non-cash issues.655 
The Companies Bill does not regulate non-cash consideration any differently 
from cash consideration. It is also clear that the monetary value of non-cash 
consideration need not be determined. Shareholders are protected by the 
requirement that the consideration must be adequate. However, I recommend that 
particulars of any non-cash consideration should be disclosed to shareholders, in 
order to enable them to assert their rights against directors who accept inadequate 
consideration.656 I also recommend that the directors should have to determine the 
adequacy of non-cash consideration if they later agree to accept non-cash 
consideration in respect of shares that have been issued for future cash 
consideration.657  
3.7.4 Evaluation of timing for capital contribution 
The time when a company receives the consideration for an issue of shares is 
primarily of interest to the company. However, just as shareholders have an 
interest in the consideration paid by other shareholders to obtain a comparable 
interest in the company, they are affected by the benefits enjoyed by these other 
shareholders in relation to the consideration they have actually contributed. 
Creditors may also be interested in whether the company has actually received 
funds from the shareholders, but this interest is remote provided the company can 
pay its debts.  
The Act requires that the full issue price of shares must be received by the 
company when it issues shares. This requirement implies that only fully paid 
shares are allowed. An issue of shares in violation of this requirement is void. The 
_________________________________________________________________  
653 See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.3.5. 
654  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.3.3. 
655  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.3. 
656 See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.6 and subclause (3) of the proposed provision ‘Consideration for 
shares’. See also Giugni “Consideration” 385 – 386 on the importance of disclosure in this 
context.  
657  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.6. 
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judgment in Etkind & Others v Hicor Trading Ltd & Another658 illustrates how easily 
a transaction can fall foul of this requirement on technical grounds.659 
None of the other jurisdictions surveyed contain a requirement that shares 
should be fully paid up. The level of regulation of unpaid or partly paid shares 
varies among jurisdictions. Regulated aspects include the allocation of 
proportionate voting and distribution rights, forfeiture of shares for non-payment, 
restrictions on the transfer of shares, liability for outstanding consideration upon 
transfer of shares, and the crediting of distributions against the outstanding 
consideration. 
In England shares in private companies need not be paid up to any extent 
when they are issued, while at least one quarter of the nominal value plus the full 
premium must be paid when shares are allotted by public companies.660 In the 
case of public companies the future consideration may not be due more than five 
years after the date of allotment and the consequences of non-compliance with 
this rule are addressed.661 English legislation does not regulate the implications of 
unpaid or partly paid shares in detail, leaving this to the company’s articles.662  
In New Zealand, shares need not be paid up when issued and the legislation 
provides for the continued liability of the person who initially undertook to pay the 
issue price.663 The directors are also given the power to refuse registration of the 
transfer of shares if not fully paid. But voting and dividend rights are not regulated. 
The regulation in Delaware and California is more comprehensive.664 Both 
these jurisdictions provide for dividends in proportion to the consideration actually 
paid on unpaid or partly paid shares. Provision is also made for forfeiture of shares 
should the shareholder default on an instalment. The original subscriber or holder 
remains liable for the issue price, and bona fide transferees are not liable. 
Creditors are given the right to enforce payment of the outstanding consideration 
in certain circumstances. 
_________________________________________________________________  
658  1999 (1) SA 111 (W). See paragraph 3.4 above.  
659  See paragraphs 3.2 and 3.3. 
660  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.4. 
661  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2. Future services are unacceptable consideration, even if they 
are to be rendered within five years. 
662  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2. 
663  See Chapter 3 paragraph 3.4.  
664  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.3.4 on Delaware and paragraph 3.3.4 on California. 
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The MBCA does not regulate this in much detail, but provides that the 
company may place the shares in escrow or otherwise restrict their transfer.665 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a transferee who takes transfer without 
knowledge of the outstanding liability will not be liable to the company in respect of 
it. 
The Companies Bill proposes the re-introduction of unpaid or partly paid 
shares.666 It provides that shares will be paid when the consideration has been 
received by the company.667 However, where the consideration is in the form of an 
instrument that is not negotiable by the company at the time the shares are to be 
issued, or is in the form of an agreement for future services, future benefits or 
future payment by the subscribing party, such consideration is deemed to have 
been furnished at any time only to the extent that the instrument has become 
negotiable by the company or that the obligations in terms of the agreement have 
been fulfilled.668  
The Bill proposes that the unpaid or partly paid shares will be issued, but 
placed in escrow in the hands of a third party. This will have the effect of restricting 
the transfer of unpaid or partly paid shares. It would seem that this requirement is 
rather restrictive when compared to for example the MBCA, as it does not leave 
room for any alternative forms of restriction on transfer. However, an 
uncomplicated approach is probably a good idea while the business community 
(re-)acquaints itself with unpaid or partly paid shares.    
The participation rights pertaining to shares placed in escrow and their 
entitlement to distributions are expressly regulated, but could be changed in an 
escrow agreement.669 Provision is also made for the forfeiture of shares and for 
crediting distributions against the unpaid consideration. The only aspect that is not 
regulated is the liability of the initial shareholder in the case of a transfer. It is 
_________________________________________________________________  
665  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.4. 
666  See paragraph 3.6.4 above. 
667  Clause 40(4). 
668  Clause 40(5). 
669  See paragraph 3.6.4 above. The default rule is that the voting rights of such shares may not 
be exercised at all and that the subscribing party can also not exercise appraisal rights in 
respect of those shares. However, the subscribing party is entitled to pre-emptive rights and 
distributions to the extent that the instrument has become negotiable or the obligations have 
been fulfilled. The company may, rather than pay the distribution over to the subscribing party, 
credit its amount against the outstanding consideration. 
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suggested that the transferor or other person who initially incurred the obligation 
will remain liable to the company on the basis of contract and that the liquidator 
can collect the debt from the shareholder if the company is liquidated while the 
liability remains outstanding. 
I view the proposals of the Companies Bill on unpaid or partly paid shares as 
sensible.670 However, provision should be made for an adequacy determination by 
the board where unpaid or partly paid shares were issued for cash consideration, 
but the company later agrees to accept future non-cash consideration when a 
further payment is due.671 This situation is not covered by the current formulation 
of clause 40(5) as the shares will not originally have been issued for consideration 
in the form of an agreement for future services, benefits or payments. I will 
formulate a proposal in this regard.672  
4 DISTRIBUTIONS 
The previous parts of this chapter are devoted to an analysis of the share capital 
structure of a company and of the regulation of the capital contribution that a 
shareholder has to make in exchange for a share in the company. These two 
aspects relate to the formation of the share capital of a company. It is this share 
capital that forms the focus of the capital maintenance doctrine. While this doctrine 
does not insist that companies should at all times have assets representing their 
share capital, it does prohibit distributions to shareholders unless the company’s 
assets exceed the value of its share capital.673 The connection between the share 
capital and the regulation of distributions was thus obvious as far as creditors are 
concerned. However, distributions also affect the interests of shareholders and in 
this regard the principle of proportionality relies on the share capital of the 
company, more particularly, on the shareholder’s relative stake in it.  
For these reasons the Companies Act was designed to ensure that share 
_________________________________________________________________  
670  Some of these may have been introduced in the Companies Bill 2008 as a result of comments 
this writer submitted on the draft Companies Bill 2007, see paragraph 3.6.4 above. 
671  See paragraph 3.6.4 above and Chapter 6 paragraph 7.6. 
672  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.6 and subclause (4) of the proposed provision entitled 
‘Consideration for shares’. 
673  This is the basic point of departure of the capital maintenance doctrine. However, there are 
various exceptions and intrusions into this principle, particularly in relation to dividends, see 
Chapter 1 paragraph 2. 
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capital is raised and properly reflected in specific accounts, and that the 
shareholders actually give the full consideration reflected in these accounts. 
Despite the introduction of new distribution rules, which no longer attach 
significance to the share capital structure of the company, the legislature 
attempted to preserve the basic structure of share capital accounts by providing 
for the compulsory adjustment of share capital accounts following share 
repurchases. Further, the distributions that were expressly regulated in the Act 
were retained with very minor amendments that do not go to the core of the 
matter.674  
The Companies Act does not contain an inclusive definition of ‛distribution’. 
However, it provides for the following distributions: 
• payments of interest on share capital in terms of section 79 
• payments for the acquisition of shares in terms of section 85 
• payments by reason of shareholding in terms of section 90 
• payments for the redemption of shares in terms of section 98. 
The requirements and consequences of each of these four kinds of distributions 
will be explored more fully in separate paragraphs. However, at this stage a brief 
explanation of the basic principles underlying the regulation of each is necessary. 
This is done with reference to the financial restrictions that apply and the effect of 
the distribution on the share capital structure of the company. Apart from giving an 
overview of the regulation of distributions, this structure also facilitates comparison 
with the proposals under the Companies Bill which does not adopt such a 
fragmented approach. 
The payment of interest on share capital is allowed in exceptional 
circumstances only and requires the sanction of the court.675 No financial 
restrictions are prescribed. However, although the interest may be ‛charged to 
capital’ the payment of interest does not reduce the amount of paid-up capital 
reflected in the share capital accounts.  
When a company makes a distribution through a payment to acquire its own 
_________________________________________________________________  
674 The only changes were the introduction of a further possible application of the share premium 
account and the capital redemption reserve to provide for a premium paid on repurchase, s 
76(3)(d) and s 98(4). 
675  This kind of distribution is discussed in paragraph 5.7 below. 
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shares, it has to satisfy the solvency and liquidity test.676 An acquisition of own 
shares will result in the reduction of the company’s share capital. Although the Act 
regulates the ‛acquisition’ of own shares, it is only when the company gives 
consideration that a distribution is involved. The acquisition of own shares for 
consideration is referred to as the ‛repurchase’ of shares. 
Although payments by reason of shareholding are subject to the same 
financial restrictions that apply to share repurchases, namely solvency and 
liquidity, they do not have the same effect on the share capital of the company.677 
While repurchases are reductions of share capital,678 payments, even if made out 
of funds representing capital, are not.679  
Payments for the redemption of shares may be made only out of certain 
sources, namely distributable profits and the proceeds of a further issue of 
shares.680 The aggregate of the company’s paid-up share capital and non-
distributable reserves will not be reduced. These restrictions were originally 
devised as an exception under the capital maintenance doctrine. 
Despite the fragmented approach to distributions it is sensible to consider the 
financial restrictions that apply to ‛payments’ under section 90 and to repurchases 
under section 85 here, before the individual requirements for the different 
distributions are analysed. This not only eliminates unnecessary repetition, but 
also facilitates comparison with the uniform financial restrictions proposed under 
the Companies Bill for all distributions. Moreover, these two kinds of distributions 
that are subject to the solvency and liquidity test arguably represent the most 
common forms of distributions made by companies.681  
Different elements of the solvency and liquidity test are considered, followed 
by a discussion of the time when the solvency and liquidity test should be applied 
and satisfied. 
_________________________________________________________________  
676  The acquisition of own shares is discussed in paragraph 6 below. 
677  Payments by reason of shareholding, including dividends, are discussed in paragraph 5 
below. 
678  See paragraph 6.3.3 below and paragraph 2.6.2 above. 
679 See paragraph 5.1 below.  
680  See paragraph 6.8 for a discussion of the redemption of shares. 
681  The redemption of redeemable preference shares is of fairly limited application, as it does not 
concern ordinary shares. The payment of interest in terms of s 79 is seldom resorted to. 
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4.1 Financial restrictions for distributions 
Although certain distributions like the redemption of shares are subject to different 
financial restrictions, the general approach is based on the requirements of 
solvency and liquidity. This test is set out in section 85(4) for repurchases and in 
section 90(2) for other payments as defined, which includes dividends.   
A company may not make any payment in whatever form to its shareholders 
if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the company would after the 
payment be unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of 
business682 or that the company’s total assets would after the payment be less 
than its total liabilities.683 
4.1.1 Reasonable grounds for believing 
The company can make payment unless there are reasonable grounds for 
believing that the solvency and liquidity measures will not be satisfied. The actual 
solvency and liquidity of the company is apparently not relevant. If the company is 
indeed insolvent or unable to pay its debts, payment would in theory be lawful 
provided there were no ‛reasonable’ grounds for believing that this was the 
position. Conversely, the test would still have been contravened if there were 
indeed reasonable grounds to believe that the company would not satisfy the test, 
and it later turns out that the company was for some or other reason, such as a 
sudden increase in the value of its assets or unexpected early payment of a debt 
owed to it, indeed not insolvent or unable to pay its debts when it made 
payment.684 
This approach can be contrasted with that followed in respect of close 
corporations where the actual solvency and liquidity of the corporation is 
relevant.685 While actual solvency and liquidity may afford creditors better 
protection, it seems to be easier from a practical perspective to apply the ‛reason 
to believe’ standard when considering the permissibility of a payment about to be 
_________________________________________________________________  
682  Section 85(4)(a), s 90(2)(a). 
683  Section 85(4)(b), s 90(2)(b). 
684  This issue of a divergence between actual solvency and liquidity and the existence of 
reasonable grounds in this regard is also dealt with in connection with the liability of directors, 
see paragraph 6.4.1.1 below. 
685 See the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 s 39(1)(b) – (d), s 40(b) – (d), s 51(1)(a) – (c). 
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made. However, a positive formulation allowing the recovery of payments that 
appear ex post facto to have been made in violation of the standards of solvency 
and liquidity may afford creditors better protection.686 
Payment may be made unless there is ‛reason to believe’ that the specified 
circumstances exist. Although it is not specified who should or should not have 
such reason to believe, it is often assumed that it must be the directors or officers 
who cause the company to make payment. However, it is clear that the standard is 
more objective than this. It is thus not necessary to attempt to proscribe a certain 
state of mind to specific persons such as directors. The determining factor is the 
existence of a reason or ground for a specific belief.  
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act criticise the 
formulation of the test which prohibits payments ‛if there are reasonable grounds 
for believing’. They state that the test appears to have objective as well as 
subjective elements. The phrase ‛reasonable grounds’ and the absence of an 
indication as to who should hold the belief point to an objective test. However, a 
‛belief’ is inherently subjective, even if it belongs to the reasonable man. It is also 
suggested that the word ‘reasonable’ should rather have belonged to ‛belief’ than 
to ‛grounds’.687 Linguistically, this would indeed have made better sense.   
The meaning of the word ‛believe’ further seems to indicate that the mere 
existence of grounds for suspecting that the company may not satisfy the criteria is 
not sufficient reason to prevent the making of a payment. It is suggested that the 
requisite belief can only be held if it appears more likely than not that the company 
is insolvent or unable to pay its debts. The negative formulation of the test could 
thus in a particular case have a different outcome than would have been the case 
if payment depended on the existence of a reasonable belief that the company 
would indeed satisfy the criteria.  
4.1.2 The liquidity element 
The liquidity test is set out in section 85(4)(a) and section 90(2)(a). It prohibits 
payment if there is reason to believe that ‛the company is, or would after the 
payment be, unable to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary course of 
_________________________________________________________________  
686 This issue will be considered in paragraph 6.4.1.4 below in relation to the liability for unlawful 
payments.  
687  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-119.  
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business’. It is not specified for how long after the payment the company should 
remain able to pay its debts. Perhaps the intention was that this should depend on 
the nature of the company’s ordinary course of business, taking into the account 
the debts that could at that stage be expected to become due. For listed 
companies, the JSE Listings Requirements require the directors to make a 
prediction for the twelve months following the date of payment.688 It has been 
argued that a similar time period should be introduced for all companies.689 In the 
case of close corporations, the liquidity requirement is divided up into two parts, 
namely: 
• that the corporation must be able to pay its debts as they become due 
in the ordinary course of its business 
•  that the transaction must, in the particular circumstances not in fact 
render the corporation unable to pay its debts as they become due in 
the ordinary course of its business.690 
Apart from the obvious difference that the liquidity test in the Companies Act has 
been formulated more compactly by taking into account only the position after the 
transaction or payment, it is also concerned with illiquidity in general rather than 
illiquidity caused by the particular payment only. This formulation avoids the need 
to determine which liability caused the inability to pay. Nevertheless, if the 
company’s inability to pay its debts is caused by another event it would probably 
only be relevant for purposes of section 85(4)(a) and section 90(2)(a) if it was 
foreseeable at the stage when the reasonable belief had to be formed. There may 
thus not be much practical difference between these tests.  
The position regarding obligations in terms of earlier unexecuted repurchase 
contracts is uncertain. It would seem that they have to be included as liabilities. 
However, it could be doubted whether such obligations can ever be regarded as 
debts due in the ordinary course of the company’s business. It is suggested that 
this issue should be addressed in the legislation so as to make it clear that they 
can be disregarded, as is the case in California and under the Model Business 
_________________________________________________________________  
688  See the JSE Limited Listings Requirements paragraph 5.69(c)(i). The prediction must cover 
the ability of the company as well as of the group to pay its debts as they arise. 
689 See Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 766. 
690 See the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 s 39(1)(c); s 40(c), s 51(1)(b). 
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Corporations Act.691 
4.1.3 The solvency element 
Section 85(4)(b) and section 90(2)(b) contain the solvency test. If there is reason 
to believe that ‛the consolidated assets of the company fairly valued would after 
the payment be less than the consolidated liabilities of the company’ payment may 
not be made. The meaning of ‛consolidated’ could cause confusion. It has been 
suggested by Delport that this provision recognises the group concept in our law 
and that the consolidated financial position of the group is relevant when a holding 
company acquires its own shares.692 This interpretation of ‛consolidated assets’ 
and ‛consolidated liabilities’ is based on the similarity of these phrases to 
consolidated financial statements prepared by a holding company. This 
interpretation cannot be supported: although consolidated financial statements are 
the most common form of group financial statements, it is by no means the only 
form.693 No explanation is given as to why the legislature would have elevated one 
form of group financial statements above others.  Moreover, when a company that 
is not part of a group wants to make payment for the acquisition of its own shares, 
it would not have consolidated financial statements and would thus, on a logical 
extension of Delport’s argument, not be able to apply the test. Since it would be 
absurd to conclude that the test cannot be applied to a single company, it must be 
concluded that the word ‛consolidated’ has a wider meaning that does not rely on 
the group situation. It would also not make sense to apply the one meaning in 
certain cases and the other meaning in other instances. It makes much more 
sense to understand ‛consolidated’ according to its ordinary non-technical 
meaning.  
It is submitted that the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham 
Companies Act694 are correct in asserting that the word ‛consolidated’ adds 
nothing to the meaning of ‛assets and liabilities’. The authors discuss the 
legislative drafting history and speculate that the word may have been inserted to 
replace the reference to the ‛realizable’ value of assets in the Canadian provision 
_________________________________________________________________  
691 Chapter 4 paragraph 3.5.2 (California) and paragraph 4.4.2 (MBCA). 
692 Delport “Company Groups” 123. 
693 See s 289(1)(b)(i) – (iii). 
694 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-70. 
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on which section 85(4) was based.695 
However, the JSE Limited Listings Requirements require the directors to 
declare that the company and the group are solvent and will remain solvent for the 
ensuing twelve months.696 
4.2 The time for application of the financial restrictions  
The time when the financial restrictions must be satisfied depends on the 
interpretation of ‛payment’. Section 85(4) and section 90(2) prohibit the ‛making’ of 
a payment if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the company may be 
unable to pay its debts or may be insolvent. However, there are no specific rules 
indicating exactly when a payment is regarded as having been made or having 
taken effect. 
The question arises whether the test must be applied when the company 
authorises, agrees to, or incurs an obligation in respect of the distribution or when 
it actually transfers money or property to the shareholder.  
Cassim argues, in relation to share repurchases, that the solvency and 
liquidity tests must be satisfied both at the time when the contract is entered into 
and subsequently when payment is made.697 He does not consider the difficulties 
that could arise if the outcome of the test applied at the two stages would differ. 
Logically, if the obligation was incurred while the company did not satisfy the test, 
it would be void. It would then not matter that the company was actually solvent 
and able to pay its debts when it eventually made payment, as the payment would 
be unlawful.  
Cassim’s interpretation is not supported by the words of section 85. Section 
85(1), which gives a company the power to approve the acquisition of its own 
shares, makes no mention of the financial situation of the company. It uses the 
term ‛acquisition’, which is wide enough to cover acquisitions without consideration 
in which case it would be unnecessary to insist on solvency and liquidity. Section 
85(4) expressly refers to ‛payment’ only. The assumption of a liability is not usually 
_________________________________________________________________  
695 See Explanatory Memorandum to Draft Bill GG 18868 8 May 1998 Notice 724. 
696 See par 5.69 of the JSE Limited Listings Requirements. There are also requirements 
regarding availability of working capital. 
697 Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 768 – 769. Curiously, the author nevertheless states that a 
company’s undertaking is conditional upon its solvency and liquidity at the time of 
performance. 
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considered to constitute a payment.698 Further, section 88, which deals with the 
enforceability of the contract, clearly envisages that the test will be applied at the 
time of execution of the contract. It also recognises by necessary implication that 
the underlying obligation is not extinguished by the company’s insolvency or 
inability to pay its debts. It is thus clear that only the time of actual payment is 
relevant. This conclusion is supported by the judgment in Capitex Bank Ltd v 
Qorus Holdings Ltd & Others.699 
Section 90 also contains various indications that the authorisation of a 
distribution does not amount to a ‛payment’. The first indication is found in the 
verbs used in conjunction with payment(s). In two instances reference is made to 
the ‛making’ of payments700 and liability is imposed in respect of the ‛receipt’ of 
payments.701 The only reference to approval or authorisation is in the context of 
authorisation in the articles.702 Secondly, the definition of payment as a ‛transfer’ of 
money or property703 also points to the completion of a distribution rather than its 
authorisation. 
Leading commentaries agree that the test must be satisfied only when the 
company actually transfers money or property. The authors of Meskin 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act state that an ‛actual payment’ rather than a 
reorganisation of capital is envisaged.704  
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act are also of 
the view that the company has to satisfy the solvency and liquidity test when it 
makes payment and not, for example, when it declares a dividend. However, their 
justification can be criticised as it appears that they make the meaning of payment 
dependent on when, in their view, the financial restrictions have to be met. With 
reference to the liquidity test they explain that the declaration of a dividend does 
not affect the company’s ability to pay and, ‛since the company has to satisfy the 
_________________________________________________________________  
698 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-71. 
699  2003 (3) SA 302 (W) at 309. 
700  Section 90(1) reads: ‘A company may make payments…’. Similarly subsection (2) states: ‘A 
company shall not make any payment’ (emphasis supplied). 
701  Section 90(4).  
702  Section 90(1). 
703  Section 90(3). 
704  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 186(3). 
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test when it makes payment’, the original incurring of the debt is not a payment.705 
It is submitted that the meaning of ‛payment’ should indicate when the financial 
restrictions have to be met and not the other way round.706 Despite the criticism 
against this argument, it succinctly illustrates the point that it makes little sense to 
require compliance with a liquidity test with reference to the position immediately 
following the declaration of a dividend if the subsequent payment of that dividend 
is also subject the company’s solvency and liquidity. 
Closely related to the issue of when the requirements have to be satisfied, is 
the issue of whether the obligation that is being incurred has to be taken into 
account. In this regard the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies 
Act conclude that it would be illogical to do so, because otherwise there would be 
no need for testing the effect of the payment on the solvency and liquidity of the 
company.707 Moreover, they argue, claims in respect of repurchases are 
subordinated in terms of section 88(3). 
It is suggested that there is a far simpler explanation in support of this 
conclusion. Although the test is considered when the company is about to make 
payment, it is the financial position of the company at the moment immediately 
after payment that must be assessed. For purposes of the solvency element, the 
underlying obligation would thus have been extinguished. The liquidity element 
also envisages that the obligation should be disregarded, as it refers to the 
situation ‛after the payment’. This explains why it is not necessary to include a 
provision along the lines of section 52(4)(a) of the New Zealand Companies Act, 
which expressly provides that the liability incurred in terms of the authorisation 
need not be taken into account.708  
4.3 Distributions under the Companies Bill 
The Companies Bill contains a single definition of ‛distribution’.709 Any distribution 
is subject to the solvency and liquidity test set out in clause 4 of the Companies 
_________________________________________________________________  
705  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-118-1. 
706  While the actual formulation of the financial restrictions can be of assistance, the possibility 
that the restrictions may have to be met at two stages cannot be dismissed in advance without 
considering the context. 
707 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-71. 
708 See Chapter 3 paragraph 4. 
709  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’. 
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Bill.710 The definition of distribution comprises three subparagraphs dealing with 
the three main methods by which distributions can be made, namely: 
• a transfer of money or property711 
• the incurrence of an obligation712 
• the forgiveness or waiver of an obligation.713 
Each of these methods will qualify as a distribution regardless of whether made 
directly or indirectly.714 The definition expressly excludes liquidation 
distributions.715 The reason for this is that in a liquidation the surplus assets will be 
distributed to shareholders only once the debts have been paid. This provides 
welcome clarity. 
The first method of distribution is a direct or indirect transfer, by a company of 
money or other company property, other than its own shares, to or for the benefit 
of one or more of its shareholders or the shareholders of another company in the 
same group of companies.716 A number of specific examples are provided. The 
generality of the last example indicates that this is an exhaustive list of 
distributions that can be effected by way of transfer of money or property.  
The examples are:717 
• dividends 
• payments in lieu of a capitalisation share 
• consideration for the acquisition of own shares  
• consideration for the acquisition by any company in a group of shares of 
another company in the group 
• transfers in respect of any of the shares of that company or of another 
company within the same group, except under the appraisal remedy.718 
_________________________________________________________________  
710  Clause 46. 
711  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a). 
712  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (b). 
713  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (c). 
714  See the introductory words of the definition in clause 1 s v ‘distribution’. 
715  See the concluding words of the definition in clause 1 s v ‘distribution’. 
716  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a). 
717  See subparagraphs (a)(i) – (iv) of the definition in clause 1 s v ‘distribution’. 
718  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a)(iv) read with clause 164(19). A ‘surrender’ of shares 
Continued 
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It is clear that the first four examples are transfers by reason of shareholding. The 
final example is a residual category covering any other kind of transfer provided it 
is in respect of shares.  
The second method by which a distribution can be made is by incurring a 
debt or obligation in favour of a shareholder or a shareholder of another company 
in the group.719 It is unclear whether the incurring of a non-monetary obligation by 
a company, for example to render a service or to refrain from doing something, will 
also constitute a distribution and, if so, how it will be quantified. It is not expressly 
stated that the obligation must be incurred in respect of shares or by reason of the 
shareholding of the shareholder. 
The third instance, namely forgiveness or waiver by a company of a debt or 
other obligation owed to the company by a shareholder or shareholder of a 
company within the group is also not expressly required to be in respect of or by 
reason of shareholding.720  
Although the word ‛indirectly’ in the introductory sentence of the definition is 
perhaps wide enough to cover distributions by a company to shareholders of other 
companies in the group,721 the definition expressly recognises the group context in 
relation to distributions. An action that would qualify as a distribution if made to the 
company’s own shareholders will also constitute a distribution if made to 
shareholders of any other company within the group.  
Despite the fact that the issue of capitalisation shares does not constitute a 
distribution, clause 47 regulates certain aspects of such issues. The board may, if 
permitted by its memorandum of incorporation, offer shareholders a cash payment 
as alternative to the capitalisation shares,722 which will qualify as a distribution.723 
The board may only offer an election to receive cash in lieu of capitalisation shares 
if, having considered the solvency and liquidity test as required by clause 46 on 
the assumption that every shareholder would elect to receive cash, it is satisfied 
that the company will satisfy that test immediately upon the completion of the 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
under the appraisal remedy is also not regarded as an acquisition of shares, see clause 48(1). 
719  Clause1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (b). 
720  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (c). 
721  See the discussion in Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1 of the meaning of ‘indirect’ in the MBCA 
definition of distribution.  
722  Clause 47(3)(a). 
723  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a)(ii), and see paragraph 4.3 above. 
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distribution.724 
The Companies Bill rules that all shares of a class must be treated equally, 
unless the memorandum expressly provides otherwise.725 It further states that the 
memorandum can entitle the shareholders to ‛distributions’ calculated in specific 
ways726 and may provide for preferences as to distributions or liquidation rights in 
respect of different classes of shares.727  
4.3.1 Financial restrictions under the Companies Bill 
The solvency and liquidity test is set out in clause 4. The test can be divided into a 
solvency element728 and a liquidity element,729 both of which must be satisfied.  
4.3.1.1 Declaration by directors 
Before a distribution is made, the board of directors must acknowledge that it has 
applied the solvency and liquidity test and has reasonably concluded that the 
company will satisfy the test immediately after completion of the proposed 
distribution.730 This resolution is required even where the distribution was not 
authorised by the board, but is pursuant to an existing obligation or a court 
order.731 It appears that the board can acknowledge its application of the solvency 
and liquidity test at any stage prior to the distribution. 
4.3.1.2 The solvency element 
The solvency element will be satisfied if, considering all reasonably foreseeable 
financial circumstances of the company at the time: 
• the fair value of the company’s assets equal or exceed its fairly valued 
liabilities, or  
_________________________________________________________________  
724  Clause 47(3)(b). 
725  Clause 37(1). 
726  Clause 37(4)(c). 
727  Clause 37(4)(d). 
728  Clause 4(1)(a). 
729  Clause 4(1)(b). 
730  Clause 46(1)(c). 
731  Clause 46(1)(c) operates independently of clause 46(1)(a). 
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• if the company is a member of a group of companies, the consolidated 
assets of the company, as fairly valued, equal or exceed the 
consolidated liabilities of the company, as fairly valued.732 
The application of the alternative test set out above seems problematic. 
Firstly, reference is made to the consolidated assets of the ‛company’ and not of 
the group. The concept of consolidated assets is used in the Companies Bill in one 
other instance only, namely in regard to an auditor’s report to be included in a 
prospectus.733 In that context an auditor’s report in respect of a holding company 
may deal with the assets three alternatives ways, one of which is with the 
consolidated assets of the (holding) company and all its subsidiaries.734 
Consolidated assets are thus associated with a holding company and not with a 
specific subsidiary. This means that not every company that is a member of a 
group can be said to have consolidated assets.735 It appears that the drafters 
intended to refer to the consolidated assets of the group, rather than of the 
company. 
Secondly, although the Companies Bill mentions group or consolidated 
financial statements,736 there is presently no detail regarding the format of such 
statements. As in the case of an auditor’s report,737 it is likely that consolidated 
assets and liabilities will be merely one of various alternative methods of compiling 
group financial statements. In view of the limitations regarding the financial 
information that may be taken into account in applying the solvency and liquidity 
test,738 it will thus be impossible for a company that uses one of these other types 
of group statements to comply with the requirements of this test.  
I consider the merit of the extension of the solvency test to the group context 
_________________________________________________________________  
732  Clause 4(1)(a). This clause does not split up the test as has been done here. Instead it reads: 
‘the assets of the company or, if the company is a member of a group of companies, the 
consolidated assets of the company, as fairly valued, equal or exceed the liabilities of the 
company or, if the company is a member of a group of companies, the consolidated liabilities 
of the company, as fairly valued’. 
733  Schedule 3 paragraph 26(3)(b)(iii). 
734  Schedule 3 paragraph 26(3). 
735  See also the argument regarding the meaning of ‘consolidated’ in the Act, paragraph 4.1.3 
above. 
736  See clause 1 s v ‘financial statements’. 
737  See Schedule 3 Part B paragraph 26(3) of the Companies Bill, dealing with the contents of an 
auditor’s certificate in connection with offers to the public. 
738  See clause 4(2)(a)(ii). 
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elsewhere.739 
A further qualification to the solvency and liquidity test applies where a 
distribution takes the form of a transfer of money or property. This qualification 
relates to the protection of preferred classes of shareholders and applies unless 
the company’s memorandum of incorporation provides otherwise. The person 
applying the solvency and liquidity test should not take into account as a liability 
the amount required to satisfy the preferential rights upon liquidation of classes 
that enjoy priority over the (preferential)740 liquidation rights of those receiving the 
distribution, if the company were to be liquidated at the time of the distribution.741 
The justification for restricting this qualification to distributions by way of transfers, 
thus excluding distributions by way of the incurrence or forgiveness of an 
obligation, is not apparent. The position in such methods of distribution is unclear. 
One possible implication is that a person applying the test for purposes of these 
other two kinds of distribution should always consider preferential liquidation 
rights. Alternatively, it may imply that such preferential rights may never be taken 
into account for such distributions, regardless of the provisions of the 
memorandum of incorporation. Both alternatives seem absurd. 
Although the provision refers to the application of the solvency and liquidity 
test, it is clear that the preferential liquidation rights of preference shareholders are 
relevant for the solvency element and not the liquidity element. This is because 
liquidation rights cannot be regarded as debts due in the ordinary course of 
business. There is no requirement that fixed preferential dividends should be taken 
into account for purposes of assessing the company’s ability to pay its debts in the 
ordinary course of business. 
4.3.1.3 The liquidity element 
The liquidity element will be satisfied if it appears that the company will be able to 
pay its debts as they become due in the course of business for a period of 12 
_________________________________________________________________  
739  See paragraph 4.4.1 below. 
740  As currently formulated the provision is applicable only if the shareholders receiving the 
distribution also enjoy liquidation rights that are preferential, but rank behind the preferential 
liquidation rights of another class. It appears that the third occurrence in clause 4(2)(c) of the 
phrase ‘preferential liquidation rights’ should have been ‘liquidation rights’ only. This is 
because ordinary shareholders will not have ‘preferential’ liquidation rights. 
741  Clause 4(2)(c).   
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months.742 If the distribution is in the form of a transfer of money or property, the 
period ends 12 months after the date on which the distribution is made. In all other 
cases it ends 12 months after the date on which the solvency and liquidity test is 
considered.743  
Unlike the solvency element, which seems to refer to the financial position of 
a group of companies, the liquidity element does not refer to a group. 
4.3.1.4 Standard of application of solvency and liquidity test 
The Companies Bill prescribes the way in which the solvency and liquidity test is to 
be applied. Any financial information to be considered concerning the company 
must be based on accounting records and financial statements that satisfy the 
requirements set out in clause 28 and clause 29 respectively of the Bill.744 It would 
seem that ‛financial information’ should not be equated with ‛reasonably 
foreseeable financial circumstances’ to which reference is made in the introductory 
sentence of clause 4(2)(a).  
The test must be based on a ‛fair valuation of the company’s assets and 
liabilities, including any reasonably foreseeable contingent assets and liabilities, 
irrespective whether arising as a result of the proposed distribution, or 
otherwise’.745 In addition to this compulsory consideration of a fair valuation, the 
board or other person applying the test ‛may consider any other valuation of the 
company’s assets and liabilities that is reasonable in the circumstances’.746  
The option of considering a valuation of the company’s assets that is not a 
fair valuation, but nevertheless ‛reasonable in the circumstances’ seems absurd. 
The intention might have been to modify either the requirement that contingent 
assets and liabilities should be taken into account or the requirement pertaining to 
liabilities arising from the proposed distribution itself. The drafting of this provision 
requires further attention.     
Liabilities that will arise from a proposed distribution must be included as 
_________________________________________________________________  
742  Clause 4(1)(b). 
743  See paragraph 4.3.1.5 below for a discussion of when the test must be considered and when 
a distribution is regarded as having been made. 
744  Clause 4(2)(a). 
745  Clause 4(2)(b)(i). 
746  Clause 4(2)(b)(ii). 
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contingent liabilities.747 This requirement creates the impression that the test is to 
be applied with reference to a moment in time before the distribution has been 
made. It seems to conflict with clause 46(1)(b) and (c) where reference is made to 
the fact that the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately 
‛after completing’ the distribution. Although the completion of a distribution will 
usually result in the extinguishing of the liability, it seems that this provision may 
be relevant when the distribution takes the form of the incurring of a debt or 
obligation that is not immediately enforceable.748 I consider this issue below in 
relation to the time for application of the restrictions.749  
The solvency and liquidity test is also referred to in clause 46(1)(b) and (c). 
These two subparagraphs refer to satisfaction of the test immediately after 
completion of the distribution, while clause 4 refers to satisfaction of the test ‛at a 
particular time’. A possible explanation is that the solvency and liquidity test is 
used not only for distributions, but also for the regulation of financial assistance for 
the acquisition of shares750 and financial assistance to directors.751  
Clause 46(1)(b) imposes an objective solvency and liquidity standard. It 
prohibits a company from making a distribution unless it ‛reasonably appears’ that 
the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test after completion of the 
distribution. This paragraph does not state to whom this should be reasonably 
apparent, so it can be assumed that the test must be applied from the perspective 
of an objective bystander.  A resolution by the board that it has ‛reasonably 
concluded’ that the company will satisfy the test is set as an additional 
requirement.752 This test differs in important respects from the test currently 
contained in sections 85(4) and 90(2) of the Act.753 
_________________________________________________________________  
747  Clause 4(2)(b)(i). The reference in this provision to ‘the’ distribution may create the impression 
that the test is relevant only when a distribution is being authorised. However, the solvency 
and liquidity test is also used for other purposes, such as the financial assistance provisions in 
clauses 44 and 45. It is submitted that the words ‘the distribution or otherwise’ should be 
replaced with ‘a distribution, financial assistance transaction, or otherwise’. 
748  Under the exception in clause 46(4)(b). It cannot be used if the obligation is immediately 
enforceable, as intended in clause 46(4)(a). 
749  See paragraph 4.3.1.5 below.  
750  Clause 44. 
751  Clause 45. These instances require application of the test after provision of the financial 
assistance, see clause 44(2)(d)(i) and clause 45(2)(d)(i). 
752  Clause 46(1)(c). 
753  See paragraph 4.4.1 below. 
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4.3.1.5 Timing for application of the solvency and liquidity test under the 
Companies Bill 
Generally, the solvency and liquidity test must be satisfied when the distribution is 
completed.754 However, clause 46(4) sets out a separate timing rule for 
distributions made by way of the incurrence of a debt or obligation.755 It provides 
that the requirements of clause 46 apply when the board resolves that the 
company may incur the obligation.756 The requirements apply not upon the actual 
incurring of the obligation, but rather upon authorisation. This seems to be the 
position even when the company will incur the obligation at a future date only or 
subject to fulfilment of a condition. Interpretation of this clause is complicated by 
the fact that it is not only the financial restrictions that must be applied at the time 
of the resolution, but all the requirements of the clause, including the board 
resolution. Clause 46(1)(b) and (c) require the solvency and liquidity test to be 
satisfied immediately after ‛completion’ of the distribution. Paragraph (b) of the 
definition of a distribution suggests that no distribution is made until an obligation 
is actually incurred. Clause 46(4) thus contains a degree of circularity. 
I submit that a definition of the moment of completion of such a distribution 
should have been included in the timing rule. This could be defined either as the 
time of authorisation or as the time the debt or obligation is actually incurred. I 
suggest that the time when the obligation is incurred is the better option. But a 
specific timing rule may possibly be superfluous, since it appears from paragraph 
(b) of the definition that a distribution is made at the time when the obligation is 
incurred. It is then only necessary to state that the reduction or extinguishing of a 
debt or obligation that has been incurred as a distribution, will not be regarded as 
a further distribution.  It appears from clause 46(4)(b) that this is the idea behind 
the timing provision, as this clause provides that its requirements do not apply to 
any subsequent action of the company in satisfaction of the debt or obligation that 
qualified as a distribution. 
This timing provision is undermined by an exception that does not qualify the 
whole of clause 46(4), but only the rule in clause 46(4)(b) stating that the 
_________________________________________________________________  
754  Clause 46(1)(b). 
755  As described in paragraph (b) of the definition of ‘distribution’, see paragraph 4.3 above. 
756  Clause 46(4)(a). 
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requirements should not be applied again when the debt or obligation is satisfied. 
As currently formulated, the implication is that the resolution, or the terms and 
conditions of the debt or obligation, could oblige the company to comply with all 
the requirements of clause 46 for a second time.757 It is unlikely that this was the 
intention of the drafters. The intention may have been to apply the financial 
restrictions not when the incurring of the debt is authorised, but only when actual 
payments are made.758 This exception would apply only in instances where, in 
terms of the resolution or terms and conditions of the debt or obligation, each 
payment in satisfaction of the debt or obligation is subject to the company’s 
solvency and liquidity. However, in order to achieve this outcome, the qualification 
would have to appear not in clause 46(4)(b) but in the main part of clause 46(4). 
The Companies Bill does not succeed in drawing a distinction between compliance 
with the financial restrictions and the other requirements including authorisation. 
4.3.1.6 The 120 day rule  
When more than 120 business days759 have passed since the board’s 
acknowledgement that it has applied the solvency and liquidity test and has 
reasonably concluded that the company will satisfy it, and the company has not 
yet completed the distribution, clause 46(3) applies. The board has to reconsider 
the solvency and liquidity test.760 The company may not proceed with or continue a 
distribution unless the board adopts a further resolution acknowledging that it has 
applied the solvency and liquidity test and has reasonably concluded that the 
company will satisfy it. This provision is based on the example of the MBCA but it 
seems to be given a wider application in the Bill than it has in that Act.761 The 120-
day rule in the MBCA applies only to ‘other distributions’. Separate timing 
provisions apply to a reacquisition of shares and a distribution of indebtedness and 
these are not subject to a re-evaluation. The rule is necessary in the MBCA 
_________________________________________________________________  
757 The introductory sentence of clause 46(4) refers to the ‘requirements of this section’ that is, 
section 46.  
758  This would be in line with the timing provision in section 6.40(g) of the MBCA, see Chapter 4 
paragraph 4.3.3. 
759  The term ‘business days’ is defined in clause 1. The use of business days for the timing 
provision could complicate its application. It is to be noted that the MBCA rule uses calendar 
days, see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.3. 
760  Clause 46(3)(a). 
761  Section 6.40(e)(3) of the MBCA, see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3. 
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because the test for other distributions must be applied at the time of authorisation 
of the distribution, unless payment is to take place more than 120 days later. It 
should also be borne in mind that the liquidity requirement in the MBCA does not 
set a time limitation, while the proposed provision requires the liquidity prediction 
to be made for a period of 12 months.762 
It appears to be unnecessary to require a reconsideration despite the fact 
that the company does not intend proceeding or continuing with the distribution in 
the ensuing period of 120 business days. Yet the implication of the proposed 
formulation is that once the first acknowledgement has been made, periodic 
reconsiderations have to take place regardless of when the company intends 
proceeding or continuing with the distribution. A company that does not intend 
implementing a distribution within 120 business days of its authorisation would 
thus be wise to postpone the adoption of the acknowledgement until shortly before 
the intended implementation. It is suggested that it would be preferable for the 
legislature to require a reconsideration only at the stage when the company is 
about to proceed with or continue a distribution. A recommendation is thus made 
for the improvement of this provision.763  
4.4 Evaluation of distributions in general 
The current regulation of distributions is fragmented. Although the common-law 
capital maintenance doctrine has been abolished, some distributions continue to 
be regulated under the previous principles. While the new rules on payments and 
share acquisitions rely on the same financial restrictions of solvency and liquidity, 
their impact on the share capital structure of the company differs significantly. The 
degree of regulatory bias that accompanies this flexibility can be assessed only 
after full consideration of the requirements and consequences of each type of 
distribution.764  
The Companies Bill contains a definition of ‛distribution’ that is similar to the 
definitions of the New Zealand Companies Act and the MBCA. However, in 
addition to the transfer of money or property and the incurring of a debt, the 
_________________________________________________________________  
762  See clause 4(1)(b). 
763  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.10. 
764  See Chapter 6 paragraph 4. Even then, the effect of taxation and external economic factors 
will be left out of the equation, in view of the scope of this thesis, see Chapter 1 paragraph 3. 
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definition in the Companies Bill contains a third category, which is not mentioned 
expressly in these other two definitions. This is the forgiveness or waiver of a debt 
or obligation.765 This category will be particularly useful because it covers the 
waiver of a claim for outstanding consideration on unpaid or partly paid shares.766  
Certain aspects of the proposed definition can be criticised.767 The first 
criticism relates to the fact that a distribution is not expressly required to be ‛in 
respect of’ or ‛by reason of’ the shareholding of the shareholder, except in one of 
the specific examples of a distribution.768 While the specific examples of 
distributions by way of transfer leave no doubt about the relationship between the 
distribution and shareholding, it is unfortunate that the definition does not 
expressly require the incurrence or forgiveness of an obligation to be ‛in respect of’ 
shares. 
The definitions in the MBCA769 and the New Zealand Companies Act770 
expressly impose such a qualification in respect of the incurring or forgiveness of 
an obligation. In England, although the purpose of the definition of distribution is 
different, the Company Law Review identified the lack of an express reference to 
shareholding or shares as a weakness.771 
A qualification can probably be read into the definition, so that it would relate 
to a shareholder in that capacity only. However, it would be preferable to make it 
clear that the incurring or forgiveness of a debt owed by a shareholder will be 
regarded as a distribution only if it is in respect of shares or by reason of 
shareholding. 
A second, more serious criticism against the definition in the Companies Bill 
is its treatment of groups of companies. Distributions in the group context are not 
restricted to distributions by a subsidiary to the shareholders of its holding 
company or to shareholders of a co-subsidiary, but apparently extend to 
_________________________________________________________________  
765  See paragraph 4.3 above. 
766  See paragraph 3.6.4 regarding unpaid or partly paid shares under the Companies Bill. In the 
New Zealand Companies Act 1993 s 57, the cancellation of liability in respect of a share is 
deemed to be a distribution, see Chapter 3 paragraph 4.1. 
767  See paragraph 4.3 above for an explanation of the definition. See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.9 for 
a suggested definition. 
768  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a)(iii)(bb). See paragraph 4.3 above. 
769  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1 
770  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.1. 
771  See Chapter 2 paragraph 5.1. 
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distributions by a holding company to the shareholders of its subsidiary. Since the 
holding company cannot, strictly speaking, make a distribution to itself, it would 
seem that such a distribution would have to be made to any other shareholders of 
the subsidiary. It is unlikely that any distribution by a holding company to 
shareholders of its subsidiary can take place in respect of their shares except if the 
holding company is buying their shares from them. According to the definition, a 
purchase by a holding company of further shares in its subsidiary constitutes a 
distribution made by the holding company to its own shareholders.772 The express 
inclusion under distributions by way of transfer, of consideration given for the 
acquisition by any company in a group of shares in any other company in the 
group, confirms this interpretation.773 Was this the intended result? Distributions 
are in essence dispositions without value,774 while consideration for the acquisition 
of further shares in a subsidiary is clearly for value. None of the other jurisdictions 
surveyed regards such payments by a holding company to shareholders of its 
subsidiary as distributions by the holding company.  
The implications of regarding a transaction that would qualify as a distribution 
by a company if made to its own shareholders, as a distribution if made to 
shareholders of any other company in the group are difficult to predict, but the 
cumulative effect of the word ‛indirectly’ and the group extension seems to be that 
the same distribution may be regarded as a distribution by more than one 
company in the group. If so, the application of the requirements for distribution in 
such instances may be problematic. I consider the extent to which the proposed 
solvency and liquidity test attempts to accommodate this extended definition in my 
evaluation of the solvency test below.775  
A comparative analysis is necessary to evaluate whether the proposed 
definition of the Companies Bill is unique in its inclusion of a group of companies. 
The definition in California expressly includes a transfer, purchase or redemption 
_________________________________________________________________  
772  However, as Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-99 point out, such an 
acquisition clearly poses no risk and need not be regulated.  
773  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a)(iii)(bb), see paragraph 4.3 above. 
774  This is so even in the case of consideration for the acquisition of shares, since a company’s 
own shares have no value in its own hands. See also Calnan “Corporate Gifts” 91, Doran 
“Transactions at an Undervalue” 170. 
775  See paragraph 4.3.1 below. 
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by a subsidiary (in respect of shares in the holding company).776 One of the 
purposes of the inclusion of an indirect transfer in the MBCA definition was seen to 
be the regulation of repurchases by a subsidiary, but neither the definition itself nor 
the solvency and liquidity test refer to a subsidiary.777 The New Zealand definition 
makes no reference to a subsidiary,778 but this can be explained by the fact that 
under New Zealand law a subsidiary may not acquire shares in its holding 
company.779 
There is thus no precedent in any of the other jurisdictions surveyed for a 
general group extension, although a specific inclusion in respect of subsidiaries is 
fairly common. The intention of the drafters may have been to cover the 
acquisition by a subsidiary of shares in its holding company as well as indirect or 
disguised distributions, but the Explanatory Memorandum does not refer to the 
policy underlying this extension. 
In have identified a number of difficulties in relation to the proposed definition 
and recommend that the idea of adding a general group dimension to the 
regulation of distributions should be abandoned. Express regulation in a separate 
provision of the giving of consideration by a subsidiary for the acquisition of shares 
in its holding company is preferable.780 I suggest that the notion of an indirect 
distribution adequately covers any other group transactions that may amount to 
distributions. In such cases the distribution will be made by the company whose 
shareholders receive the distribution. The company supplying the funds will have 
to justify the expense in some or other way and, if it happens to be a wholly owned 
subsidiary, it is likely that the payment will also qualify as a distribution by the 
subsidiary to the holding company. 
Thirdly, the express exclusion of appraisal payments from the definition of 
‛distribution’ can be questioned. This exclusion has the effect that shareholders 
who insist on being paid for their shares as a result of their dissent with certain 
_________________________________________________________________  
776  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.1. 
777  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1. 
778  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.1. 
779  See Chapter 3 paragraph 6.7. 
780  See also paragraph 6.7 below. The question whether the acquisition by a subsidiary of shares 
in its co-subsidiary (which is not a subsidiary of itself) should be regulated, is addressed in 
paragraph 6.10.7 below.  
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corporate actions, receive payment in preference to creditors.781 There seems to 
be no good reason for excluding appraisal payments from the ambit of 
distributions. It must be remembered that a shareholder relying on the appraisal 
remedy need not even prove that she was prejudiced by the resolution. Yet the 
Companies Bill affords such a shareholder the same status as a creditor, while a 
shareholder who succeeded under the oppression remedy will have to wait for 
payment until the company is able to satisfy the solvency and liquidity test. It is 
unacceptable to leave the ball in the court of the company to approach the court if 
it does not wish to make the appraisal payment because of its financial position. A 
company who wishes to favour its dissenting shareholders may apparently do so, 
because it is not obliged to approach the court. 
Appraisal payments are subject to the financial restrictions in California,782 
New Zealand783 and under the MBCA.784 
It seems that a payment for shares made in compliance with a court order will 
be regarded as a distribution and thus subject to the solvency and liquidity test. I 
submit that appraisal payments and payments in terms of a court order should be 
regulated in a more coherent fashion and I will make a recommendation on this.785 
4.4.1 Evaluation of the financial restrictions of solvency and liquidity 
I submit that the application of a solvency and liquidity test as a general restriction 
on distributions adequately protects the interests of creditors. The current Act does 
not use this test for all distributions, but it forms the backbone of the regulation of 
distributions.786 A comparison of the solvency and liquidity test in the Companies 
Bill and the test currently contained in section 85(4) and section 90(2) of the Act is 
necessary, as they differ in several respects. 
First, the test in clause 46(1)(b) is cast as a positive statement. The current 
test prohibits a distribution if there is reason to believe that the company will not 
_________________________________________________________________  
781  The company can apparently decide whether it wants to pay, because it is given the right, but 
is not obliged to, approach the court to rearrange its obligation to pay the appraisal amount. 
See paragraph 6.9 below for a further discussion of this issue. 
782  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.1. 
783  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.1. 
784  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1. 
785  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.9 and the suggested definition of distribution. 
786  The payment of interest on share capital under s 79 is not often resorted to, and redemption is 
Continued 
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satisfy the test787 while the test proposed in the Bill allows a distribution only if it 
reasonably appears that the company will satisfy the test. 
Second, the need for a positive enquiry and resolution is emphasised by 
clause 46(1)(c) which deals with the board acknowledgement. The current test 
does not require any declaration or resolution of the board, and so imposes a 
negative duty on the directors.788 Both tests contain an objective element, because 
under the proposed test objective factors will be relevant in assessing whether the 
directors’ conclusion was indeed reasonable. However, compliance with clause 
46(1)(c)  does not depend on whether the directors have based their 
acknowledgement on reasonable grounds, but on whether they have in fact made 
the requisite acknowledgement by way of a resolution. The requirement in clause 
46(2) that the company should fully carry out a distribution once the board has 
adopted the solvency resolution,789 seems to conflict with the objective 
requirement in clause 46(1)(b).790 Although the board has to base its resolution on 
the financial position of the company immediately after completion of the 
distribution,791 the company may no longer reasonably appear to satisfy the test at 
that later stage of up to 120 business days after acknowledgement when it makes 
the distribution. It may be that these different standards were enacted for the 
purpose of distinguishing between the validity of a distribution on the one hand, 
and the liability of directors on the other hand.792 But it is strange that the company 
is obliged to proceed with what is in effect an unlawful distribution, merely based 
on the board’s formal acknowledgement. If the board’s solvency resolution carries 
such weight, provision should perhaps be made for a retraction where it 
subsequently appears that the company will not satisfy the test. 
Third, the solvency element in the Companies Bill requires that the financial 
position of a group of companies must be taken into account. There seems to be 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
restricted to redeemable preference shares. 
787  See paragraph 4.1.1 above. 
788 The JSE Limited Listings Requirements require a declaration by the directors, see paragraph 
5.69(c).  
789  Unless more than 120 business days have lapsed since the board’s acknowledgement. See 
clause 46(3). 
790  See also the discussion of the enforceability of authorised or permitted distributions in 
paragraph 5.8.2 below. 
791  Clause 46(1)(c). 
792  See further paragraph 4.4.1.1 below. 
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no good reason why the financial situation of the group should be taken into 
account for this purpose, but not for the liquidity requirement. I have indicated that 
the use of the phrase ‛consolidated assets of the company’ creates 
uncertainties.793 Even if this is taken as a reference to the consolidated assets of 
the group rather than of the company, the justification of this requirement can be 
questioned. The financial position of a group of companies hardly seems relevant 
where a subsidiary is making a distribution to its shareholders other than the 
holding company, especially when the proposed definition of ‘subsidiary’ does not 
require the holding company or its other subsidiaries to hold any shares in the 
subsidiary.794 Conversely the financial position of a subsidiary in which the holding 
company holds no shares or only a relatively low percentage of shares, should not 
be relevant when the holding company makes a distribution.  
I submit that this provision should be reconsidered for the same reason as 
the blanket extension of ‛distribution’ to include any shareholder of a company in 
the group.795 Perhaps the idea should be limited to the instance of a subsidiary 
that is a wholly owned subsidiary as presently defined in the Act, namely a 
subsidiary with all its shares held by the holding company and its other 
subsidiaries.796 
4.4.1.1 Evaluation of reasonable grounds for believing versus 
acknowledgement of consideration 
I have illustrated that the way in which the solvency and liquidity test is currently 
formulated imposes a negative rather than a positive duty on the company.797 In a 
sense, the test in section 85(4) can be described as an insolvency and illiquidity 
test rather than a solvency and liquidity test. This is because payment is allowed in 
principle, unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the company is 
insolvent or will be unable to pay its debts. This formulation derives from the 
Canada Business Corporations Act.798 
_________________________________________________________________  
793  See paragraph 4.3.1.2 above. 
794  See the definition of ‘subsidiary’ in clause 1 and the deeming provision in clause 3. 
795  See paragraph 4.4 above. 
796  Although the Bill uses the term wholly ‘owned’ subsidiary, its definition does not rely on 
shareholding at all, see clause 3.  
797  See paragraph 4.1.1 above. 
798  See s 40 of the Canada Business Corporations Act RSC 1985 c C-44. 
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Despite the use of the phrase ‛reasonable grounds to believe’ the test is 
objective rather than subjective because the outcome does not depend on the 
actual belief of the company or its directors but on that of a reasonable person. 
The determining factor is the existence of a reason or ground upon which a 
conclusion could reasonably be reached.799  
Moreover, it is the existence of reasonable grounds to believe in a certain 
future state of affairs that is conclusive.800 The test is thus based on a prediction or 
forecast rather than on the actual financial position of the company. Provided the 
prediction was reasonable, the test is satisfied even if the prediction later appears 
to have been wrong. Conversely, the distribution will be technically unlawful if the 
prediction was unreasonable at the time, but is later proved to be accurate.801 I 
have cautioned that this could result in a potential conflict between company law 
and insolvency law, at least in relation to the solvency element. In an insolvent 
winding-up of a company the actual solvency of the company at the time of 
payment is measured in order to assess whether the payment will be voidable. 
By contrast, the financial restrictions applicable to close corporations require 
a positive enquiry into the corporation’s solvency and liquidity as a prerequisite for 
payment. It is submitted that different results could be reached in borderline cases 
depending on whether a positive or negative duty is involved. 
From a comparative perspective it emerges that the other jurisdictions that 
subject distributions to a solvency and liquidity test all impose a positive duty on 
the company or its directors. A formal solvency declaration is required in England, 
and auditor confirmation is also necessary.802 In New Zealand directors also have 
to sign a solvency certificate.803 In California and under the MBCA a solvency 
declaration is not required, but the test is cast in purely objective format. 
The provision in the Companies Bill that requires a resolution by directors 
that they have considered the solvency and liquidity test and concluded that the 
_________________________________________________________________  
799  See paragraph 4.1.1 above.  
800  See paragraph 4.1.1 above. 
801  Although in such a case it is unlikely that action will be taken to recover the unlawful 
distribution. 
802  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.2.2. Note, however, that in England the solvency and liquidity test 
is applied only for share repurchases out of share capital. 
803  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.3. 
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company will satisfy it, must be welcomed.804 It will ensure that the interests of 
creditors and, to the extent that liquidation preferences must be taken into 
account, shareholders enjoy proper consideration. 
An exploration of the solvency and liquidity test proposed in the Companies 
Bill discloses that the test must be applied ‛considering all reasonably foreseeable 
financial circumstances of the company at the time’. These introductory words 
imply that a prediction is envisaged. This is reinforced by the first words of the 
liquidity element, namely ‛it appears that the company will be able’. Yet, the 
solvency element does not state that it should ‛appear’ that the assets ‛will’ exceed 
the liabilities, but is formulated objectively with reference to a particular point in 
time. This results in tension between the introductory words of the test and the 
solvency element. 
I suggested, in comments submitted to the Department of Trade and Industry 
on the 2007 draft Companies Bill, which contained the same solvency test as the 
2008 Companies Bill, that the consideration of foreseeable circumstances militates 
against the notion of a solvency test and that these words should rather be used in 
relation to the liquidity element only. This results in a combination of actual 
solvency and predicted liquidity, as exemplified by the Californian provision.  
In California, the retained earnings test and the asset-liability ratio test 
depends on the actual financial position of the company while the liquidity element 
seems to be based on a prediction or assumption made immediately before the 
distribution.805 In England, New Zealand and under the MBCA the lawfulness of a 
distribution depends on the corporation’s actual compliance with the restrictions 
when the distribution is made.806 However, in all these jurisdictions additional 
factors are relevant to determining liability for an unlawful distribution. 
Other jurisdictions show a more sophisticated approach in which a distinction 
is drawn between the application of the test for purposes of authorisation of a 
distribution and for purposes of imposing liability for unlawful distributions. It 
stands to reason that the authorisation or making of a distribution will have to be 
based on a prediction or at least an assumption about the company’s solvency 
_________________________________________________________________  
804  See paragraph 4.3.1.1 and clause 46(1)(c) of the Companies Bill. 
805  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2. 
806 See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.2.2, Chapter 3 paragraph 4.2, Chapter 4 paragraphs 3.4.2 and 
4.4.2.  
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and liquidity. But creditors’ interests are affected by the actual solvency or liquidity 
of the company rather than by the accuracy of predictions or assumptions. So it 
makes sense to base liability for the return of unlawful distributions on the actual 
financial position of the company as it appears after the event. As I argue below, 
such an approach does not exclude the possibility of limiting prima facie liability 
with reference to the conduct or state of mind of the directors who authorised or 
shareholders who received the distribution.807   
The Companies Bill already contains provisions that facilitate a distinction 
between how the test is applied when distributions are authorised as opposed to 
when liability is imposed. Clause 46(1)(b) allows a company to make a distribution 
if it ‛reasonably appears’ that the company will satisfy the test, while clause 
46(1)(c) requires a resolution by the board that it has ‛reasonably concluded’ that 
the company will satisfy the test. By contrast, liability can be imposed on directors 
only if ‛immediately after making all of the distribution … the company does not 
satisfy the solvency and liquidity test’ and, in addition, if it was unreasonable at the 
time of the decision to conclude that the company would satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test after making the relevant distribution. However, since the notion of an 
assumption or prediction has in effect been built into the solvency and liquidity test 
itself, there is no basis for working with actual solvency and liquidity. The 
attempted distinction is thus ineffective. I suggest that this problem can be 
overcome by removing the words ‛considering all reasonably foreseeable 
circumstances at the time’ from the introductory sentence of the solvency test and 
inserting them at the beginning of the liquidity element.808 
4.4.1.2 Evaluation of the liquidity element 
A liquidity element is a common feature of the financial restrictions in the 
jurisdictions that have abolished capital maintenance or legal capital.809 Although 
the overarching test in New Zealand is called a ‛solvency test’ it contains a 
balance-sheet solvency element as well as an equity solvency or liquidity 
_________________________________________________________________  
807  See paragraph 6.10.4 below. 
808  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.12 for a proposal in this regard. 
809  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.2 for New Zealand, Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2.3 for California and 
paragraph 4.4.2 for the MBCA. 
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element.810 The terms ‛equity insolvency test’, ‛equity solvency’ and ‛equity test’ 
are all used to refer to what is generally called the liquidity test in South Africa. 
Despite the apparent similarity between liquidity tests, there are differences 
in approach. In some instances a specific time period is prescribed, in others not. 
The test can be based either on a mere expectation of continued liquidity or on 
actual continued liquidity, coupled with an element of causation. The provision can 
prescribe that certain liabilities are excluded or included, or give no further 
guidance in this regard.  
The liquidity element of the solvency and liquidity test in the Act requires an 
assessment of the company’s ability to pay its debts as they arise in the ordinary 
course of business and does not refer to a particular time limit during which the 
company should remain able or be expected to remain able to pay its debts as 
they arise in the ordinary course of business.811  
The Companies Bill proposes to introduce a 12 month period in respect of 
which the prediction of continued liquidity should be made. A precedent for this 
approach can be found in the JSE Limited Listings Requirements812 and also in 
England.813 No particular time period is coupled to the liquidity element in New 
Zealand, California or in the MBCA. I submit that the specification of a time period 
will provide more certainty for directors when they authorise a distribution. 
However, it may disadvantage creditors of companies that have longer-term 
commitments that are clearly foreseeable, but not payable within 12 months. It is 
submitted that the imposition of a time limit is undesirable and that the ‛ordinary 
course of business’ of each company should be the decisive factor in judging its 
liquidity.814  
If it is deemed necessary to impose a specific time period in order to protect 
creditors, this should rather be done by way of a presumption that the company 
_________________________________________________________________  
810  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.2. 
811  See paragraph 4.1.2 above. 
812  See JSE Limited Listings Requirements paragraph 5.69(c), discussed in paragraph 4.1.2 
above. 
813  See CA 1985 s 173(3)(b); CA 2006 s 714(3)(b), discussed in Chapter 2 paragraph 6.2.2. 
814  See Murphy “Equity Insolvency” 870 who argues that the widely differing circumstances under 
which companies operate makes a time frame impracticable. Murphy, writing on the American 
MBCA which in its Official Comment sets out guidelines for the application of the test, 
suggests that guidance should be given as to how a reasonable time should be established for 
each company, for example by using operating cycles. See also Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
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did not satisfy the test if it is liquidated within a specified period. An example can 
be found in the Close Corporations Act where payments to members made within 
two years of the winding-up of a close corporation are recoverable unless the 
members can prove that the corporation satisfied the solvency and liquidity test at 
the time of payment.815 In effect, a two year period is thus imposed coupled with a 
reverse onus. This would provide more protection to creditors than the current and 
proposed tests, because the creditors or liquidator do not have to prove that the 
assessment was unwarranted if the company is indeed liquidated shortly after the 
distribution. The directors still have to base their assessment on the company’s 
expected ability to pay its debts, depending on the ordinary course of its business.  
However, I submit that creditors will be adequately protected by a simple 
liquidity test, without reference to any time period. The question of the voidability of 
a distribution in an ensuing liquidation should be determined under insolvency law. 
Causation is not relevant in the liquidity element of the Act or under the 
proposed liquidity element in the Companies Bill. The specific effect of a 
distribution on the company’s ability to pay its debts is relevant in the liquidity test 
of the Close Corporations Act, where it is required that the payment should not 
render the close corporation unable to pay its debts,816 and in the California 
Corporations Code, where the distribution should not seem 'likely to result' in 
inability to pay.817 However, in both these instances the test must be applied with 
reference to the moment before the distribution is made. A test which expressly 
requires the position to be determined immediately after a distribution has been 
made, has by implication already discounted the effect of the distribution. If a 
presumption is introduced to the effect that a company which is liquidated within a 
specified period is deemed not to have complied with the solvency and liquidity 
test, then lack of causation should be an element of a defence shareholders can 
raise in order to escape liability for the return of distributions received by them, as 
is currently the case in the liability provision of the Close Corporations Act.818 
However, I have asserted that such a presumption should not be introduced. 
The Act does not contain any specific guidelines as to which debts should be 
_________________________________________________________________  
815  See s 70 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
816  See paragraph 4.1.2 above.  
817  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2.3. 
818  Section 70(2)(c) of the Close Corporations Act. 
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taken into account in determining the company’s ability to pay. This is also the 
case in most of the other systems surveyed. However, the MBCA expressly 
prescribes that claims in respect of previously authorised distributions (other than 
the distribution in respect of which the test is being applied) must be disregarded if 
their enforceability depends on the company’s solvency and liquidity at the time of 
payment.819 This is a useful exclusion, given the uncertainty as to whether such a 
claim can ever be regarded as a debt due in the ordinary course of a company’s 
business.820 
The Companies Bill unfortunately does not provide for the exclusion of 
liabilities which are subordinated depending on the company’s solvency and 
liquidity. To the contrary, it expressly requires any reasonably foreseeable 
contingent liabilities to be taken into account at a fair value. I submit that it is fair to 
value such subordinated claims at nil, but that it is preferable to exclude them 
expressly.821 
4.4.1.3 Evaluation of the solvency element 
All jurisdictions that have adopted alternatives to the capital maintenance or legal 
capital doctrine include a solvency element as an integral part of the financial 
restrictions on distributions. The difference between a solvency test and the capital 
maintenance test is that the latter requires a margin over solvency which is equal 
to the share capital of the company.  
A comparison of the solvency requirements applicable in the different 
jurisdictions shows that the current South African test is relatively lenient and out 
of step with international trends. This is because the South African test is satisfied 
whenever the assets equal the liabilities following a distribution. No provision is 
made for the protection of preference shareholders.822  
The Californian standard is probably the strictest in that the alternative tests 
of retained earnings and asset-liability ratios each require a margin of assets over 
_________________________________________________________________  
819  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
820  See paragraph 4.1.2 above. 
821  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.12. 
822  Even the Canadian provision on which the South African test is based requires that share 
capital and reserves be treated as a liability and that liquidation preferences of preferent 
classes must be provided for, see s 40 of the Canada Business Corporations Act RSC 1985 c 
C-44. 
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liabilities subsequent to the distribution.823 The retained earnings test has the 
effect that the assets have to exceed the liabilities by at least the value of the 
original investment of shareholders while under the asset-liability ratios test the 
total assets have to exceed the total liabilities by a margin of 25 per cent.824 In 
addition, the liquidation preferences of any senior classes of shares have to be 
covered by retained earnings, while arrear cumulative preference dividends must 
be covered by an excess of assets over liabilities.825   
Liquidation preferences of classes of shareholders enjoying priority over the 
shareholders to whom the distribution is being made also have to be provided for 
in New Zealand826 and under the MBCA.827 
The standard of the South African solvency and liquidity test is comparable to 
that in England.828 However, in England the application of this test is limited to 
instances where private companies repurchase their shares out of share capital. 
Other distributions must be made out of distributable profits, implying that there will 
be an excess of net assets over share capital,829 which in the case of public 
companies must be at least equal to the prescribed minimum capital of £50 000.830 
Preference shareholders are also protected under capital maintenance or 
legal capital systems such as England and Delaware. In relation to dividends, the 
most common form of distribution, the terms of issue of the preference shares will 
entrench their right to receive dividends in priority to other classes of shares. Their 
liquidation preferences are safeguarded by the rule that contributed capital, 
including the capital in respect of which they enjoy the preference, must be 
maintained. In Delaware the rights of preference shareholders are regulated 
expressly in the event of a repurchase of shares funded out of a capital reduction 
surplus. 831  
_________________________________________________________________  
823  See Chapter 4 paragraphs 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.2.2. 
824  The ratio of current assets to current liabilities could differ, depending on the circumstances. 
See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2.2. 
825  Regardless of whether the corporation relies on the retained earnings or asset-liability ratio 
test, see Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2.4.  
826  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.2. 
827  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
828  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.2.2. 
829  See Chapter 2 paragraphs 5.2.1 and 6.2.1. 
830  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.2. 
831  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.5.2. 
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The introduction of protection for preference shareholders was considered by 
the company law reform project.832 However, the Companies Bill proposes as 
default option that such rights will not be taken into account.833 Further, if the 
memorandum of incorporation provides that preferential liquidation rights should 
indeed be taken into account as liabilities of the company, it seems that this may 
only be done when the distribution is in the form of a transfer of money or property 
and not also when an obligation is incurred or forgiven.834  
I recommend that, as is the case in the MBCA and in New Zealand, the 
default option should be that liquidation preferences must be taken into account, 
leaving it to companies to expressly exclude this protection if it is not required. It is 
difficult to justify why a company that has chosen to provide for preferential rights 
to the return of capital, should be allowed to make distributions to ordinary 
shareholders that will endanger those rights. At least, if the memorandum is 
required to provide expressly that liquidation preferences will not be taken into 
account when distributions are made, potential investors in preference shares will 
be alerted to this fact and can make an informed decision. 
4.4.1.4 Evaluation of standards for application of the financial restrictions 
The Act requires that the assets and liabilities of the company should be ‛fairly 
valued’. No further detail is provided as to how this should be done.835 In contrast, 
specific instructions are contained in the New Zealand Companies Act836 and in 
the MBCA837 to the effect that the enquiry must be based on the most recent 
financial statements that comply with the financial disclosure requirements or on a 
fair or reasonable basis, while certain assets and liabilities that must either be 
included or excluded are specified. The Californian asset-liability ratio test also 
expressly excludes certain assets and liabilities.838  
_________________________________________________________________  
832 See Policy Framework 4.3.2. 
833  See clause 4(2)(c), discussed in paragraph 4.3.1.4 above. 
834  See paragraph 4.3.1.4 above where the obscurity and ambiguity of this provision is discussed 
in more detail. 
835  Compare the amended s 228(4) which requires the fair value of a company’s undertaking or 
assets to be determined as described in financial reporting standards.  
836  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.2. 
837  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
838  Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2.2. 
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The provisions in the Companies Bill are comparable to those in New 
Zealand and under the MBCA.839 However, I criticised certain aspects of their 
formulation.840 I suggest that a degree of legislative guidance on the application of 
the test is necessary. However, the standards for the solvency element and the 
liquidity element should be clearly distinguished, because the liquidity element 
necessarily involves a consideration of aspects that may not appear from the 
financial statements of the company.  
I consider it unnecessary to take the obligation to be incurred into account as 
a liability, either for purposes of the solvency element or the liquidity element, 
since it is the financial position immediately after the distribution that must be 
established.841  
It appears that outstanding obligations under other repurchase contracts 
need to be included as liabilities for purposes of the solvency element.842 
However, it is uncertain whether debts due in respect of earlier repurchases 
should be taken into account in assessing the liquidity of the company as these 
debts can hardly be regarded as debts due in the ordinary course of the 
company’s business and are in any event not enforceable while the company is 
unable to pay its debts. I suggest that this issue should be addressed in the 
legislation in order to clarify whether such debts must be taken into account, as is 
the case under the MBCA.843  
It appears that the reference to ‛consolidated’ assets and liabilities of a 
‛company’ could cause confusion when determining what assets and liabilities 
must be considered when the solvency test is applied.844 
Unfortunately this term is also used in the Companies Bill, albeit with the 
qualification that the company should be a member of a group. As the proposed 
test is currently formulated, the consolidated assets have to be taken into account 
whenever a group company makes a distribution and not only when it makes a 
distribution to the shareholders of another company in the group. This seems to be 
_________________________________________________________________  
839  See clause 4(2)(a). 
840  See paragraph 4.3.1.4 above. 
841  See paragraph 4.3.1.4 above. 
842  See paragraph 4.1.2 above. 
843 See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
844  See paragraph 4.1.3 above. 
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an unnecessary complication845 that will make unjustified inroads into the separate 
legal personality of a subsidiary making a simple distribution to its own 
shareholders who, it must be remembered, might not even include the holding 
company.846 
I suggest that this provision should be reconsidered in conjunction with the 
proposed definition of ‛distribution’.847 The regulation of distributions in the group 
context should be limited to instances where a subsidiary makes a distribution to 
shareholders of its holding company, and it should be made clear whether the 
financial restrictions will in such a case be applied independently to the subsidiary 
and the holding company, to the subsidiary and holding company as a unit, or to 
the group as a whole. In this regard, I suggest that the preferable option is that the 
test should be satisfied by both the holding company and the subsidiary.848 
4.4.2 Evaluation of the time for the application of the financial restrictions 
Under the Act, the solvency and liquidity test must be satisfied at the time when 
payment, in the sense of an actual transfer of money or property, takes place.849 It 
is at this stage that there should not be reasonable grounds for believing that the 
company will be insolvent or unable to pay its debts after payment. The wording of 
sections 85(4) and 90(2) do not support the application of the test when a 
repurchase or payment is authorised.850  
South Africa is the only one of the solvency and liquidity jurisdictions 
surveyed that consistently applies the financial restrictions at the time of actual 
payment or transfer. In New Zealand the test must be satisfied at the time of 
authorisation of a distribution, although payment is prohibited if the directors are 
no longer satisfied that the company will comply with the solvency and liquidity 
test.851 A distinction between different kinds of distributions and the time when 
_________________________________________________________________  
845  Especially in view of the uncertainty regarding the determination of the ‘consolidated’ assets 
and liabilities from the financial statements, see paragraph 4.3.1.2 above.     
846  For example, when the holding company can control the voting rights in the general meeting 
or the majority in the board, see clause 3. 
847  See paragraph 4.3 above. 
848  See also paragraph 6.9.6 below. 
849  See paragraph 4.2 above. 
850  See paragraph 4.2 above. 
851  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.3. 
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their effect should be measured is also evident in the MBCA.852  
The timing rules in New Zealand, California and under the MBCA are more 
complex in that they distinguish between different kinds of distributions.853 As 
regards dividend-like payments (payments other than for share repurchases) in 
New Zealand, the board has to consider the financial restrictions at the time of 
authorisation and be satisfied that the company will be solvent and liquid 
immediately after the distribution. It is thus not the financial position at the time of 
authorisation that is considered, but the prospective position at the time of 
payment. Further, the directors may not proceed with the actual distribution or 
payment if they are no longer satisfied that the company will comply with the 
financial restrictions.854 In California the time when a distribution is made is 
expressly regulated in respect of different kinds of distributions with the result that 
the financial restrictions are sometimes applied at the time of authorisation of the 
distribution and sometimes at the time of actual payment or transfer.855 In the case 
of a dividend, the date of authorisation is used and not the record date or payment 
date.856 Under the MBCA the financial restrictions have to be met at the time of 
‛giving effect’ to a distribution.857 Although both the declaration and the payment of 
a dividend are mentioned as examples in the definition of a distribution, the time 
for application of the financial restrictions is expressly regulated. Dividend-like 
distributions fall under the general timing rule and are thus deemed to take effect 
on the date of authorisation, provided payment is made within 120 days of the 
authorisation.858 If payment is to take place more than 120 days after 
authorisation, the financial restrictions must be met on the date of actual 
payment.859 Under the MBCA if an indebtedness is distributed, the effect must be 
measured on the date the indebtedness is distributed, except if each payment is 
_________________________________________________________________  
852  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3. 
853  See paragraph 4.2 above, Chapter 3 paragraph 4.3, Chapter 4 paragraphs 3.4.3 and 4.4.3. 
854  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.3. 
855  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.3. 
856  California General Corporation Law s 166. Note that California also does not mention the 
incurring of obligations in its definition of ‘distribution’. See also Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.3. 
857  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3. 
858  However, the payment of a dividend at any stage while the company is insolvent, even within 
the 120 day period, would be liable to be set aside as a fraudulent conveyance, see Chapter 4 
paragraphs 1 and 4.4.6.  
859  Section 6.40(e)(3) of the MBCA, see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3.. 
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made subject to the corporation’s solvency and the debt is subordinated to those 
of ordinary trade creditors.860 This sophisticated timing rule illustrates a correlation 
between the status of a claim in respect of a distribution and the timing rule. 
In view of the tendency in systems based on solvency and liquidity to rely to 
some extent on the date of declaration of a dividend, the question arises whether 
the South African approach of using the date of payment as the time when the 
financial restrictions have to be satisfied, needs to be reconsidered. It is more 
complex to use the date of declaration, coupled with further qualifications such as 
a 120-day rule or the prohibition of payment if directors are no longer satisfied of 
the solvency and liquidity of the company, or to rely on fraudulent conveyance law. 
In any event this approximates the result of the date-of-payment approach. I 
submit that the current timing rule in section 90 offers an uncomplicated solution 
that properly protects creditors.  
This approach will continue under the provisions of the Companies Bill, 
because dividends are included under the first category of distributions, namely 
the transfer of money or property.861 The effect of a dividend thus has to be 
measured when the distribution is ‛made’. 
The comparative study also shows that there are specific rules for 
distributions by way of the incurring of an indebtedness. Although the meaning of 
‛payment’ in section 90 refers to an actual transfer of money or property, the 
distribution of a debt instrument may qualify as a transfer of property and thus as a 
payment for purposes of section 90.862 The financial restrictions would thus have 
to be satisfied when the payment is made, in this case when the debt instrument is 
transferred and not when payments are effected in terms of the debt instrument. 
The subsequent payments cannot strictly be regarded as payments by virtue of 
shareholding but should rather be attributed to ownership of the debt 
instrument.863 If such a distribution is not regarded as a transfer of property, but as 
an ordinary incurring of an obligation, each payment on the instrument should be 
regarded as a payment for purposes of section 90. 
The different timing rules can be explained through the correlation between 
_________________________________________________________________  
860  See s 6.40(e), (g), see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3. 
861  See paragraph 4.3 above. 
862  See paragraph 5.1.1 below. 
863  It may be that the instrument has been transferred to a non-member. 
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the status of a shareholder’s claim in respect of a previously authorised distribution 
and the time when the effect of the distribution is measured. If a shareholder 
acquires an unconditional unsubordinated claim that is immediately enforceable, 
the restrictions have to be satisfied at the time when the claim is created. 
Conversely, if the shareholder’s claim is postponed or subordinated, the test must 
be satisfied when payment is made.  
It is suggested that the approach in South Africa, where the effect of a 
distribution864 is measured at the time when money or property is transferred, and 
the shareholder receives a subordinated claim, offers a sensible and relatively 
uncomplicated solution. It also accords with the time when the effect of 
distributions giving rise to contractually subordinated claims for payment is 
measured in terms of the MBCA.  
The Companies Bill seeks to introduce a specific timing rule that will 
distinguish between different kinds of distributions.865 A distribution by way of the 
incurring of an obligation or debt must comply with the restrictions when it is 
authorised by the board and not when the debt or obligation is satisfied.866 All 
other distributions must be evaluated when the company intends to ‛make’ a 
‛proposed’ distribution. This seems to be a reference not to the initial authorisation 
of a distribution, but to an intended transfer of money or property.867 It appears that 
the directors are required to adopt the resolution acknowledging their proper 
application of the solvency and liquidity test at this stage. If, however, the 
distribution has not been completed within 120 business days of an 
acknowledgement by the directors that they have successfully applied the 
solvency and liquidity test, a new assessment must be done.868   
The formulation of the 120 day rule in the Companies Bill has been 
criticised.869 Although the draft clause appears to be based on a provision of the 
_________________________________________________________________  
864  Either a payment in respect of an acquisition of shares (s 85) or a payment otherwise by 
reason of shareholding (s 90). 
865  See paragraphs 4.3.1.5 and 4.3.1.6 above. 
866  See clause 46(4)(a) of the Companies Bill. 
867  This is confirmed by paragraph (a) of the definition of a distribution as a ‘transfer by a 
company of money or property’. Each payment would thus qualify as a distribution.  
868  See clause 46(3) of the Companies Bill, discussed in paragraph 4.3.1.6 above. 
869  See paragraph 4.3.1.6 above. 
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MBCA,870 the circumstances in which it is proposed to apply differ substantially 
from its scope in the MBCA.871 Under the MBCA the general time of measurement 
is when a distribution is authorised, while the Companies Bill uses the time of 
‛making’ of a distribution as the point of departure. Another important difference is 
that under the MBCA the directors are not required to adopt a specific resolution 
acknowledging that they have successfully applied the financial restrictions,872 
while the Companies Bill does require such a resolution.  
I support the requirement of a declaration or formal acknowledgement 
resolution, because it places a positive duty on directors and thus appears more 
likely to prevent unlawful distributions.873 The disadvantage, though, is that 
compliance with this formality introduces a specific date for application of the 
financial restrictions and thus impairs flexibility. As a result, some arrangement 
becomes necessary to address the situation. It is in this regard that a formal 
reconsideration serves a useful purpose. Even though the test is first applied when 
the company is about to ‛make’ a distribution, rather than when the distribution is 
authorised, there may be an unexpected delay between the first consideration and 
the completion of the distribution. The directors will then have to take positive 
steps to assess the financial situation of the company. I recommend that the 120 
day rule should apply to any kind of distribution, but that a reconsideration should 
only be required when the company is about to proceed with the distribution. 
However, the acknowledgement by the directors should not be 
overemphasised. It appears from the Companies Bill that a company will be 
obliged to proceed with a distribution on the basis of a current 
acknowledgement.874 This will oblige a company to proceed with and complete a 
distribution on the basis of the directors’ acknowledgement even when it appears, 
within the 120 day period, that the company no longer satisfies the test.875 
I suggest that the New Zealand approach of prohibiting implementation of a 
distribution whenever the directors are no longer satisfied of the company’s 
_________________________________________________________________  
870  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3. 
871  See paragraph 4.3.1.6 above. 
872  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
873  See paragraph 4.4.1.1 above. 
874  Clause 46(2), see paragraph 5.8.2 below. 
875  See paragraph 5.8.2 below. 
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solvency and liquidity offers a better solution to dealing with a change in the 
financial situation of a company between the date of an acknowledgement by the 
directors and the date of implementation of a distribution.876 I regard this general 
prohibition as preferable to the English approach of imposing strict time limits 
between the authorisation and completion of distributions.877 
I also suggest that a company should be prohibited from proceeding with a 
distribution if the directors are no longer satisfied that the company’s financial 
situation allows it. In such a case the shareholder should not be able to enforce 
her claim, despite the existence of a current positive acknowledgement by the 
directors. This proposal does not obviate the need for a formal reconsideration by 
the directors, but merely attaches less weight to the acknowledgement. 
In the final chapter several recommendations are made in this regard.878 
5 DIVIDENDS AND OTHER PAYMENTS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
Section 90 regulates the making of ‛payments’ to shareholders by reason of their 
shareholding. Certain aspects of these dividend-like payments have been 
discussed in relation to distributions in general.879 The most important of these is 
the solvency and liquidity test which applies not only to payments under section 
90, but also to share repurchases. In this section the remaining rules that apply to 
payments under section 90 are considered.  
The concept of a ‛payment’ is narrower than that of a distribution, primarily 
since it does not include payments for the acquisition of shares.880 It is, however, 
wider than the concept of a dividend.881 The term ‛dividend’ is usually reserved for 
distributions of profits882 while ‛payment’ is defined without reference to the source 
of funds distributed.883  
_________________________________________________________________  
876  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.3. 
877  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.3.4.5. 
878  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.11 and the provision entitled ‘Effective date of distribution’; 
paragraph 7.13 and subclause 1(b) of the provision entitled ‘Liability for distributions in 
violation of solvency and liquidity test’.  
879  See paragraph 4 above. 
880  The exclusions from the definition of ‘payment’ are discussed in paragraph 5.1.3 below. 
881  See paragraphs 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 below. 
882  See Van Dorsten Dividends 26.  
883  Although reference is often made to payments out of ‘profits’ or out of ‘capital’, the funds of a 
company are not physically separated into profits and capital. A distribution out of profits is a 
Continued 
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Prior to the enactment of section 90 in its current form,884 the payment of 
dividends was not regulated by legislation but by the common law.885 In 
accordance with the capital maintenance principle, distributions out of share 
capital were not allowed, except under a formal reduction of capital or upon the 
winding-up of a company.886 Profits could be distributed to shareholders by way of 
dividends.887 
Section 90(1) is cast as an enabling provision. It states that a company may 
make payments in accordance with section 90 and its articles. However, 
subsection (2), which sets out the financial restrictions, contains a clear prohibition 
on the making of any payment in violation of the solvency and liquidity 
requirements. The concept of a payment is defined in subsection (3). Subsection 
(4) regulates the liability of shareholders who receive payments that do not comply 
with subsection (2). Various aspects of section 90 will now be analysed. 
5.1 Kinds of payments regulated 
A ‛payment’ is defined for purposes of section 90 as including any direct or indirect 
payment or transfer of money or other property to a shareholder of the company 
by virtue of the shareholder’s shareholding in the company.888 Certain payments 
that are regulated by other provisions of the Act are expressly excluded.889  
The difference between payments under section 90 on the one hand and 
payments for the acquisition of shares under sections 85, 98 and 252 on the other 
hand, is that these latter instances involve not only a distribution of capital but also 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
payment that is made in circumstances where the excess of assets over issued share capital 
and non-distributable reserves of the company is sufficient to cover the amount of the 
distribution. In contrast, a distribution will be made out of capital to the extent that the 
company’s net assets will after the payment be less than its share capital and reserves.   
884  By s 14 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999. The repealed s 90 dealt with certain 
criminal offences pertaining to formal reductions of capital, see Cilliers & Benade Corporate 
Law 2 ed 331 – 337 for a discussion. See McLennan "Dividends" 126ff for an overview of the 
new position. 
885  See Van Dorsten Dividends 1 – 2.  
886  See Re Exchange Banking Co (Flitcroft’s Case) (1882) 21 ChD 519 (CA) at 533; Re Guinness 
v Land Corporation of Ireland (1882) 22 ChD 349 (CA) at 356; Hill v Permanent Trustee Co of 
New South Wales Ltd (1889) 2 Ch 629 (CA) at 669; Cohen NO v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (W) 
at 705 – 706. 
887  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 186(3). 
888  Section 90(3). 
889  Section 90(3), see paragraph 5.1.3 below. 
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an alteration or subrogation of the rights of the shareholders.890 Acquisitions of 
own shares result in a reduction of share capital,891 and are thus per definition paid 
out of capital funds.892 Although the company may have assets in excess of its 
share capital, the payment is out of capital because it is reflected as such in the 
share capital accounts.  
Payments under section 90, on the other hand, are not followed by 
adjustments to share capital accounts and are thus not reductions of share capital, 
regardless of whether or not the company’s net assets exceed its share capital. 
Section 90 thus allows capital funds to be paid to shareholders without a reduction 
of capital.893 Such a payment will consequently not reduce the amount of the 
shareholder’s claim to the return of capital upon liquidation or dissolution of the 
company. Another difference between payments under section 90 and payments 
for the repurchase of shares is that the latter are frequently selective rather than 
proportional.894  
5.1.1 Direct or indirect payment or transfer of money or property 
The first feature of the definition that merits comment is the inclusion of the word 
‛payment’ as a transaction that would qualify as a payment. The intention behind 
this tautology was probably to convey the idea that indirect payments are also 
included. 
It is not clear whether the words ‛direct or indirect’ relate to payment only or 
also to the transfer of money or property, but it is suggested that these words 
qualify both payments and transfers. 
The difference between a payment and a transfer of money needs to be 
considered. Payment generally presupposes the existence of a debt while a 
_________________________________________________________________  
890  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-113, 5-117. 
891  See paragraph 2.6 above and paragraphs 6.3.3 and 6.8.1 below. In the case of a redemption, 
the reduction is, however, offset by the fresh capital or the capital redemption reserve fund, 
see paragraph 6.8.1 below. 
892  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5.113; 5-117.  
893  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-112. The concept 'capital funds’ refers to 
funds that represent share capital which is the case where the company does not have assets 
valued in excess of its share capital. 
894  Payments under s 90 may, however, be disproportionate if the articles provide accordingly, 
see paragraph 5.1.2 below. 
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transfer of money does not necessarily imply an underlying debt.895 Further, 
certain methods of extinguishing obligations do not involve a physical transfer of 
money, for example set-off. However, set-off would probably still qualify as an 
indirect transfer of money.  
A transfer of ‛property’ refers to movable or immovable property. A dividend 
in specie is a good example of a ‛payment’ by way of the transfer of property.  
An indirect payment or transfer would be present where the company 
arranges for payment through another person or entity, for example its holding 
company or subsidiary. Payments made on behalf of or in favour of a shareholder 
would also be regarded as indirect payments. 
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act suggest that 
the repayment by a company of money advanced to it by a third party for the 
purpose of making payments would not qualify as a payment because it is not 
made to a shareholder.896 Their conclusion appears to be correct, but it is 
suggested that the reason is that the company will have made a payment to the 
shareholder at the time when the funds advanced by the third party were 
transferred to the shareholder by or on behalf of the company. A payment cannot 
be excluded from the ambit of section 90 merely because it is made to someone 
other than the shareholder, since payments made to third parties would in certain 
circumstances qualify as indirect payments to shareholders. 
5.1.1.1 Is the incurring of an obligation covered? 
The definition of 'payment' in section 90 does not mention the incurring of an 
obligation in favour of a shareholder. The possibility that it may be regarded as an 
indirect payment is raised by the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham 
Companies Act, but rejected as unsound.897  
A personal right is not property and the incurring of an obligation to make 
payment would thus not qualify as a payment or transfer for purposes of section 
90. It is submitted that it would be untenable to regard the incurring of a debt as an 
indirect payment. It would mean that the financial restrictions would have to be 
_________________________________________________________________  
895  Harrismith Board of Executors v Odendaal 1932 AD 539. 
896  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-116 – 5-117. 
897  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-116.   
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applied twice, since section 90 does not exclude the subsequent payment from its 
ambit. It is suggested that the South African legislature clearly intended the 
financial restrictions to be applied at the time of payment or transfer only and not 
at the time when the liability is first incurred.898 This may explain why the definition 
of payment in section 90 does not expressly include the incurring of a debt.  
If the incurring of a debt were to be regarded as an indirect payment, it would 
also cause interpretation problems of sections 86 and 90(4). It would make no 
sense to hold directors or shareholders personally liable for the amount of an 
obligation incurred towards them if they had not yet received property or money. It 
is also evident that section 88 maintains a distinction between the existence of an 
obligation to pay and actual payment and that the enforceability of payment for the 
acquisition of shares, rather than the incurring of an obligation, depends on 
solvency and liquidity.899  
It is a feature common to the definitions of ‛distribution’ in New Zealand900 
and under the MBCA901 that not only the transfer of money or other property is 
mentioned, but also the incurring of an obligation or debt in favour of the 
shareholder.  
It is submitted that the legislature’s decision to refrain from including a 
reference to the incurring of a debt, despite the example of the MBCA and New 
Zealand definitions, is a clear indication that it did not intend to include the creation 
of an obligation under the concept of a payment. The fact that it was deemed 
necessary in those jurisdictions to expressly include the incurring of a debt as a 
distribution implies that it would not otherwise have qualified as an indirect transfer 
of money or property in those jurisdictions. 
The absence of a specific timing rule for the application of the financial 
restrictions to the incurring of a debt supports the conclusion that it is only the 
actual transfer of money or property that qualifies as a payment.902 Although the 
time when the financial restrictions have to be met cannot be used to determine 
whether a payment has been made, there is an important correlation between the 
_________________________________________________________________  
898  See paragraph 4.2 above. 
899  See paragraph 6.5 below. 
900  New Zealand Companies Act s 2(1) s v ‘distribution’, see Chapter 3 paragraph 4. 
901  MBCA s 1.40(6); see Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1. 
902  See paragraph 4.2 above. 
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definition of a payment or distribution and the timing rule, since the timing rule has 
to provide for the different transactions that are regarded as distributions or 
payments.903  
A feature of the general definitions of ‘distribution’ in New Zealand, California 
and in the MBCA is the inclusion of references to specific methods by which 
distributions can be made. In addition to express references to purchases, 
redemptions or other acquisitions of shares, necessitated by the more 
comprehensive nature of the concept of a distribution, which are present in all 
three definitions, the definitions of California and the MBCA expressly mention 
dividends.904 The South African section 90, on the other hand, does not contain 
any examples.  
The distribution of an ‛indebtedness’ is expressly mentioned in the MBCA 
and New Zealand definitions.905 As has been explained earlier,906 the word in this 
context refers to debt instruments such as promissory notes and bonds. In South 
Africa such a distribution of a debt instrument would probably qualify as a transfer 
of property and can be distinguished from the incurring of an obligation not 
embodied in a debt instrument. The express inclusion of the distribution of an 
indebtedness in the MBCA is followed up with a specific timing provision that 
applies to this specific type of distribution.907  
5.1.1.2 Comparison of dividends and ‛payments’ 
The MBCA regards both the declaration and the payment of a dividend as 
distributions.908 The California Corporations Code refers to the transfer of cash or 
_________________________________________________________________  
903  See paragraph 4.2 above. In addition to the correlation between definition and timing rules, 
there is also a correlation between the timing rule and the status or ranking of a distribution 
claim, see paragraph 4.4.2 above. 
904  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.1; Chapter 4 paragraphs 3.4.1 and 4.4.1. 
905  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.1 and Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1. Further examples in the New 
Zealand definition include a purchase of property and the redemption or other acquisition of 
shares. In the MBCA the declaration or payment of a dividend and a purchase, redemption, or 
other acquisition of shares are mentioned. 
906  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1. 
907  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3. In New Zealand a specific timing provision is not necessary, 
as all distributions are measured at the time of authorisation, although they may not be 
completed if the circumstances have changed, see Chapter 3 paragraph 4.3. 
908  This is necessary in view of the timing provision which is discussed in Chapter 4 paragraph 
4.4.3. 
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property by way of dividend or otherwise.909 Dividends, in the narrow sense of a 
distribution of profits,910 clearly fall within the definition of payment in section 90. If 
a dividend is paid following the declaration of a final dividend, it would constitute a 
payment in the ordinary sense of the word since the company would have become 
indebted to the shareholder in the amount of the dividend.911 The payment of 
interim dividends would qualify as transfers of money, since there is no prior 
declaration which gives rise to a claim for payment on the part of the 
shareholder.912 As a result, the financial restrictions of section 90(2) apply to 
interim as well as final dividend payments in addition to any restrictions imposed 
by the articles of a company. 
I suggest that the declaration as opposed to payment of a dividend cannot be 
regarded as a payment for purposes of section 90.913 This is because the creation 
of an obligation to pay does not amount to a payment or transfer of money or 
property. I will also explain below that the effect of section 90(2) is that a 
shareholder no longer has an unconditional claim against the company in respect 
of a declared dividend as was the case under the common law.914 
At common law any payment or benefit given by virtue of shareholding that 
was neither a return of capital following a capital reduction nor a liquidation 
dividend was regarded as a dividend in the wide sense of the word, regardless of 
what the company called it.915 The courts are prepared to characterise certain 
disguised transactions as distributions to shareholders.916  
The meaning of ‛payment’ in section 90 is the same as that of ‛dividend’ in 
the wide sense.917 It can be expected that the courts, drawing on the established 
_________________________________________________________________  
909  Section 166 of the California Corporations Code, see Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.1. 
910  South African Iron and Steel Industrial Corporation Ltd v Moly Copper Mining and Exploration 
Co (SWA) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 705 (NmHC) at 712. 
911  Utopia Vakansie-oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A). However, as a result of the 
operation of section 90(2), the obligation will be conditional upon the company’s satisfaction of 
the solvency and liquidity test. 
912  See Van Dorsten Dividends 37 – 38; Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-153. 
913  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-150. 
914  See paragraph 5.4 below. 
915  R A Hill v Permanent Trustee Co of New South Wales Ltd [1930] AC 720 (PC) at 731. 
916  See Aveling Barford Ltd v Perion Ltd [1989] BCLC 626 where the sale by a company of an 
asset at an undervalue to another company controlled by the beneficial shareholder of the 
seller-company was held to be a distribution.  
917  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-135. As a result of the abolition of the 
capital maintenance doctrine, dividends or payments may also now lawfully be made out of 
Continued 
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principles regarding disguised dividends, will ignore terminology or form and rather 
consider the substance of a payment.  
5.1.1.3 Is the payment of interest on share capital a ‛payment’? 
The payment of interest on shares or share capital is another example of a 
payment by virtue of shareholding. The prohibition against the payment of 
dividends out of capital applied with equal force to interest payments.918 Section 
79 of the Companies Act provides for the payment of interest on shares in certain 
circumstances and, prior to the amendments introduced by Act 37 of 1999, used to 
function as an exception to the common-law rule.919 Unlike certain other payments 
that are expressly regulated by other sections of the Companies Act, payment of 
interest on shares has not been excluded from the definition of ‛payment’ for 
purposes of section 90. Section 90 should thus also apply to the payment of 
interest on shares, in addition to the requirements of section 79.920  
The retention of section 79, which was originally enacted as an exception, 
but now imposes more onerous requirements than the general rule, creates the 
same kind of problems that arise in relation to the applications of the share 
premium account.921 Section 79(1) is cast as an enabling provision, allowing 
interest to be paid on shares issued for the purpose of raising money for the 
construction of buildings or the provision of plant. It does not repeat the common-
law prohibition against payments to shareholders otherwise than out of profits. 
Section 79(2) contains a prohibition against the payment of ‛such’ interest unless 
the requirements of the section are complied with. Section 79 can only be given 
effect by implying a prohibition against the payment of interest on shares. The first 
difficulty in implying such a prohibition is whether it should extend to any interest 
payments or only to interest ‛charged to capital expenses’. The heading to section 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
capital funds. For this reason these authors suggest that the term ‘dividend’ should henceforth 
be used in its narrower sense to distinguish a division of profits from distributions out of capital 
funds.  
918  See Re Alexandra Palace Co (1882) 21 ChD 149 at 157; Re National Bank of Wales Limited 
(1899) 2 Ch 629 (CA) at 669. 
919 See paragraph 5.7 below. This option has not been used often, as it is easier to use 
debentures to finance such operations, see Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 
5-30.  
920  The requirements are discussed in paragraph 5.7 below. 
921  See paragraph 2.4.3.3 above. 
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79 reads ‛Payment of interest out of capital in certain instances’. This suggests 
that the prohibition extends only to the payment of interest otherwise than out of 
profits. This also accords with the capital maintenance rule. The reference to 
‛such’ interest in section 79(2) should thus be regarded as a reference to interest 
‛charged to capital’ as envisaged by subsection (1). It must be noted that despite 
the reference to share capital in the heading, subsection (1) does not provide for 
the reduction of share capital by the amounts paid out as interest but only for the 
interest to be charged to capital expenditure. This means that it may be reflected 
as part of the costs of establishing the infrastructure and also that it may be paid 
despite the fact that the value of the company’s assets does not exceed the 
amount of its share capital.922  
The second difficulty lies in establishing whether the implied prohibition 
covers interest on all shares or alternatively only on shares issued to finance 
construction work.923 The original purpose of the provision, coupled with the fact 
that it was left unchanged in 1999, indicates that a general prohibition should be 
inferred and not only a prohibition in respect of shares issued to finance 
construction and plant. If the wider prohibition is accepted as correct, the 
implication would be that interest out of capital may never be paid on shares 
issued for purposes other than the financing of construction and plant, not even if 
section 90 is complied with. If the narrower prohibition were to be accepted it 
would mean that interest out of capital may be paid on shares issued for any other 
purpose subject to compliance with section 90 only. In both instances the position 
regarding shares issued for the financing of construction would be that the 
requirements of section 79 as well as of section 90 have to be met. Where interest 
is to be paid out of profits, section 79 would not apply, but section 90 would. 
If it is indeed the case that ‛capital’ may not be employed in paying interest 
on shares issued otherwise than to fund construction and plant, not even if the 
requirements of section 90 are met, it is clearly an undesirable situation. Apart 
from the difficulty in establishing whether a particular payment is interest or 
perhaps some other kind of payment, there seems to be no distinction in principle 
between interest payments and other payments by reason of shareholding that 
_________________________________________________________________  
922  That is, out of funds representing share capital. 
923  Section 79(1) reads: ‘Where any shares of a company are issued for the purpose of raising 
money to defray the expenses of the construction …… the company may pay interest…’ 
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could justify this disparate treatment.924  
5.1.2 By reason of shareholding 
An implication of the fact that the payment is ‛by virtue of the shareholder’s 
shareholding in the company’ is that payments to shareholders of a particular 
class would, as in the case of dividends, generally have to be proportionate.925  
The phrase ‛by virtue of shareholding’ can be contrasted with the phrase ‛in 
respect of shares’ in the MBCA926 and the words ‛in relation to shares’ in the New 
Zealand Companies Act.927 The definitions of distribution in these two jurisdictions 
are wider than the South African definition of ‛payment’ as they also include share 
acquisitions, which need not necessarily be proportionate. The words of section 90 
seem to focus on continued shareholding and imply proportionate treatment of 
shareholders. 
The fact that section 90 does not provide for the adjustment of the share 
capital accounts that apportion shareholder rights and further lacks any of the 
formalities usually associated with disproportionate treatment of shareholders928 
strengthens the presumption against selective payments.929  
The principle of equality of treatment applies unless the articles of the 
company expressly permit the company to deviate from it. A question that arises is 
to what extent any existing arrangements in the articles of companies pertaining to 
‛dividends’ would also apply to ‛payments’ as defined in section 90. It is further 
important to know whether the common law principles regarding dividends will also 
protect shareholders when other payments by reason of shareholding are being 
_________________________________________________________________  
924  Section 79 is discussed in paragraph 5.7 below. 
925  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-136. Van Dorsten Dividends 41 – 43. See 
McClurg v Canada 76 DLR (4d) 217 (SCC) at 228. However, the presumption of equality can 
be negated by the articles or by agreement, see Patakh Centre (Pty) Ltd v Stern NO 1978 (1) 
SA 259 (D) at 263 – 264; McClurg v Canada 76 DLR (4d) 217 (SCC). See also Meskin 
Henochsberg on the Companies Act 186(3) where it is argued that selective payments would 
be possible if provided for in the company’s articles. See Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd v SA 
Mutual Life Assurance Society 1977 (3) SA 631 (T) and the further appeal at 1977 (3) SA 642 
(A); Donaldson Investments (Pty) Ltd & Others v Anglo-Transvaal Collieries Ltd 1979 (1) SA 
959 (W); appeal at 1983 (3) SA 96 (A). See also the discussion by Sher “Preference 
Shareholders” 87.  
926  See MBCA s 1.40(6), discussed in Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1. 
927  New Zealand Companies Act 1993 s 2 s v ‘distribution’, discussed in Chapter 3 paragraph 4.1. 
928  For example, a special resolution. 
929  See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-136. 
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made. 
As will be explained below, a company can make payments under section 90 
only if its articles allow it to do so.930 A company could replace the provisions of its 
articles regulating dividends with comprehensive provisions regulating payments, 
including the relative entitlement to payments of different classes of shares.931 
However, if a company alters its articles by merely inserting an authorisation to 
make payments as envisaged in section 90, retaining existing references to 
dividends, several uncertainties arise.  
The answers to the following questions are far from clear: 
• Can holders of participating preference shareholders rely on ‛payments’ 
made to ordinary shareholders to conclude that the ordinary 
shareholders have received the prerequisite dividend that triggers their 
participation rights? 
• Can preference shareholders complain if payment is made to ordinary 
shareholders before the preference dividend has been paid? 
• If the articles provide for different dividends only, does this mean that 
the general principle of equality nevertheless applies in respect of other 
payments so that preference shareholders who have received their 
dividend are also entitled to share in payments? In other words, does 
the principle of exhaustiveness in relation to preference shares apply 
only to dividends in the narrow sense or to all payments?  
• Can the holders of one class of ordinary shares complain if payments 
are made to another class of ordinary shares despite the fact that both 
classes are entitled to share in dividends according to the nominal value 
of their shares? 
• To what extent can a company avoid giving effect to the relative 
entitlements of shareholders by designating a distribution as a payment 
rather than a dividend? 
• Can directors authorise payments despite a provision in the articles 
reserving for the general meeting the power to declare a dividend? 
 
_________________________________________________________________  
930  See paragraph 5.5 below. 
931  It would obviously have to be mindful of a possible alteration of class rights, see s 56(5). 
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5.1.3 Exclusions 
The exclusions from the definition of ‛payment’ are: 
• an acquisition of shares in terms of section 85932 
• a redemption of redeemable preference shares in terms of section 98933 
• any acquisition of shares in terms of an order of court934 
• the issue of capitalisation shares in the company.935 
The definitions of ‛distribution’ in New Zealand, California and under the MBCA are 
wider than the South African definition of ‛payment’, as they also include the 
acquisition of shares by way of purchases, redemptions or otherwise. 
Due to the fragmentation of the South African distribution rules, share 
acquisitions in any form are expressly excluded from the definition of ‛payment’ as 
they are regulated in other provisions of the Act. It is not clear why reference is 
made to ‛acquisition’ and ‛redemption’ rather than to a ‛payment’ in respect of an 
acquisition or redemption, but it is submitted that the exclusion relates to the 
payment itself. 
The need for excluding an issue of capitalisation shares from the definition of 
‘payment’ can be explained by the fact that the company will be capitalising profits 
it could otherwise have distributed to its shareholders. Since the funds remain in 
the company, capitalisation has the opposite effect from a distribution. The 
company does not transfer or dispose of any of its property936 and the 
capitalisation issue has no effect on the total assets and liabilities of the company 
or on its ability to pay its debts. Technically the shareholders do receive property in 
the form of shares,937 but the intrinsic value of each shareholder’s interest in the 
company remains the same. It is interesting to note that in New Zealand and under 
the MBCA the definition of ‘distribution’ also excludes capitalisation shares by 
stating that a distribution is the transfer of money or assets ‛other than the 
_________________________________________________________________  
932  See paragraph 6.1 below. 
933  See paragraph 6.8 below. 
934  See s 252 of the Act. 
935  See paragraph 3.2.1 above for a discussion of capitalisation issues.  
936  See CIR v Collins 1923 AD 347 at 363 – 364. In this case the court had to determine whether 
the issue of capitalisation shares resulted in the shareholder receiving an amount in money or 
money’s worth which could be subject to income tax. 
937  Shares are regarded as movable property, see s 91. 
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company’s own shares’.938 This clearly implies that capitalisation shares are 
regarded as assets, but that their issue is nevertheless not regarded as a 
distribution.  
The issue of the possible exclusion of interest payments provided for in 
section 79 has been mooted above.939 As a result of the limitation imposed by the 
purpose for which the shares must have been issued, it would be necessary to 
restrict any exclusion to interest payable on such qualifying shares so that interest 
payments on shares issued for purposes other than financing construction would 
be subject to section 90. However, it is suggested that the need for a provision 
such as section 79 has fallen away in view of the abolition of the capital 
maintenance principle.940  
5.2 Financial restrictions 
Section 90(2) imposes the financial restrictions of solvency and liquidity on 
payments by virtue of shareholding. It is cast as a very clear prohibition and it is 
suggested that it applies to all companies regardless of the content of their articles 
and irrespective of whether or not their articles provide for payments in terms of 
section 90.941 Companies that may in terms of their articles pay dividends out of 
profits only, will thus in addition have to satisfy the financial restrictions of solvency 
and liquidity.942 
There are two differences between the common-law financial restrictions on 
the payment of dividends and those imposed by section 90(2). First, the balance 
sheet test has become less onerous. At common law the assets of a company 
would have to exceed not only its liabilities but also the amount of its share capital 
before a dividend could be paid. The company would thus have to maintain a 
certain margin over solvency. Under the new rules an excess over liabilities is 
sufficient. From a balance sheet perspective the new test is thus less restrictive 
than the common-law test. 
_________________________________________________________________  
938  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.1 and Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1. 
939  See paragraph 6.1.1. 
940  See the further discussion of s 79 in paragraph 5.7 below. 
941  See Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 186(3).  
942  Although payments out of profits would not usually create a solvency problem, the same is not 
true of liquidity. 
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The second difference lies in the addition of the liquidity test set out in section 
90(2)(a). While the solvency test in section 90(2)(a) is less restrictive than the 
common-law capital maintenance yardstick, the capital maintenance doctrine did 
not enquire into the liquidity of a company as a prerequisite for the declaration and 
payment of dividends. The liquidity test has thus introduced a new dimension to 
the financial restrictions for distributions.  
The solvency and liquidity test is discussed in paragraph 4.1 above. 
5.3 Timing for the application of the financial restrictions 
As has been explained earlier, the solvency and liquidity test must be applied at 
the time of payment.943 This rule must be compared to the common-law rule that a 
dividend was validly declared provided the company had the requisite profits when 
it declared the dividend.944 Section 90 does not require the company to consider 
its financial position at the time of declaration of a dividend or authorisation of a 
payment, but only when actual payment or transfer takes place.  
The timing principle has important implications for the status of the 
shareholder’s claim following the declaration of a dividend.   
5.4 Status of claim in respect of authorised but unpaid distributions 
While the position of a shareholder in respect of payment for the acquisition of 
shares is expressly regulated in section 88,945 the status of a claim in respect of a 
section 90 distribution which has been authorised but not yet paid, such as a 
declared but unpaid dividend, is not expressly regulated.  
Prior to the introduction of the current section 90, a shareholder obtained an 
unconditional right to enforce payment of a declared dividend.946 The validity of a 
dividend depended on the existence of profits on the date of declaration of the 
dividend and not the date of payment. Van Dorsten947 refers to the situation where 
_________________________________________________________________  
943  See paragraph 4.2 above. 
944  See Industrial Equity Limited v Blackburn (1977) 13 CLR (Aust HC) at 578 – 579; Marra 
Developments Ltd v BW Rofe Pty Ltd (1977) 3 ACLR 185 (CA NSW) at 207 – 209. The 
enforceability of a declared dividend is considered in paragraph 5.4 below. 
945  See paragraph 6.5 below. 
946  See Van Dorsten Dividends 99; Utopia Vakansie-oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A); 
Boyd v CIR 1951 (3) SA 525 (A). See also the authority referred to in note 944 above. 
947  See Van Dorsten Dividends 99. 
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a company ‛loses its distributable profits’ between the time of declaration and the 
time of payment and states that the debts will not be enforceable in such 
circumstances. However, the cases quoted by Van Dorsten,948 actually address 
the situation where it subsequently appears that the company did not in fact have 
the requisite profits at the time the dividend was declared. It seems clear that 
where the company did in fact have profits at the time of declaration of the 
dividend but its financial position deteriorated subsequent to the declaration, the 
company could nevertheless lawfully pay the dividend.949 However, such a 
payment while the company’s liabilities exceed its assets may be impeachable 
under the Insolvency Act as a disposition without value.950   
Section 90(2) has substantially changed the common-law position of 
shareholders following the declaration of a dividend. The effect of section 90(2) is 
that the shareholder’s claim will be conditional upon the company’s solvency and 
liquidity.951 Because the financial restrictions apply at the time of actual payment, 
the shareholder does not have the status of an ordinary creditor in respect of the 
declared dividend but rather a contingent or subordinated claim. The position is 
thus similar to that under section 88 in that the shareholder cannot enforce 
payment if the claims of creditors have not been paid.  
There are, however, important differences between the regulation in section 
88 of an unpaid claim for the acquisition of a share and the position with respect to 
an unpaid section 90 distribution in the event of liquidation. Firstly, the position of 
preference shareholders is expressly dealt with in section 88. In the event of 
liquidation the claim for payment of the purchase price of shares will rank after the 
claims of shareholders of classes that enjoy priority over the class of acquired 
shares.952 This provision offers some protection to preference shareholders. 
Secondly, section 88 confirms that the seller-shareholder will retain a claim 
for payment. However, should a company be wound up with outstanding liabilities 
_________________________________________________________________  
948  See McGregor v De Beers Consolidated Mines (1903) 20 SC 284 at 291; Cohen NO v Segal 
1970 (3) SA 702 (W) at 705. See also Enterprise Wholesalers (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim 1954 (2) SA 
262 (N) at 267.  
949  See Utopia Vakansie-oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) SA 148 (A); Boyd v CIR 1951 (3) SA 
525 (A). See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-148 – 5-153. 
950  See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 346. 
951  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-153. 
952  Section 88(3), discussed in paragraph 6.5 below. 
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in respect of section 90 payments, the position of shareholders who have not been 
paid is less certain. It could be that they will retain their claims, which will be 
subordinated to those of other creditors.953 However, since the requirements of 
section 90(2) will no longer be capable of being satisfied,954 it may be argued that 
the shareholder’s claim will remain unenforceable.955 This conclusion is reinforced 
by the absence of any express regulation along the lines of section 88(3). If it was 
necessary to include a provision in respect of repurchases, its absence in relation 
to other payments may indicate that a different position obtains in this latter 
instance.  
There does not seem to be a good reason for this different treatment of 
unpaid distributions. Section 88 refers to a contract between the shareholder and 
the company. In the case of section 90 there would not usually be a separate 
contract between the shareholder and the company, although reliance could 
possibly be placed on the contractual nature of the articles to conclude that the 
shareholder has a contractual entitlement to a payment that has been authorised 
in accordance with the articles. It is suggested that the status of a claim for 
payment under section 90 should be expressly regulated. This apparent oversight 
is another illustration of an anomaly caused by the fragmented regulation of 
distributions. 
5.5 Authorisation 
Section 90(1) allows the making of payments by a company ‛subject to the 
provisions of this section and if authorised thereto by its articles’. While section 
90(1) is formulated as an enabling provision, it is clear from the outset that two 
limitations are imposed. First, the provisions of section 90 have to be complied 
with, and second, the articles must authorise the payment.  
It is not clear in which way the articles of association have to authorise the 
payment. It may either mean that a payment must not be in conflict with the 
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953  This position is supported by Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-153. 
954  See Ex parte De Villiers & Another NNO: In re Carbon Developments (Pty) Ltd (in liq) 1993 (1) 
SA 493 (A) 504 – 5. Even in the case of a liquidation of a company able to pay its debts, it 
may be argued that the company will as a result of the winding-up no longer be able to pay its 
debts as they arise in the ordinary course of its business.   
955  See Luiz & Van der Linde “Subordination Agreements” 103. 
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articles956 or that the payment must be expressly authorised by the articles. The 
wording of the subsection, especially the inclusion of the word ‛thereto’, seems to 
suggest that the articles have to state expressly that the company may make 
payments to its shareholders, or even that the company may make payments 
subject to section 90. This latter type of authorisation seems to be envisaged by 
the authors of Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act who refer to the 
alteration of the company’s articles ‛authorising it to make payments under s 
90’.957  This interpretation is also supported by the fact that the same words in 
section 85 are generally understood as requiring an express authorisation.958 It 
would also be sufficient if, rather than referring expressly to section 90 the articles 
authorised the company to make payments to shareholders subject to solvency 
and liquidity. 
On a literal interpretation of section 90 it would seem that a company will not 
be able to make any payments to shareholders if its articles are silent on 
payments to shareholders. The company which previously had an inherent power 
to declare and pay dividends will no longer be able to do so. 959 However, if the 
articles provide for some kinds of payment only, only such payments would be 
possible. The articles of a company can thus impose restrictions in addition to 
those contained in section 90. In this regard the model articles contained in 
Schedule 1 of the Act still provide that dividends may be paid out of profits only.960 
A company with these articles will thus be able to make payments that can be 
described as dividends out of profits, but will not be able to make any other 
payments to its shareholders under section 90.961 
_________________________________________________________________  
956  In which case it should rather have read ‘subject to the provisions of this section and its 
articles’. This would make it clear that the purpose of section 90(1) is merely to leave room for 
the imposition by a company of further limitations on payments to shareholders. 
957  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 186(3). 
958  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-62 and see paragraph 6.3.1.1 below. 
959  It is not a common-law requirement that the articles should authorise dividends, see Patakh 
Centre (Pty) Ltd v Stern 1978 (1) SA 259 (D) at 263. In this regard the common law position 
was that the general meeting could declare dividends unless the articles gave this power to 
the directors. The model articles provide that the general meeting may declare a dividend, but 
that the amount may not exceed that recommended by the directors. The articles can also 
impose limitations. See also Van Dorsten Dividends 34 – 35. 
960  See article 86 of Table A and article 85 of Table B. 
961  The word ‘dividend’ in the narrow sense already implies that profits must be used, as a 
dividend is a pro rata distribution of profits, see Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies 
Act 5-107. The existence of the capital maintenance rule would obviously have limited the 
kinds of payments company articles would have provided for. 
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It has been suggested that the word ‛dividend’ in the model articles may have 
a wider meaning than a division of profits to shareholders while the company is a 
going concern, and would, for example, include the payment of interest on share 
capital.962 However, the provision in the articles should not be confused with the 
common-law rule which prohibits the return of capital. It is this rule that prohibits 
dividends as well as any other payment by reason of shareholding out of share 
capital.963 It is suggested that the term ‛dividend’ in the articles of a company 
would in most instances have been intended to refer only to dividends in the 
narrow sense.964 
It is submitted that unless a company’s articles allow it to make payments 
other than ‛dividends’, the company would thus not be able to benefit from the 
introduction of the new regime allowing it to make payments otherwise than out of 
profits. The model articles do not provide for any other payments which could 
possibly be regarded as payments under section 90. Although provision is made 
for the reduction of share capital965 which could include the making of payments to 
shareholders by way of the return of capital, payments in terms of section 90 do 
not result in a reduction of share capital despite the fact that they may have been 
made ‛out of capital’.966 It would thus appear that a company that has adopted the 
model articles will not be able to make payments other than dividends unless its 
articles are altered.  
_________________________________________________________________  
962  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-135. The authors thus argue that the 
purpose of this article is not to limit the funds or profits from which dividends in the narrow 
sense may be paid, but to make it clear that such other payments would also have to be made 
out of profits. This interpretation can be criticised. Just as in the case of dividends in the strict 
sense, the common-law also prohibits the making of any other payments to shareholders out 
of capital. The function of the article is to restrict the source from which dividends may be paid. 
There is a difference between ‛profits’ and amounts ‘otherwise than capital’, see Blackman, 
Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-139 note 1.  
963  For example, the rule against the return of capital to shareholders also prohibits the payment 
of interest to shareholders, see Re National Bank of Wales Limited (1899) 2 Ch 629 (CA) at 
669; Re Alexandra Palace Co (1882) 21 ChD 149 at 157. For this reason, it is unlikely that the 
term ‛dividend’ in existing articles would have been intended to include interest payments. The 
same applies to payments out of assets representing share capital. 
964  See also paragraph 5.1.2 above regarding the re-interpretation of articles referring to 
dividends only. 
965  See Table A article 31(g), Table B article 30(g). 
966  See paragraph 5.1 above. Whether this article can be regarded as authorisation for a 
company to repurchase its shares under section 85 is discussed in paragraph 6.3.1.1 above. 
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5.6 Liability for distributions made in contravention of the Act 
The fragmentation of the distribution rules also leads to a fragmented approach to 
the imposition of liability for unlawful distributions. Section 90(4) imposes liability 
on a shareholder who receives any payment contrary to the financial restrictions 
set out in section 90(2). The liability is towards the company. Section 86, on the 
other hand, provides for liability in respect of payments for the acquisition of 
shares in violation of section 85(4). The consideration that follows is thus restricted 
to the recovery of unlawful payments under section 90, although certain important 
differences between the two situations will be alluded to. A complete evaluation of 
the liability provisions can only be made if the two sets of liability provisions are 
assessed together, especially in view of the proposals in the Companies Bill. The 
liability provisions dealing with share repurchases under the current Act967 and the 
proposals in respect of distributions in general under the companies Bill968 are 
evaluated elsewhere.969  
When section 90(4) is compared to section 86(2) and (3), which provides for 
liability in the case of share repurchases, it is obvious that shareholders feature 
more prominently in section 90. While section 86 allows the court to impose 
liability on shareholders upon application by a director or a creditor, section 90(4) 
states bluntly that shareholders ‛shall be liable’. Unlike section 86, no provision is 
made for the discretion of the court. 
As is the case in section 86, the state of mind of the recipient is irrelevant for 
purposes of section 90(4).970 A shareholder will be liable despite having been 
unaware that the financial restrictions have been contravened.971 It is interesting to 
consider the common-law position of shareholders who received an unlawful 
dividend. In England the courts have relied on the constructive trustee principle 
and have accordingly held that the amount of an unlawful dividend can be 
recovered only from shareholders who were aware of the unlawfulness of a 
_________________________________________________________________  
967  See paragraph 6.4 below. 
968  The liability provisions of the Companies Bill are considered in relation to share repurchases, 
see paragraph 6.9.3 below. 
969  See paragraph 6.10.4 below. 
970  See paragraph 6.4.2 below. 
971  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-129. Criticism against this strict liability 
will be considered in the context of the liability provisions applicable to share repurchases, see 
paragraph 6.4.2 below. 
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distribution.972 However, under South African law the shareholders will be liable to 
restore the unlawful dividend to the company on the basis of unjustified 
enrichment, regardless of whether or not they were aware of its unlawfulness.973 
The position of shareholders under section 90(4) is thus comparable to their 
position at common law. The rights of the company, and indirectly of its creditors, 
take precedence over the reliance that the shareholder may have placed on the 
validity of the payment received. 
Only the company will be able to enforce repayment by the shareholders. 
Although all distributions to shareholders have the same effect from the creditors’ 
perspective, creditors are not given any right to recover payments made in 
contravention of section 90.974 The creditors' right under section 86(3) to claim 
from directors is attractive not only because it may be less costly to sue a few 
directors than a whole class of shareholders, but also because it offers additional 
pockets from which funds may be recovered. Consideration could be given to 
affording creditors an action against shareholders directly. 
The directors, who under section 86(1) are primarily liable for unlawful 
payments in respect of share repurchases,975 are not mentioned at all in section 
90(4). It is difficult to conceive of an explanation for this diverging approach.976 As 
has been noted by the authors of Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act, the 
circumstances are comparable.977 The apparent impunity of directors is rather 
illogical if regard is had to the fact that while shareholders have to approve share 
repurchases by special resolution, they are not required to be involved in the 
authorisation of ‛payments’. 
Despite the failure of section 90 to impose liability on directors, they will most 
likely be liable to the company on the basis of a breach of fiduciary duties.978 The 
directors also risk being held personally liable for the company’s debts in terms of 
_________________________________________________________________  
972  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.6. 
973 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-129 note 6; Van Dorsten Dividends 
125 – 127. See also Cohen NO v Segal 1970 (3) SA 702 (W). 
974  This inconsistency is also noted by Cassim “Reform of Company Law and Capital 
Maintenance” 286. 
975  See paragraph 6.4.1 below. 
976  See Cassim “Reform of Company Law and Capital Maintenance” 286 who argues that 
directors who consented to an unlawful dividend should be liable. 
977  Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 186(4). 
978  See Van Dorsten Dividends 124 – 125.  
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section 424, as the unlawful dividend may show that the company’s business is 
being carried on recklessly.979  
5.7 Payment of interest on capital 
Section 79 allows the payment of interest on shares out of capital under certain 
circumstances. The purpose for which the shares are issued must be to raise 
money for the construction or provision of certain capital assets which cannot be 
made profitable for a long period.980 The company may pay interest for the period 
and charge it to capital as part of the cost of construction or provision of the capital 
infrastructure. This provision is not often used in practice.981 
The payment of interest must be authorised in the company’s articles or by 
special resolution.982 The approval of the Minister must also be obtained.983 The 
Minister may appoint someone to conduct an enquiry in the matter, and the 
company will be liable for the costs of the enquiry.984 The Minister will determine 
the period for which interest may be paid and this may not extend beyond the end 
of the half year following the half year during which the construction has been 
completed or the plant has been provided.985 The Minister also determines the 
rate, which may not exceed 6 per cent per annum.986 Although the company is 
allowed to use capital funds, the payment of interest is not regarded as a return of 
capital and the amount paid up on the shares is thus not regarded as having been 
reduced.987 The implication of this is that the interest is similar to a dividend. 
The payment of interest on shares is also a payment by virtue of a 
shareholder’s shareholding and is thus also included under the provisions of 
section 90.988 Unlike certain other payments specifically regulated by other 
sections of the Companies Act, payment of interest on shares has not been 
_________________________________________________________________  
979  See Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 186(4).  
980  Section 79(1). The section mentions the construction of works and building and the provision 
of plant. 
981  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-30. 
982  Section 79(2)(a). 
983  Section 79(2)(a). 
984  Section 79(2)(b). 
985  Section 79(2)(c). The concept ‘half year’ is defined in subsection (3). 
986  Section 79(2)(d). 
987  Section 79(2)(e). 
988  See paragraph 5.1.1.2 above. 
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excluded from the definition of ‘payment’ for purposes of section 90. It would thus 
seem that the company would still have to comply with the financial restrictions of 
section 90 before it makes any interest payment authorised under section 79. 
If it is indeed the case that ‛capital’ may not be employed in paying interest 
on shares issued otherwise than to fund construction and plant, not even if the 
requirements of section 90 are met, it is clearly an undesirable situation. Apart 
from the difficulty in establishing whether a particular payment is interest or 
perhaps some other kind of payment, there seems to be no distinction in principle 
between interest payments and other payments by reason of shareholding that 
could justify this disparate treatment. 
It is suggested that there is no longer any need for a specific provision 
allowing interest to be paid on shares.989 This provision was intended to soften the 
impact of the capital maintenance principle. Section 90 affords sufficient flexibility 
in relation to payments to shareholders. Although section 79 does not impose 
financial restrictions for interest payments, I submit that the solvency and liquidity 
tests would impose appropriate limitations even where shareholders invest in 
capital-intensive projects that may not become profitable soon. 
5.8 Dividends and other payments under the Companies Bill 
In view of the central definition of ‛distribution’ in the Companies Bill and the more 
coherent approach to the regulation of different kinds of distributions, many of the 
rules apply to share repurchases and other distributions alike. The basic definition 
of ‛distribution’ under the Companies Bill and the financial restrictions are 
considered in a previous section.990 Additional rules apply to share repurchases, 
which are considered in the next section.991 In this section only two aspects will be 
addressed, namely authorisation of distributions and the status of a claim in 
respect of authorised but unpaid distributions. This will facilitate comparison with 
the present regulation of payments under section 90 of the Act.  Although the 
Companies Bill regulates liability for unlawful distributions in general, I consider 
these provisions in the context of liability for unlawful repurchases.992 Once again, 
_________________________________________________________________  
989  This sentiment is shared by Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-30. 
990  See paragraph 4.3 above. 
991  See paragraph 6.9 below. 
992  See paragraph 6.9.3 below. 
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the purpose is to facilitate comparison between the proposals of the Companies 
Bill and the current position. The current provisions regulate liability in respect of 
repurchases in a more comprehensive fashion than liability in respect of unlawful 
payments.993  
5.8.1 Authorisation of distributions 
Distributions have to be authorised by the board,994 except those made in 
compliance with a court order or pursuant to an existing legal obligation of the 
company.995  It appears that the initial authorisation by the board can be given at 
any stage before the distribution is made. This authorisation has to be 
distinguished from the solvency and liquidity acknowledgement that is discussed 
elsewhere.996  
The Bill does not prescribe any authorisation or approval of distributions by 
the general meeting. However, a company’s memorandum of incorporation could 
impose such a requirement in respect of all or any distributions by the company.997   
5.8.2 Status of claim in respect of authorised but unpaid distributions 
The requirements of clause 46 must be met before distributions may be made. 
Although there is no prescribed time when the board has to adopt the resolution 
acknowledging its application of the solvency and liquidity test, it is provided that 
the distribution must be ‛fully carried out’ once the board has adopted the 
resolution containing the acknowledgment.998 It seems that the distribution 
becomes enforceable once the board has made the acknowledgment. However, 
the enforceability lasts for 120 business days only. If the distribution has not been 
completed within this period, it cannot be carried out until a further 
acknowledgement has been made.  
Enforceability depends on the acknowledgement rather than on objective 
_________________________________________________________________  
993  See paragraph 5.6 above in relation to liability for unlawful payments. Liability for unlawful 
repurchases under the Act is considered in paragraph 6.4 below. 
994  Clause 46(1)(a)(ii). 
995  Clause 46(1)(a)(i). 
996  See paragraph 4.3.1.1 above. 
997  The directors would be obliged to comply with such a requirement, see clause 76(3). Liability 
for non-compliance with the provisions of the memorandum of incorporation is imposed by 
clause 77(2)(b)(iii). 
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solvency and liquidity. A shareholder is apparently entitled to insist on 
implementation of the distribution, despite the fact that the objective solvency and 
liquidity test is not satisfied. I have alluded to this anomaly above.999 
A specific arrangement exists for the enforceability of distributions in terms of 
a court order. If it appears that the company would not satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test if it were to comply immediately with the court order, the company 
may apply to a court for an order varying the original order.1000 The court can then 
make an order that ensures payment in terms of the original order is made at the 
earliest possible date compatible with the company satisfying its other financial 
obligations as they become due and payable.1001 
The enforceability of share repurchase agreements is regulated in clause 48 
and is discussed below.1002 
5.9 Evaluation of dividends and other payments 
Section 90 allows the distribution of the net assets of a company regardless of 
whether or not they represent share capital. Even if share capital is in effect used 
for a payment, there is no adjustment of share capital accounts.1003 It is for this 
reason that section 90 is credited as the provision that has abolished the capital 
maintenance concept in South Africa.1004 It is this provision that makes it possible 
for a company to distribute its total net assets to shareholders as opposed to only 
those assets that represent the excess over share capital and reserves.1005 A 
company can thus make a payment to its shareholders despite the fact that its net 
assets are worth less than the amount of its share capital and non-distributable 
reserves.1006 The share repurchase provisions require an adjustment of capital 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
998  Clause 46(2). This rule is subject to the 120-day rule set out in clause 46(3). 
999  See paragraph 4.4.2 above.  
1000  Clause 46(5)(a). 
1001  Clause 46(5)(b). 
1002  See paragraph 6.9.4 below. 
1003  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-112; Jooste “Can Share Capital be 
Reduced” 296. 
1004  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-14; 5-103; 5-112. See also Cassim 
“Reform of Company Law and Capital Maintenance” 285. 
1005  See Chapter 1 paragraph 2 for an explanation of the application of the capital maintenance 
principle in relation to the net assets of a company. 
1006  See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 344 – 351 and Blackman, Jooste & Everingham 
Continued 
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accounts1007 and can thus, despite the more modern financial restrictions, still be 
regarded as a reduction of capital that does not actually violate the concept of 
capital maintenance.1008 
A positive feature of section 90 is the use of the same financial restrictions 
that apply in the case of share repurchases. The financial restrictions of solvency 
and liquidity imposed by section 90(2) applies to all payments to shareholders, 
even when such payments are made in terms of company articles that allow 
dividends out of profits only, and ensure a uniform approach.1009  
Section 90 is problematic in that its regulation of payments differs in material 
respects from the regulation of payments in respect of share acquisitions. I have 
already referred to the uncertainty regarding the status of claims in respect of 
authorised but unpaid 'payments'.1010 The lack of an express director liability 
provision has also been criticised.1011 These anomalies can be attributed to the 
fragmentation in the regulation of different distributions.      
A further problem in section 90 relates to the adjustment of common-law 
principles on dividends and existing dividend provisions in articles of companies to 
encompass the wider range of payments that have become possible.1012 Unless 
payments are regarded as dividends, preference shareholders in particular are in 
a difficult position. 
While the rights of preference shareholders are protected by the financial 
restrictions under the MBCA (the adjusted net worth test)1013 and in New 
Zealand,1014 the South African legislation does not provide any protection for the 
rights or interests of preference shareholders. This problem is aggravated by the 
fact that, for obvious reasons, the common law does not regulate payments 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
Companies Act 5-107 on the previous position.  
1007  See paragraph 6.3.3 below. 
1008  Jooste “Can Share Capital be Reduced” 294. See, however, Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 
344 who state that the principle of capital maintenance was abolished by section 85 to 89 of 
the Act.  
1009  See paragraph 5.2 above. 
1010  See paragraph 5.4 above. 
1011  See paragraph 5.6 above. 
1012  See paragraph 5.1.2 above. 
1013  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
1014  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.2. 
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otherwise than out of profits.1015 South Africa should give consideration to 
regulating the position of preference shareholders when distributions are made, 
whether in the form of share acquisitions or of payments. It is a pity that the model 
articles in Schedule 1 of the Act have not been amended to reflect the new 
distribution rules. It may take time for companies to adjust their articles so that 
these problematic aspects are addressed. 
In New Zealand the term ‘dividend’ has been extended to include any 
distribution which is not a share repurchase or the provision of financial 
assistance.1016 It is further expressly provided that dividends have to be 
proportionate to the shareholding of members of a specific class or to the 
consideration paid. It appears that South Africa could also benefit by the 
introduction of a statutory definition of a dividend which is wider than the traditional 
common-law concept. This will make it clear that the principle of equality or 
proportionality applies, and may also solve the problem of interpreting the articles 
of companies that were drafted under the previous rules.  
Cassim criticises the fact that a special resolution is not required for section 
90 payments.1017 However, companies can impose restrictions on the directors, 
and it is quite common for articles to provide that dividends must be recommended 
by directors and approved by the shareholders by ordinary majority.1018 Directors 
usually also have the discretion to pay interim dividends without approval of the 
general meeting.1019 On the assumption that payments under section 90 have to 
comply with the principle of proportionality, I submit that it is an unnecessary 
impairment of flexibility to subject any payment by reason of shareholding to 
approval by special resolution.1020 
On the other hand, the shareholders will face liability in respect of unlawful 
payments and clearly have an interest in controlling unusual payments under 
section 90. The solution in the JSE Limited Listings Requirements may offer a 
_________________________________________________________________  
1015  It does regulate reductions of share capital, see paragraph 2.6 above. However, payments 
under s 90 are not reductions of share capital. 
1016  See s 53(1) of the New Zealand Companies Act 1993, discussed in Chapter 3 paragraph 5. 
1017  Cassim “Reform of Company Law and Capital Maintenance” 286. 
1018  See Table A article 84 and Table B article 83.  
1019  See Table A article 85 and Table B article 84. 
1020  Cassim “Reform of Company Law and Capital Maintenance” 287 concedes that a distribution 
under section 90 ‛cannot fairly be compared with a share buy-back’. 
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suitable compromise. Cash dividends paid out of retained income, as well as scrip 
dividends and capitalisation issues, need not be approved by shareholders. 
However, shareholder approval is required for all other ‛payments’, which include 
any payment out of capital funds and any non-cash distribution.1021 Approval can 
either be a specific approval of a particular payment or a general approval, but a 
general approval cannot be used in respect of payment exceeding 20 per cent of 
the company’s share capital plus reserves.1022 
Under the Companies Bill all distributions will be subject to a uniform set of 
rules, although additional requirements will apply to share repurchases.1023 For this 
reason, I evaluate the distribution rules of the Companies Bill elsewhere.1024 It is 
sufficient to emphasise here that the coherent regulation of distributions in the 
Companies Bill will eliminate many of the problems associated with section 90 of 
the Act. A particular advantage of the Companies Bill is that it requires the 
memorandum to set out the rights and preferences of each class of shares in 
respect of distributions in general rather than in respect of dividends only.1025 This 
will avoid the uncertainties that presently exist about ‛payments’ where articles 
regulate the payment of ‛dividends’ only.1026 
6 SHARE REPURCHASES 
6.1 Power to acquire shares 
Section 85(1) states that a company may, by special resolution and if authorised 
thereto by its articles, approve ‛the acquisition of shares issued by the company’. 
The words ‛by the company’ belong to ‛shares issued’ and not to ‛acquisition’, as is 
clear from the Afrikaans text ‛wat deur die maatskappy uitgereik is’. Despite this 
wide formulation it is clear that section 85(1) relates to the acquisition ‛by a 
company’ of its own shares.1027 This intention appears from a reading of the 
_________________________________________________________________  
1021  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.85. It seems that an ordinary resolution will suffice. 
1022  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.86. 
1023  See paragraph 4.3 above. 
1024  See paragraph 4.4 above. 
1025  See clauses 36(1)(b)(ii), 37(2)(b) and 37(4) and paragraphs 2.8.1 and 4.3 above. 
1026  See paragraph 5.1.2 above. 
1027 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-40. 
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provisions as a whole. It is also evident from the headings to Chapter V and to 
section 85 which speak of the acquisition by the company. It was clearly not 
intended to subject to approval by special resolution every acquisition of a 
company’s shares by whomever, as this would make share transfers unworkable 
and bring share markets to a halt. 
The power to approve the acquisition of own shares is given subject to the 
section ‛and any other applicable law’.1028 It is not clear which particular applicable 
legal principles the legislature had in mind. The Securities Services Act1029 and the 
Securities Regulation Code on Takeovers and Mergers1030 contain provisions that 
could apply to the acquisition of own shares.1031 The reference would also include 
common-law principles of company law embodying directors’ duties and providing 
for the fair treatment of shareholders.1032 An interesting question is whether this 
qualification could also refer to other provisions of the Act in terms of which shares 
can be acquired, namely section 98 which provides for the redemption of shares 
and section 252 which provides that the court may order a company to purchase 
its shares. If this is the case, another question that arises is whether the 
qualification has the effect of excluding these acquisitions from section 85 or of 
imposing its requirements in addition to those that already apply to the particular 
acquisition. The relationship between section 85 and these acquisitions is 
considered in more detail in the following paragraph.   
6.1.1 Meaning of acquisition 
Although the concept of an ‛acquisition’ of own shares is used, the company does 
not actually acquire its shares, since they have to be cancelled as issued shares 
_________________________________________________________________  
1028  Section 85(1). 
1029  Act 36 of 2004. 
1030  GNR 29 of 1991, as amended. 
1031  Section 75 of the Securities Services Act, for example, prohibits a company from acquiring its 
own shares in order to manipulate the market for its shares. Rule 7.1 of the Securities 
Regulation Code on Take-overs and Mergers requires disclosure of certain dealings during an 
offer period, including dealings by the offeree company. Rule 19 has not been amended to 
include an acquisition by an offeree company of its own securities as an instance of prohibited 
frustrating action. Such an acquisition would, however, conflict with general principle 7 and 
would thus be against the spirit of the Code. Rule 29(a)(ii) refers to an offer being 
implemented through a reduction of capital and could thus also apply when a company 
acquires its own shares, see paragraph 2.6.3.2 above.   
1032  See paragraph 2.6.3.2 above. 
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‛upon acquisition’.1033 At most, the company in effect acquires authorised but 
unissued shares which are not property in its hands.1034 
The term acquisition is not defined for purposes of section 85.1035 It is not 
very clear which transactions should be regarded as ‛acquisitions’ for purposes of 
section 85(1). The impact of the reference to ‛issued’ shares is also relevant in this 
regard. In particular, it must be considered whether the term acquisition covers 
only a transfer of previously issued shares, or whether the issue and allotment of 
shares following a subscription would also qualify as an acquisition of issued 
shares by the subscriber. Since it would be pointless for a company to issue and 
allot shares to itself unless they could be held in treasury, this question is only 
relevant in relation to subsidiaries and will accordingly be considered 
elsewhere.1036  
The plain words of section 85(1) seem to include any kind of acquisition of 
issued shares, although the financial restrictions in section 85(4) apply only when 
a payment has to be made by the company. The common law prohibited both the 
purchase of own shares and the holding by a company of its own shares in order 
to protect share capital and to avoid the abuse of a company trafficking in its own 
shares.1037 The prohibition against the acquisition of own shares was inferred from 
the existence of formal reduction of capital provisions.1038 The prohibition did not 
extend to acquisitions which did not reduce the company’s share capital. Under 
the common law companies could thus acquire their own shares in other ways 
than repurchase, for example by donation, and these shares could be held on 
behalf of the company by a trustee.1039 The effect of section 85 on these instances 
_________________________________________________________________  
1033 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-63. See paragraph 6.6 below for a 
discussion of the status of repurchased shares. 
1034  See Price “Acquisition of Own Shares” 61 regarding some practical consequences of the fact 
that no property is transferred to the company. Although Price deals with the position in 
England, similar considerations apply in South Africa. 
1035  It is, however, defined in s 440A, for purposes of Chapter XVA, as ‛including purchase or 
subscription’. 
1036 See paragraph 6.7 below. 
1037 Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 (HL); Wolfe v Liquidators Smyth and Crawford 
1914 CPD 187; Sage Holdings Ltd v The Unisec Group Ltd & Others 1982 (1) SA 337 (W) at 
347 – 349; The Unisec Group Ltd & Others v Sage Holdings Ltd 1986 (3) SA 259 (T) at 264 – 
265. 
1038  See Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 (HL) at 415 – 416, 423, 438. 
1039 Re Castiglione’s Will Trust [1958] Ch 549; [1958] All ER 480. This judgment is criticised by 
Gower “Companies Owning Their Own Shares” 314, because the company will in effect 
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of acquisitions is not clear. It could be argued that authorisation in the articles and 
a special resolution will now be required for all acquisitions. If this position is 
accepted, it is submitted that the status of shares previously so acquired will not 
be affected so that they may continue to be held on behalf of the company by a 
trustee.  
However, the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 
argue1040 that a donation of shares to the company ‛presumably’ does not 
constitute an ‛acquisition’ by it of its own shares. No reason is given, but reference 
is made to the Canadian position where, unlike South Africa, the legislation 
expressly allows a company to accept shares surrendered to it as a gift and where 
such shares are not required to be cancelled.1041 The conclusion of these authors 
can be supported, and it is submitted that justification can be found in interpreting 
the new provisions against the background of the common-law prohibition. The 
requirements of section 85 should thus apply only to acquisitions which were not 
previously allowed. This is in line with the presumption that a statute amends the 
existing law only to the extent that is necessary.1042  
It is not clear whether these implications were considered by the legislature. 
It is recommended that this uncertainty should be cleared up by expressly 
providing for acquisitions otherwise than for value. 
The redemption of shares can also be regarded as an acquisition. Unlike 
section 90(3) which expressly excludes a payment in redemption of shares from 
the definition of ‛payment’ for purposes of section 90, section 85 does not 
expressly exclude the redemption of shares from the meaning of ‛acquisition’. It is 
submitted that the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act are 
correct in their conclusion that section 85 does not apply to redemptions because 
they are comprehensively provided for in a separate provision, namely section 
98.1043 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
acquire voting rights in respect of these shares. 
1040  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-63. 
1041  See s 37 of the Canada Business Corporations Act 1985. 
1042  See Du Plessis “Statute Law” paragraph 328. 
1043 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-63. See paragraph 6.8 below regarding 
redemptions. 
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6.2 Financial restrictions for repurchases 
The financial restrictions for share repurchases consist of a liquidity element, set 
out section 85(4)(a), and a solvency element, contained in section 85(4)(b). Both 
have to be satisfied.  
The introductory sentence of section 85(4) provides that a company may not 
make any payment ‛in whatever form’ to acquire any share issued by it if there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that the circumstances in either of the two 
subparagraphs are present. 
‛Payment’ is not defined in section 85(4) and it is not clear what the phrase ‛in 
whatever form’ contributes to its meaning. Payment is, however, defined in section 
90(3), for purposes of that section, as including any direct or indirect payment or 
transfer of money or property to a shareholder.1044 Certain payments are expressly 
excluded by section 90(3), including payments for shares acquired under section 
85. Presumably section 85(4) envisages any counter-value, whether in money or 
in kind, given in consideration of the acquisition of shares. 
The financial restrictions are discussed elsewhere.1045 
6.2.1 The timing for the application of the financial restrictions  
The relevant time for enquiring into the solvency and liquidity of the company is 
when it is about to make any payment for the acquisition of its shares. However, it 
is the financial position immediately after the payment has been made that must 
be determined. This aspect is discussed elsewhere.1046 As a result of the fact that 
the test must be satisfied at the time of payment rather than the time of 
authorisation, shares may be acquired by the company on credit.  
6.3 Procedure and other requirements 
One of the central concerns regarding share repurchases is the risk of unfair 
treatment of shareholders, particularly when selective repurchases are made.1047 
For this reason, it is important to consider aspects such as the authorisation for 
_________________________________________________________________  
1044 See paragraph 5.1 above. 
1045  See paragraph 4.1 above. 
1046  See paragraph 4.2 above. 
1047  See, for example, Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 774; Cassim “Reform of Company Law 
and Capital Maintenance” 287;  
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repurchases and the procedural requirements. Further, because a reduction of 
capital is involved, the rules regarding adjustment of share capital accounts also 
merit attention.  
The acquisition of a company’s own shares can be unfair towards either the 
vendor-shareholder or the non-selling shareholders.1048 Since approval is by 
special resolution, the agreement of the vendor shareholder is not required unless 
she holds sufficient shares to block a special resolution.1049 It can be argued that 
even in the case of a voluntary sale to the company, shareholders do not have a 
free choice. If no offer is made to a shareholder, she has to remain a shareholder 
or find a purchaser other than the company. If an offer is made, the shareholder 
can likewise not choose to maintain the status quo - she has to either sell in order 
to preserve her relative stake, or refuse to sell and thus accept an increase in her 
ownership participation.1050  
The company has a duty not to discriminate unfairly between shareholders; 
otherwise it would constitute a fraud on the minority.1051 Such a fraud could be 
perpetrated not only in the case of targeted or selective repurchases but also in 
general offers if the controllers who approve the offer have no intention of selling 
their own shares.1052 
Over the years the courts developed a certain hierarchy for reductions of 
capital. In the case of a reduction based on the loss of capital, the shares of the 
lowest ranking shareholders were cancelled. When the purpose of a reduction was 
to distribute excess capital, the classes ranking first in respect of liquidation 
distributions, were cancelled first.1053 The share repurchase provisions contain no 
similar hierarchy. In view of the uncertainty of the application of the common-law 
principles to share repurchases, it is important to provide sufficient statutory 
protection for shareholders when a company embarks on a repurchase of its 
shares.  
_________________________________________________________________  
1048 See Chapter 1 paragraph 1. 
1049 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-44 create the incorrect impression that all 
share repurchases are based on consensus between the selling shareholder and the 
company. 
1050 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-47. 
1051 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-78. 
1052  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-78. 
1053 See paragraph 2.6.1 above. 
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It is for this reason that section 87(1)(a) and section 87(4) lay down rules 
regarding the fair treatment of shareholders. The offer that has to be made to all 
shareholders in terms of section 87(1)(a), is discussed below.1054 Section 87(4) 
compels the company, when acquiring shares in response to an offer to all 
shareholders, to acquire shares as far as possible on a pro rata basis. It is 
suggested that the company has to acquire the shares in proportion to the number 
of shares offered by each shareholder and not to their total shareholding in the 
company.1055 However, as will be shown below, compliance with this procedure 
can be avoided with relative ease.   
6.3.1 Authorisations 
One of the primary shareholder protection mechanisms can be found in the 
authorisation requirements for share repurchases.1056 In Capitex Bank Ltd v Qorus 
Holdings Ltd & Others the court described authorisation in the articles and 
approval by special resolution as ‛internal requirements’.1057  Since the articles and 
any special resolution are clearly public documents of the company, the court’s 
remark must be understood as a reference to the internal relations in the 
company.  
6.3.1.1 Articles of association 
Before a company may approve the acquisition of its shares under section 85, its 
articles of association must authorise it to do so.1058 The model articles have not 
been amended since the introduction of the new distribution provisions. Article 
31(g) of Table A and article 30(g) of Table B provide that a company may reduce 
its share capital in any manner. As is explained above,1059 the reduction of capital 
provisions have been deleted and companies can now reduce their share capital 
through repurchases or other acquisitions. It could be argued that these articles 
authorise companies to reduce their share capital by way of a share repurchase. 
_________________________________________________________________  
1054  See paragraph 6.3.2.1 below. 
1055 See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-92-1. 
1056  See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 325. 
1057  See Capitex Bank Ltd v Qorus Holdings Ltd & Others 2003 (3) SA 302 (W); 2003 CLR 1 (W) 
at 7. 
1058 Section 85(1). The articles can be amended to include such authorisation, see s 62. 
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However, a contrary argument is that section 85(1) requires authority for the 
company to ‛acquire’ its shares1060 and this is clearly not envisaged by the model 
articles. The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act are of the 
view that these articles do not confer the required authority on companies.1061 
It is submitted that this question should be answered bearing in mind the 
contractual nature of the articles of association.1062 For this reason, such a radical 
reinterpretation of existing articles would be unwarranted. However, different 
considerations apply in respect of companies that have adopted these articles 
subsequent to the 1999 amendments. The article empowering the company to 
reduce its capital would, in view of the repeal of the reduction of capital procedure, 
be an unnecessary provision with no force or effect, unless it was intended to cater 
for repurchases, the only kind of reduction possible at the time of adoption of the 
articles. Bearing in mind that the parties must have intended that article to have 
some effect, the inference can be drawn that they had in mind the reduction of 
capital by an acquisition of shares. 
The authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act suggest that 
the directors would also have to be authorised in the articles to execute a share 
repurchase because it would not normally form part of managing the company.1063 
They suggest that an express and separate power should be contained in the 
articles (subject to prior approval). However, although it may sometimes be difficult 
to assess which actions constitute management of a company1064 it is submitted 
that it is unnecessary to provide for such a power. The directors will, after all, be 
acting in the execution of a special resolution authorising an acquisition of own 
shares. Executing resolutions should always be considered part of conducting a 
company’s business. 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
1059 See paragraph 2.6 above. 
1060 Although, as has been explained in paragraph 6.1 above, the company does not actually 
acquire its shares. 
1061 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-14. 
1062 In terms of s 65(2). 
1063 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-62. 
1064 See Ex parte Russlyn Construction (Pty) Ltd 1987 (1) SA 33 (D); Ex parte Screen Media Ltd 
1991 (3) SA 462 (W); Ex parte Tangent Sheeting (Pty) Ltd 1993 (3) SA 488 (W); Ex parte 
Graaf-Reinet Rollermeule (Edms) Bpk 2000 (4) SA 670 (E) which deal with the question of 
whether applying for winding-up is part of managing a company. See also Larkin “A Question 
of Management” ; McLennan “Powers of Directors” ; Havenga “Directors May Not”. 
 440 
6.3.1.2 Special resolution 
The acquisition of the company’s shares must be approved by special 
resolution.1065 This measure is an important part of the protection of 
shareholders.1066 A special resolution is also a requirement for certain share 
repurchases in England,1067 but not in Delaware, California or under the MBCA.1068 
In New Zealand a unanimous resolution is required for direct selective offers, 
unless the company’s constitution expressly allows non-pro rata offers.1069 
Section 85 does not impose any voting restrictions on shareholders, and as a 
result there is considerable scope for abuse by controlling shareholders.1070 They 
could, for example, vote for the acquisition of their own shares at an excessive 
price. Further, since the Act gives no indication that coercive acquisitions are 
prohibited1071 it appears that the controlling shareholders can even vote to acquire 
shares from non-consenting minority shareholders.   
In relation to non-voting preference shares the authors of Blackman, Jooste 
& Everingham Companies Act argue that the resolution authorising the repurchase 
of preference shares is not a resolution affecting their rights or interests and that 
they will thus not be able to vote.1072 Their argument is based on the fact that the 
resolution authorising the repurchase will result in an offer being made to 
preference shareholders, which they are not obliged to accept. Their rights and 
interests will only be affected once shareholders accept the offer and their shares 
are acquired and cancelled, but then the resolution has already been adopted. It is 
submitted that a resolution for the purchase of preference shares may indeed be 
regarded as a resolution which, even though it will result in an offer only, directly 
_________________________________________________________________  
1065 Section 85(1). 
1066 See Cilliers & Benade Corporate Law 325 where it is described it as the ‛initial’ protection for 
shareholders, while Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 6-54 call it the 
‛fundamental’ protection. 
1067 See Chapter 2 paragraph 5.3.1.1 (off-market repurchases) and paragraph 5.3.1.4 
(repurchases out of capital). An ordinary resolution suffices for market purchases, see 
paragraph 5.3.1.3. 
1068 See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.6.3 (Delaware), paragraph 3.6.3 (California) and paragraph 4.6.3 
(MBCA). 
1069  See Chapter 4 paragraph 6.3.2.  
1070  For an interesting analysis of theoretical differences between general shareholder approval 
and approval by disinterested shareholders, see Hill “Changes in the Role of the Shareholder” 
201. 
1071  Unless the pro rata offer procedure of s 87(1) and (4) is followed. 
1072  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-65. 
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affects at least the ‛interests’ of the preference shareholders.1073 
While it is true that the redemption of redeemable preference shares is not 
regarded as a variation or abrogation of class rights,1074 there is an important 
difference between the redemption of shares which were issued on the 
understanding that they may be redeemed and the repurchase of shares 
otherwise than in accordance with their terms of issue. In view of the express 
reference in section 194 to resolutions for the reduction of share capital, it is 
submitted that preference shareholders will be entitled to vote in respect of any 
acquisition of own shares, as this would amount to a reduction of capital.1075 
A resolution to repurchase ordinary shares will affect the rights or interests of 
preference shareholders regarding dividends and return of capital unless provision 
is made for these preferent rights.1076 
Section 85 does not provide for a time period within which a special 
resolution for the repurchase of shares has to be executed. It thus seems possible 
to authorise a repurchase far in advance of the actual acquisition. In England and 
in New Zealand repurchases have to be made within specified time periods.1077 
The greater flexibility of the South African provisions can be attributed to the fact 
that the financial restrictions apply at the time of payment and no formal 
declaration or disclosure of the company’s financial position is required. I submit 
that the South African approach is preferable. However, it seems desirable to 
regulate the possibility that directors may during the currency of a general 
approval agree to a future repurchase which will only be executed after the 
general approval has lapsed.  
A specific issue that arises in relation to the prior authorisation of 
repurchases is whether it is possible to create ordinary redeemable shares by 
approving in advance the repurchase of shares on terms providing for it taking 
effect in future either at the option of the company or the seller. The authors of 
_________________________________________________________________  
1073 See the wide interpretation of ‛interests’ in Utopia Vakansie-oorde Bpk v Du Plessis 1974 (3) 
SA 148 (A) at 178. 
1074 See Re Saltdean Estate Co Ltd [1968] 3 All ER 829 (Ch); Re William Jones & Sons Ltd [1969] 
1 All ER 913 (Ch). 
1075  See also paragraph 2.6 above on the reduction of capital. 
1076  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-65. 
1077 See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.3.3.5 on the position in England (applicable to repurchases out of 
capital only) and, in respect of New Zealand, Chapter 3 paragraph 6.3.2 (selective offers) and 
paragraph 6.3.3 (stock exchange acquisitions subject to prior notice). 
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Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act say that it is possible.1078 
Cassim, on the other hand, does not consider this possibility, but nevertheless 
argues that the legislature should allow ordinary redeemable shares.1079 
 I must point out, however, that ordinary redeemable shares will have to be 
issued as unredeemable shares first, before the shareholders will be able to 
approve the repurchase that will take place in the future. This is because a 
company may only obtain approval to acquire its ‛issued’ shares.1080 
6.3.1.3 General and specific approvals. 
An approval can be either a general approval or a specific approval for a particular 
acquisition.1081 The Act does not explain the meaning of these terms, but the 
phrase ‛for a particular transaction’ clearly qualifies the meaning of specific 
approval.1082 A general approval remains valid until the next annual general 
meeting of the company, unless it is revoked earlier by special resolution.1083 This 
makes a general approval suitable for conferring a discretion on directors to 
repurchase shares when they regard it as appropriate.1084 However, as a result of 
the legislature’s failure to correctly identify the circumstances when a pro rata offer 
should be required, the position is now that a general approval must be followed 
by a pro rata offer. This obviously removes the whole point of an approval that 
remains valid for a year, unless the intention was simply that the board could 
obtain an authorisation to implement a pro rata offer within the ensuing year.  
When sections 85 and 87 are read together it appears that the importance of 
classifying an approval as either specific or general is that the procedural 
requirements pertaining to the offering circular depend on the type of approval.1085 
While it may have been expected that the formalities would depend on the kind of 
repurchase involved, that is, a selective repurchase or an offer to all shareholders, 
this is not the case. The procedure is determined by the kind of approval and 
_________________________________________________________________  
1078 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-66. 
1079  See Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 763. 
1080  See s 85(1). 
1081 Section 85(2). 
1082 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-68. 
1083 Section 85(3). 
1084 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-91. 
1085 See s 87(2)(a), discussed in paragraph 6.3.2.1 below. 
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although the legislature may have attempted to introduce a correlation between 
the kind of approval and the kind of offer, it did not succeed in doing so.  
As a result, the procedure can be manipulated by signifying an approval as 
either specific or general.1086 Since an offering circular and pro rata acquisition are 
prescribed in the case of a general approval only, it should have been stated that 
only general approvals should be allowed in the case of a pro rata acquisition - a 
conclusion which seems to negate the essential nature of a general approval. 
Unfortunately, a company inviting offers from all its shareholders could easily 
avoid proper disclosure and the equal treatment of shareholders prescribed by 
section 87 by using a specific approval rather than a general approval. The 
advantage of a general approval in enabling directors to make incidental 
acquisitions is also removed by this curious approach of requiring a circular and 
pro rata acquisition for all general approvals. I recommend that the procedure, 
including the type of authorisation required, should be prescribed with reference to 
the nature of the acquisition, determined with regard to its likely effect on 
shareholders.1087 
6.3.2 Other formalities 
In terms of section 85(9) a company may not acquire its own shares if ‛as a result 
of such acquisition there would no longer be any shares in issue other than 
convertible or redeemable shares’. A company can thus not use a repurchase as a 
way of informal winding-up of its affairs.1088 
A company that has acquired its own shares must inform the Registrar of the 
acquisition within thirty days of such acquisition.1089 
6.3.2.1 Procedure for unlisted shares 
Section 87 prescribes the procedure for the acquisition by a company of its own 
shares. This procedure applies unless the shares are acquired in terms of a 
_________________________________________________________________  
1086 This issue is discussed in more detail in Van der Linde “Share Repurchases” 27 – 28 and in 
Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-91. 
1087 See paragraph 6.10.3 below. 
1088 It is curious that the conversion provisions of s 75 do not contain a similar limitation. It would 
seem possible for a company to convert all its shares into redeemable or convertible shares.  
1089 Section 87(5). 
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specific approval1090 or through a registered stock exchange within South 
Africa.1091 In short, the procedure must be followed when the company has 
authorised the acquisition by way of a general approval. The company has to 
comply with the following formalities: 
The company has to send a written offering circular to each registered 
shareholder and offer to acquire shares from the shareholder.1092 This circular has 
to contain certain prescribed details about the offer by the company. A copy of the 
circular also has to be lodged with the Registrar.1093 The liability for untruths in 
such a circular is similar to that in respect of untruths in a prospectus.1094 
If the company’s offer to acquire shares is taken up in respect of a greater 
number of shares than the company intends acquiring, it has to acquire the shares 
pro rata from all the shareholders who offered to sell their shares. This 
requirement is aimed at the fair and equal treatment of shareholders. It is 
uncertain whether the offer must be taken up pro rata to the total shareholding of 
each shareholder offering to sell her shares or, if she does not offer all her shares, 
with reference only to the number of shares offered by her. It is suggested that the 
calculation should relate to the number of additional shares offered by an each 
shareholder in addition to the portion the company intended acquiring from each 
shareholder.1095 If one determines the number with reference to the total 
shareholding, the absurd situation may arise that the company has to take up the 
offer in respect of more shares than the shareholder is willing to sell. 
The company has to notify the Registrar within 30 days of the completion of 
the acquisition of the date, number and class of shares it acquired.1096 This 
requirement applies to all acquisitions, regardless of whether they are made under 
a general or specific approval. 
_________________________________________________________________  
1090 Section 87(2)(a). 
1091 Section 87(2)(b). 
1092 Section 87(1)(a). 
1093 Section 87(1)(b). 
1094 Section 87(3). 
1095 See the New Zealand position, Chapter 3 paragraph 6.3.1. 
1096 Section 87(5). 
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6.3.2.2 Procedure for listed shares 
If a company acquires its listed shares through transactions on the JSE Limited 
(market purchases), the company need not comply with section 87(1).1097 The 
company will have to comply with any further requirements that may be set by the 
JSE Limited.1098 In accordance with section 87(5) the company must inform the 
Registrar of an acquisition within 30 days.  
The Listings Requirements of the JSE Limited sets out the procedure and 
requirements for the acquisition by a listed company of its own shares and by a 
subsidiary of shares in its holding company.1099 The rules are aimed primarily at 
ensuring proper disclosure. They also set certain limits regarding the number of 
shares that may be acquired and the price that may be paid in respect of general 
repurchases.1100 Some of the rules expand on the requirements of section 85, 
such as the requirements of a statement by the directors pertaining to the solvency 
and liquidity of the company for the ensuing twelve months.1101 There are also 
special disclosure requirements for the acquisition of shares from related 
parties.1102 
In accordance with section 85(2) of the Companies Act, the JSE rules 
provide for both specific and general approvals.1103 However, it definitively couples 
the kind of approval with the kind of repurchase involved. A specific approval 
authorises, and approves the terms of, a particular repurchase, and is used for a 
‛specific repurchase’.1104 Two separate types of specific repurchase are 
distinguished, namely pro rata offers to all shareholders and specific offers from 
named shareholders.1105 A general approval is used for ‛a general repurchase of 
_________________________________________________________________  
1097 Section 87(2)(b). 
1098 Section 87(6). 
1099 JSE Limited Listings Requirements pars 5.67 – 5.84. Particulars with regard to disclosure are 
set out in paragraphs 11.23 to 11.27 and the timing of disclosure is prescribed in Schedule 24. 
1100  JSE Limited Listings Requirements pars 5.68 and 5.72(d). 
1101 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.69(c). 
1102 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.69(e). The meaning of ‛related parties’ is described 
in pars 10.1 – 10.3. 
1103  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.67. 
1104  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.67(a). 
1105 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.69. The reference to an offer ‛from’ specific 
shareholders indicates that the shareholder must be offering to dispose of shares to the 
company and it thus appears that acquisitions must be consensual.   
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securities’.1106  
Since the rules apply to the acquisition of listed shares, they apply also to the 
acquisition by a subsidiary of listed shares in its holding company. When a 
subsidiary undertakes to purchase shares in its listed holding company, the 
shareholders of the holding company also have to approve of the acquisition by 
special resolution.1107 
A company must, after the repurchase of its shares, still comply with the 
shareholder spread requirements set out in the JSE Limited Listings 
Requirements, which dictates that a prescribed minimum percentage of the shares 
be held by the public.1108 
A company or its subsidiary may not repurchase its securities within a 
‛prohibited period’.1109 Once a company has announced that it will repurchase its 
securities under a specific repurchase, it must pursue the proposal unless the JSE 
Limited permits it to abandon the proposal.1110  
If a company engages in a specific repurchase from a named shareholder, 
the shareholders must receive a circular which should contain sufficient 
information to enable them to decide how to vote. Apart from certain general 
information, prescribed information about the terms of the repurchase must be set 
out and a declaration by the directors of the financial situation and prospects of the 
company for the next 12 months must be included.1111 The shareholders 
participating in the repurchase, and their associates, may not vote.1112 
In the case of a pro rata offer the company must issue a circular that invites 
shareholders to tender their securities and states that they may tender more than 
their pro rata entitlement.1113 Where additional shares are tendered, the acquisition 
_________________________________________________________________  
1106 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.67(b). 
1107 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.76. 
1108 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.69(f). The shareholder spread requirements are set 
out in pars 3.37 – 3.41. 
1109 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.69(h). A ‛prohibited period’ is a closed period as 
defined in the definitions of the Listings Requirements, as well as any period during which 
unpublished price sensitive information exists in relation to the securities, see par 3.67. 
1110  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.69(g). 
1111  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 11.25. 
1112 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.69(b). 
1113  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 11.23(e). 
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must be made on an equitable basis.1114 The particulars that must be contained in 
this circular are prescribed and a solvency and liquidity declaration by the directors 
must be included.1115 
A ‛general repurchase of securities’ gives a renewable mandate to the 
directors to purchase securities subject to the JSE Limited requirements and any 
further restrictions set out in the mandate. No more than 20 per cent of the shares 
of a class may be acquired in terms of a general repurchase in any one financial 
year.1116 The acquisition must be implemented on the open market and must be 
done without any prior understanding or arrangement between the company and 
the counterparty.1117 This rule guards against abuse of the general repurchase 
power to effect a specific repurchase. 
The circular which must be sent to shareholders prior to the meeting at which 
the approval is sought must contain certain prescribed information including 
particulars of the way in which the board intends utilising the authority.1118 
The price may not be more than 10 per cent above the weighted average of 
the market value for the securities for the five business days immediately 
preceding the date on which the transaction was agreed.1119 A company may at 
any given stage only appoint one agent to effect the repurchases on the 
market.1120 The shareholders must be informed after certain specified percentages 
of shares have been acquired.1121 The announcement must contain particulars of 
the dates of purchases, number and value of shares acquired, highest and lowest 
prices paid, the extent of the authority remaining, the funds used, and the financial 
prospects of the company.1122 
The JSE Limited Listings Requirements also provides expressly for 'odd lot' 
offers.1123 These are non-proportionate offers that are made to shareholders who 
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1114  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 11.23(e) read with par 5.33. 
1115  JSE Limited Listings Requirements pars 11.23 – 11.24. 
1116  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.68. 
1117  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.72(a). 
1118  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 11.26(c). 
1119 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.72(d). Should there not have been any trades in the 
preceding 5 day period, the JSE must be consulted for a ruling. 
1120 JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.72(e). 
1121  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 11.27. 
1122  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 11.27. 
1123  JSE Limited Listings Requirements pars 5.123 and 11.53. 
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hold less than 100 shares or, in cases where the company can illustrate that the 
cost associated with disposing of a specific greater number of shares is equal to or 
exceeds the total value of that number of shares, such higher number of 
shares.1124 The rules make it clear that the shareholder must always be given an 
election of either retaining or selling the odd-lot holding.1125 Expropriation as a 
default option in respect of shareholders who fail to make an election is allowed 
only if the articles provide for such expropriation and the specific odd-lot offer has 
been approved by the company in general meeting.1126  
6.3.3 Adjustment of capital accounts 
Section 85(5) and (6) regulate the adjustment of share capital accounts following 
an acquisition of own shares. Adjustment follows logically on the requirement that 
acquired shares have to be cancelled as issued shares and restored to the status 
of authorised but unissued shares.1127 Section 85(7) provides for payments out of 
reserve accounts, including ‛statutory non-distributable reserves’.1128  
It is interesting to note that the previous reduction of capital provisions did not 
prescribe the way in which the share capital accounts had to be adjusted, also not 
in the case where shares were cancelled.1129 Instructions pertaining to the 
adjustment of share capital accounts are also absent from the redemption 
provisions of section 98. Similarly section 252 is silent on the adjustment of 
accounts in instances when a company is ordered to purchase its own shares, 
although the court may order that the capital be reduced 'accordingly'. 
In terms of section 85(6), where no par value shares are acquired, the stated 
capital account must be decreased by an amount derived by multiplying the 
number of acquired shares with ‛the amount arrived at by dividing the stated 
capital contributed by issued shares of that class by the number of issued shares 
_________________________________________________________________  
1124  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.123(a), (b). 
1125  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.124(a). 
1126  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.124(d). 
1127 Section 85(8), see paragraph 6.6 below. 
1128  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-72 observe that as a result of s 90 there 
are no longer any reserves that cannot be distributed to shareholders. Nevertheless the term 
should be interpreted as a reference to share premium account and capital redemption 
reserve. See paragraphs 2.4.3 and 2.4.4 above for a discussion of these reserves. 
1129 See ss 83 – 90 of the Act immediately prior to its amendment in 1999. Section 87(1) merely 
provided that the special resolution had to set out the existing share capital, particulars of the 
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of that class’. This latter amount is the average issue price of the shares. 
Reference is made to the ‛stated capital contributed’ and not to the amount 
standing to the credit of the stated capital account. Therefore, if stated capital has 
been applied, for example to provide for preliminary expenses or commissions,1130 
and the repurchase involves all or most of the class of shares, it could happen that 
the stated capital account will not be sufficient to write off the prescribed amount in 
respect of the shares acquired. Presumably an apportionment would have to be 
made. 
Section 85(5) regulates the adjustment of a company’s issued share capital 
account where par value shares are acquired by the company. The issued capital 
has to be decreased by an amount equal to the nominal value of the acquired 
shares.1131  
6.3.4 Premiums on acquisition 
If par value shares are acquired at a premium, the premium may be paid out of 
reserves, including the share premium account and the capital redemption reserve 
fund.1132 It must be noted that this last provision is merely enabling and that the 
company need not write off the premium against reserves. 
The fact that the share premium account and capital redemption reserve 
account may be used to provide for a premium in respect of par value shares only, 
is criticised by the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act.1133 
The authors argue that, as the holders of par value shares1134 have no preferred 
interest in these reserves, it should also be possible to use these reserves, 
especially the capital redemption reserve fund, when no par value shares are 
acquired at a premium.1135 Since a premium can by definition only be paid when 
there is a nominal or par value,1136 it appears that what they may have in mind is a 
repurchase at a price which exceeds the average issue price of the no par value 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
proposed reduction, and the resultant state of the share capital of the company. 
1130 See paragraph 2.4.2 above. 
1131 Section 85(5). 
1132 Section 85(7).  
1133 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-72. 
1134 They actually say 'ordinary' shares, but probably mean par value shares. 
1135 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-72, especially note 2. 
1136 As is clearly articulated by the phrase ‛premium above the par value’ in s 85(7). 
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shares.  
Although it is true that the holders of par value shares have no preferent right 
to the share premium account,1137 the Act does seem to envisage some or other 
link between the par value shares in respect of which a premium was contributed 
and the share premium account in respect of that class.1138 This is apparent from 
the second proviso to section 76(3)(c) which regulates the application of the share 
premium account to provide for a premium on the redemption of shares that have 
been converted into redeemable preference shares.1139 In line with this provision, 
one would have expected that a premium upon repurchase should only have been 
allowed out of the premium initially contributed by such shares. Just as in the case 
of shares later converted into redeemable shares, shares repurchased did not 
necessarily contribute to the share premium account. From the point of view of 
shareholders, a decision to repurchase shares at a premium has an impact similar 
to a decision to convert shares into redeemable shares and to redeem them at a 
premium. It is submitted that there is no good reason for this distinction between 
repurchases and redemptions. Perhaps the intention was to allow only the 
premium contributed by the shares repurchased to be cancelled out again. But this 
is clearly not in accordance with the wording which expressly refers only to shares 
being ‛acquired’ at a premium over the par value.1140 
While a case can be made out for restricting the application of the share 
premium account to provide for premiums on the repurchase of par value shares, 
since a share premium account is necessarily contributed by par value shares, the 
same cannot be said about the capital redemption reserve fund. A capital 
redemption reserve fund can arise from the redemption of par value or no par 
value shares. If there should indeed be some correlation between the type of 
shares contributing non-distributable reserves and the subsequent application of 
those reserves, it is difficult to see a distinction between a repurchase at a 
premium of shares issued at par and a repurchase above the average issue price 
of no par value shares. In both instances the company is returning more than it 
_________________________________________________________________  
1137 Unless the articles provide otherwise, see paragraph 2.4.3.4.3 above. 
1138 Alternatively, the shares should have been issued with the right to receive that premium, see 
paragraph 2.4.3.3.2 above. 
1139 This is discussed in more detail in paragraph 6.8.3 below. 
1140 Section 85(7). 
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received for the shares and more than what is reflected as share capital (including 
non-distributable reserves) in respect of those shares. In one instance it is allowed 
to reduce its reserves, but not in the other instance. There is no reasonable 
justification for this divergence.  
A second anomaly is that the capital redemption reserve cannot be used to 
provide for a premium upon the redemption of shares. Since the effect of 
repurchase and redemption is similar, one would have expected that it would also 
have been allowed to use the capital redemption reserve to provide for a premium 
payable upon redemption. The share premium account may be used in both 
instances, albeit subject to the two provisos in the case of redemption at a 
premium. 
The application of the adjustment provisions to repurchases by subsidiaries 
in terms of section 89, is considered elsewhere.1141 However, it makes sense to 
consider the application of section 85(7) to such repurchases here. In particular 
the question arises whether a subsidiary can use its share premium account and 
capital redemption reserve to pay a premium on the acquisition of par value 
shares in its holding company. It may be argued that since section 85(7) is not 
concerned with the adjustment of a share premium initially contributed in respect 
of repurchased shares, a subsidiary should also be able to reduce its share 
premium account and capital redemption reserve through paying a premium on 
the shares of its holding company. This would be unusual, especially since the 
subsidiary can apparently not adjust its issued share capital and stated capital 
accounts by the par value or average issue price of the shares it acquires.1142 
It is suggested that various aspects of section 85(7) need to be reconsidered. 
It seems that it would have made more sense to provide for the writing off of share 
premiums contributed in respect of shares being repurchased. It is submitted that 
if the par value shares had been issued at a premium, this premium should upon 
repurchase be deducted from the share premium account to the extent that the 
repurchase price exceeds the par value of the shares, but not exceeding the 
average premium contributed by the shares. Further, it should be provided that the 
capital redemption reserve account can be applied in respect of the excess of the 
_________________________________________________________________  
1141 See paragraph 6.7 below. 
1142  See paragraph 6.7.2 below. 
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repurchase price paid by the company over the issue price of the acquired shares. 
In the case of a repurchase by a subsidiary, no adjustment to the share premium 
account or capital redemption reserve account of either company should be 
allowed.  
The conceptual difficulties surrounding non-distributable reserves as share 
capital of the company in respect of which no particular shareholders have any 
entitlement are vividly illustrated by the issues raised. The proposals I outline in 
the previous paragraph may, however, address some of the concerns about the 
status and application of statutory non-distributable reserves if such accounts were 
to be retained in a future Companies Act. 
6.4 Liability for unlawful repurchases 
Section 86 regulates some aspects of the liability of directors and shareholders 
when shares have been acquired contrary to section 85(4), that is, when payment 
was made in breach of the financial restrictions. The provisions, which will be 
discussed below, do not regulate the consequences of non-compliance with other 
requirements or formalities for repurchases. Further, section 86(5) expressly 
preserves any liability that may be incurred under the Act, any other law, or the 
common law.  
The issue of liability for unlawful repurchases did not directly arise at 
common law, in view of the prohibition on share repurchases.1143 However, since a 
repurchase is in essence a distribution by the company, the common-law 
principles of liability for unlawful dividends should apply also to unlawful payments 
for the acquisition of shares. This issue is considered in relation to liability for 
unlawful dividends.1144 This uncertainty regarding the liability of shareholders may 
complicate the interpretation of section 86(2) and (3) which provide for court 
orders against shareholders.1145                                                                                     
The directors also incur common-law liability for the amount of an unlawful 
_________________________________________________________________  
1143 Presumably if a company purported to repurchase its shares, it would be able to recover the 
purchase price from the shareholder on the basis that the agreement was ultra vires and thus 
void, see Trevor v Whitworth (1887) 12 App Cas 409 (HL) at 436. 
1144 See paragraph 5.6 above. 
1145 See paragraph 6.4.2 below. 
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dividend on the basis of a breach of their duties.1146 Although liability for an 
unlawful distributions in the form of payments for a repurchase could probably also 
be imposed on the same common-law principles, section 86(1) creates a specific 
statutory liability of directors.1147 Directors may further also be liable to the 
company for breach of their duties when they fail to ensure compliance with any of 
the non-financial requirements and formalities of sections 85, 87 and 88.  
Against the background of the common-law principles of liability, the specific 
provisions of section 86 can now be considered. 
6.4.1 Liability of directors 
As sanction for non-compliance with the solvency and liquidity requirements, 
section 86(1) imposes personal liability on the directors who allowed the company 
to acquire its shares. These directors are jointly and severally liable to the 
company.1148 The extent of the liability is the amount of the unlawful payment 
which has not been otherwise recovered by the company. The court may grant 
relief to a director under section 248.1149 
Section 86(6) extends the concept of 'director' for purposes of section 86 and 
section 89 to include directors of a holding company. The reference to section 89 
seems to indicate that the directors of a holding company will only be liable if the 
subsidiary is acquiring shares in the holding company, that is, where section 86 is 
applied in conjunction with section 89. However, the language is not clear and it 
could perhaps be argued that the directors of a holding company will also be liable 
if the subsidiary acquires its own shares. However, in such a case section 89 is 
not involved. It may have been preferable for section 86(6) to have referred to ‛this 
section read with section 89’.   
6.4.1.1 Basis of liability 
The solvency and liquidity test does not depend on the subjective belief of the 
director or directors as to the solvency and liquidity of the company. Because 
_________________________________________________________________  
1146 See Dovey v Cory [1901] AC 477 HL. See also Van Dorsten Dividends 122 – 123; Blackman, 
Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-131 – 5-133. 
1147 See paragraph 6.4.1 below. 
1148 Section 86(1). 
1149 The court may do so if it has been established that the director acted honestly and reasonably 
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section 85(4) works with the existence or not of reasonable grounds, this same 
objective standard will trigger the liability provisions. However, liability is imposed 
on directors who, ‛contrary to the provisions of section 85(4), allow the company to 
acquire any share issued by it’,1150 
A first issue that arises is when the company can be said to have ‛acquired’ 
its shares contrary to section 85(4). Although section 86(6) starts out by referring 
to allowing the ‛acquisition’ of shares, it is clear from the rest of this subsection that 
it is not the acquisition of shares as such that is relevant, but only the payment of 
an amount in contravention of section 85(4). The use of the word ‛acquire’ can be 
problematic because payment and acquisition need not take place 
simultaneously.1151 Section 86(4) specifies the time period within which an action 
may be instituted as within three years of the date of ‛completion of the 
transaction’. It thus appears that although the making of payment triggers liability, 
the time limit is calculated from the date when both payment and acquisition have 
taken place. 
Secondly, the meaning of ‛allow’ needs to be considered. The authors of 
Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act explain that since the company is 
the entity which makes the unlawful payment, and not the directors, some or other 
action of directors relating to the payment needs to be targeted.1152 In this sense, 
‛allow’ has a wider meaning than, for example ‛authorise’ or ‛sanction’. The word 
would also cover instances where a director fails to prevent an unlawful payment, 
for example when she knows that payment is due and does not supervise the 
officers who have to decide whether payment can lawfully be made or not. 
However, if the director was unaware of the payment or could not have prevented 
the company from making payment, she cannot be said to have allowed 
payment.1153 It can thus be concluded that the director must at least have been 
aware of the payment.  
Cassim criticises the liability provision as unreasonably strict and argues that 
_________________________________________________________________  
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and ought fairly to be excused. 
1150 Section 86(1). 
1151 See also paragraph 6.1.1 above where the meaning of this word is discussed in the context of 
section 85(1). 
1152 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-75. 
1153 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-75. 
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liability should depend on whether or not the director consented to or voted in 
favour of the resolution authorising the acquisition.1154 Cassim does not attempt to 
explain the possible meaning of ‛allow’,1155 but assumes that liability could be 
imposed on a director who was absent from the board meeting which resolved to 
purchase shares.1156  
Apart from the fact that Cassim seems to underestimate the importance of 
the word ‛allow’, certain aspects of his criticism call for comment: 
It would seem that directors will be overprotected if they are liable only for the 
positive act of consenting to or voting in favour of a resolution and not also for their 
failure to prevent unlawful payments. 
It is not clear which board resolution to repurchase shares Cassim has in 
mind. One can assume that a board will resolve to propose the adoption by the 
general meeting of a special resolution containing a specific or general approval. If 
a general approval is obtained, the board will have to adopt a further resolution to 
exercise the power given to it in terms of the general approval.1157 Lastly, although 
this is probably not really a resolution ‛authorising’ the ‛purchase’ of shares, there 
may be a board resolution authorising the making of a payment. It is conceivable 
that payment will often be made without a further board resolution. It appears that 
Cassim has in mind one or both of the first two resolutions, but not specifically a 
resolution to make payment. 
In view of the timing aspect inherent in section 85(4), the solvency and 
liquidity tests have to be satisfied when payment is made.1158 The solution 
suggested by Cassim, along the lines of the Canadian provisions,1159 is not 
_________________________________________________________________  
1154  Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 770 – 771. 
1155  In fact, he does not refer to the word ‛allow’ at all, see Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 770 
where it is stated that s 86(1) ‛imposes on the “directors” of a company who acquire shares in 
breach of the provisions of s 85(4) joint and several liability to restore to the company’. 
1156  Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 771. 
1157 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-79 explain that directors will always have 
the discretion whether or not to implement a repurchase, even in the case of a specific 
approval. 
1158  See paragraph 4.2 above. Cassim argues that the financial restrictions have to be satisfied 
both at the time the resolution is adopted and at the time of payment, see Cassim “New 
Statutory Provisions” 768. His suggestion on director liability nevertheless does not leave 
scope for the imposition of liability on directors who authorise a resolution at a time when the 
financial restrictions are satisfied and then subsequently allow payment when it is clear that 
the restrictions are no longer satisfied.  
1159 See Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 770 – 771. 
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suitable for South Africa. In South Africa it should be irrelevant whether a director 
voted for or against any earlier board resolution to repurchase shares at a stage 
when the company’s financial situation may well have been different. Regardless 
of the director’s opinion on the desirability or not of a repurchase, she has a duty 
to prevent the making of payment in contravention of section 85(4). Even if 
Cassim’s argument were to be interpreted as referring to a resolution to make 
payment it may not solve the problem, because some time may lapse between 
such a resolution and the eventual payment. I think it is more sensible to consider 
the position of each director at the actual time of payment and ask whether the 
director allowed unlawful payment to be made.  
A third issue is whether or not the director should have been aware of the 
fact that the provisions of section 85(4) were contravened, or only that payment 
was made. Clearly, the lawfulness of a payment depends on purely objective 
standards.1160 However, the word ‛allow’ implies some state of mind or awareness 
on the part of the directors. The wording of section 86(1) seems to imply that the 
director’s knowledge of the violation is irrelevant. The words ‛contrary to the 
provisions of section 85(4)’ appear in parenthesis between ‛The directors of a 
company who’ and the word ‛allow’. If the provision had imposed liability on 
‛directors who allow payment contrary to the provisions of...’, it may have indicated 
that the directors should (knowingly) have allowed unlawful payment. The authors 
of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act also state that the director 
need only have been aware of the fact that payment was made for an acquisition 
of shares.1161 
Section 86 must be considered in conjunction with section 248 which 
provides for the granting of relief to directors who acted honestly and 
reasonably.1162 The court will grant relief if it thinks that the director ought fairly to 
be excused. Although the financial restrictions impose an objective test, and 
liability does not in the first place depend on the director’s knowledge of the 
unlawfulness of the payment, the director’s subjective belief and standard of care 
displayed will be relevant for purposes of section 248.   
_________________________________________________________________  
1160  See paragraph 4.1.1 above.  
1161  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-76. 
1162  Section 86(1) expressly refers to section 248. 
 457
6.4.1.2 Extent of liability 
The second main issue regarding the liability of directors is the extent of the 
liability. The directors are jointly and severally liable with each other for the amount 
of the unlawful payment that has not been recovered by the company. The 
company could have recovered money from the shareholder or former shareholder 
or from other directors. It is to be noted that the liability of a shareholder who 
received payment is not jointly with the directors. 
It is not clear whether liability will arise in respect of the full payment or only 
the extent to which the payment renders the company insolvent or unable to pay 
its debts. Neither section 85(4) nor section 86 expressly provide for an 
apportionment.  
6.4.1.3 Right of recourse 
It is clear that the extent of the director’s liability will depend on any amounts 
recovered by the company. Their liability is reduced only by amounts actually 
recovered by the company.1163 For this reason, directors are given the right under 
section 86(2) to apply to court for an order compelling a shareholder or former 
shareholder to restore to the company any unlawful payment she received. It is 
important to note that the provision refers to payment to the company and not to 
the director. Further, it is not a prerequisite that the director should actually have 
paid any amount to the company before she can bring the application to court. It 
thus seems that the application by the director can be regarded as a kind of 
derivative action brought on behalf of the company rather than an ordinary right of 
recourse.1164 Any amount recovered from the shareholder or former shareholder 
will obviously reduce the liability of the director, which serves as a strong incentive 
for the director to institute proceedings.1165  
The question arises whether a director admits her own liability by applying to 
court for an order against a shareholder or former shareholder. The right to apply 
is given to a director ‛who is liable under subsection (1)’.1166 The director would 
_________________________________________________________________  
1163  As Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-76 explain, it is not a defence that the 
company is able to recover payments from other parties. 
1164  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-74-1. 
1165 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-75. 
1166  Section 86(2). 
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thus have to allege that she is liable in order to establish her locus standi, which 
may be used by the company to the detriment of the director. Curiously, the 
shareholder would be able to argue that the director is not liable and thus does not 
have locus standi to bring the application. If the purpose of an application by a 
director is to facilitate recovery by the company from shareholders, obstacles in 
the way of recovery should be removed. However, the company has an 
independent right to recover unlawful payments from the shareholders,1167 so the 
board can cause the company to take the necessary steps for recovery without 
resorting to section 86(2). However, a director who is for some reason not liable 
under section 86(1) does not have the right in her own name to apply for an order 
against shareholders.  
The position of a director who has already paid the amount of the unlawful 
payment to the company requires further attention. A literal interpretation of 
section 86(2) would imply that such a director will not have locus standi to bring an 
application against the shareholder or former shareholder under section 86(2), 
because she will no longer be ‛liable under subsection (1)’. It is to be hoped that 
such an interpretation will be avoided because it will skew the balance in favour of 
the shareholder. If directors know that they will lose their right of recovery, they 
would have an added incentive to resist or postpone repaying an unlawful 
payment to the company. 
The effect of any recovery by the company subsequent to the director’s 
payment is also uncertain. The director would have paid the amount for which she 
was liable at the time of payment. It is not clear whether her liability can be 
reduced retrospectively. Once a director has paid the full amount of the unlawful 
distribution, the company may no longer have a claim against the shareholder or 
other directors. It would thus make sense to adjust the director’s liability whenever 
amounts are recovered by the company and to provide for a refund to the director. 
Alternatively a director who has made payment to the company should be allowed 
to obtain an order that the shareholder or former shareholder pay the amount to 
her directly. Section 86(2) gives the court the power to order a repayment by the 
shareholder to the company only. 
Despite the problems regarding recovery from shareholders, a director who 
_________________________________________________________________  
1167  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-74-1.  
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has restored the amount to the company will have an ordinary right of recourse 
against her co-directors who are also liable.1168 This right arises from the nature of 
joint liability. 
6.4.2 Liability of shareholders 
It was pointed out earlier1169 that shareholders will be liable to repay to the 
company the amount of unlawful distributions, including payments for the 
acquisition by the company of their shares. This liability arises because the 
payment is unlawful and thus void.1170 The good faith of the shareholder is not 
directly relevant. This is criticised by Cassim, who is in favour of specific statutory 
protection of shareholders who received a payment in good faith.1171 However, as 
the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act point out, 
protection of the good faith of the shareholder would result in the shareholder 
being preferred to the company’s creditors.1172 
Even if the English common-law position were to apply in South Africa so that 
shareholders would be liable in respect of unlawful dividends only if they knew that 
it was paid out of capital,1173 it is unlikely that this would assist vendor-
shareholders because a repurchase is in essence paid out of capital. 
Section 86(2) enables directors to apply to court for an order against a 
vendor-shareholder, and section 86(3) affords creditors and shareholders the right 
to bring a similar application against the shareholder or former shareholder. In 
each instance the court can order the shareholder to make payment to the 
company. These rights of action do not detract from the right of the company itself 
to enforce repayment by shareholders.1174 According to the authors of Blackman, 
Jooste & Everingham Companies Act it would have absurd consequences if only 
directors, creditors or other shareholders could enforce repayment by the vendor-
_________________________________________________________________  
1168  See Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 770. 
1169 See paragraph 6.4 above. 
1170 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-84. 
1171  See Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 771 – 772. 
1172  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-77. 
1173 See Blackman et al 5-129; Lucas v Fitzgerald (1903) 20 TLR 16. See also Chapter 2 paragraph 
5.6 especially notes 318 and 319. See also paragraph 5.6 above on differences between 
English and South African law in this regard.  
1174 See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-74 – 5-75. 
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shareholder, but not the company.1175 
The proceedings under section 86(2) or (3) have to be instituted within three 
years of the date of completion of the acquisition.1176 The ‛date of completion of 
the acquisition’ may be later than the date of payment, but it is uncertain exactly 
when an acquisition will be completed.  
As will emerge from the discussion below, there appear to be some 
differences in the liability of shareholders depending on whether it is the company 
itself, a director, or a creditor or other shareholder who is taking action. 
6.4.2.1 Application by director 
A director who is liable under section 86 may, under section 86(2), apply to court 
for an order compelling a shareholder or former shareholder to refund the unlawful 
payment to the company. Although the director will reduce her own liability by any 
amount recovered from the shareholder, the action appears to be in the nature of 
a derivative action, because the payment will be made to the company.1177 Several 
aspects of this provision seem to be unsatisfactory. 
Section 86(2) speaks only of the repayment of ‛money’ that was paid to the 
shareholder. This is unfortunate as the implication seems to be that other forms of 
consideration cannot be recovered by a director. This conclusion is reinforced by 
the fact that section 86(3)(a) expressly allows creditors and other shareholders to 
obtain an order for the repayment of money or the return of other consideration 
given.1178 
It has been argued that section 86(2) does not give the court the discretion to 
take into account whether or not the shareholder acted in good faith, because, 
unlike section 86(3), it does not expressly state that the court may make an order 
‛if it finds it equitable to do so’.1179 Unless it is also argued that the court does not 
have the power to refuse such an application, which is clearly absurd, this 
deduction cannot be supported. However, it is unfortunate that these two 
subsections that both deal with recovery from shareholders have been formulated 
_________________________________________________________________  
1175  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-74 – 5-75. 
1176 Section 86(4). 
1177 See also the discussion of the right of recourse in paragraph 6.4.1.3 above. 
1178 See paragraph 6.4.2.2 below. 
1179 Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 771 – 772. 
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in such different ways. 
Section 86(2) does not set out which other orders the court may make. It 
merely states that the director can apply for an order that the shareholder repay 
money to the company. No provision is made for other orders, such as an order 
that the company reissue shares to the vendor-shareholder or any other order that 
the court deems fit. It seems that the court should also be given the power under 
this subsection to order the company to issue an equivalent number of shares to 
the shareholder.1180 
6.4.2.2 Application by creditor or shareholder 
A creditor (who was a creditor at the time of the acquisition or whose cause of debt 
arose before the acquisition) or any shareholder (including shareholders who 
acquired their shares after the acquisition) may apply to court for an order against 
a shareholder or former shareholder who sold shares to the company and 
received payment in contravention of section 85(4).1181  
The court may, if it finds it equitable, order that the shareholder or former 
shareholder return to the company the money or other consideration received for 
the acquisition of the shares. It may also order the company to issue to the 
shareholder or former shareholder an equivalent number of shares. Although it 
may seem unfair to order return of the consideration without a reissue of shares, 
this is not necessarily the case. In a proportionate repurchase, for example, or 
where the company has only one shareholder, there will have been no change in 
the relative equity interests involved so it makes no difference whether shares are 
reissued or not. 
The court is expressly given the power to make any other order as it thinks 
fit. It is not clear what other orders could be useful. Presumably the court could 
order partial restoration to the extent of the insolvency or illiquidity. It may also be 
possible to obtain an order that payment should be made directly to the creditor or 
shareholder, although a court would probably do so in exceptional circumstances 
only. The court may perhaps even order that the loan account of a shareholder be 
debited. 
_________________________________________________________________  
1180 See paragraph 6.4.2.2 below for a discussion of such an order. 
1181  Section 86(3). 
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If the court orders the return of the consideration, the question arises whether 
the underlying obligation will be extinguished or not. If it is merely the payment that 
is set aside, the agreement should still be intact so that the company can pay at a 
later stage when it can satisfy the financial restrictions. Such an order would have 
the same effect as the subordination that is provided for in section 88.1182 
However, other orders the court could make may include the setting aside of the 
agreement, which would have the effect of extinguishing the underlying obligation. 
6.5 Enforceability of contracts for the acquisition of own shares 
Section 88 expressly provides that a contract for the acquisition by a company of 
its own shares is enforceable against the company except if execution of the 
contract would result in a violation of the financial restrictions set out in section 
85(4).1183 The vendor-shareholder is thus a creditor of the company. In order to 
avoid an order for specific performance against it the company will have to prove 
that payment would compromise either its solvency or its liquidity.1184 It is clear 
that it is the financial position of the company at the time when it is sought to 
enforce the contract that is relevant.1185 Due to the fact that section 88 merely 
cross-refers to section 85(4) it seems that the company has to prove only that 
there are ‛reasonable grounds for believing’ that it will not meet the solvency and 
liquidity criteria. It may have been preferable to require a higher degree of proof 
from the company in these circumstances.   
The shareholder-vendor will not be able to enforce the contract while the 
company does not meet the financial restrictions, but will remain entitled to 
payment as soon as the company is lawfully able to execute the contract.1186 The 
company’s inability to pay thus amounts to a kind of temporary impossibility of 
performance. 
_________________________________________________________________  
1182  See paragraph 6.5 below. 
1183  Section 88(1). Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-95 explain the history of this 
provision. Although it seems to have been based on the doctrine of consideration which does 
not apply in South African law, the provision offers a sensible solution. 
1184  Section 88(2). The company thus has to prove the existence of reasonable grounds for 
believing that (a) the company is, or would, after making the payment, be unable to pay its 
debts as they become due in the ordinary course of business; or (b) the consolidated assets of 
the company fairly valued would after the payment be less than the consolidated liabilities of 
the company. 
1185  Because the test must be satisfied when payment is made, see paragraph 4.2 above. 
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If the company is wound up before the vendor-shareholder has been paid in 
full, the claim in respect of consideration will be ranked in priority to the other 
shareholders of the class who have not sold their shares to the company.1187 This 
is a rather exceptional provision since it amounts to a statutory subordination of 
the claims of certain creditors (shareholder-vendors) to the claims of certain 
shareholders (those of classes preferent to the class of shares acquired by the 
company). While the interests of preference shareholders are not taken into 
account in the application of the financial restrictions,1188 they become relevant 
once the company has been wound up. It is also significant that the vendor-
shareholders enjoy priority over the remaining shareholders of their class. The 
motivation for this seems to be the existence of the contract between the company 
and the vendor-shareholder. This contract was authorised by the general meeting 
so that the remaining shareholders can be said to have agreed to this relative 
advantage.  
6.6 The status of repurchased shares 
Shares acquired under section 85 have to be cancelled as issued shares and 
restored to status of authorised shares ‛forthwith’.1189 It is not clear when shares 
will be regarded as having been ‛acquired’.1190 For purposes of this provision it will 
probably be as soon as the shares are no longer held by the seller. It does not 
seem necessary that all the obligations of the repurchase agreement should have 
been extinguished before the shares can be said to have been acquired. 
Acquisition can thus take place even though the company has not yet paid the 
consideration for the shares. It seems that the moment of transfer or acquisition 
can be determined contractually.  
Section 85(8) provides that the cancelled shares will remain authorised 
shares. There is thus no direct option of cancelling them completely, but the 
company can subsequently cancel its authorised but unissued shares in terms of 
section 75(1)(h). It is worth noting that section 98 does not expressly provide for 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
1186  Section 88(3). 
1187  Section 88(3). 
1188  See paragraph 4.1 above. 
1189  Section 85(8). 
1190  See paragraph 6.1.1 above. 
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the cancellation of redeemable preference shares upon redemption, but merely 
states that the redemption of shares will not be deemed to constitute a reduction of 
authorised share capital.1191 The effect of these two provisions seems to be 
similar. 
Section 85(8) prescribes the cancellation of shares acquired under section 85 
only. The peremptory cancellation of shares acquired by a company means that 
treasury shares are not allowed in South Africa. It has thus been suggested that 
treasury shares may indeed be possible if, for example, a company receives its 
own shares as a dividend in specie from its subsidiary.1192   
Shares held by a subsidiary in its holding company can for practical purposes 
be regarded as treasury shares.1193 South African companies with subsidiaries can 
thus indirectly hold treasury shares up to a limit of 10 per cent of issued shares.1194 
By allowing subsidiary companies to hold up to 10 per cent of the shares in the 
holding company, treasury shares are thus indirectly allowed. In keeping with the 
usual regulation of treasury shares, shares held by a subsidiary may not be 
voted.1195 However, the subsequent sale or transfer of such shares by a subsidiary 
is not regulated in the Companies Act. 
6.7 Acquisitions by a subsidiary 
The acquisition by a subsidiary of shares in its holding company can be described 
as an indirect acquisition of own shares by the holding company.1196  
It was previously not possible for subsidiaries to acquire shares in their 
holding companies. Prior to its amendment,1197 section 39(1) prohibited the 
allotment, issue or transfer of shares in a holding company to its subsidiary.1198 
_________________________________________________________________  
1191  Section 98(3). 
1192  Delport “Company Groups” 127. However, Delport explains that the residual common-law 
prohibition on a company acquiring its own shares should prevent such a situation from 
arising. Alternatively, he argues, the very nature of a share as a bundle of rights implies that a 
company cannot hold its own shares.  
1193  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-73; Bhana “Company Law Implications” 
245; JSE Limited Listings Requirements paragraph 5.75. 
1194  Section 89. The acquisition by a subsidiary of shares in its holding company is considered in 
more detail in paragraph 6.7 below.  
1195  Section 39. See paragraph 6.7 below. 
1196  See Bhana “Company Law Implications” 238. 
1197  By s 4 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999.  
1198  A subsidiary could, however, continue to hold shares it acquired in its holding company prior to 
Continued 
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6.7.1 ‛Acquisition’ by a subsidiary 
Section 89 empowers subsidiary companies to acquire shares in their holding 
company up to a maximum of ten per cent in the aggregate of the number of 
issued shares in the holding company. The ten per cent limit applies in respect of 
the total number of issued shares of the holding company that are acquired by all 
its subsidiaries, apparently regardless of the value of the shares in relation to the 
total share capital. It would have been more sophisticated to apply the restriction 
with respect to each class of shares.  
It is unfortunate that section 89 limits the number of shares that can be 
‛acquired’ rather than ‛held’ by subsidiaries. Strictly interpreted, once subsidiaries 
have acquired 10 per cent in accordance with section 89, no further acquisitions 
may be made even if the subsidiaries no longer hold all the shares so acquired. 
Further acquisitions would only be possible if the number of shares of the holding 
company is increased. This result could have been avoided if the number of 
shares that may be acquired depended on the balance of shares acquired under 
section 89 still held by the subsidiaries. The emphasis placed on ‛acquisition’ 
rather than ‛hold’ also means that there is no problem with subsidiaries continuing 
to hold shares acquired under section 89 if the total number of shares in the 
company is subsequently reduced so that the acquired shares exceeds the 10 per 
cent limit. 
Section 39(1) regulates the holding by subsidiaries of shares in their holding 
company that were acquired in accordance with section 89. The amendment of 
section 39 created a number of problems. Delport1199 as well as Wainer1200 point 
out that the ten per cent limit of section 89 and the restriction on voting provided 
for in section 39(1) apply only to shares acquired ‛in accordance with section 89’. 
Shares held by a subsidiary in its holding company that were acquired prior to it 
becoming a subsidiary are not covered by section 39. Such shares do not count 
towards the ten per cent limit and, more importantly, are no longer subject to the 
neutralising of voting rights provided for in the amended section 39(1). It must be 
noted that the exclusion of voting rights of the subsidiary is a rather 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
it becoming a subsidiary, s 39(3) prior to its amendment by s 4 of the Companies Amendment 
Act 37 of 1999. 
1199  Delport “Company Groups” 127 – 128. 
1200  Wainer “Problems and Doubts” 135 – 136. 
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unsophisticated provision to begin with, as it requires the ‛percentage’ of votes in 
the company to be reduced by the ‛number’ of shares acquired by the 
subsidiary.1201 
The extent to which the abolishing of the general prohibition on cross-
holdings has enabled subsidiaries to acquire shares in their holding company 
otherwise than in accordance with section 89, is uncertain. There is a view that 
any acquisition of shares by a subsidiary qualify as an acquisition for purposes of 
section 89 and is thus mutatis mutandis subject to sections 85 to 88.1202 This 
would include the issue of capitalisation shares, with the result that once the ten 
per cent limit has been reached, no further capitalisation shares may be issued to 
the subsidiary.1203 
The contrary view is that shares acquired through capitalisation issues or 
through dividends in specie from co-subsidiaries are not acquired in accordance 
with section 89 and thus not subject to the ten per cent limit, the voting exclusion 
and the provisions of sections 85 to 89.1204 
This confusion is undesirable. While the word ‛acquisition’ should clearly not 
be limited to repurchases, giving it a wide interpretation covering dividends in 
specie and capitalisation shares could cause problems regarding the application of 
certain of the other requirements for share acquisitions, particularly the 
authorisation requirement. It would mean that a company engaging in a 
capitalisation issue may need a special resolution merely because its subsidiary 
happens to hold a few shares in it. On the other hand, a wide interpretation will 
give more effect to the purpose behind the ten per cent limit. Recommendations 
for the improvement of this situation will thus be made.1205   
The difficulties surrounding the interpretation of sections 89 and 39 are well 
illustrated by the allotment and issue of shares to a subsidiary. It seems fair to 
assume that a subsidiary subscribing for shares in its holding company will indeed 
_________________________________________________________________  
1201  See Delport “Company Groups” 125. 
1202  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-98 – 5-99. 
1203  This situation is not as unlikely as it would seem: while the issue of capitalisation shares will 
preserve the proportionate interests of shares in a particular class, the 10% limit applies to the 
total number of shares in the holding company which may include shares in classes not 
receiving a capitalisation issue. 
1204  Delport “Company Groups” 127 – 128. 
1205  See paragraph 6.10.7 below. 
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‛acquire’ the shares allotted and issued to it.1206 It would also make sense to treat 
such acquisitions in the same way as purchases by the subsidiary. It is more 
difficult to apply this reasoning to the issue of capitalisation shares to the 
subsidiary, which was expressly allowed as an exception to the general prohibition 
prior to its repeal in 1999.1207 The subsidiary will not be making any payment and 
the application of sections 85 to 88 to this situation does not make sense. Yet, the 
term ‛acquire’ in section 89 does not seem to support a distinction between 
purchases, subscriptions and capitalisation issues.  
On the other hand, it could be argued that, because section 85 refers to the 
approval of the acquisition of shares ‛issued’ by the company, an approval to allot 
and issue shares to a subsidiary does not amount to the approval of an acquisition 
of issued shares, because the shares are not yet in issue when the approval is 
purportedly given. This would mean that neither an issue following subscription by 
the subsidiary nor a capitalisation issue would be regarded as acquisitions for 
purposes of section 89. However, section 89 does not repeat the reference to 
‛issued’ shares. 
It is clear that either result is untenable. Legislative intervention is necessary 
in order to exclude the voting rights of any shares in its holding company that are 
held by a subsidiary. Clarity is also needed with regard to the proper application of 
the ten per cent limit and sections 85 to 88. There may also be a problem in 
recovering consideration from a holding company where its subsidiary acquired its 
shares through subscription. Since the holding company is not a former 
shareholder, the directors would not have recourse against it on the basis of 
section 86(2). 
Another complication is that section 39(2) exempts the holding of shares in 
its holding company by a subsidiary acting in a representative capacity or as a 
trustee from the voting restriction of section 39(1), but not from section 89, which 
prescribes that the acquisition must be done in accordance with section 85 to 88 
and which imposes a ten per cent limit to acquisitions by a subsidiary.1208  
_________________________________________________________________  
1206  The meaning of ‘acquire’ in s 85 is considered in paragraph 4.1.1 above. 
1207  Section 39(3)(b) as it read prior to its amendment by s 4 of Act 37 of 1999. 
1208  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-98 – 5-99. 
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6.7.2 Requirements 
The requirements and procedures for an acquisition under section 89 are mutatis 
mutandis the same as for the acquisition by a company of its own shares. Various 
uncertainties arise as to the exact application of sections 85 to 88 in the group 
context.   
Wainer explains that it is the authorisations, liabilities and procedural aspects 
of sections 85 to 88 that apply to acquisitions in terms of section 89.1209 It is clear 
that subsections (5), (6) and (8) of section 85, providing for  the adjustment of 
share capital accounts and the cancellation of shares would not apply to the 
acquisition of shares in a holding company by a subsidiary as the subsidiary will 
be holding those shares as contemplated in section 39.1210   
There seems to be general agreement that section 85(1) to (3), which deals 
with the authorisation of an acquisition of shares, and section 85(4), which 
contains the financial restrictions, apply when a subsidiary acquires shares in its 
holding company.1211 However, there is considerably less certainty as to whether 
the holding company, the subsidiary or both companies should comply with these 
requirements.1212 
I have previously suggested that it is the articles of association of the 
subsidiary that should authorise it to acquire shares in its holding company and 
that the special resolution should be taken by the members of the subsidiary.1213 
Since the subsidiary will be making payment for shares it acquires, it has been 
said that the financial restrictions should be applied with reference to the 
subsidiary.1214 If the financial restrictions of section 85(4) should indeed be applied 
to the subsidiary it will be a strong indication that the other requirements should 
also be satisfied by the subsidiary and not by the holding company.  
An argument could however also be made out that the authorisation should 
emanate from the holding company. Such an argument can be based on the 
differences in the wording of sections 85 and 89: section 85 does not provide that 
_________________________________________________________________  
1209  Wainer “Problems and Doubts” 138. 
1210  See Van der Linde “A Company’s Purchase of its Own Shares” 71; Loubser “Recent 
Developments” 9 – 10; Wainer “Problems and Doubts” 138. 
1211  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-100; Wainer “Problems and Doubts” 138. 
1212  See Meskin Henochsberg on the Companies Act 186(2). 
1213 Van der Linde “A Company’s Purchase of its Own Shares” 71 
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a company may acquire its own shares, but provides that a company can 
‛approve’ the acquisition of its shares (by itself); section 89 does not state that a 
subsidiary can approve the acquisition of shares in its holding company, but that a 
subsidiary can ‛acquire’ shares in its holding company. It could thus be said that 
the approval by the (holding) company is the common feature of these two 
sections dealing respectively with acquisitions by the company and by a 
subsidiary. Alternatively, it could even be argued that the approval requirement 
does not apply at all when a subsidiary acquires shares in its holding company.  
Delport does not deal with the question whether it is the holding company or 
the subsidiary that has to authorise the acquisition.1215 However, he does indicate 
that it is a subsidiary that will have to comply with the solvency and liquidity test if it 
acquired shares in its holding company.1216  
The JSE Listing Rules requires a special resolution by the holding company 
as well as the subsidiary.1217 These rules also require the directors to state that the 
‛company and the group’ will satisfy the prescribed financial restrictions.1218 
Bhana states that recognition of the separate existence of the holding 
company and subsidiary company warrants that the authorisation should emanate 
from the subsidiary acquiring shares in its holding company.1219 Where the 
subsidiary also has shareholders other than the holding company, this would result 
in some protection for these minority shareholders. However, she correctly points 
out that factually as opposed to legally, an acquisition by a subsidiary is nothing 
more than in indirect acquisition by the holding company.1220 It has the same effect 
on the shareholders of the holding company that an acquisition of own shares 
would have.1221 For this reason she is in favour of requiring authorisation by both 
the subsidiary and the holding company. The same reasoning is applied to 
_________________________________________________________________  
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1214  Van der Linde “A Company’s Purchase of its Own Shares” 71. 
1215  See Delport “Company Groups” 123 – 124. Delport does, however, criticise the requirement 
that a wholly owned subsidiary, or for that matter and company with a single shareholder, has 
to pass a special resolution when it intends acquiring its own shares. 
1216  Delport “Company Groups” 123. Delport argues that it is only when a holding company is 
acquiring shares in itself that the consolidated financial position of the group has to be taken 
into account. 
1217  JSE Limited Listings Requirements par 5.76. 
1218  JSE Limited Listings Requirements pars 5.69(c) and 11.26(d). 
1219  Bhana “Company Law Implications” 238. 
1220  Bhana “Company Law Implications” 238. 
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compliance with the financial restrictions, but without a consideration of the effect 
of the acquisition on the creditors of the holding company.1222  
Although an acquisition by a subsidiary will not lead to adjustments of the 
share capital accounts, it is not clear whether section 85(7), which permits the 
application of reserves to cover a premium payable on acquisition, could or should 
apply to an acquisition by a subsidiary. The authors of Blackman, Jooste & 
Everingham Companies Act conclude that this provision is not applicable,1223 but 
they classify it together with section 85(5) and (6) as a provision ‛requiring the 
reduction of capital accounts’. However, section 85(7) does not require the 
adjustment of accounts, it merely authorises the application of reserve accounts. 
Obviously there is no causal link between a premium payable for shares in a 
holding company and the statutory non-distributable reserves of the subsidiary and 
logically a subsidiary should not be allowed to reduce its reserves in this way.1224 
According to the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 
section 85(9), which prohibits an acquisition that would leave no shares other than 
convertible or redeemable shares in issue, does not apply to the section 89 
situation in view of the 10 per cent limitation.1225 However, since the 10 per cent is 
determined not per class, but in relation to the total number of shares, it is 
theoretically possible that a subsidiary can acquire all the shares other than 
convertible or redeemable shares in its holding company.1226 It is submitted that a 
better reason is the fact that shares acquired by the subsidiary will remain in issue. 
The application mutatis mutandis of section 85(9) to an acquisition by the 
subsidiary does not compel one to regard the shares acquired and held by the 
subsidiary as if they are no longer in existence. 
6.7.3 Liability for unlawful purchases 
Section 86(6) gives an indication of the application of the liability provision to the 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
1221  Bhana “Company Law Implications” 243 – 244. 
1222  Bhana “Company Law Implications” 239. 
1223  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-100. 
1224  See also the discussion in paragraph 6.3.3 above. 
1225  Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-101. 
1226  Although unlikely, this is possible if 90% or more of the total number of shares are convertible 
or redeemable. 
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directors of the holding and subsidiary companies.1227 The shareholder liability 
provision also seems easily adapted to the section 89 situation. The creditors of 
the subsidiary, or any shareholder of the subsidiary, could invoke the provisions of 
section 86(3). The vendor-shareholder will be liable to restore the consideration 
received to the subsidiary. Instead of ordering the company to issue shares to the 
vendor, it would appear that the court would have to order the subsidiary to 
transfer the shares back to the vendor. 
However, if it is accepted for the sake of argument that the financial 
restrictions must also be met by the holding company, the question arises whether 
the shareholders and creditors of the holding company will also be entitled to 
institute proceedings for the recovery of unlawful payments from the shareholder. 
If it can be argued that the interests of the shareholders and creditors of the 
holding company required its solvency and liquidity to be considered in the first 
place, it must follow that they should have a right to proceed against the vendor-
shareholders. However, restitution should still be made to the subsidiary that paid 
the consideration. It is suggested that this problem provides further support for a 
conclusion that it is the financial position of the subsidiary only that is relevant for 
purposes of section 89 read with section 85(4).1228  
If new shares allotted and issued to the subsidiary can be regarded as 
shares acquired under section 89,1229 it does not seem possible to recover the 
consideration paid by the subsidiary by relying on section 86, since the holding 
company does not qualify as a shareholder or former shareholder. If the intention 
is that subsidiaries should be able to subscribe for shares in their holding company 
subject to compliance with the solvency and liquidity tests, this aspect should also 
be addressed in the liability provision. 
6.7.4 Procedure 
The procedure for acquisition would depend on the kind of approval in the 
subsidiary. In appropriate cases the subsidiary will have to make a pro rata offer to 
the shareholders of the holding company.1230 
_________________________________________________________________  
1227  Also see paragraph 6.4.1 above. 
1228  See paragraph 6.10.7 below. 
1229  See paragraph 6.7.1 above. 
1230  See paragraph 6.3.2 above on the different procedures for listed and unlisted shares. 
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6.7.5 Enforceability 
The application of section 88 to acquisitions by a subsidiary means that the 
subsidiary cannot be compelled to perform if payment would violate the financial 
restrictions. Should the subsidiary be wound up, the implication of section 88(3) 
seems to be that the vendor-shareholders will rank after the creditors of the 
subsidiary. There is no room for taking into account the priority rights of preference 
shareholders in the holding company or the claims of any other shareholders of 
the holding company. 
6.8 The redemption of shares  
The Companies Act contains separate provisions for the redemption of 
redeemable preference shares. Although redemption and repurchase will have the 
same effect on the capital accounts of a company,1231 the procedure and financial 
restrictions for the two options differ in important respects. This divergence can be 
explained by the historical development of the two procedures. It has been 
possible since 1939 for companies to redeem preference shares.1232 It is 
submitted that a company may also repurchase its redeemable shares in 
accordance with section 85 rather than redeem them. It would have to comply with 
all the requirements for share repurchases, including authorisation by special 
resolution.1233 Clearly, the price at which the shares are redeemable and the price 
paid on repurchase would have to be compared and the time difference between 
repurchase and redemption taken into consideration by the directors in exercising 
their duty to act in the best interest of the company.  
An interesting question is whether a company should be expressly prohibited 
from purchasing their shares at more than the current redemption price, as is the 
case in Delaware.1234 Although shareholders of South African companies are 
protected by the fact that they have to authorise repurchases by special resolution, 
while the authorisation of shareholders is not required in Delaware, a similar 
_________________________________________________________________  
1231  See paragraph 4 above. 
1232  See De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 572; Blackman, Jooste & Everingham 
Companies Act 5-270. Redemption of redeemable preference shares was made possible by s 
21 of the Companies Amendment Act 23 of 1939 which introduced s 43 into the 1926 
Companies Act. 
1233  See paragraph 6.3.1.2 above regarding which shareholders may vote. 
1234 See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.6.2. 
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provision may be particularly useful in instances where directors are given a 
general approval to acquire shares.  
The advantage of redeemable shares is the flexibility introduced into the 
capital structure of the company. The requirements and consequences were 
developed against the background of the capital maintenance concept. Preference 
shares may be redeemable at the option of the company, or on a fixed date or at 
the option of the shareholder after a fixed date.1235 The reason why only 
preference shares could be made redeemable was to reduce the risk of abuse.1236   
The Act does not make provision for the status of a claim in respect of the 
redemption of a share. This is left to be determined according to general 
principles. As it is clearly stated that shares may be redeemed only out of the 
specific sources, it stands to reason that no claim for redemption can arise while 
the company does not have the required funds. However, once a valid obligation 
has arisen, the shareholder becomes a creditor and will be entitled to payment.1237 
Contrary to the position in the case of a repurchase, no provision is made for 
statutory subordination. This appears to be an anomaly because the redemption 
will have exactly the same effect on creditors as a repurchase. It is significant that 
in England, the enforceability and ranking of claims in respect of redemptions are 
regulated in the same way as for repurchases.1238  
The possibility of using the general share repurchase power to create what 
are in effect redeemable ordinary shares is alluded to elsewhere.1239 This would be 
done by way of a previously authorised conditional repurchase agreement. 
However, the financial restrictions for repurchases rather than the limitations of 
section 98 would apply when the shares are ‛redeemed’. There seems to be no 
reason why such arrangements should not be allowed. 
A company that redeems it's redeemable preference shares need not comply 
_________________________________________________________________  
1235  Section 98(1). See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-271. 
1236  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-270. These authors refer to The 
Purchase by a Company of its Own Shares, A Consultative Document (1980) Cmnd 7944 Part 
II par 4 where the risk of abuse of voting power is mentioned as the reason for this limitation. 
However, another very important reason is to protect the prior right of preference shareholders 
to the return of capital. 
1237  See Choice Holdings Ltd & Others v Yabeng Investment Holding Co Ltd 2001 (3) SA 1350 
(W).  
1238  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.5. 
1239  See paragraph 6.3.1 above. 
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with the solvency and liquidity test, as redemption is neither an acquisition in terms 
of section 85 nor a payment under section 90.1240 Instead, the redemption is 
subject to the financial restrictions imposed by section 98. The redemption may be 
made from two possible sources: out of the proceeds of a fresh issue of shares or 
out of distributable profits of the company.1241 
6.8.1 Redemptions out of profits 
The first source from which shares may be redeemed is ‛profits which would 
otherwise be available for dividends’. The interpretation of this concept is 
uncertain. As a result of the radical changes to the distribution rules brought about 
by section 14 of the Companies Amendment Act 37 of 1999 the concept ‛dividend’ 
may have acquired a new meaning. ‛Payments’, which include dividends, may be 
made from any funds of the company provided the solvency and liquidity test is 
satisfied.1242 Should profits available for dividend now be understood as any funds 
from which section 90 payments or dividends in the wide sense may be made? It 
is suggested that profits available for dividend remains a separate concept and 
that the common-law principles continue to apply in this regard. This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that the redemption of shares is expressly excluded from the 
ambit of section 90.1243  
Where the redemption is funded out of profits available for dividend, an 
amount equal to the nominal or par value or, in the case of no par value shares, 
the book value of the redeemed shares, must be transferred to a capital 
redemption reserve fund which will be subject to the provisions relating to share 
capital as if it were share capital of the company.1244 The book value of no par 
value shares is the part of the stated capital contributed by the preference shares 
redeemed or to be redeemed.1245 It is interesting to note that section 85(6), which 
provides for the adjustment of the stated capital account where no par value 
shares were acquired by the company, does not employ the concept of book 
_________________________________________________________________  
1240  Section 90(3) expressly excludes the redemption of shares under s 98 from the meaning of 
‛payment’. 
1241  Section 98(1)(a). 
1242  See paragraphs 5.1.2 and 5.2 above. 
1243  Section 90(3). Also see paragraph 6 below. 
1244  Section 98(1)(b). 
1245  Section 98(6). 
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value, but rather the average issue price.1246 The reason for this difference is not 
clear. The difficulties surrounding the application of the capital redemption reserve 
fund to provide for a premium on repurchase have been considered elsewhere.1247 
6.8.2 Redemption out of a fresh issue 
The second source from which a redemption may be funded is out of the proceeds 
of a fresh issue of shares, issued for purposes of the redemption.1248 The fresh 
issue of shares is seen to replace the share capital represented by the redeemed 
shares. It is expressly provided that the company need not increase its authorised 
share capital, but can issue fresh shares as if the shares about to be redeemed 
had never been issued.1249 In the case of par value preference shares the 
company may issue replacement shares up to the nominal amount of the shares 
about to be redeemed. When no par value shares are being redeemed, 
replacement shares up to the book value of the shares about to be redeemed may 
be issued. There thus seems to be no restriction on the number of no par value 
shares the company may issue for purposes of the redemption, as long as the 
total issue price will not exceed the book value of the redeemed shares. The share 
capital or the number of no par value shares will not be deemed to be increased 
for purposes of section 75(3).1250  
6.8.3 Redemption premiums 
Any premium payable on redemption must be paid out of the share premium 
account or out of distributable profits.1251 It has been argued that the whole of the 
proceeds of a fresh issue of shares, including any premium, may be used to pay 
the nominal value of the redeemed shares.1252 Although section 98(1)(a) refers 
plainly to the ‛proceeds’ of the fresh issue, this does not fit in well with the 
provisions governing the structure of the share capital. A premium on the fresh 
_________________________________________________________________  
1246  See paragraph 6.3.3 above. 
1247  See paragraph 6.3.4 above. 
1248  Section 98(1)(a). 
1249  Section 98(2). 
1250  See s 98(2). Section 75(3), which imposes a prescribed fee on increases in the authorised 
capital of a company is considered in paragraph 2.5.1 above.  
1251  Section 98(1)(c). 
1252  See Cilliers and Benade Corporate Law 230 and the example in note 66. 
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issue would have to be added to the share premium account and can thus in 
accordance with section 76(3) be applied to pay the premium on redemption, but 
not the nominal value of the redeemed shares. Similarly, the nominal value of the 
fresh issue of shares may not be used for the premium payable on the redeemable 
shares.1253 If the premium contributed by the newly issued shares is written off in 
respect of the nominal value of the redeemed shares, section 76(2) and (3) are not 
given effect.  
There is no general requirement in section 98 that the amount taken from the 
share premium account must in some way have related to the premium payable 
on the redemption. However, s 76(3)(c)(ii) requires such an allocation where 
ordinary shares have been converted into redeemable preference shares. Only 
that portion of the amount standing to the credit of the share premium account 
which arose on the original issue of such shares may be applied. In the case of 
redeemable preference shares issued after the commencement of the 1992 
Companies Amendment Act, a premium on redemption may only be paid out of 
the share premium account if it is payable according to the terms of issue of the 
shares concerned and such terms have been embodied in the articles since prior 
to the allotment of the shares (or later, with permission of the court).1254 
6.9 Acquisition of own shares under the Companies Bill 
The Companies Bill contains a comprehensive definition of ‛distribution’ that 
includes the transfer of money or property in consideration for the acquisition by a 
company of its own of shares.1255 As a distribution, a share repurchase is thus 
subject to all the requirements pertaining to distributions.1256 Clause 48 regulates 
the acquisition by a company of its own shares as well as the acquisition by 
subsidiaries of shares in their holding company. Although the giving of 
consideration for the acquisition of one company in a group of shares in any other 
company in the group is a distribution,1257 such acquisitions are not regulated in 
clause 48, except where a subsidiary  is acquiring shares in its holding company.  
_________________________________________________________________  
1253  Section 98(1)(a). 
1254  See s 76(3)(c)(i). 
1255  Clause 1 s v ‛distribution’, discussed in paragraph 4.3 above. 
1256  See paragraph 4.3.1 (financial restrictions) and paragraph 5.8.1 (authorisation) above. 
1257  See clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a)(iii)(bb), discussed in paragraph 4.3 above. 
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Although appraisal payments are not regarded as distributions, the company 
‛may’ nevertheless approach the court to vary its obligations if it can prove that its 
liquidity (but not its solvency) will be impaired.1258 Compliance with a court order 
for the acquisition of shares under the oppression remedy will be regarded as a 
distribution, although the company ‛must’ approach the court for relief if there is 
reason to believe that its solvency or liquidity will be impaired. I think that this 
disparate regulation of procedures with the same basic objective, namely to 
protect shareholders from being locked into a company, is difficult to justify and 
makes the law unnecessarily complex. 
6.9.1 Power to acquire own shares 
In addition to the requirements for a distribution which must be satisfied when a 
company transfers money or property as consideration for the acquisition of its 
shares,1259 the ‛decision’ that a company will acquire its own shares must satisfy 
the requirements of clause 46.1260 It is not clear how a mere decision can satisfy 
the requirements of clause 46, which are: 
• that the board should authorise the distribution 
• it should reasonably appear that the company will satisfy the solvency 
and liquidity test after completing the distribution 
• that the board should acknowledge its application of the solvency and 
liquidity test. 
 
A 'decision' will have no effect on the solvency and liquidity of a company,1261 and 
the requirements as to an acknowledgement (and especially a reconsideration of 
the solvency and liquidity test and a subsequent acknowledgement under the 120-
day rule) will usually follow rather than precede a ‛decision’ to acquire shares.  
It is also unclear whether a separate decision to acquire shares is envisaged 
or whether the ‛decision’ refers to the authorisation of the distribution by the board 
_________________________________________________________________  
1258  See clause 164(17). 
1259  See clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a)(iii)(aa). 
1260  Clause 48(2)(a). 
1261  The announcement of a decision to repurchase can influence the price of the company’s 
shares, but not the value of its assets and liabilities. 
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under clause 46.1262 The impression is created that, in contrast with any other 
resolution under clause 46 to make a distribution,1263 a repurchase resolution can 
be taken only if the company is solvent and liquid at the time of the resolution. The 
general scheme of the Companies Bill is to require satisfaction of the test when a 
payment or transfer is made in consideration for the acquisition of shares.1264  If 
the intention is to deviate from this general principle and require an additional 
consideration of solvency and liquidity,1265 this should be stated clearly. Further, if 
it is necessary to cross-refer to the requirements for distributions in general, this 
should not be set as a prerequisite for the ‛decision’ to acquire shares. It would be 
preferable for the ‛acquisition’ or 'payment' to satisfy the requirements of clause 
46. 
An acquisition of shares may not be made if, as a result of that acquisition, 
there will no longer be any shares of the company in issue other than shares held 
by one or more subsidiaries of the company1266 or convertible or redeemable 
shares.1267 This requirement seems superfluous for two reasons. First, in view of 
the limitation of ten per cent of each class that may be held by subsidiaries,1268 it is 
impossible that a company which indeed has shares other than convertible or 
redeemable shares could find itself in the position (as a result of an acquisition) 
where there are no other shareholders of its unconvertible or unredeemable 
shares.  Second, it is required that a company should always have at least one 
shareholder other than a company that is part of the same group.1269 If, as has 
been suggested above,1270 this provision was adjusted to require such a non-
group shareholder to hold at least one share other than a convertible or 
redeemable share, the partial duplication of the requirement could be avoided by a 
_________________________________________________________________  
1262  See clause 46(1)(a)(ii). 
1263  See paragraph 5.8.1 above. 
1264  Payment of consideration for shares is a distribution as envisaged in paragraph (a) of the 
definition. See paragraph 4.3.1.5 for a discussion of the timing rule applicable to such 
distributions. 
1265  It would be a step backward compared to the current position as confirmed in Capitex Bank 
Ltd v Qorus Holdings Ltd & Others 2003 (3) SA 302 (W), see paragraph 6.1 above. 
1266  Clause 48(3)(a). 
1267  Clause 48(3)(b). 
1268  Clause 48(2)(b)(i), see paragraph 6.9.6 below. 
1269  Clause 35(3)(b). 
1270  See paragraph 2.9.2 above. 
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suitable cross-reference.  
6.9.2 Authorisation and procedure 
The Companies Bill requires neither authorisation in the Memorandum of 
Incorporation nor a resolution of the general meeting.1271 It is not expressly stated 
that repurchases should comply with relevant terms and conditions of the 
company’s memorandum of incorporation,1272 but it can be accepted that 
repurchases in violation of the memorandum of incorporation will be open to attack 
by shareholders1273 and will expose the directors to liability for breach of their 
duties.1274  
The idea of dispensing with the requirements of authorisation in the 
memorandum and a special resolution by the general meeting seems to derive 
from the MBCA.1275 The total lack of regulation of the procedure that should be 
followed in a repurchase also corresponds with the approach under the MBCA.  
6.9.3 Liability for unlawful distributions and repurchases under the 
Companies Bill 
Although the Companies Bill regulates the liability for unlawful distributions in a 
coherent fashion, this will be discussed in the context of liability for unlawful 
repurchases in order to facilitate comparison with the more comprehensive 
provisions on liability for unlawful repurchases under the Act. The focus of the 
Companies Bill is on the liability of directors. The Act expressly provides for 
director liability in the case of unlawful repurchases but not for unlawful 
‛payments’. For this reason, the liability provisions of the Companies Bill are best 
addressed here.  
_________________________________________________________________  
1271  Compare clauses 44(2)(a) and 45(2)(a) which require express authorisation in the 
memorandum of incorporation for financial assistance for the acquisition of shares or to 
directors and others. 
1272  As is done in clauses 44(2)(b) and 45(2)(b) in relation to financial assistance. 
1273  See clause 15(6) which deals with the effect of the memorandum of incorporation. 
1274  The directors would be obliged to comply with such a requirement, see clause 76(3). Liability 
for non-compliance with the provisions of the memorandum of incorporation is imposed by 
clause 77(2)(b)(iii). However, clause 77(4) limits the liability of directors in respect of 
distributions to circumstances where the financial restrictions were not satisfied, see 
paragraph 6.9.3.1.2 below. 
1275  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
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6.9.3.1 Directors 
Clause 77 regulates the liability of directors and prescribed officers.1276 For 
purposes of this provision the term ‛director’ has a wider meaning that includes an 
alternate director, prescribed officer and a member of a board committee or audit 
committee, irrespective of whether the person is also a member of the company’s 
board.1277 However, when regard is had to the specific provisions on liability for 
distributions and repurchases, it seems that only a director in the narrow sense 
can be held liable because she must have participated in the board resolution 
authorising the distribution.1278 The director is liable jointly and severally with any 
other director who is liable for the same act.1279    
6.9.3.1.1 Requirements 
The first requirement for liability is that the director must either have been present 
at a meeting where the board approved the distribution or must otherwise have 
participated in the making of the decision.1280 The Companies Bill provides that 
board resolutions can be taken otherwise than at a meeting if adopted by a 
majority of the directors, either by written consent in person or by electronic 
communication, provided that all the directors received notice of the matter to be 
decided.1281 It appears that a director who has been notified of a matter to be 
decided otherwise than at a meeting will have participated in the making of a 
decision.  
It also appears from the cross-references in clause 46(6) and in clause 48(7) 
to ‛approval’ of a distribution or acquisition that liability depends on the director’s 
participation in the resolution authorising the distribution or approving the 
_________________________________________________________________  
1276  The liability of directors for distributions made contrary to clause 46 is regulated in clause 
46(6) read with clause 77(3)(e)(vi) while clause 48(7) read with clause 77(3)(e)(vii) deals with 
the liability in respect of an acquisition of shares contrary to clauses 46 and 48. 
1277  See clause 77(1).  
1278  See clause 46(1)(a)(ii). 
1279  It appears that only other directors can be held liable for the same act. This means that the 
director will not be jointly and severally liable with shareholders who received the distribution, 
since their liability does not depend on the same act. The directors will be liable only for the 
balance not recovered from shareholders, see clause 77(4)(b).  
1280 Clause 46(6)(a) and clause 77(3)(e) read with clause 74. The duplication of the basic 
requirement of presence at a meeting and failure to vote against the resolution in clause 46(6) 
and clause 77(3)(e) is unnecessary. 
1281  Clause 74. 
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acquisition that is envisaged, not the resolution acknowledging application of the 
solvency and liquidity test.1282 As a result, it seems that a director who did not 
participate in that resolution but who helped adopt a subsequent resolution in 
which the board acknowledged that it has applied the solvency and liquidity test, 
will escape liability. This is clearly undesirable.  
The second requirement is that the director must have failed to vote against 
the resolution despite knowing that the distribution is contrary to the provisions.1283  
The failure to vote against the resolution applies equally to a meeting and to a 
decision taken otherwise than at a meeting. A director who fails to note her dissent 
with a decision taken otherwise than at a meeting, will also be liable. 
In terms of the Companies Bill a person is regarded as ‛knowing’ something 
not only when she had actual knowledge of it, but also if she was in a position 
where she reasonably ought to have had actual knowledge, or to have 
investigated the matter to an extent that could have provided her with actual 
knowledge, or to have taken measures which, if taken, could reasonably be 
expected to have provided her with actual knowledge of the matter.1284  
In the case of liability for a distribution, the director should know that the 
distribution violates clause 46, while knowledge of the violation of either clause 46 
or clause 48 is required for liability in respect of an acquisition of shares. 
Two additional requirements are imposed for liability under clause 
77(3)(e)(vi), that is, liability for a distribution in violation of clause 46. The first of 
these additional requirements is that the company should not have satisfied the 
solvency and liquidity test immediately after ‛making all of the distribution’.1285 This 
requirement introduces an objective ex post facto solvency and liquidity test as a 
prerequisite for liability. It is an important limitation, since it makes little sense to 
hold directors liable based on an incorrect solvency and liquidity prediction if the 
company nevertheless happened to be solvent and liquid when the distribution 
was made. However, it also seems as if liability cannot be imposed in respect of 
partial implementation of a distribution in violation of the solvency and liquidity 
_________________________________________________________________  
1282  Even if the reference is rather to the acknowledgement resolution, it is clear that such a 
resolution also has to deal with the predicted financial situation upon completion of the whole 
distribution. 
1283  Clause 46(6)(b) and clause 47(7)(b) read with clause 77(3)(e). 
1284  Clause 1 s v ‘knowing, knowingly or knows’. 
1285  Clause 77(4)(a)(i). 
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requirements, since it is stated that there must be non-compliance with the test 
after making ‛all’ of the distribution contemplated in the resolution.  
The second additional requirement for liability under clause 77(3)(e)(vi) is 
that it must have been unreasonable at the time of the ‛decision’ to conclude that 
the company would satisfy the solvency and liquidity test after making the relevant 
distribution.1286 The reference to the ‛decision’ rather than to a ‛resolution’ is 
unclear, but the different words used may indicate that the reference is to the 
resolution acknowledging application of the solvency and liquidity test. This also 
makes sense in the context, because the directors are only required to consider 
the solvency and liquidity test when making that acknowledgement. The effect of 
this requirement is to temper the objective solvency and liquidity standard imposed 
by clause 46(6). Despite actual insolvency or illiquidity, the directors will thus 
nevertheless be excused if they acted reasonably when making the 
acknowledgement. Conversely, directors who acted unreasonably when making a 
declaration will escape liability if the company nevertheless happened to satisfy 
the requirements at the crucial moment. 
As a result of these two further requirements it is clear that although clause 
46(6) and clause 77(3)(e)(vi) refer to a distribution contrary to clause 46, it is only 
in respect of non-compliance with the financial restrictions that the director can 
incur liability under these provisions.  
It is immediately obvious that directors involved in an acquisition of shares in 
violation of the financial restrictions potentially face wider liability than directors 
who are being held liable on the basis of an unlawful distribution. Since payment in 
respect of an acquisition is also a distribution, this bias seems unjustified. 
Moreover, directors could potentially also be liable for loss or damage caused by 
non-compliance with any of the other non-financial requirements for share 
acquisitions. 
6.9.3.1.2 Extent of liability 
A director is liable for any loss, damages or costs sustained by the company as a 
direct or indirect consequence of the director’s conduct.1287 Clause 77(3)(e) 
_________________________________________________________________  
1286  Clause 77(4)(a)(ii). 
1287  Clause 77(3)(e) introductory words. 
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identifies a number of instances that can result in liability, including unlawful 
distributions1288 and unlawful acquisitions of shares.1289  
The discrepancy with regard to the requirements for liability for distributions 
and acquisitions respectively1290 is also evident in respect of the extent of liability. 
Clause 77(4) limits the liability that can be imposed under clause 77(3)(e)(vi) 
in respect of distributions violating clause 46 to the difference between the amount 
by which the value of the distribution exceeded the amount that could have been 
distributed without causing the company to fail to satisfy the solvency and liquidity 
test;1291 and the amount, if any, recovered by the company from persons to whom 
the distribution was made.1292 This limitation does not apply where clause 
77(3)(e)(vii) applies, even if the only problem with the acquisition was that the 
payment violated the financial restrictions.  
There is also uncertainty as to whether clause 77(8), which imposes liability 
on the director for the costs of all parties in the court proceeding to enforce liability 
and to restore to the company the amount improperly paid and not recoverable, 
also applies in instances where clause 77(4) limits the extent of the liability.  
6.9.3.2 Shareholder liability 
The provisions regarding director liability make mention of amounts recovered 
from shareholders who received distributions1293 or from whom shares were 
repurchased.1294 However, the Companies Bill makes no express provision for the 
liability of shareholders in respect of unlawful distributions or in respect of share 
acquisitions. This is a departure from the current position under section 90(4) and 
section 86(2) and (3).1295  
In the absence of specific statutory liability in respect of the receipt of 
distributions in violation of the requirements, an action for recovery must be based 
on common-law principles. It appears that invalidity would form the basis for 
_________________________________________________________________  
1288  Clause 77(3)(e)(vi). 
1289  Clause 77(3)(e)(vii). 
1290  See paragraph 6.9.3.1.1 above. 
1291  Clause 77(4)(b)(i). 
1292  Clause 77(4)(b)(ii). 
1293  Clause 77(4)(b)(ii).  
1294  Clause 48(6). 
1295  See paragraphs 5.6 and 6.4.2 above. 
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recovery of any distribution. Invalidity could arise due to non-compliance with any 
of the requirements, not only the solvency and liquidity test. It also appears that 
shareholders will be liable to restore the unlawful payment to the company 
regardless of whether they received it in good faith or with knowledge of the non-
compliance. 
6.9.4 Enforceability of repurchase agreements 
An agreement for the acquisition of shares is enforceable, subject to clause 48(2) 
and clause 48(3).1296 These clauses set out the power of a company to acquire 
shares subject to the ‛decision’ satisfying the requirement of clause 461297 and 
subject to shares other than convertible or redeemable shares remaining in issue 
to a shareholder other than its subsidiaries.1298  
On the assumption that clause 48(2)(a) succeeds in incorporating the 
requirements of clause 46,1299 it appears that non-compliance with any of the 
requirements for repurchases will render the contract unenforceable. This position 
is a departure from the current section 88(1) in which non-compliance with the 
solvency and liquidity test is the only basis for unenforceability.1300  
A contract whereby a subsidiary undertakes to acquire shares in its holding 
company will be unenforceable if the ten per cent limit will be exceeded or if the 
holding company will no longer meet the requirement as to shares that must 
remain in issue. However, since no attempt has been made to incorporate the 
requirements of clause 46, including the solvency and liquidity requirements into 
clause 48(2)(b), the acquisition appears enforceable regardless of the financial 
position of the subsidiary. 
A company that is unable to fulfil its obligations in terms of a repurchase 
agreement can approach the court for relief.1301 If it is just and equitable in view of 
the financial circumstances of the company the court may make an order ensuring 
that the person to whom the company is required to make a payment in terms of 
_________________________________________________________________  
1296  Clause 48(4). 
1297  Clause 48(2)(a). 
1298  Clause 48(3). 
1299  See paragraph 6.9.1 above. 
1300  See paragraph 6.5 above. 
1301  Clause 48(5)(a). 
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the agreement is paid at the earliest possible date compatible with the company 
satisfying its other financial obligations as they fall due and payable.1302 
Closer analysis of the order that the court may make reveals that its ultimate 
object must be to ensure payment without jeopardising the company’s ability to 
satisfy its other financial commitments. This clause is probably not wide enough to 
cover orders forcing the company to increase the number of shares of a particular 
class, to reduce the number of shares held by subsidiaries, to issue shares to a 
shareholder other than one of its subsidiaries, or to instruct the board to consider 
or reconsider the solvency and liquidity test and acknowledge its application of the 
test. Such orders may be necessary if the court has to rectify non-compliance with 
the non-financial requirements of repurchases. However, the provision does not 
refer to any circumstances other than ‛financial circumstances’ and ‛financial 
commitments’ that should be considered by the court. 
It would be preferable to state clearly that enforceability will depend solely on 
the company’s ability to satisfy the solvency and liquidity test. If the intention is 
indeed to make enforceability dependent on the company’s ability to satisfy any of 
the requirements for repurchases, the court should have more powers as to the 
order it can make.  
The company bears the burden of proving that fulfilment of its obligations will 
violate the relevant provisions.1303  
The ranking of claims in respect of unfulfilled repurchases when a company 
is liquidated is not regulated. It appears that such claims will rank concurrently with 
the claims of other creditors.1304  This is also different from the position under the 
current Act.  
If a company has acquired shares contrary to clauses 46 or 48, the company 
may apply to court to reverse the acquisition. The court may order return of the 
consideration and the reissuing of the shares.1305 The use of the conjunctive ‛and’ 
implies that the court may not order the one without the other.1306 
_________________________________________________________________  
1302  Clause 48(5)(c). 
1303  Clause 48(5)(b). 
1304  Compare paragraph 5.6 for a discussion of the current position under section 88. 
1305  Clause 48(6). 
1306  Compare paragraph 6.4.2.2 above. 
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6.9.5 Status of repurchased shares 
Shares reacquired by a company as contemplated in clause 48 have the status of 
shares that have been authorised but not issued.1307 
6.9.6 Acquisitions by subsidiaries 
Clause 48(2)(b) authorises a subsidiary to acquire shares in its holding company. 
Unlike clause 48(2)(a) which expressly makes the ‛decision’ by a company to 
acquire its own shares subject to compliance with the requirements of clause 
46,1308 clause 48(2)(b) does not cross-refer to the requirements of clause 46. 
Although the reasoning behind this apparent inconsistency is unclear, the 
omission of this requirement in relation to acquisitions by a subsidiary must be 
welcomed, in view of the difficulties I mentioned.1309 The requirements for 
distributions will obviously have to be satisfied when the subsidiary transfers the 
consideration for the shares. 
Two further principles apply to acquisitions by subsidiaries. First, subsidiaries 
may not together hold more than ten per cent of the number of any class of shares 
in their holding company.1310 Second, a subsidiary may not vote in respect of any 
shares it holds in its holding company.1311 These provisions are an improvement 
on the current situation because they apply to any shares held by a subsidiary and 
not only to shares acquired after the subsidiary became a subsidiary.1312 The 
limitation of the percentage of each class of shares rather than of the total number 
of shares in the company is also welcomed.1313 I will deal with the difficulties that 
remain below.1314  
6.9.7 The redemption or conversion of shares 
In terms of the Companies Bill, a company may have shares that are redeemable 
_________________________________________________________________  
1307  Clause 35(5)(a). 
1308  See clause 48(2)(a) and the discussion in paragraph 6.9.1 above. 
1309  See paragraph 6.9.1 above. 
1310  Clause 48(2)(b)(i). 
1311  Clause 48(2)(b)(ii). This principle is a consequence of rather than a prerequisite for 
acquisitions.  
1312  See paragraph 6.7 above. 
1313  See paragraph 6.7 above. 
1314  See paragraph 6.10.9 below for an evaluation. 
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or convertible at the option of the company, the shareholder or another person at 
any time, or upon the occurrence of any specified contingency.1315 The 
consideration may be cash, indebtedness, securities or other property.1316 The 
inclusion of securities1317 is necessary because the provision also applies to 
conversions.  
The price, amount or other consideration may be specified in the terms of 
issue of the shares, determined according to a formula or subject to any terms set 
out in the company’s memorandum of incorporation.1318 
Redemptions must also comply with the requirements for distributions set out 
in clause 46, as well as those for the acquisition of shares set out in clause 48. 
Conversions are not expressly regarded as distributions and need to comply 
only with the memorandum of incorporation.1319 This is unfortunate, as a 
conversion may affect the interests of creditors in the same way as a 
distribution.1320 However, it is possible to regard a conversion as a distribution in 
appropriate circumstances, for example, as a transfer ‛otherwise in respect of any 
of the shares of that company or of another company within the same group of 
companies’.1321 Alternatively, it could qualify as the ‛incurrence of a debt or other 
obligation by a company for the benefit of one or more holders of any of the shares 
of that company or of another company within the same group of companies’.1322 
In this instance, although a transfer of shares cannot amount to a distribution,1323 
the transfer of a debt security may be regarded as a distribution. 
6.10 Evaluation of repurchases  
The regulation of share repurchases poses definite challenges because share 
repurchases involve a distribution to shareholders as well as a reorganisation of 
_________________________________________________________________  
1315  Clause 37(4)(b)(i). 
1316  Clause 37(4)(b)(ii). 
1317  See the definition of ‘security’ in s 1 of the Securities Services Act 36 of 2004. The term 
includes debt instruments.  
1318  Clause 37(4)(b)(iii) – (iv). 
1319  See clause 37(4)(b). 
1320  This is why conversions are also regarded as distributions under s 6.03(b) of the MBCA, see 
Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.1. 
1321  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (a)(iv), see paragraph 7.1. 
1322  Clause 1 s v ‘distribution’ paragraph (b), see paragraph 7.1. 
1323  See the introductory sentence of the definition of ‘distribution’ in clause 1. 
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share capital. From the perspective of creditor protection repurchases require the 
same response as any other distribution. This also explains why the financial 
restrictions applicable to repurchases have been evaluated in relation to 
distributions in general.1324 However, shareholders are exposed to unequal 
treatment which can dilute the value of their shareholdings as well as the balance 
of power in the company. The focus of this section will thus be on measures 
safeguarding the interests of shareholders. Nonetheless, an evaluation of all the 
non-financial requirements applicable to share repurchases as well as the 
consequences of repurchases is necessary.  
6.10.1 Evaluation of power to acquire shares 
Section 85 (1) provides for the acquisition of shares by a company. The choice of 
the term ‛acquisition’ is unfortunate for three reasons. First, the company has to 
cancel the shares and thus does not really acquire them. Second, because the 
term has not been defined, it is not clear whether it will cover instances where 
shares are ‛acquired’ by the company for no consideration. Although the financial 
restrictions in section 85(4) apply only when payment is involved, the authorisation 
requirements of section 85(1) apply to any acquisition. However, there is no good 
reason to insist on authorisation in the articles and in a special resolution of the 
company where an ‛acquisition’ does not affect the funds of the company or the 
rights of other shareholders, for example when shares are donated to a company. 
Third, the term seems wide enough to include the redemption of shares, which is 
regulated separately but not expressly excluded. This could create the impression 
that the requirements of section 85 apply in addition to those of section 98. It is 
unlikely that this was intended, as the authorisation requirements of section 85(1) 
negate the essential characteristics of redeemable shares. Also, it makes little 
sense to impose the financial restrictions of section 85(4) in addition to those 
imposed on redemptions. 
I suggest that the term ‛acquisition’ should be defined and that the acquisition 
of shares for no consideration should be expressly excluded. The redemption of 
shares should not be subject to the authorisation requirements for repurchases. 
However, it is preferable that the same financial restrictions apply to redemptions 
_________________________________________________________________  
1324  See paragraph 4.4.1 above. 
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and repurchases.1325 
The Companies Bill uses the term ‛acquisition’ without providing a definition. 
By implication this includes shares acquired in compliance with a court order. But 
the Companies Bill also expressly excludes shares surrendered to the company 
under the proposed appraisal remedy, which appears anomalous. Although the 
Companies Bill will solve some of the uncertainty regarding the meaning of 
‛acquisition’, I submit that further attention should be given to the inclusion or 
exclusion of payments made under the appraisal remedy and court orders. An 
advantage of the Companies Bill is that the redemption of shares is also regarded 
as an acquisition, so that the same financial restrictions apply to repurchases and 
redemptions.  
The greatest difficulty with the proposals on share acquisitions under the 
Companies Bill relates to the group concept. The definition of ‛distribution’ includes 
payments or transfers to the shareholders of any other company in the same 
group and is evaluated elsewhere.1326 However, when dealing with share 
acquisitions in particular, clause 48 addresses the acquisition of shares by a 
subsidiary in its holding company but does not mention other acquisitions within a 
group. As a result, there is no limit on the extent of shareholding of a company in 
its co-subsidiary, because neither the ten per cent limit of clause 48(2) nor the 
requirement in clause 48(3) that shares other than convertible or redeemable 
shares or shares held by one or more subsidiaries must remain in issue, will apply 
to shares that co-subsidiaries hold in each other.1327 It appears that the drafters of 
the Bill have not fully considered the implications of the wider definition of 
distribution.1328 I submit that the acquisition of shares by a subsidiary in a co-
subsidiary (other than its own subsidiary) should also be regulated expressly if it is 
indeed the intention behind the wide definition of 'distribution'.1329  
_________________________________________________________________  
1325  Also see paragraph 6.10.8 below. 
1326  See paragraph 4.4 above. 
1327  See also paragraph 2.9.2 above where it was pointed out that the Companies Bill does not 
contain a general requirement on the minimum issued, as opposed to authorised, shares. 
1328  The draft Companies Bill of 2007 does not contain this extended definition of ‛distribution’, with 
the result that there has not been opportunity for public comments on the idea of a general 
group extension. 
1329  See paragraph 6.10.7 below. 
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6.10.2 Evaluation of financial restrictions 
I evaluate the financial restrictions applicable to distributions, including share 
acquisitions elsewhere.1330 I will focus here on the timing aspect in relation to 
share acquisitions. Although it is clear that the time of payment is decisive under 
the Act,1331 the Companies Bill introduces a measure of confusion by requiring that 
the ‛decision’ to acquire shares should satisfy the requirements of clause 46.1332 
This appears to be contrary to the general scheme of the Companies Bill which 
requires the financial restrictions be satisfied when a distribution, in this case the 
transfer of money or property, is made.  
In general, the requirements of solvency and liquidity are no doubt sensible 
restrictions on repurchases. But the comparative study revealed a rather 
interesting exception that merits consideration in South Africa. In California the net 
proceeds1333 of a life policy or of disability insurance payable to the corporation 
may be applied to repurchase or redeem the shares of a deceased or disabled 
shareholder in terms of a prior agreement.1334 This exception can play an 
important role in closely held private companies, in particular because the situation 
in such companies is recognised as one of the justifications of a share repurchase 
power. But if the company is unable to pay its debts, this exception will be to the 
disadvantage of the creditors who are generally entitled to be paid from all the 
company’s property, including the proceeds of a policy. I submit that an exception 
is warranted, but that only the excess over the total premiums paid should be 
available for the repurchase. In my view this solution adequately protects the 
creditors.1335 
6.10.3 Evaluation of procedure 
The Act provides minimum standards of protection to shareholders by requiring 
_________________________________________________________________  
1330  See paragraph 4.4.1 above. 
1331  See paragraph 6.2.1 above. 
1332 See paragraph 6.9.1.1. 
1333  That is, the excess over any premiums contributed by the corporation. 
1334  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2.5. 
1335  Provision could be made for the calculation of interest on premiums paid, so that the creditors 
will also be compensated for the time value of money. However, it should be remembered that 
premiums paid while the company was not experiencing any financial difficulties could hardly 
have been paid to the disadvantage of creditors. 
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authorisation in the articles and a special resolution approving an acquisition. 
It appears that the requirement of authorisation in the articles does not add 
much to the protection of shareholders, as the articles may also be altered by 
special resolution. The same shareholders who have the power to approve an 
acquisition will be able to approve the alteration of the articles. It may be difficult 
for a minority shareholder to prove that the inclusion of a repurchase power in the 
abstract is not in the best interest of the company. It is more likely that a 
shareholder will succeed in attacking a special resolution to approve a particular 
repurchase of shares as amounting to unfairly prejudicial conduct than would be 
the case with a special resolution to alter the articles and so grant the company 
the power to acquire its own shares. 
The special resolution approving a repurchase offers better protection since 
specific information about the proposed special resolution will have been disclosed 
to the shareholders.1336 However, in view of the absence of voting restrictions on 
shareholders who participate in selective repurchases, this protection is 
compromised.1337 The Act also prescribes the procedure to be followed for certain 
repurchases, but there are anomalies in the regulation of the procedure for the 
acquisition of unlisted shares.1338 When section 87(2) was enacted in 1999, it 
provided that an offering circular was not required ‛if, and to the extent that, the 
shares are acquired in terms of the special resolution passed in terms of section 
85(3)’. While section 85(3) does refer to a general approval, the special resolution 
authorising the repurchase is passed in terms of section 85(1). The only special 
resolution referred to in section 85(3) is a resolution which revokes a general 
approval.  
The position after 1999 appeared to be that an offering circular was not 
required where shares were acquired under a general approval. On the other 
hand, this was required for every acquisition under a specific approval, even for a 
specific approval of an acquisition from a particular shareholder. This did not make 
sense. After all, if the company passed a special resolution which specifically 
approved an acquisition from a single shareholder, the whole purpose of the 
resolution was defeated if the company nevertheless had to make offers to (and 
_________________________________________________________________  
1336  See s 199(1). 
1337  See paragraph 6.3.1.2 above. 
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acquire shares from) all the shareholders. In order to avoid the necessity of 
sending out an offering circular when a company wanted to acquire shares from a 
specific named shareholder, it had to resort to an acquisition under a general 
approval which left the directors free to also acquire further shares as they saw fit. 
After the amendment of December 3, 2001, section 87(2)(a) now states that 
an offering circular is not required where the approval is a specific approval. This 
means that it is required in the case of a general approval. Prior to the 
amendment, a general approval in an unlisted company would have afforded the 
directors a wide discretion, subject to the mandate given, to acquire shares from 
whomever wanted to sell without resorting to a pro rata offer. One context in which 
such a general power might have been very useful was in relation to employee 
shareholder schemes where the shares of employees who left the company could 
be repurchased by the company. 
However, because section 87 now obliges the company to send out an 
offering circular to all shareholders inviting them to offer their shares, the ambit of 
what can be achieved by way of a general approval has been narrowed down to 
pro rata acquisitions only. While the Companies Amendment Act 35 of 2001, 
which amended section 87(2)(a), may have solved some anomalies, it created 
fresh ones. 
Although the Act distinguishes between a specific and a general approval, it 
does not define either concept and gives no indication of when an approval will be 
general or specific. Would it be possible for the general meeting to manipulate the 
procedural requirements by simply declaring an approval to be either general or 
specific, regardless of its terms? Is it possible, for example, to pass a ‛specific’ 
approval for company A to acquire 600 class A shares at a price of Rx per share 
pro rata from all its shareholders who are willing to sell? If so, the section 87(2)(a) 
requirement of an offering circular will not apply and the company can presumably 
follow its own procedure to give effect to the resolution. Can a resolution 
authorising the company to, during the course of the financial year, acquire up to 
10 per cent of its shares at a price between Rx and Ry per share be either a 
general or a specific approval? This dilemma is not solved by interpreting the 
concepts general and specific according to their ordinary meaning, because the 
_________________________________________________________________  
Continued 
1338  See paragraph 6.3.2.1 above. 
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requirement of an offering circular substantially limits the ordinary meaning of a 
general approval. 
I suggest that this problem can be attributed to the legislature’s failure to 
distinguish between the three main types of repurchases which should each be 
regulated in an appropriate fashion. The three types of share repurchases1339 
commonly recognised in modern company law are: 
• self-tender or pro rata offers: the company offers to acquire shares 
from shareholders who are willing to sell - in order to treat shareholders 
fairly, such repurchases should be made as far as possible on a pro 
rata basis 
• selective repurchases: the company wishes to acquire shares from 
one or more identified shareholders who should, due to their interest in 
the matter, not be allowed to vote - full disclosure of the reasons for the 
repurchase and the price payable is required 
• general repurchases: the company is given a general power to 
acquire shares as and when they become available - this power is given 
for a fixed period and the volume of shares and the price ranges can be 
stipulated. 
The procedure prescribed by the JSE Limited in fact distinguishes between the 
three types of repurchases. As a result, a divergence has arisen between the 
types of repurchases that may be made by listed and unlisted companies and the 
basic rules that apply to each. On the one hand, unlisted companies do not enjoy 
the same flexibility under the Act as listed companies do in terms of the JSE 
Limited rules. On the other hand, the procedural safeguards of the Act can be 
avoided by unlisted companies while listed companies have to comply with a 
procedure designed for the specific type of repurchase. Section 87(2)(a) may need 
further attention to bring it into line with the more sophisticated rules of the JSE 
Limited. Procedurally the concepts of general and specific repurchases are almost 
exact opposites, depending on whether they involve unlisted or listed shares. The 
JSE Limited Listings Requirements also exclude the votes of shareholders whose 
shares are being acquired in a selective repurchase and so reduce the risk of 
_________________________________________________________________  
1339 Acquisitions in terms of court orders or minority buy-out rights excluded. 
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abuse.1340  
The Companies Act should distinguish between the different types of specific 
approval and regulate each in an appropriate way. Shareholders in unlisted 
companies are probably exposed to a greater risk of abuse through share 
repurchases than shareholders in listed companies, and so it is understandable 
that the current protection of shareholders in selective repurchases is regarded as 
insufficient.1341 
As regards general approvals, it should once again be possible, as was the 
case in the period between the 1999 and 2001 Companies Amendment Acts, for 
unlisted companies to give their directors a general mandate to repurchase shares 
without having to resort to an offering circular. It should be made clear that an 
offering circular will be required in the case of a self-tender offer only. 
The proposed deregulation of repurchases in the Companies Bill is 
regrettable. Neither authority in the memorandum nor shareholder approval by 
resolution is required. The risks associated with selective repurchases are not 
addressed. It appears easy for a company to exclude in its Memorandum of 
Incorporation the presumption of equality within a class embodied in clause 37(1). 
Moreover, the fair treatment of different classes of shares in a share repurchase is 
ignored, although very limited allowance is made for taking into account the 
liquidation preferences of shares.1342 While the appraisal remedy proposed in 
clause 164 will be available if the rights of a class of shares are materially affected 
by an alteration of the memorandum, an acquisition of shares will not involve such 
an alteration of the memorandum and will thus not entitle the shareholders to insist 
on appraisal of their shares. Also, since the directors decide on share 
repurchases, they may use repurchases to expropriate shareholders. 
I submit that the requirements of clauses 46 and 48 and the duties imposed 
on directors will not adequately protect shareholders against the risks inherent in 
repurchases, and in particular, coercive or selective repurchases. Shareholders’ 
only recourse will be to rely on the duties of director, to the extent that these duties 
_________________________________________________________________  
1340 See paragraph 6.3.2.2 above. 
1341  See Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 775; Cassim “Reform of Company Law and Capital 
Maintenance” 287 – 288. See also Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-45 – 5-
47 for a discussion of the risks attendant on repurchases. 
1342  See paragraph 4.3.1.4 above. 
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are preserved under the Companies Bill. In this regard, a director’s duty to 
exercise powers for a proper purpose is expressly mentioned in the Companies 
Bill.1343 Shareholders could possibly also use the minority oppression remedy.1344 
In view of the generally recognised risks associated with selective repurchases, I 
submit that shareholders should not have to rely on such remedies, the 
enforcement of which will necessarily have adverse cost implications. It would be 
preferable to protect shareholders through appropriate preventative measures.  
While the MBCA does not prescribe a procedure for fair treatment of 
shareholders in repurchases, other legislation such as the Federal Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934,1345 as well as established principles of state laws, does 
regulate this. Most state laws rely on the principle that directors should exercise 
their powers for a proper purpose.1346 Also, the existence of fiduciary duties owed 
by controlling shareholders to minority shareholders in closely held companies is 
well recognised and applied in the context of selective repurchases. Although 
South African law also recognises the proper purpose principle,1347 it may take 
time for the courts to develop its application in the context of repurchases. Further, 
the recognition of fiduciary duties of majority shareholders is in its infancy in South 
Africa and its possible effect on the appropriate procedure for repurchases must 
still be determined by the courts.  
I submit that the protective measures of the New Zealand Companies Act 
provide a better model for South Africa. In addition to express authorisation in the 
memorandum, the directors have to resolve that the repurchase is fair to the 
company as well as the remaining shareholders.1348 Disclosure of prescribed 
details to shareholders is essential where selective acquisitions are proposed and, 
unless the company’s constitution expressly provides for non-pro rata offers, the 
written consent of each shareholder is required.1349  
_________________________________________________________________  
1343  See clause 76(3)(a). 
1344  See clause 163. 
1345  15 USCA ss 78a et sec; see s 13(e) and Rule 13e-4. This applies to listed companies. 
1346  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.3. 
1347  This is confirmed in clause 76(3)(a). 
1348  See Chapter 3 paragraphs 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. 
1349  Chapter 3 paragraph 5.3.2. 
 496 
6.10.4 Evaluation of liability 
Although the company can hold shareholders liable to return the amount of an 
unlawful payment, either as consideration for the acquisition of shares or 
otherwise by reason of shareholding, the Act provides for the liability of directors in 
respect of payments for the acquisition of shares only. It is anomalous to hold 
directors liable in respect of repurchases but not in respect of other payments, 
particularly in view of the fact that liability for the former is imposed only for non-
compliance with the financial restrictions. 
From the perspective of creditor protection, there is no justification for a 
different approach to director liability for dividend-like payments and for unlawful 
share repurchase payments. If statutory liability were imposed on directors in 
respect of non-compliance with the shareholder protection measures, this would 
recognise the basic difference between repurchases and other distributions.  
Difficulties would remain even if section 86 were to apply to all distributions. 
Firstly, the position of a director who has paid the amount of the unlawful 
consideration to the company should be regulated. The extent of a director’s 
liability depends on recovery from shareholders and the contribution of co-
directors. It was argued that a director who already extinguished this liability to the 
company should have a direct right of recourse against shareholders. Such a 
director should also be refunded if the company subsequently recovers payment 
from a shareholder. Curiously, the current provisions appear to forbid this. It 
should be made clear that such a director does not lose the right to apply for and 
receive repayments by shareholders or former shareholders. 
Secondly, the court should be given more flexibility as to the kinds of orders it 
could make when a director, as opposed to a creditor or shareholder, applies for 
an order against the vendor-shareholder.1350 In particular the court should be given 
the power to order that the company issue shares to the shareholder or former 
shareholder, as is the case under section 86(3).1351 The court should also be 
entitled to make any other order it deems fit, including an order that the 
shareholder should make a payment directly to directors who have already 
restored an unlawful payment to the company. Thirdly, various discrepancies arise 
_________________________________________________________________  
1350 Compare section 86(3), discussed in paragraph 6.4.2.2 above, with section 96(2), discussed 
in paragraph 6.4.2.1 above. 
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from an analysis of section 86(2) when compared with section 86(3), although both 
provide for recovery from shareholders. There seems to be a difference between 
the orders a court can make on application of a director under section 86(2) and 
on application by a creditor or shareholder under section 86(3). It appears that 
when the application is brought by a director the court can only order the vendor-
shareholder to make payment to the company. Although it could be argued that 
the court has this power in any event,1352 the obvious differences in the wording of 
these two provisions are unsatisfactory. The express reference to particular types 
of orders in the one provision may possibly justify a conclusion that these types of 
orders cannot be made under a provision that fails to mention them yet mentions 
other orders.   
Shareholders who received an unlawful payment are liable to restore this 
amount to the company. There is no indication in the Act that bona fide vendors 
are excused, although the court is given a discretion to refuse an order under 
section 86(3). Cassim criticises the lack of an express provision exonerating a 
bona fide vendor, since the discretion of the court under section 86(3) leaves room 
for uncertainty.1353 However, the authors of Blackman, Jooste & Everingham 
Companies Act point out that a bona fide vendor would nevertheless have been 
preferred above the company’s creditors.1354  
I submit that the latter argument is convincing. It also accords with the South 
African common law, which relies on the principles of unjustified enrichment rather 
than on the notion of a constructive trustee. Although knowledge on the part of the 
recipient may influence the specific enrichment action that should be used, 
recovery from a bona fide recipient is possible, which is not the case under the 
constructive trustee doctrine.1355  
The practical application of the recovery provision will depend on the ability to 
identify the recipient. It can be problematic to enforce this liability in the case of 
share repurchases on a stock exchange.1356 However, the directors will remain 
_________________________________________________________________  
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1351 See paragraph 6.4.2.2 above. 
1352  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-76. 
1353  Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 771 – 772. 
1354 Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-77.  
1355  See paragraph 5.6 above. 
1356  See Van der Linde “A Company’s Purchase of its Own Shares” 69. The anonymity of market 
purchases may also complicate the application of tax consequences of repurchases. See 
Continued 
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liable for any deficit that is unrecoverable from vendors. 
It could be argued that if recovery from shareholders were to be limited to 
shareholders who knew of the unlawfulness of a payment, the liability of directors 
would be an adequate safeguard for creditors. However, in large companies, 
especially listed companies, such reliance may be unwarranted. While the 
chances of finding knowing shareholders are remote, acquisitions on stock 
exchanges will usually involve significant amounts of money which the directors 
may very well be unable to restore.  
The Companies Bill constitutes an improvement on the current Act because it 
expressly regulates the liability of directors for all distributions. Despite references 
to liability if a distribution is made contrary to the requirements of clause 46 as 
such,1357 directors can be liable only for non-compliance with the solvency and 
liquidity test.1358 Non-compliance with any of the other requirements will have to be 
determined according to the general liability principles of the Bill.1359 
As is the current position, creditors are not allowed to institute action against 
directors in respect of unlawful distributions. The liability of directors is towards the 
company only. However, in terms of the proposed statutory derivative action, 
creditors will be able to do so with the permission of the court.1360 Shareholders 
and co-directors will also be able to enforce the company’s right of recovery.   
A director who did not participate in the initial meeting or resolution 
authorising a distribution, or who voted against the resolution, is exempt from 
liability even if she was subsequently involved in an acknowledgement resolution 
that reached an unreasonable conclusion regarding the company’s solvency and 
liquidity. Similarly, no liability can be imposed under clause 77(3)(e)(vi) in respect 
of distributions in compliance with a court order or pursuant to an existing legal 
obligation. This may be an oversight and I submit that liability in respect of 
unreasonable acknowledgements should be regulated along similar lines. There is 
_________________________________________________________________  
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Cathro “Share Buy Backs” 86 – 88 for a discussion of the position in Australia where on-
market and off-market repurchases are taxed differently to ensure neutrality between all 
market purchases. Although in South Africa the company will be able to calculate its liability for 
STC, the vendor may still account for the receipt of the purchase price as if the sale was made 
to a third party.  
1357  See clause 46(4)(a) and clause 77(3)(e). 
1358  See clause 77(4). 
1359  See clauses 75 to 77.  
1360  See clause 165(2)(d). 
 499
a possibility that a director may nevertheless incur liability for breaching her duty of 
care and skill under a more general liability clause.1361  
The Companies Bill also provides expressly for director liability in respect of 
share acquisitions.1362 Clause 77(3)(e)(vii) imposes liability where shares are 
acquired in violation of clause 48 or clause 46. This implies that either clause 
77(3)(e)(vi) or clause 77(3)(e)(vii) could be used when the company makes a 
distribution in respect of an acquisition of shares contrary to the distribution 
requirements, since a payment for the acquisition of shares is a ‛distribution’ and 
also involves and ‛acquisition of shares’. Under paragraph (vii), the director will be 
exposed to potential liability for a higher amount than would be the case under 
paragraph (vi).1363 This effect seems to have been unintended and could be 
avoided by removing the reference to clause 46 not only from paragraph (vii) of 
clause 77(3)(e), but also from clause 48. There seems to be no justification for this 
divergence when the basic problem is that the company made a distribution while 
it did not satisfy the solvency and liquidity test.   
It is a common trend among the other jurisdictions surveyed to base 
directors’ liability not merely on the actual insolvency or illiquidity of the company 
but rather on their failure to exercise due diligence, particularly in relation to the 
financial restrictions. In England directors who signed the solvency declaration in 
respect of a repurchase out of capital are liable if the company is wound up within 
one year of the date of the payment, unless they can prove that they had 
reasonable grounds for forming the opinion set out in the declaration.1364  
In New Zealand three different bases of liability are distinguished, namely 
signing of a solvency certificate in the absence of reasonable grounds for believing 
that the company would satisfy the solvency test; failure to take reasonable steps 
to ensure that the correct procedure is followed and failure to take reasonable 
steps to prevent a distribution when the director is no longer satisfied that the 
company would satisfy the solvency test.1365 In Delaware directors are liable for 
the wilful or negligent violation of any of the requirements pertaining to 
_________________________________________________________________  
1361  See clause 77(2). 
1362  Clause 48(7) read with clause 77(3)(e)(vii). 
1363  See paragraph 6.9.4.1 above.  
1364  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.5.2. 
1365  See Chapter 3 paragraph 6.4. 
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repurchases or dividends, but a director can escape liability by proving that she did 
not consent to the distribution and caused her dissent to be noted in the 
minutes.1366 Directors who are present at the meeting where a disposition is 
approved and who fail to vote against the distribution will be liable under 
Californian law for distributions in violation of the financial restrictions. However, a 
director cannot be held liable unless she was negligent or acted in bad faith. Under 
the MBCA directors who voted in favour of or assented to a distribution in violation 
of either the financial restrictions or the articles of the company are potentially 
liable if they failed to comply with the standard of conduct for directors. An express 
provision exonerating directors in respect of reliance on information supplied by 
others is a feature common to all three the American systems. 
Under the proposed provisions of the Companies Bill a director who did not 
participate in the initial meeting or resolution authorising a distribution, or who 
voted against the resolution, is exempt from liability even if she was subsequently 
involved in an acknowledgement resolution that reached an unreasonable 
conclusion regarding the company’s solvency and liquidity. The failure to 
distinguish between the authorisation of a distribution and a resolution 
acknowledging compliance with the financial restrictions also means that directors 
cannot be liable when a payment in accordance with existing rights or in 
compliance with a court order is made in violation of the solvency and liquidity test.  
As under the present provisions, creditors are not given the right under the 
Companies Bill to institute action directly against directors in respect of unlawful 
distributions. The liability of directors is towards the company only. However, in 
terms of the proposed statutory derivative action,1367 shareholders and co-directors 
will be able to enforce the company’s right of recovery.  The comparative survey 
showed that California is the only other jurisdiction that expressly grants creditors 
and shareholders a general right to enforce the liability of directors in respect of 
unlawful distributions,1368 although Delaware allows this in the case of dissolution 
or insolvency of the company.1369 It is suggested that the company is the proper 
claimant and that creditors and shareholders should as a general rule not be 
_________________________________________________________________  
1366  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.4.4. 
1367  See clause 166.  
1368 See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.5.1. 
1369 See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.4.4. 
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allowed to proceed against the directors.1370 
Although the Companies Bill refers to recovery from shareholders, it does not 
expressly regulate this aspect. It appears that only the company will be able to 
enforce liability against the shareholders. The directors are not given any direct 
recourse against shareholders, although the extent of their liability depends on the 
amounts recovered from shareholders. I submit that this is not a serious problem, 
as the directors can recover these amounts through the company. Also, the 
proposed statutory derivative action can be used by directors, shareholders, 
registered trade unions and, with the permission of the court, any other person 
including a creditor.   
The effect of the Companies Bill is that unlawful distributions can be 
recovered from shareholders even if they received the distribution in good faith 
and without knowledge of the violation.  
In view of criticism against this wide liability of shareholders, a consideration 
of this issue in other jurisdictions is warranted. Although the finer detail differs, 
shareholders are exempted from liability on the basis of good faith or ignorance of 
the impropriety of the distribution in New Zealand, California and under the 
MBCA.1371 With regard to the USA the effect of the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer 
Act, which allows a creditor to recover a distribution from a shareholder if it left the 
corporation insolvent or with unreasonably small capital offsets this more lenient 
treatment.1372 
In England shareholders from whom shares were acquired out of capital, 
have no defence and are automatically liable to return the consideration if the 
company is wound up within one year of the payment. However, in respect of 
distributions otherwise than in terms of a share repurchase it must be shown that a 
shareholder knew or had reasonable cause to believe that a distribution was made 
in contravention of the provisions in order to hold her liable to return a 
distribution.1373 
The decision whether to hold shareholders liable despite their good faith is 
_________________________________________________________________  
1370  See paragraph 7.13 and the provision entitled ‘Liability for distributions in violation of solvency 
and liquidity test. 
1371  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.4.2; Chapter 4 paragraphs 3.4.6.2 and 4.4.6.  
1372  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.6.2 where it is also explained that this remedy is not restricted to 
insolvency proceedings.  
1373  See Chapter 2 paragraph 5.6. 
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ultimately based on a policy judgment in which the interests of creditors and 
shareholders are accorded relative weight. However, factors such as the upheaval 
that would be caused if recovery is sought from a large number of anonymous 
shareholders of listed shares, the duplicate liability of directors and the possible 
reliance on insolvency measures to impeach unlawful distributions also come into 
play. I suggest that the simplest solution is to hold shareholders liable regardless 
of whether they received a distribution in good faith. Practical difficulties in 
enforcing such recovery should not obscure the basic principle that ultimately, 
creditors enjoy preference in respect of the repayment of their debts. 
6.10.5 Evaluation of enforceability 
A contract for the repurchase of shares is enforceable, except to the extent that 
the company cannot perform without breaching the financial restrictions. If the 
company is wound up before the vendor-shareholder has been paid in full, the 
claim in respect of consideration will be ranked in priority to the other shareholders 
of the class who have not sold their shares to the company. This is a rather 
exceptional provision since it amounts to a statutory subordination of the claims of 
certain creditors (shareholder-vendors) to the claims of certain shareholders 
(those of classes enjoying priority over the class of shares acquired by the 
company). While the interests of preference shareholders are not taken into 
account in the application of the financial restrictions,1374 they thus become 
relevant once the company has been wound up. It is also significant that the 
vendor-shareholders enjoy priority over the remaining shareholders of their own 
class.1375  
An almost identical arrangement regarding enforceability and the ranking of 
claims in respect of unfulfilled share repurchase contracts is found in England and 
in New Zealand.1376 It is also notable that claims in respect of share repurchases 
and redemptions are treated in the same way.1377 Currently the Act does not 
regulate the ranking of a claim in respect of an obligation to redeem shares, which 
is clearly undesirable.  
_________________________________________________________________  
1374  See paragraph 4.1.3 above. 
1375  See paragraph 6.5 above. 
1376  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.5 and Chapter 3 paragraph 6.5. 
1377  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.5 and Chapter 3 paragraph 6.5. 
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The proposals of the Companies Bill with regard to the enforceability of 
repurchase agreements are unsatisfactory. Although an attempt appears to have 
been made at distinguishing between financial inability and other reasons why the 
company alleges that it cannot fulfill its obligation, and the orders the court may 
make in each instance, it has been foiled by inaccurate or overly broad cross 
referencing.1378 The cost and time implications of obliging a company that already 
finds itself in financial difficulties to approach the court for relief, apparently 
regardless of whether or not the vendor-shareholder is pressing for payment, are 
also ill-considered. The rationale for forcing the company to bring an application in 
the event of non-compliance with certain requirements while making an application 
optional when certain other requirements have not been met is also not clear.  
As regards the general enforceability of distributions the Companies Bill 
enjoins a company to proceed with a distribution on the basis of an 
acknowledgement by the directors that the company satisfies the financial 
restrictions. Enforceability of the distribution does not depend on the actual 
solvency and liquidity of the company at the time of enforcement, but rather on 
whether the directors have made an acknowledgement within the relevant period. 
This appears to conflict with the requirement in clause 46(1)(b) that it should 
reasonably appear that the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test 
immediately after completing the distribution. If enforceability depends purely on 
the board’s acknowledgement, clause 46(1)(b) does not have any effect and 
clause 46(1)(c), which deals with the acknowledgement could have stood by itself. 
The purpose of this provision may have been to prevent the company from 
assigning the contract or to release the vendor-shareholder from liability.1379 If this 
was the intention, I suggest that a distinction should be drawn between the 
moment the agreement becomes binding and the actual enforceability of payment. 
If the board has considered the solvency and liquidity test for purposes of 
making an acknowledgement and concludes that the test is not satisfied, it has to 
approach the court for an order varying its original order,1380 only in the case of a 
distribution in compliance with a court order and apparently not in any other 
_________________________________________________________________  
1378  See paragraph 6.7.5 above. 
1379  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.3.2.  
1380  See paragraph 5.8.2 above. 
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case.1381  
The ranking of an unpaid claim in respect of a repurchase in a subsequent 
winding-up of the company is not addressed. It seems that such claims would rank 
concurrently with the claims of other creditors. 
I make suggestions for the improvement of this provision.1382 
6.10.6 Evaluation of status of shares 
The Act and the Companies Bill adopt the solution that shares should be cancelled 
when they are acquired by the company.1383 However, it is uncertain exactly when 
shares are ‛acquired’ by the company. In New Zealand it is expressly provided that 
a company acquires shares when, but for the deemed cancellation, the company’s 
name would have been entered into the register of shareholders.1384 Apart from 
the fact that this provision appears to address the problem that in view of the 
cancellation the company never really ‛acquires’ the shares, it does not seem to 
take the matter much further. It does not appear necessary to include a similar 
regulation of this aspect in the South African Companies Act. Consistent use of 
terminology such as 'acquire', 'complete' and 'pay' and careful cross-referencing 
would be an improvement. 
It is not certain how the acquisition of uncertificated shares should be 
handled. Under section 91A(4) the account of the transferee has to be credited in 
the subregister. Presumably the shares will be cancelled once they are entered 
into the name of the company’s account in the subregister. Whether this satisfies 
the requirement that they should be cancelled ‛forthwith’ is debatable. 
While many problems are associated with treasury shares,1385 they are 
allowed in Delaware and to a limited extent in England and New Zealand.1386 In 
South Africa shares held by a subsidiary in its holding company are an indirect 
form of treasury shares. If South Africa were to introduce treasury shares the 
disposal of such shares may have to be regulated, in addition to extending the 
_________________________________________________________________  
1381  Except if the distribution is in respect of an acquisition of shares, in which case the procedure 
outlined in the preceding paragraph applies. 
1382  See Chapter 6 paragraph 7.16. 
1383  See paragraphs 6.6 and 6.9.6 above. 
1384  See Chapter 3 paragraph 6.6. 
1385  See Chapter 1 paragraph 1. 
1386  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.6, Chapter 3 paragraph 6.6 and Chapter 4 paragraph 2.6.6. 
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voting restrictions currently in section 39 to treasury shares.1387 Obviously it would 
be necessary to consider the cumulative effect of shares held through subsidiaries 
and in treasury. In England crossholdings are generally not allowed.1388 Also, the 
distinction between listed and unlisted companies and the opportunities for the 
regulation of disposal of treasury shares should be borne in mind. Tax implications 
are another relevant factor. However, I think that the notion of treasury shares is 
conceptually flawed. 
6.10.7 Evaluation of acquisitions by a subsidiary 
The main advantage of using a subsidiary to acquire shares in a holding company 
rather than having the holding company acquire its own shares, is that secondary 
tax on companies (STC) will not be payable.1389 A repurchase and cancellation of 
a share will amount to a distribution and is classified as a dividend for purposes of 
STC. However, when the subsidiary acquires shares in its holding company the 
shares are not cancelled and the purchase is not regarded as a dividend. It is 
uncertain whether this incentive will fall away when STC is abolished as the 
principles for the taxation of dividends have not yet been formulated. 
Crossholding of shares can lead to various abuses and has been criticised by 
various academics and by South African courts.1390  
The protection against these abuses in the Act and in the Companies Bill is 
found in the imposition of the ten per cent limit on crossholdings and the 
neutralisation of voting rights.1391 The Companies Bill will rectify the rather obvious 
inadequacies of the Act in this regard.1392 It makes it clear that the ten per cent 
limit applies in respect of shares held by subsidiaries and plainly states that the 
voting rights may not be exercised.  
However, as is the case under the Act, the Bill does not regulate the 
consequences of subsidiaries holding more than ten per cent of the shares of a 
_________________________________________________________________  
1387  See Chapter 5 paragraph 6.10.6. 
1388  See paragraph 6.7 below. 
1389  See Wainer “Problems and Doubts” 138; Cassim “New Statutory Provisions” 779 – 780.  
1390  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-102; Wainer “Problems and Doubts” 
138 – 139; Delport “Company Groups” 125; The Unisec Group Ltd & Others v Sage Holdings 
Ltd 1986 (3) SA 259 (T) at 265 – 266. 
1391  See paragraphs 6.7 and 6.9.7 above. 
1392  See paragraph 6.7 above. 
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particular class. Various events subsequent to an acquisition could cause this limit 
to be exceeded, including the exercise of appraisal rights by other shareholders of 
the class, the issue of capitalisation shares, a selective repurchase of shares, or 
the acquisition of a further subsidiary that already holds shares in the holding 
company. It may not be easy to predict relatively small or temporary infractions of 
the limit.1393 There may be difficulties in taking timeous preventative action, for 
example difficulty in finding a purchaser for the shares or inability by the holding 
company to implement a selective repurchase of the shares held by its 
subsidiaries. A rule similar to that found in the English Companies Act that allows 
twelve months to rectify the limit in respect of treasury shares, should be 
considered.1394 Although this provision applies to direct treasury shares, it should 
be easy to adapt it to shares held by subsidiaries. 
However, in view of the risk of abuse associated with crossholdings and the 
eminent demise of the tax advantages, it might be preferable to prohibit a 
subsidiary from acquiring shares in its holding company or in any co-subsidiary 
that holds shares in it.1395 This will eliminate the problem of dividend round-tripping 
and the considerable risk posed to minority shareholders of partially owned 
subsidiaries.1396   
6.10.8 Evaluation of redemption of shares 
The Act provides different procedures and requirements for the repurchase of 
shares and the redemption of shares. These diverging rules for redemption and 
repurchase of shares should not be retained. In particular the same financial 
restrictions should apply to both options. This problem is addressed by the 
Companies Bill which does not distinguish between repurchases and redemptions 
in this regard. In all the other systems investigated, repurchases and redemptions 
are subject to the same financial restrictions.   
It makes sense to distinguish between redemptions at the option of the 
company and other redemptions as far as the procedural issues are concerned. 
_________________________________________________________________  
1393  An example would be where it is uncertain how many shareholders will elect a cash payment 
in lieu of an issue of capitalisation shares. 
1394  See Chapter 2 paragraph 5.7. 
1395  See Chapter 6 paragraph 6.7. 
1396  See Blackman, Jooste & Everingham Companies Act 5-102. 
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An example of this is found in New Zealand where the procedural requirements for 
redemptions at the option of the company are the same as those for 
repurchases.1397 The Companies Bill appears to succeed in drawing such a 
distinction. The provision regulating distributions expressly refers to existing legal 
obligations.1398 In such a case board authorisation is not required, but an 
acknowledgement of solvency and liquidity must nevertheless be made. It can be 
assumed that a redemption at the option of the company is regarded as a 
distribution which is subject to authorisation by the board. Although this difference 
may seem insignificant, it may lead to opposing results as far as the liability of 
directors is concerned, because this liability is made dependent on participation in 
the original authorisation of the distribution.1399 
I think the legislation should expressly state that redeemable shares may be 
repurchased prior to the redemption date.1400  
_________________________________________________________________  
1397  See Chapter 3 paragraph 6.8. 
1398  Clause 46(1)(a). 
1399  See paragraph 6.10.4 above. 
1400 See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.8. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
1 INTRODUCTION  
This final chapter commences with a summary of the different aspects of the 
regulation of share capital, capital contributions and distributions that were 
considered, followed by a conclusion and list of key recommendations. I then 
make more specific recommendations through proposed statutory provisions for 
the regulation of share capital and distributions. Although I have suggested 
improvements to particular provisions of the current Act in my criticisms of the 
current position, my proposals envisage a more complete overhaul of this area. 
For this purpose I will use the Companies Bill, which also aims to reform this area, 
as a point of departure where appropriate. In doing so, I hope that this thesis can 
make a contribution to the review process which is already in an advanced stage. 
This chapter and thesis concludes with a final analysis of the regulation of share 
capital structure, contributions and distributions and its impact on creditors and 
shareholders.  
2 STRUCTURE OF SHARE CAPITAL 
The analysis of South African law commenced with a discussion of the share 
capital structure established by the Companies Act.1 The provisions dealing with 
authorised capital, issued capital, kinds of shares, share capital accounts, 
undistributable reserves, variation and reduction of share capital and loss of 
capital were identified as the components of this capital structure.   
2.1 Authorised capital 
The requirement that a company state its authorised capital in its memorandum of 
association, and amend this memorandum whenever the authorised capital is 
increased or decreased, is a clear indication of the importance of share capital in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
1  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2. 
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the scheme of the Act.2  
Although the authorised capital determines the fee payable to the Registrar, 
the main function of authorised capital is to protect existing shareholders against 
dilution of their equity interests through the issue of shares beyond the stipulated 
limit. Authorised capital is a preventive measure operating on a structural level.   
All the systems surveyed offer protection to shareholders against dilution of 
their interests when further shares are issued, but the methods of implementation 
and levels of protection differ. Apart from authorised capital, restrictions on the 
issue of shares, including pre-emptive rights, also provide protection.3 
The decision to rely on the concept of authorised capital does not depend on 
or correlate with the type of financial restrictions a system prescribes for 
distributions.4 Some capital maintenance systems use authorised capital while 
others do not. Similarly, authorised capital is used in some solvency and liquidity 
systems, but not in others. Examples of each combination can be found in the 
jurisdictions analysed.5 The existence or not of strong pre-emptive rights on share 
issues is a good indication of whether reliance is placed on authorised capital in a 
system. Similarly, systems that do not have authorised capital tend to require 
shareholder approval for all or certain share issues. 
In South Africa, authorised capital can be increased by special resolution, 
while shareholder approval by ordinary resolution is a general requirement for the 
issue of shares. Issues to directors must be approved by special resolution. Pre-
emptive rights in relation to issues of further shares apply to listed companies.6 
The Corporate Laws Amendment Act of 2006 extends existing pre-emptive rights 
on the transfer of shares to certain further share issues, but this amendment is 
problematic in several respects.7 
The Companies Bill proposes to retain authorised capital and the 
requirement of a special resolution for an increase, although the power to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
2  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.1. 
3  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.9.1. 
4  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.9.1.  
5  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.1; Chapter 3 paragraph 2; Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.2.1, 3.2.1 and 
4.2.1. Also see Chapter 5 paragraph 2.9.1. 
6  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.1. 
7  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.1. 
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authorise further shares can be delegated to the board.8 It does away with 
shareholder approval as a general prerequisite for the issue of shares, but 
extends the special resolution requirement to include both issues to directors and 
substantial further issues. It also introduces pre-emptive rights on further share 
issues as the default option for private companies. 
Pre-emptive rights afford more protection to minority shareholders than the 
requirement of a special resolution for the increase of authorised capital, coupled 
with an ordinary resolution for the actual issue of shares.9 This is because the 
right of minority shareholders to subscribe for further shares cannot be overridden 
by a majority vote. But shareholders who do not have additional funds to invest in 
the company will not enjoy the benefit of pre-emptive rights. The extent of the pre-
emptive rights and the ease with which they may be excluded also have an 
influence on the level of protection enjoyed by shareholders. 
While pre-emptive rights offer excellent protection to minority shareholders, 
they can also unduly restrict the company’s ability to issue shares as 
consideration for assets, especially in the course of a merger or acquisition. This 
explains why pre-emptive rights are often made applicable to cash issues only.10 
The potential abuse of non-cash issues to effect a dilution of shareholder interests 
can be addressed in other ways, for example strict regulation of non-cash 
consideration or a requirement of shareholder approval by ordinary or special 
resolution. It is difficult to explain why the Companies Bill provides for pre-emptive 
rights in respect of cash and non-cash issues alike, but excludes them when 
future consideration in any form is involved.11 In my discussion of these proposed 
provisions, I warn that this distinction can be abused. 
I suggest that pre-emptive rights should be the default option for both private 
and public companies in order to protect shareholders against dilution of their 
shareholdings. In private companies there is the additional consideration of a 
closed circle of shareholders. For this reason, existing shareholders in private 
companies should be given the opportunity to take up shares that their fellow 
_________________________________________________________________ 
8  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.1. 
9  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.9.1. 
10  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.1 and Chapter 4 paragraph 4.2.1.  
11  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.1. 
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shareholders decline to subscribe for.12 I think my proposal will achieve an 
appropriate balance between shareholder protection and the company’s ability to 
issue further shares to raise capital or fund beneficial transactions.  
A shareholder approval requirement targeting specific kinds of issues that 
have a greater potential for abuse is preferable to a general approval requirement, 
as it allows more flexibility. The Companies Bill proposal on substantial further 
issues13 is welcomed in principle, although I have criticised the threshold of 30 per 
cent, as well as its application where the company has more than one class of 
shares.14  
In view of the limited application of the shareholder approval requirement 
and the proposed pre-emptive rights, I propose that the notion of authorised 
capital should be retained.15 However, it should be recognised that this concept is 
a remnant of the ultra vires doctrine and that persons who subscribe for 
unauthorised shares may be adversely affected should the issue not be ratified. 
For this reason, directors should also be made personally liable to the persons 
who offered to take up shares.16 At the same time the provisions on shareholder 
approval and pre-emptive rights should be improved.17 
2.2 Minimum share capital 
A statutory prescribed minimum capital, such as found in England for public 
companies, can offer some protection to creditors. But the specified amount is 
necessarily arbitrary. It is generally accepted that a minimum capital requirement 
can achieve little more than discourage frivolous incorporations.18 
Although the Act does not prescribe a minimum issued or paid-up capital 
_________________________________________________________________ 
12  See paragraph 8.5 below and the proposed provision entitled ‘Pre-emptive right to be offered 
and to subscribe shares’. 
13  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.1. 
14  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.1. 
15  The proposed provision appears in paragraph 8.2 below and is entitled ‘Authorisation for 
shares’. 
16  See paragraph 8.5 below and subclause 3(e) of the proposed provision entitled ‘Issue of 
shares’. 
17  See the proposed provisions entitled ‘Shareholder approval for issue of shares in certain 
circumstances’ and ‘Pre-emptive rights to be offered and to subscribe shares’ in paragraph 
8.2 below. 
18  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.2. 
  
513
expressed in monetary terms, each subscriber to the memorandum of 
incorporation has to take up at least one share.19 The requirements for the issue 
of a certificate to commence business recognise by implication that a company 
may fund its operations through debt rather than rely on its issued capital.20 The 
minimum issued share capital is not required for the sake of creditors, but to 
ensure that the company can function.21 It can do no harm to make it a statutory 
requirement that a company should at all times have at least one share in issue 
that confers the right to vote and to receive the net assets of the company on its 
dissolution. I suggest that it is better to state this as a general requirement from 
the outset than to prescribe which shares should remain in issue following an 
acquisition of shares as is currently done in the Act.22  
The Companies Bill requires that there should always be at least one share 
in issue to at least one person other than a company that is part of the same 
group of companies to which the company belongs.23 However, the proposed 
provision is badly drafted. Apart from the fact that the provision will in effect 
prohibit the shares of a ‘wholly owned’ subsidiary from being held exclusively by 
the holding company and its subsidiaries, there is no qualification as to the nature 
of the one share that must be issued. As the provision is currently drafted, the one 
issued share need not be a voting share that entitles its holder to receive the net 
assets on liquidation. This is undesirable and I suggest that the proposed 
provision on issued capital must be aligned with the provision regarding 
authorised capital.24 The status of shares acquired by the company should be 
dealt with in the provision dealing with authorised capital. A properly drafted 
provision will provide certainty and also allow simplification of the share 
acquisition provisions, so I will make suggestions for the improvement of this 
provision.25 
_________________________________________________________________ 
19  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.2. 
20  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.2. 
21  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.9.2. 
22  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 2.9.2 and 6.3.2. 
23  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.2. 
24  See clause 37(3)(b), discussed in Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.2. 
25  See paragraph 8.4 below and the provision entitled ‘Requirement to have shareholders’. My 
proposed provision is based on the example in the MBCA. 
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2.3 Kinds of shares 
Par value and no par value shares were analysed in detail.26 Although the 
Companies Act allows both these types of shares, par value shares are more 
popular. I argued that the legal consequences of these two types of shares 
depend on the way in which they are regulated rather than on the intrinsic 
difference between them, namely the existence or not of a par value.27 
I explain that under the Act par value shares are more flexible because the 
company can apportion the issue price between the share capital account, 
representing the nominal value, and the share premium account, representing the 
premium.28 Although the stated capital account can be equated with the issued 
share capital account plus the share premium account of a company, the 
opportunities for applying the stated capital account are more restricted than the 
share premium account.29 The requirement that the full issue price of no par value 
shares should be reflected in a stated capital account possibly explains the 
unpopularity of these shares in South Africa. This feature distinguishes South 
African no par value shares from no par value shares found in the other 
jurisdictions. 
I also argue that sections 81 and 82, the two provisions protecting holders of 
par value and no par value shares respectively against a dilution in the value of 
their shareholdings, afford holders of no par value shares more protection, and 
limit the freedom of directors to decide on an issue price to a greater extent, than 
is the case with par value shares.30 
The par value of shares is used in the Companies Act in the determination of 
voting rights and public companies may deviate from this principle to a limited 
extent only. I observe that the Act does not provide for the allocation of voting 
rights between holders of par value shares and of no par value shares in 
circumstances where both types of shares carry voting rights in the same 
_________________________________________________________________ 
26  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.3 
27  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.3.2. 
28  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.3.1. 
29  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.3.1.3. 
30  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.3.1.4 and see also paragraph 3.5.3. 
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company.31 I also illustrate that the correct application to no par value shares of 
certain provisions granting members the right to call a meeting or demand a poll 
depending on the percentage of capital or of issued share capital they hold is 
uncertain.  
Despite the legislature’s attempt at ensuring a degree of neutrality, several 
anomalies and inconsistencies can be attributed to this dual system.32  
Delaware is the only other jurisdiction surveyed that provides for a dual 
system of par and no par value shares.33 While the capital maintenance or legal 
capital doctrine still applies in Delaware, its regulation of how the consideration 
received for par and no par value shares should be reflected in share capital and 
reserve accounts differs from South African law in important respects.34 In 
Delaware it is not required that the full consideration received for no par value 
shares should be reflected as stated capital.35 Share premiums are also not 
regulated, although the board of directors has the discretion to reflect any portion 
of a premium as share capital.36  
No par value shares are used to the exclusion of par value shares in each of 
the jurisdictions surveyed that have abolished the capital maintenance doctrine, 
namely New Zealand,37 California38 and states following the MBCA.39 These 
systems are also characterised by the absence of regulation of share capital 
accounts in which the contributions of shareholders are reflected.  
The South African experience since 1999 indicates that it is indeed possible 
to have a system based on solvency and liquidity in a par value share 
environment characterised by the regulation of share capital accounts. However, 
this experience also illustrates that many of the provisions traditionally associated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
31  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.3.1.5. 
32  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.3.2. 
33  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.3. 
34  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.7. 
35  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.4 and Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.2. 
36  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.2.4. 
37  See Chapter 3 paragraph 2. 
38  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.2.3. 
39  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.2.3. 
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with the par value concept serve no useful purpose in such a system.40  
Although the choice between par value and no par value shares does not 
affect the protection of creditors, the kind of shares used in a company may be 
relevant for shareholders. The dual system is complicated and its implications 
uncertain. Par value shares appear to apportion shareholder interests in a 
predictable fashion, but the practice of fixing a low par value and issuing shares at 
a premium can be used to overcome this apparent proportionality. I submit that 
companies should be allowed considerable freedom in determining the relative 
voting and distribution rights of different classes of shares. However, this should 
be done in a transparent fashion and not through the manipulation of par values 
and premiums.41  
I recommend that only no par value shares should be used in South Africa 
and that existing par value shares should be phased out. This is in line with the 
system of compulsory no par value shares proposed in the Companies Bill.42  
2.4 Share capital and reserve accounts 
Share capital accounts and reserve accounts are closely regulated in the Act. The 
nominal value of issued par value shares must be reflected in a share capital 
account and any premium in a share premium account.43 The stated capital 
account must reflect the full proceeds of an issue of no par value shares.44 
The imposition of restrictions on the application of share premiums is one of 
the most problematic aspects of the capital structure of companies in South 
Africa. Although the Act purports to treat share premiums as if they constitute 
share capital, it nevertheless allows the application of the share premium account 
in instances where ordinary share capital cannot be applied. Following the 
abolition of the capital maintenance principle, the share capital of a company has 
little significance from the point of view of creditors. It is equally insignificant from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
40  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 2.3.2 and 2.4.3.5. 
41  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.9.3. 
42  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.3. See also paragraph 8.1 below and the proposed provision 
entitled ‘Legal nature of company shares’. 
43  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 2.4.1 and 2.4.3. 
44  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.2. 
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the perspective of shareholder rights. This is because despite some legislative 
attempts to identify premiums with the shareholders who contributed them, 
shareholder rights are generally determined without reference to share 
premiums.45 
Besides South Africa, England is the only jurisdiction surveyed to regulate 
share premium accounts.46 I argue that the regulation of share premium accounts 
must be reconsidered.47 If par value shares and share premium accounts are 
retained, consideration will have to be given to the introduction of merger relief as 
has been done in England.48 However, the retention of only no par value shares 
will avoid the problem of share premium accounts altogether.49  
Together with the share premium account, the share capital and stated 
capital accounts previously played an important role in the application of the 
common-law principle that share capital had to be maintained. I explained that 
although these accounts are no longer relevant for the financial restrictions 
applicable to distributions, the Companies Act still comprehensively regulates the 
keeping of share capital accounts and carefully circumscribes when they may or 
should be adjusted.50 In view of the new philosophy of subjecting distributions to 
solvency and liquidity these prescriptions are unnecessary from the creditors’ 
perspective. However, shareholders still have an interest in the share capital 
accounts as these indicate the relative entitlements of shareholders to 
distributions and other membership rights.51 
Companies should be free to arrange the way in which the rights of 
shareholders in respect of contributed capital should be reflected. With the 
exception of England, this is currently the position in all the other jurisdictions that 
have been surveyed and is also in line with the proposals of the Companies Bill.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
45  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.3.4.3. 
46  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.4.3. 
47  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.3.4.3. 
48  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.4.3. 
49  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4.3.5. 
50  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.4. 
51  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.9.4. 
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2.5 The variation of share capital 
I analyse the rules on the variation of share capital.52 Share capital can be 
increased or decreased,53 shares can be consolidated or subdivided54 and par 
value shares can be converted into no par value shares or vice versa.55 I illustrate 
that in most of these instances there are uncertainties and anomalies pertaining to 
the calculation of the prescribed fee on authorised capital.56 The main objection 
against these variation provisions is that they are unnecessarily complex to the 
extent that they form part of the regulation of share capital and reserve accounts. I 
have already criticised these aspects.57  
The Companies Bill also contains a provision regarding the variation of share 
capital. Unlike the current provision which regulates the consequences of 
variations in considerable detail, the clause enables a company by special 
resolution to amend its capital or to delegate certain powers in this regard to the 
board of directors.58 Although the appraisal remedy will be available in respect of 
certain variations of share capital, it appears that an increase in authorised capital 
will not qualify, even if new classes are created with priority over existing classes 
of shares. Shareholders will have to rely on the other protection measures against 
dilution of shareholder interests, namely pre-emptive rights and shareholder 
approval for certain issues.59  
I support the proposals of the Companies Bill with regard to variation of 
capital, although I recommend that they should be contained in a separate 
section.60 
_________________________________________________________________ 
52  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.5. 
53  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.5.1. 
54  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.5.2. 
55  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.5.3. 
56  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 2.5.1 – 2.5.3.3. 
57  See paragraph 2.4 above. 
58  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.8.5. 
59  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
60  See paragraph 8.3 below and the provision entitled ‘Variation of share capital’. 
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2.6 The reduction of issued capital 
I assert that despite the repeal of the capital reduction provisions,61 companies 
can still achieve reductions of share capital through the acquisition of shares 
under section 85, redemption of shares under section 98 or the repurchase of 
shares in terms of a court order under section 252.62 
I suggest that most, if not all, of the kinds of reductions that were previously 
possible under the repealed provisions, are still possible through the creative 
combination of share acquisitions, including acquisitions without consideration, 
variations of capital and the issue of capitalisation shares out of reserves.63 
Although these methods may appear to be more cumbersome than the direct 
reduction of share capital under the previous provisions, I argue that this 
inconvenience must be balanced against the requirement for court approval under 
the repealed provisions.64  
In my view the reduction of capital through the acquisition of shares 
adequately protects the interests of creditors when compared to the protection 
they enjoyed under the repealed capital reduction provisions.65 However, minority 
shareholders are worse off because share repurchases that may affect their rights 
disproportionately can be forced on them by a special resolution without their 
consent, and, unlike disproportionate reductions of capital under the repealed 
provisions, will not be subjected to scrutiny by a court.66  
When considering the interpretation of remaining references in the Act to the 
reduction of capital,67 I suggest that these references should be understood as 
references to reductions by way of the acquisition of shares resulting in 
adjustments to the share capital accounts. I raised but rejected the possibility that 
references to the reduction of capital can by implication refer to applications of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
61  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6. 
62  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.2 
63  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.3. 
64  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.3. 
65  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.4. 
66  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.4. 
67  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.5. 
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share premium account and capital redemption reserve fund.68 
I recommend that existing references in the Act to the reduction of capital 
should, depending on the context, be replaced with direct references to the 
acquisition of shares or adjustments of capital accounts consequent upon such 
acquisitions.69 This proposal is of an interim nature as it applies only to the current 
Companies Act. 
In the comparative study, separate reduction of capital provisions were found 
only in systems that retained the capital maintenance principle.70 In these systems 
companies may need to reduce the formal capital yardstick to enable them to 
continue making distributions to shareholders. This is unnecessary if distributions 
depend on solvency and liquidity only.  
2.7 Loss of capital 
One of the grounds for winding-up of a company is that it has lost 75 per cent of 
its share capital or that this capital has become useless for its business. For 
purposes of this provision, share capital will be regarded as lost if the company’s 
net assets are less than the amount of its share capital. While the retention of this 
ground does not make sense from the perspective of creditor protection, I argue 
that because shareholders have a residual interest in the capital they invested, 
loss of capital should remain a ground for winding-up.71  
I think this legitimate interest of the shareholders, rather than creditor 
protection, also underlies the requirement in England that a meeting of 
shareholders should be convened in the event of a substantial loss of capital.72 
3 CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
A shareholder’s capital contribution to a company consists of the consideration 
given in respect of the issue of shares. My analysis of the regulation of 
consideration reveals that common-law principles were enhanced and also 
_________________________________________________________________ 
68  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.5. 
69  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.6.5. 
70  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.9.6. 
71  See Chapter 5 paragraph 2.7. 
72  See Chapter 2 paragraph 2.7. 
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eroded by statutory provisions.73  
I deal with the consequences of non-compliance with the requirements 
before considering the different aspects of the size, form and timing of capital 
contributions. An allotment and issue in violation of the requirements is void, 
although the court may validate the irregular creation, allotment or issue of 
shares.74 This seems to be unnecessarily rigid. The solution adopted in England, 
namely to hold the allottee liable to pay the full consideration in cash 
immediately,75 may also not be suitable in every case. I think a distinction should 
be made between the consequences of different types of non-compliance.    
The Companies Bill proposes to relax the regulation of the size, form and 
timing of capital contributions.76 Although it is stated that shares will be fully paid 
once the company has received the consideration ‘approved’ by the directors,77 
there is uncertainty about the legal consequences for the subscriber if directors do 
not conform to the required standards of conduct.78 It should be made clear 
whether or not a subscriber will become liable for the difference between the initial 
determination and the amount that should reasonably have been determined. In 
Delaware and California the directors’ determination is conclusive, except if fraud 
is involved.79 The MBCA does not provide a fraud exception and simply makes 
the determination conclusive.80 Directors can nevertheless be held liable for 
breach of their duties. It is recommended that South Africa should follow the 
example of the MBCA.81 Allottees should not be liable for more than they 
undertook to contribute.  
_________________________________________________________________ 
73  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3. 
74  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 3.2 and 3.4. 
75  See Chapter 2 paragraphs 3.2 and 3.4. 
76  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 3.6.1 – 3.6.4. 
77  Except if future consideration is involved, see chapter 5 paragraph 3.6.4. 
78  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 3.6.1 and 3.7.1. 
79  See Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.3.1 and 3.3.1. 
80  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.1. 
81  See paragraph 8.6 below and subclause (5) of the proposed provision entitled ‘Consideration 
for shares’. 
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3.1 Size of capital contribution 
The minimum consideration payable for the issue of shares depends on whether 
or not the shares have a par value.82 The consideration for par value shares must 
be at least equal in value to their nominal value. This is because the common-law 
rule against the issue of shares at a discount still applies in South Africa. This is 
one of a number of instances where the legislature retains the rules regarding the 
formation of share capital despite its reforms of the distribution rules.83 Although 
there is no common-law rule regarding minimum consideration for no par value 
shares, there is a statutory limitation on the minimum issue price where further 
shares of an existing class are being issued.84  
In England and Delaware, the other jurisdictions surveyed that have par 
value shares, the consideration is also required to equal or exceed the par value 
of the shares. England no longer allows an exception to this rule.85 In Delaware 
shares may be issued below par if approved by shareholders, but creditors are 
entitled to hold the subscriber liable for the discount.86 The South African 
exception in section 81 is unique because it makes an issue at a discount valid 
also against creditors. 
Despite some similarities between section 81, which provides for the issue of 
par value shares at a discount,87 and section 82, which regulates the minimum 
price at which no par value shares may be issued,88 these two provisions serve 
different purposes.89 While both provisions aim to protect existing shareholders 
against the uncontrolled dilution in the value of their shareholdings, section 81 in 
addition caters for the interests of creditors and future shareholders. Unfortunately 
neither of these provisions is effective in preventing the uncontrolled dilution of 
shareholder value, because the interest of shareholders relates to the current 
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82  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.1. 
83  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.1. 
84  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.1.2 
85  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.1. 
86  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.3.1. 
87  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.1.1. 
88  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.1.2. 
89  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.7.1. 
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value of their shares rather than the consideration they initially paid for their 
shares.  
The Companies Bill provides that shares must be issued for adequate 
consideration.90 This is a flexible concept that allows directors to take into account 
the company’s current financial situation as well as market conditions. I suggest 
that the present value of existing shares is a factor the directors have to take into 
account in determining the adequacy of the consideration. Directors will also be 
personally liable for loss caused to the company by a determination in breach of 
the standard of conduct expected from them.91 For this reason I submit that it is 
unnecessary to impose specific restrictions on the minimum price at which further 
shares may be issued.  
I recommend that the requirement of adequate consideration, as proposed in 
the Companies Bill, should be introduced, but extended so that a determination 
will also be required if non-cash consideration is later substituted for the initial 
consideration.92    
3.2 Form of capital contribution 
I discuss the acceptable forms of consideration for shares93 and illustrate that in 
South Africa the types of acceptable consideration are curtailed by the 
requirement that the company should actually have received the consideration 
prior to allotment and issue.94  
While the comparative study shows that future consideration is often 
subjected to stricter regulation and that in a number of jurisdictions future services 
may not be accepted as consideration,95 it also appears that South Africa attaches 
harsher consequences to non-compliance with these rules. An issue and 
allotment for an improper consideration, for example future services, will be void 
_________________________________________________________________ 
90  Clause 40(4)(a), see Chapter 5 paragraph 3.6.1. 
91  Clause 40(3) read with clause 77(2)(a) – (b), see Chapter 5 paragraph 3.6.1. 
92  See paragraph 8.6 and the provision entitled ‘Consideration for shares’, especially subclause 
(4). 
93  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.2. 
94  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.4. 
95  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2 (England); Chapter 4 paragraph 2.3.2 (Delaware) and 
paragraph 3.3.2 (California). 
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in South Africa while in England, for example, the allotment will be valid and the 
subscriber will be liable to pay the consideration in cash.96  
The Companies Bill states that shares may be issued for any 
consideration.97 Although I welcome this approach, I criticise the definition of 
consideration which includes things irrespective of their apparent or intrinsic 
value.98 In my view a new Companies Act should not contain a definition of 
consideration.  
Although the Act provides for the issue of capitalisation shares there is still a 
debate about the consideration aspect.99 Capitalisation shares are expressly 
regulated as an exception to the consideration requirement in England, New 
Zealand and under the MBCA. I suggest that South Africa needs a similar 
exception to accommodate capitalisation issues. The express recognition that 
shares may be issued otherwise than for consideration is a positive feature of the 
Companies Bill.100 Treating capitalisation issues and conversions as exceptions to 
the rule obviates the need to resort to artificial explanations of consideration.101  
The proposed regulation of capitalisation shares in the Companies Bill must 
be commended.102 In addition to addressing the consideration aspect, the 
implications of offering cash alternatives are also expressly regulated.103 
3.3 The regulation of non-cash capital contributions 
Although consideration for shares may be paid in cash or kind, the imposition of 
additional formalities in respect of non-cash consideration is common.104 South 
African law requires disclosure of particulars regarding non-cash consideration, 
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96  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2. 
97  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.6.2. 
98  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.7.2. 
99  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.2.1. 
100  In terms of clause 40(1)(b) shares may be issued in terms of conversion rights pertaining to 
previously issued securities of the company, while clause 40(1)(c) provides that shares may 
be issued as capitalisation shares. See also Chapter 5 paragraph 3.6.2. 
101  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.2.1. 
102  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.7.2.1. 
103  Clause 47(3)(b), see Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3. 
104  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.3, Chapter 3 paragraph 3.3, Chapter 4 paragraph 3.3.3 and 
paragraph 4.3.3. 
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but valuation is required only in order to reflect the consideration in the share 
capital and, where applicable, reserve accounts of the company.105 The 
consequence of a discrepancy between the value of non-cash consideration and 
the issue price is the subject of conflicting views,106 but I argue that these 
opposing views can be reconciled by drawing a distinction between the effects of 
such a discrepancy on the consideration due to the company on the one hand and 
on the share capital accounts on the other hand.107  
The valuation provisions do not achieve neutrality between par and no par 
value shares, as the requirements in respect of no par value shares have a 
slightly wider application, prescribe the procedure in more detail, and cannot be 
avoided by recording a value.108 
In comparison with most of the other jurisdictions surveyed, the South 
African regulation of non-cash consideration is lenient. In England and in 
Delaware, the two systems surveyed that still rely on the maintenance of share 
capital, the solutions are, respectively, to require independent valuation in respect 
of shares in public companies109 and to impose shareholder liability for watered 
shares.110 In contrast, the general approach in systems based on solvency and 
liquidity is to protect the company and the shareholders by obliging the directors 
to determine that fair value was given for the shares.111 Nevertheless, additional 
precautions are prescribed in respect of non-cash consideration in California,112 in 
New Zealand,113 and in respect of substantial non-cash issues under the 
MBCA.114  
South African law is stricter than some jurisdictions in its classification of 
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105  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.3. 
106  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.3.1. 
107  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.3.1. 
108  See paragraph 3.3. 
109  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.3. The disclosure requirement for private companies is similar to 
the South African position that applies to all companies having a share capital. 
110  See Chapter 4 paragraph 2.3.1. 
111  See Chapter 3 paragraph 3.3; Chapter 4 paragraphs 3.3.3 and 4.3.3. See also Chapter 5 
paragraph 3.7.3.  
112  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.3.3.  
113  See Chapter 3 paragraph 3.3. 
114  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.3.3. 
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what constitutes cash. Cheques and promissory notes are not regarded as cash 
and so are subject to the increased regulation applicable to non-cash 
consideration.115 I recommend that a definition of cash consideration, based on 
the example in the English Companies Act,116 should be inserted into the Act to 
allow common forms of payment such as cheques and promissory notes to be 
treated as cash rather than as non-cash consideration.117  
Under the Companies Bill there are no additional requirements for non-cash 
consideration. I criticise this lack of additional protection measures for existing 
shareholders when non-cash consideration is accepted by the board and suggest 
that particulars of non-cash consideration should be disclosed to shareholders.118 
This will enable them to take appropriate action against directors who accept 
inadequate consideration. The provision I recommend appears below.119  
3.4 Timing of capital contribution 
The time when a capital contribution has to be made is of interest to the company 
as well as to existing shareholders.120 A company may not allot and issue shares 
unless it has received the full issue price or other consideration for those 
shares.121 The primary effect of this requirement is that the issue of unpaid or 
partly paid shares is not allowed in South Africa, but this rule also curtails the 
nature of the consideration that may be accepted.122  
All the other systems I include in my comparative study allow unpaid or 
partly paid shares and regulate their legal consequences in varying degrees of 
detail.123 Provision is usually made for the forfeiting of shares to the company 
should the shareholder default in paying up the outstanding amounts when due. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
115  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.2. 
116  CA 1985 s 738(2); CA 2006 s 583(3), see Chapter 2 paragraph 3.2. 
117  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.7.2. See the proposed definition of ‘cash’ in paragraph 8.6 below. 
118  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.7.3. 
119  See paragraph 8.6 and subclause (3) of the provision entitled ‘Consideration for shares’. 
120  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.7.4. 
121  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.4. 
122  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.7.4. 
123  See Chapter 2 paragraph 3.4, Chapter 3 paragraph 3.4, Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.3.4, 3.3.4 
and 4.3.4 and the summary in Chapter 5 paragraph 3.7.4. 
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Restrictions on the transfer of unpaid or partly paid shares are also common. 
Where transfer is not restricted, the liability of the transferor and the position of the 
transferee are usually regulated. Delaware and California regulate the 
participation of unpaid or partly paid shares in more detail and afford partly paid 
shares dividend rights in proportion to the amount paid up on them.124   
The Companies Bill allows unpaid or partly paid shares and regulates their 
implications in detail.125 The basic principle is that shares are regarded as paid up 
to the extent that consideration has been received by the company.126 The 
transfer of unpaid or partly paid shares is restricted as such shares have to be 
placed in trust in the hands of a third party and will be transferred to the 
shareholder when paid. The Companies Bill sets out the default participation 
rights pertaining to shares placed in escrow and their entitlement to distributions, 
but these aspects can be changed in an escrow agreement.127  
Unpaid or partly paid shares should be welcomed as they will provide 
additional flexibility in the area of corporate finance. The proposed regulation 
follows a cautious approach, but nevertheless allows deviation from certain 
elements of the scheme, for example with respect to voting and distribution rights. 
These shares can potentially play an important role in black economic 
empowerment transactions.  
Although I support the proposed provisions, I recommend that provision 
should be made for an adequacy determination by the board where unpaid or 
partly paid shares were issued for cash consideration, but the company later 
agrees to accept future non-cash consideration when a further payment is due.128 
This situation is not covered by the current formulation of clause 40(5) as the 
shares will not originally have been issued for consideration in the form of an 
agreement for future services, benefits or payments. I also recommend, and 
include a proposal, that the familiar concept of a trust should be used instead of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
124  See Chapter 4 paragraphs 2.3.4 and 3.3.4. 
125  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.6.4. 
126  Companies Bill, 2008 clause 40(4). 
127  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 3.6.4 and 3.7.4. 
128  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 3.6.4 and 3.7.4. 
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‘escrow’.129  
3.5 The regulation of commissions 
I discuss the regulation of commission in respect of subscribing or procuring 
subscriptions for shares briefly. I observe that the relevant section is one of the 
very few provisions of the Act expressly limiting the application of funds 
representing issued share capital.130 There is some uncertainty about the 
interpretation of the provision, and I suggest that the correct approach is to regard 
the provision as an exhaustive regulation of commissions, regardless of whether 
the commission is paid out of share capital or other funds.131  
The Companies Bill does not regulate the payment of commission, as this is 
unnecessary in view of the deregulation of share capital and share capital 
accounts. 
4 DISTRIBUTIONS 
The Companies Act does not contain an inclusive definition of ‘distribution’. 
However, the following payments that are regulated in the Companies Act are 
essentially distributions:132 
 
• payments to shareholders for the acquisition of their shares by the 
company 
• payments to shareholders on the redemption of their shares 
• payments to shareholders as interest on their shares 
• payments to shareholders by reason of their shareholding. 
 
Each of these distributions is regulated by separate provisions of the Act.133 
Different financial restrictions apply. The first and last of the above distributions 
_________________________________________________________________ 
129  See paragraph 8.7 below and the subclause (4) of the provision entitled ‘Consideration for 
shares’. 
130  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.5. 
131  See Chapter 5 paragraph 3.5. 
132  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4. 
133  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4. 
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are subject to the solvency and liquidity of the company, following the extensive 
amendments brought about by the Companies Amendment Act of 1999.134 The 
second and third distributions, which were expressly regulated in the Act prior to 
these amendments, continue to be regulated as specific exceptions to the capital 
maintenance principle.135 This fragmentation creates anomalies.136 
In contrast, the Companies Bill contains a comprehensive definition of the 
concept ‘distribution’.137 Three main methods of making distributions are 
identified, namely: 
• a transfer of money or property 
• the incurrence of an obligation 
• the forgiveness or waiver of an obligation  
As well as setting out these methods, the definition provides a list of examples of 
distributions and also expressly excludes certain transactions from the ambit of 
the definition.138 
I identify some similarities between the proposed definition in the Companies 
Bill and the definitions of the New Zealand Companies Act and the MBCA. I note 
that the third method, which is not mentioned expressly in these other two 
definitions, will be useful as it covers the waiver of a claim for outstanding 
consideration on unpaid or partly paid shares.139  
I criticise certain aspects of the proposed definition. First, I assert that the 
indiscriminate extension of the definition to the group context is undesirable. The 
extension may have the undesirable consequence of affecting transactions which 
are clearly not in the nature of distributions, for example the acquisition by a 
holding company of further shares in its subsidiary.140  
Despite an analysis of comprehensive definitions of ‘distribution’ in other 
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134  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 4, 5 and 6. 
135  See Chapter 5 paragraphs 5.7 and 6.8. 
136  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4. 
137  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3. 
138  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3. 
139  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3. 
140  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3. 
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jurisdictions no precedent can be found for a general extension to all companies 
within a group. The Californian definition expressly includes distributions by a 
subsidiary,141 while one of the purposes of the inclusion of an indirect transfer in 
the MBCA definition is to regulate aspects of repurchases by a subsidiary.142  
I recommend that the definition of ‘distribution’ should be restricted to 
distributions by a company to its own shareholders, whether directly or 
indirectly.143 In addition, the acquisition by a subsidiary of shares in its holding 
company should be expressly regulated, preferably in a separate provision.144 In 
my view the notion of an indirect distribution sufficiently covers any other group 
transactions that may amount to distributions.   
A second criticism I raise against the proposed definition is that it does not 
expressly require the distribution to be ‘in respect of’ or ‘by reason of’ the 
shareholding of the shareholder, except in one of the specific examples of a 
distribution.145 I propose that such a qualification should be inserted.146  
Third, with reference to the express exclusion of appraisal payments from 
the definition, I criticise the incoherent regulation of appraisal payments and 
payments for shares in terms of a court order.147 I submit that the interests of 
creditors should enjoy priority over those of dissenting shareholders. Payments 
under the proposed appraisal remedy should be subject to the financial 
restrictions just like payments to shareholders in terms of a court order.148  
4.1 Financial restrictions for distributions 
Although the Act does not subject all distributions to the same financial 
restrictions, the solvency and liquidity test can be described as the general rule 
because it applies to the most common forms of distributions, namely ‘payments’ 
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141  See Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.1.  
142  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.1. 
143  See also paragraph 8.8 below. 
144  See also paragraph 8.14 below. 
145  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4. 
146  See paragraph 8.8 and subparagraphs (b) – (c) of the recommended definition of 
‘distribution’. 
147  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4. 
148  See paragraph 8.8 and the recommended definition of ‘distribution’. 
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and share repurchases. In both instances payment may not be made if there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that after the payment the company’s liabilities 
will exceed its assets or that it will not be able to pay its debts as they become 
due in the ordinary course of business. 
I observe that the way in which the solvency and liquidity test is formulated 
imposes a negative rather than a positive duty on the company.149 This is 
because payment is allowed in principle, unless there are reasonable grounds to 
believe that the company is insolvent or will be unable to pay its debts. 
The other jurisdictions that subject distributions to a solvency and liquidity 
test all impose a positive duty on the company or its directors to enquire into the 
financial position of the company when making a distribution.150 The positive 
action that will be required of directors in relation to the resolution acknowledging 
application of the solvency and liquidity test is an improvement, provided that the 
acknowledgement is not used as the final determinant of enforceability of a 
distribution.151 
I have already criticised the proposed inclusion in the solvency element of 
the ‘consolidated assets of the company’ where the company making the 
distribution is a member of a group of companies.152 It appears from the context 
that the intention was to refer to the consolidated assets of a group of companies. 
However, the group aspect is taken too far, especially if the subsidiary is partially 
owned and its financial affairs not integrated with those of the holding company.153 
The difficulties are aggravated by the wide definition of distribution in the group 
context. I recommend that both the definition and the financial restrictions should 
be reconsidered.  
4.1.1 Reasonable grounds for believing 
The existence or not of reasonable grounds to believe that a certain state of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
149  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.1.1. 
150  For the position in England see Chapter 2 paragraph 6.2.2; for New Zealand see Chapter 3 
paragraph 4.3; for California see Chapter 4 paragraph 3.4.2; for the MBCA see Chapter 4 
paragraph 4.4.2.  
151  See paragraph 6.5 below. 
152  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.2. 
153  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.2. 
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affairs will exist immediately after payment, must be objectively assessed in 
applying the financial restrictions of the Act.154 Under the Companies Bill, the 
validity of a distribution will also not depend on actual solvency and liquidity but on 
the reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the company.155  
I submit that the validity or lawfulness of a distribution should depend on 
whether the company in fact satisfies the financial restrictions when it makes the 
distribution. If the requirements are not met, the amount of the distribution should 
be recoverable from the recipient shareholders. The liability of directors, on the 
other hand, should depend on their conduct when applying the test.156  
A distinction between the lawfulness and recoverability of a distribution and 
the liability of directors is also made in England,157 New Zealand and under the 
MBCA. I make suggestions regarding the solvency and liquidity test as well as the 
liability provision.158  
4.1.2 The liquidity element 
All the systems that have abolished capital maintenance include a liquidity 
element as part of the financial restrictions for distributions. But there are subtle 
differences between the various jurisdictions. A time period may be specified as is 
the case in England where a solvency declaration is required for certain 
distributions from capital.159 However, in all the other systems, including South 
Africa, no time period is prescribed.160 The Companies Bill proposes to introduce 
a 12 month period.161 While a specific limitation can provide directors with more 
certainty when they have to make a statutory declaration as required under the 
Companies Bill, I advise against introducing a specific time period. Creditors of 
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154  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.1.1. 
155  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.1. 
156  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.1.1. 
157  See Chapter 2 paragraph  
158  See paragraph 8.10 below for the proposed solvency and liquidity test. See paragraph 8.11 
regarding liability. 
159  See Chapter 2 paragraph 6.2.2. Although England still applies the capital maintenance 
doctrine, a repurchase from capital is one of the exceptions to that principle. 
160  Although the JSE Limited Listings Requirements prescribe a 12-month period, see chapter 5 
paragraph 4.1.2. 
161  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.3. 
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companies with clearly foreseeable longer-term commitments may be 
disadvantaged by a 12 month limit, especially when extraordinary distributions are 
being made. The ordinary course of business of different companies may 
reasonably require a shorter- or longer-term projection to be made. 
I also propose that claims in respect of distributions that are enforceable 
subject to solvency and liquidity should be excluded expressly as they are not due 
in the ordinary course of business.162  
4.1.3  The solvency element 
A solvency element is an integral part of the financial restrictions of all the 
jurisdictions that have adopted alternatives to the capital maintenance or legal 
capital doctrine. In comparison with solvency requirements applicable in other 
jurisdictions, the South African balance sheet test is relatively lenient because it 
does not provide for any margin over solvency.163 In most of the systems 
surveyed there is a margin equal to the liquidation preferences of preferent 
shareholders. While the purpose is to protect preferent shareholders, creditors 
benefit at the same time. It is also obvious that the South African financial 
restrictions are out of step with international trends in the protection of preference 
shareholders.164 I recommend that the liquidation preferences of preferred classes 
of shareholders should be taken into account under the solvency element as a 
default option, unless the company’s constitution expressly provides otherwise. I 
do not agree with the approach in the Companies Bill which requires express 
provision to be made for the protection of preferent shareholders. 
The manner in which the solvency of a company must be determined is not 
prescribed in the Act. In New Zealand165 and under the MBCA,166 approved and 
audited financial statements must be used. This is also proposed in the 
Companies Bill, although the specific provision is somewhat ambiguous.167 While 
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162  See paragraph 8.10 and subclause (2) of the provision there. 
163  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.1.3. 
164  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.1.3. 
165  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.2. 
166  See Chapter 4 paragraph 4.4.2. 
167  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.4. 
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it is a good idea to consider the information in properly prepared accounts, the 
validity of a distribution should ultimately depend on the actual solvency of the 
company at the time the distribution is made. Directors who know that the 
company has suffered a loss since the time reflected in the financial statements 
should also not be able to escape liability. I will recommend a provision clarifying 
this issue.168  
4.1.4 The timing for the application of the financial restrictions 
The solvency and liquidity test must be satisfied at the time when payment, in the 
sense of an actual transfer of money or property, takes place.169  
Among the solvency and liquidity jurisdictions surveyed, South Africa is the 
only one consistently to apply the financial restrictions at the time of actual 
payment or transfer.170 The date of authorisation is used for all distributions in 
New Zealand171 and for certain distributions in California and the MBCA.172 The 
time of application of the test also has an influence on the status of the 
shareholder’s claim in respect of the distribution. 
As a result of the inclusion of the incurring of a debt or obligation in the 
definition of ‘distribution’, the Companies Bill also introduces a specific timing rule 
stating that the distribution takes effect when the incurring of an obligation or debt 
is authorised.173 
The general rule is that a distribution may not be made unless it appears that 
the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test ‘immediately after 
completing the proposed distribution’.174 When the company intends to ‘make’ a 
‘proposed’ distribution, the board must pass a resolution acknowledging its 
satisfaction that the company will comply with the test. However, the 120 day rule 
which has become necessary as a result of the requirement of a formal 
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168  See paragraph 8.11 and subclause (1)(b) of the proposed provision entitled ‘Liability for 
distributions in violation of solvency and liquidity test’. 
169  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.2. 
170  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.2. 
171  See Chapter 3 paragraph 4.3. 
172  See Chapter 4 paragraphs 3.4.3 and 4.4.3. 
173  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.5. 
174  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.5.  
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acknowledgement by the directors, detracts from this principle.175 I recommend 
that the 120 day rule should be relevant for the formal acknowledgement by 
directors only, but that the actual enforceability of the distribution should not 
depend on it.176  
I submit that a company should be prohibited from proceeding with a 
distribution if the directors are no longer satisfied that the company’s financial 
situation allows it.177  
5 DIVIDENDS AND OTHER PAYMENTS BY REASON OF SHAREHOLDING 
Section 90 allows the distribution of the net assets of a company and so has 
abolished the capital maintenance doctrine.178 Although the solvency test in 
section 90(2)(a) is less restrictive than the common-law test for dividends, the 
liquidity test added a new dimension to the financial restrictions in comparison 
with the common law.179  
 The definition of ‘payment’ includes dividends in the narrow as well as in the 
wide sense. However, it is uncertain to what extent common-law rules as well as 
existing arrangements in company articles pertaining to ‘dividends’ apply to 
‘payments’, particularly when a payment would not have been lawful at common 
law.180 This uncertainty may have a negative impact on preference shareholders 
in particular. To solve this problem I recommend a statutory definition of 
‘dividend’, similar to the one in the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993, coupled 
with a proportionality requirement.181  
The common-law position of shareholders following the declaration of a 
dividend has been affected by the new financial restrictions.182 Because the 
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175  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.3.1.6. See also paragraph 6.5 below on the problem with 
enforceability. 
176  See paragraph 8.9 and subclauses (2) – (4) of the proposed provision entitled ‘Making of 
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financial restrictions apply at the time of actual payment, the shareholder will 
obtain a contingent claim when the dividend is declared. The position is similar to 
that in respect of unpaid consideration for the acquisition of shares, although the 
enforceability of section 90 payments is not regulated by statute.183  
The failure to impose express statutory liability on directors for unlawful 
payments under section 90 is out of step with the position that obtains to 
repurchases. It is also out of step with international trends.184 I recommend that 
the liability of directors and shareholders should be regulated in the same way as 
in respect of unlawful repurchases.185  
The additional procedural requirements applicable to repurchases in 
comparison with payments under section 90 are justified by the fact that the latter 
do not involve the alteration or subrogation of the rights of the shareholders. I 
assert that payments under section 90 have to comply with the principle of 
equality or proportionality in their effect on shareholders unless the company’s 
articles provide otherwise. 
The proposals of the Companies Bill will contribute to solving this dilemma, 
because the Bill contains a comprehensive definition of ‘distribution’ and provides 
for equal rights within a class unless the memorandum expressly provides 
otherwise.186 The memorandum must also set out the rights and preferences of 
each class of shares in respect of ‘distributions’ rather than ‘dividends’.187 When 
the model provisions for a memorandum of incorporation are drafted, it might be a 
good idea for them to provide for a distinction in formalities between ‘regular’ 
distributions out of profits and other distributions like returns of capital or non-cash 
distributions, as this will alert shareholders to distributions in respect of which 
there may be an increased risk of repayment.188  
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6 SHARE REPURCHASES 
Although the term share repurchase is generally used to describe a transaction 
under section 85, the section applies to the ‘acquisition’ by a company of its own 
shares.189  
6.1 Power to acquire shares 
The meaning of the word ‘acquisition’ in section 85 is not defined.190 This raises 
questions about the proper application of sections 85 to 88 to acquisitions that 
were possible at common law or in terms of the Act prior to the 1999 
amendments. These include acquisitions for no consideration, redemptions of 
redeemable preference shares and the acquisition of shares in compliance with a 
court order under section 252. I regard the possibility that such acquisitions may 
have become subject to regulation under section 85 as untenable. I conclude that 
the legislature probably did not intend to subject such acquisitions to the 
requirements of sections 85 to 88, but suggest that this uncertainty should be 
cleared up by expressly excluding these other acquisitions from the ambit of the 
general repurchase or acquisition provision.  
The Companies Bill also does not define ‘acquisition’ of shares. Although 
redemptions and acquisitions under court orders are clearly regarded as 
distributions, there are conflicting indications in the Companies Bill as to whether 
they are also acquisitions.191 On the other hand, the ‘surrender’ of shares under 
the appraisal remedy is neither a distribution nor an acquisition. The Companies 
Bill is also silent on the acquisition by a company of its own shares for no 
consideration.  
I think that a definition of ‘acquisition’ is necessary.192 The effect of the 
definition on related provisions like those regulating the status of acquired shares 
should also be considered.193 
I also recommend that the repurchase by a subsidiary of shares in its holding 
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company or in a co-subsidiary should be regulated in a separate provision.194 
6.2 Financial restrictions for repurchases 
The main function of the common-law prohibition against the purchase by a 
company of its own shares is to protect the creditors of the company against the 
diminution of the company’s capital.195 One of the primary objectives in regulating 
share repurchases is to find an alternative protection mechanism for creditors. 
The approach adopted in the Companies Act is to protect creditors through the 
financial restrictions of solvency and liquidity.196  
Although a prohibition against repurchases is commonly associated with the 
capital maintenance doctrine, share repurchases are nevertheless allowed in both 
the systems surveyed that still rely on capital maintenance. In England, shares 
may be repurchased upon the same terms as redemptions or, in the case of 
private companies, even from capital.197 Delaware allows repurchases out of 
profits or as part of a reduction of capital.198  
While most of the requirements of section 85 apply to acquisitions in general, 
the financial restrictions of solvency and liquidity apply only when the acquisition 
involves a payment by the company. Although the concept of a payment is not 
defined for purposes of section 85(4), the provision refers to payment ‘in whatever 
form’. It appears from the context that consideration in the form of money or 
property is envisaged.199 This wider interpretation of ‘payment’ is also in line with 
the definition of payment in section 90(3) of the Act.  
I raise the possibility of an exception to facilitate the acquisition of shares of 
deceased or disabled shareholders out of the proceeds of an insurance policy 
payable to a company,200 and recommend a provision based on the example in 
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California.201 
6.3 Procedure and other requirements 
While compliance with the financial restrictions protects the interests of creditors, 
the procedural aspects of share repurchases can safeguard shareholders against 
abuse of the repurchase power. Two main approaches emerged from the 
comparative study. One the one hand Commonwealth jurisdictions tend to 
prescribe the procedure by statute, focusing on proper authorisation and 
disclosure. Jurisdictions in the USA on the other hand, prefer to base shareholder 
protection on general principles focusing on directors’ fiduciary duties, although 
abuses associated with particular types of repurchases, such as greenmail, are 
regulated at federal level. 
South Africa opted for the statutory regulation of the procedure, but it is 
sometimes difficult to establish which requirements apply to a particular 
acquisition of shares.202  
The procedures for repurchases of listed and unlisted shares diverge in 
important respects.203 The more extensive regulation in respect of listed shares 
offers better protection to shareholders and is in line with the international trend of 
distinguishing between repurchases on the basis of the risk they entail from a 
shareholder protection perspective.204 
The Companies Act makes provision for a pro rata or self-tender offer 
procedure. It prescribes the information that must be disclosed to shareholders 
when they are invited to offer their shares to the company and obliges the 
company to acquire shares as far as possible on a pro rata basis if more shares 
are offered.205 
I assert that minority shareholders are not adequately protected against 
selective repurchases. Despite an attempt by the legislature to correct an earlier 
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error with regard to when the pro rata offer procedure should be followed, the 
procedure with its onerous disclosure and liability provisions can be avoided by 
manipulating the kind of approval.206 Also, minority shareholders can be coerced 
into selling their shares back to the company if the required majority gives a 
specific approval. While the Act apparently does not exclude coercive 
repurchases, the JSE Limited Listings Requirements clearly require that as a 
general rule shareholders be given a free choice, even in the case of odd-lot 
offers.207  
The Companies Bill proposes to relax the procedure and contains no 
prescriptions on the steps that should be followed.208 I argue that specific attention 
should be given to the protection of shareholders in selective repurchases. The 
legislation should draw a proper distinction between different kinds of acquisitions 
and clearly state the procedural requirements applicable to each. A distinction 
between self-tender offers, selective repurchases and general repurchases is 
necessary. The opportunity of manipulating the procedure to the detriment of 
minority shareholders should be eliminated. 
An interesting question I consider is whether, in view of the similarities 
between share repurchases and reductions of capital, 209 the common-law 
principles on fair treatment of shareholders in a reduction of capital will also be 
applicable to share repurchases.210 I conclude that it is best to avoid any doubt in 
this regard by providing statutory protection.211 
6.3.1 Authorisation and procedural steps 
Together with authorisation in the articles, approval by special resolution 
constitutes the main protection mechanism for shareholders.212 I argue that the 
requirement of authority in the articles does not enhance the protection of 
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shareholders because the articles can be altered by the same majority that can 
pass the special resolution approving a repurchase.213 
Although the Companies Bill proposes that a repurchase of shares must be 
authorised by the board of directors,214 it does not prescribe any authorisation or 
approval of distributions by the general meeting. I submit that the requirements of 
clauses 46 and 48 and the duties imposed on directors will not adequately protect 
shareholders against the risks inherent in repurchases, and in particular, selective 
repurchases.215 
The comparative analysis reveals that approval by special resolution is a 
requirement for off-market share repurchases in England while an ordinary 
resolution is sufficient for market repurchases.216 In New Zealand shareholder 
approval is not required for pro rata offers to all shareholders, but for selective 
offers either the written consent of all shareholders or express permission in the 
company’s constitution is required.217 Shareholder approval is not required in 
Delaware, California or under the MBCA.218 I explain that procedural aspects of 
repurchases are regulated at federal level in the USA, in certain instances also in 
respect of unregistered securities.219 The courts in the USA have over the years 
also had the opportunity of developing the application of general principles of 
company law to the share repurchase situation.  
In view of the concern regarding the fairness of share repurchases to 
minority shareholders, I propose that selective repurchases should be subject to 
shareholder approval by special resolution, after full disclosure.220 The votes of 
the vendor-shareholders should be excluded. It should also be made clear that 
shareholders cannot be coerced into selling their shares to the company, except 
under a scheme of arrangement.    
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Although selective repurchases have a greater potential for abuse, 
proportionate repurchases in a specific class of shareholders can also result in 
unfair treatment among different classes. Shareholder approval should be 
prescribed also for proportionate acquisitions or self-tender offers, as an 
alternative to authorisation in the company’s constitution.221 This could be an 
ordinary resolution, but the interests of classes of shareholders that do not 
generally confer the right to vote should be taken into account. It should be made 
clear that preference shareholders will have voting rights when their class of 
shares or the shares of any class ranking behind them with regard to the return of 
capital are being repurchased.222 
The legislature’s attempt at protecting shareholders by providing for a pro 
rata tender offer procedure has been unsuccessful because the prescribed 
procedure can be avoided by simply designating the approval as a specific 
approval. At the same time poor legal drafting has resulted in removing the 
flexibility of a general repurchase authority. 
The JSE Limited Listings Requirements are more effective in protecting 
shareholders. The distinction it makes between different kinds of repurchases 
facilitates the imposition of appropriate shareholder protection mechanisms while 
flexibility is nevertheless retained. 
I criticise the complete freedom of procedure allowed by the Companies Bill. 
While this approach is also found in state legislation in America, it is qualified 
there by the existence of general principles that have been developed over years. 
In the absence of well-developed common-law principles on fair treatment of 
shareholders in a repurchase, I recommend that South Africa enacts statutory 
protection. I think that the New Zealand principles applicable to selective 
repurchases provide a suitable example.223 Accordingly, I propose specific 
disclosure requirements in addition to shareholder approval.224  
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6.3.2 Other formalities 
When shares have been acquired, the Registrar must be notified. This rule 
applies to listed and unlisted shares alike.225 The JSE Limited prescribes various 
additional formalities, including announcements of acquisitions made.226 However, 
in view of the proposed deregulation of share capital accounts, I submit that 
notifying the Registrar is unnecessary, but that shareholders of all companies 
should also be informed when the directors have acquired shares in terms of a 
general repurchase power.227  
6.3.3 Adjustments to capital accounts 
Although it appears obvious that a company must adjust its share capital accounts 
when it cancels the shares it acquired, the Act expressly regulates the adjustment 
of share capital accounts.228 I point out that similar adjustments are not expressly 
required for an acquisition through the redemption of shares. When the court 
orders a repurchase of shares by a company under section 252 it has the power 
to direct the reduction of the company's share capital as a consequence of the 
acquisition, although the exact adjustments that may be required are not 
prescribed.  
I identify several uncertainties and anomalies regarding the application of the 
statutory non-distributable reserves to provide for a premium on the repurchase of 
shares.229 But, in view of the proposal to abolish par value shares and deregulate 
share capital accounts, specific recommendations in this regard are unnecessary. 
6.4 Liability for unlawful repurchases 
Holding directors accountable for unlawful distributions and providing for the 
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recovery from shareholders of amounts they received in violation of the financial 
restrictions is an integral part of the regulation of repurchases as well as other 
distributions. I discuss the issue under share repurchases because the provisions 
of the Act in this regard are more comprehensive than is the case with section 90 
payments.230 
6.4.1 Directors 
Directors who allow a company to make a payment for the acquisition of its 
shares at a time when there is reason to believe that the company is insolvent or 
unable to pay its debts are jointly and severally liable to restore the amount to the 
company to the extent that it has not been recovered.231 
The basis of liability is that the director ‘allowed’ an unlawful payment and I 
assert that a director must at least be aware of the payment and of the adverse 
financial position of the company before liability can arise.232 The director will also 
have to have neglected her duty to prevent the unlawful payment. Although it is 
difficult to think of circumstances where a director who is prima facie liable will 
nevertheless be able to prove the requirements for relief by the court, this 
possibility is expressly preserved by the liability provision.233  
The Act does not provide for liability of directors in respect of non-
compliance with the authorisation and other procedural requirements for 
repurchases. Also, the Act does not provide for director liability when section 90-
payments are made in violation of the financial restrictions. Such liability will be 
determined in terms of the common law. The Companies Bill provides for statutory 
liability of directors regardless of the type of distribution involved, but once again 
in respect of non-compliance with the financial restrictions only.234  
It is a common trend in the jurisdictions surveyed to base directors’ liability 
not merely on the actual insolvency or illiquidity of the company but rather on their 
failure to exercise due diligence when considering the financial position of the 
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company. I criticise the proposals of the Companies Bill which consider only the 
participation of directors at the time of authorisation of a distribution.235 I submit 
that liability should be imposed for implementing a distribution in violation of the 
financial restrictions.  
The extent of a director’s liability depends on recovery from shareholders 
and the contribution of co-directors. I argue that a director who has already 
extinguished this liability to the company should have a direct right of recourse 
against shareholders. Such a director must also be refunded if the company 
subsequently recovers payment from a shareholder.236 The current provisions 
appear not to allow this. 
6.4.2 Shareholders 
The Companies Act provides that directors who are liable for an unlawful payment 
can institute proceedings to compel a vendor-shareholder to restore the payment 
to the company.237 Creditors can also seek a court order against the shareholder 
or former shareholder for the return of the consideration to the company.238 
The options available to the court are set out in some detail in relation to 
proceedings brought by creditors, but not by directors.239 I think that this 
discrepancy should be addressed by the legislature. Unfortunately there have not 
been any reported cases to indicate how a court will exercise its discretion when 
asked to make an order against shareholders. 
The Act does not provide exceptions to the liability of shareholders and it can 
be assumed that they will be liable regardless of their good faith. This approach 
corresponds with the treatment of dispositions without value, which includes 
distributions to shareholders, under the insolvency legislation.240 
I explain that in New Zealand, California and under the MBCA shareholders 
are not liable under companies legislation if they were unaware of the violation of 
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the financial restrictions or acted in good faith, although they may have to restore 
the payment under insolvency law or fraudulent conveyance law.241  
The Companies Bill does not expressly regulate the liability of shareholders 
for distributions in violation of the financial restrictions. Liability is implied by the 
reference in the director liability provisions to the amount that may have been 
recovered from shareholders.242 The intention appears to be that shareholders will 
be liable even if they received the consideration in good faith. Such an approach 
obviously creates uncertainty for shareholders, but it is suggested that the scale 
should be tipped in favour of creditor rights. If a large group of shareholders who 
received a distribution in good faith are allowed to retain the unlawful payment, 
thereby increasing the potential liability of a few directors, the chances of 
successful recovery may be compromised.243 Despite the practical difficulties that 
may arise from the recovery of distributions, I recommend that shareholders 
should be liable in respect of any distribution received in violation of the financial 
restrictions.244 
6.5 Enforceability of contracts for the acquisition of own shares 
A contract for the repurchase of shares is enforceable, except to the extent that 
the company cannot perform without breaching the financial restrictions. In a 
subsequent liquidation the claim will rank before the claims to the return of capital 
of remaining shareholders of that class, but after the claims of creditors and 
preferent shareholders.245 This arrangement was seen as exceptional in view of 
the fact that the interests of preferent shareholders are not taken into account 
when distributions are made during the existence of the company.246 My only 
criticism against this rule is that it does not also apply to redemptions. 
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I criticise the proposals of the Companies Bill on enforceability and identify 
four difficulties.247 First, there is tension between the provisions dealing with the 
basic requirements for distributions, the acknowledgement by directors, and the 
enforceability of distributions. I argue that the requirement that a distribution must 
be fully carried out once the directors have made an acknowledgement cannot be 
reconciled with the basic requirements for distributions. Second, the Companies 
Bill does not deal with the ranking of an unpaid distribution, and in particular a 
claim in respect of a share repurchase agreement, in an ensuing liquidation. 
Third, I view the requirement that the company is obliged to approach the court for 
relief in certain circumstances as unnecessary. Fourth, the Companies Bill allows 
a company to resist the enforcement of repurchases on certain non-financial 
grounds that are within its own control or that it can rectify. I make several 
suggestions for the regulation of the enforceability of share repurchase 
contracts.248  
6.6 The status of repurchased shares 
With regard to the requirement that shares acquired by the company should be 
cancelled ‘forthwith’, I assert that the cancellation will coincide with the moment 
when the shares are no longer held by the shareholder. This means that the 
company will not acquire its own shares in a literal sense.  
The peremptory cancellation of shares acquired by a company under section 
85 means that the shares cannot be held as treasury shares.249  
There are many problems and risks associated with treasury shares, not 
least of which are serious conceptual difficulties.250 However, treasury shares are 
allowed in Delaware and to a limited extent in England and New Zealand. The 
risks are addressed in considerable detail in the English legislation and regulatory 
scheme.251  
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It is my opinion that treasury shares should not be allowed in South Africa.252  
6.7  Acquisitions by a subsidiary 
The South African regulation of acquisitions by subsidiaries occupies a middle 
ground between the complete prohibitions in England and New Zealand and the 
absence of any restrictions in the American systems. 
I criticise several aspects of the regulation of acquisitions by subsidiaries of 
shares in their holding companies. The main problem is that the provisions do not 
distinguish between the acquisition of shares on the one hand and the holding of 
shares on the other.253 Legislative intervention is necessary in order to exclude 
the voting rights of any shares a subsidiary holds in its holding company. Clarity is 
also needed with regard to the proper application of the ten per cent limit and 
whether the subsidiary, the holding company, or both should comply with the 
requirements for repurchases, like authorisation and the financial restrictions.254 It 
should also be stated whether subsidiaries can subscribe for shares in their 
holding companies.  
The Companies Bill avoids the confusion between the acquisition and the 
holding of shares, but does not state whether the subsidiary, the holding 
company, or both, should comply with the requirements.255 It also does not 
regulate the consequences should the ten per cent limit be exceeded. 
The difficulties alluded to can be solved by prescribing exactly how the 
requirements should apply when a subsidiary is acquiring shares in its holding 
company. It is better to do this in a separate provision rather than in the same 
provision that regulates the acquisition of own shares. 
However, the question whether cross-holdings should be allowed at all 
needs to be considered first. The comparative study shows that the acquisition of 
shares by a subsidiary in its holding company is prohibited in New Zealand and in 
England. The main objection against cross-holdings is the depletion in apparent 
capital. Apart from this, there is the risk of dividend round-tripping and 
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manipulation of share prices. When a subsidiary purchases the shares of its 
holding company it can dilute the value of the interests of the remaining 
shareholders in the holding company. If the subsidiary is not wholly-owned, its 
own minority shareholders may be disadvantaged. These objections also apply to 
the acquisition by a subsidiary of shares in any co-subsidiary which holds shares 
in itself.  
I recommend that a subsidiary should not be allowed to acquire shares in its 
holding company or in any co-subsidiary which holds shares in it.256 
However, if this is allowed, it should be made clear that the subsidiary as 
well as the holding company should satisfy the financial restrictions. The 
repurchase should also be approved by the shareholders of the holding company 
and, if it is a selective repurchase, the vendor-shareholders should not be allowed 
to vote. Unless the subsidiary is wholly-owned, the repurchase should be 
approved by its shareholders except the holding company, its subsidiaries, and 
any vendor-shareholder of the holding company who also holds shares in the 
subsidiary. Provision should be made for the disposal or cancellation of shares 
held in excess of the ten per cent limit.  
Although I support an outright prohibition on cross-holdings, some 
recommendations regarding repurchases by subsidiaries are set out below as an 
alternative.257 
6.8 The redemption of shares 
I observe that the redemption of shares in South Africa is still regulated in the 
same manner as under the capital maintenance doctrine.258 In systems based on 
solvency and liquidity the redemption of shares is included in the definition of 
distribution and subjected to the same financial restrictions. I recommend that the 
diverging rules for redemption and repurchase of shares should not be 
retained.259 In particular, the same financial restrictions should apply to both 
options. It also makes sense to distinguish between redemptions at the option of 
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the company and other redemptions as far as the procedural issues are 
concerned. An example of this is found in New Zealand where the procedural 
requirements for redemptions at the option of the company are the same as those 
for repurchases.260 I also recommend that the power to repurchase redeemable 
shares prior to the redemption date should be regulated expressly, as is the case 
in England and Delaware.261 
Under the Companies Bill redemptions are treated as a specific form of 
acquisition of own shares, the only difference between the redemption and 
repurchase of shares being that the former will take place in terms of an existing 
legal obligation of the company while the latter must be authorised by the 
board.262 Presumably redemption at the option of the company will be regarded as 
a distribution that has to be authorised by the directors. I suggest that this issue 
should be addressed expressly.263  
7 CONCLUSIONS AND KEY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A complex body of provisions rigidly regulate the composition and adjustment of 
share capital accounts and so-called non-distributable reserve accounts. This 
complexity can be attributed mainly to the co-existence of par value and no par 
value shares. The fact that the relevant provisions are scattered throughout the 
Companies Act is a contributing factor. 
Despite their complexity, the rules regarding the formation of share capital 
do not afford creditors significant protection. While these accounts previously 
formed the basis of the regulation of distributions to shareholders, this is no longer 
the case. These rules can be justified only with regard to their impact on 
shareholders. 
Shareholders have a direct interest in the proper apportioning of their relative 
rights. The share capital accounts can play an important role in this regard. 
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However, due to the very limited correlation between statutory undistributable 
reserves and the interests of specific shareholders, these accounts are of little 
relevance to shareholders. 
 Shareholders also have an interest in the preservation of shareholder value 
and voting power and can expect some protection against the dilution of their 
shareholding when further shares are issued. However, the current protection 
mechanisms that ignore market value are ineffective. Alternative measures of 
protecting shareholders can be more flexible and efficient than the current 
provisions. I mention pre-emptive rights and shareholder approval for certain 
share issues. These measures can supplement the protection offered by the 
regulation of share capital and capital contributions. 
Although the capital invested in a company and the returns on it belong to 
the company, the shareholders expect a return on the capital contribution they 
made. Distributions to shareholders are regulated because they can endanger the 
effectiveness of the hierarchy among creditors and shareholders. Distributions 
also highlight problems of equal treatment of shareholders of the same class and 
fairness among different classes of shareholders. 
The protection of creditors is achieved by the imposition of financial 
restrictions. Provided a company remains solvent and able to pay its debts as 
they become due, the interests of creditors are safe. Shareholders with preferent 
rights can also be protected by financial restrictions that take into account these 
preferential rights. South African law lags behind important jurisdictions in 
providing protection to preferent shareholders. 
While there is a basic principle of equality or proportionality among 
shareholders, it is not always practical to adhere to it when distributions are made. 
Flexibility should be allowed, but subject to proper safeguards to protect 
shareholders. The protective measures employed are based on the consent of 
shareholders, either through authorisation in the company’s constitution or 
through resolutions, enhanced by disclosure and fiduciary duties.  
I conclude that: 
• Companies should be required to state their authorised capital. 
• It should be required that a company should always have at least one 
issued share that has the right to vote on any matter that arises for 
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decision at a general meeting, and at least one share that has the right 
to share in distributions without restriction. This can be the same share. 
• Shares should not have a par value. 
• The composition and adjustment of share capital accounts should not 
be regulated by the Companies Act. 
• The minimum capital contribution in respect of shares should not be 
prescribed, but directors should be required to declare that the agreed 
consideration is fair to the company. 
• There should be maximum flexibility regarding the size, form and timing 
of capital contributions. 
• Particulars of non-cash capital contributions should be disclosed to 
shareholders. 
• The concept ‘distribution’ should be properly defined. 
• Distributions should be subject to compliance with a solvency and 
liquidity test 
• Distributions should in principle be proportionate and any exceptions to 
this principle should be expressly sanctioned. 
• The preferential liquidation rights of shareholders should be regarded 
as liabilities whenever distributions are made to lower ranking classes. 
• Any selective distributions within a class of shares should be subject to 
specific shareholder approval, following proper disclosure, and the 
voting rights of the recipient shareholders should be excluded. 
8 PROPOSED PROVISIONS 
I set out a number of proposed provisions, preceded by short explanations for 
each group of provisions. As I do not number these provisions, cross-referencing 
between sections is not possible. However, the relationship between different 
provisions should be reasonably clear. I have adopted terminology from the 
Companies Bill, for example 'Memorandum of Incorporation', and these provisions 
are designed to fit into the broad framework of the Companies Bill. 
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8.1 Kinds of shares  
Shares should not have a par value. In this regard I propose the following 
provision, based on clause 35(1), (2) and (6) of the Companies Bill. Clause 35 
deals with a number of issues, some of which apply to shares in general, some to 
authorised shares and others to issued shares. This may make it difficult to find 
specific provisions. I also propose that the transferability of shares should 
expressly be made subject to compliance with the memorandum of association. 
Existing par value shares should be converted with preservation of their rights.264 
Legal nature of company shares 
(1) A share issued by a company is movable property, transferable in any 
manner provided for or recognised by this Act or other legislation and in 
accordance with the Memorandum of Incorporation. 
(2) A share does not have a nominal or par value, subject to subsection (3). 
(3) Par value shares in existence at the date of commencement of this Act retain 
their par value pending their conversion into shares without par value, as far 
as possible preserving their relative rights and preferences, in accordance 
with regulations issued by the Minister. 
8.2 Authorised capital 
A company should set out its authorised share capital in its Memorandum of 
Incorporation which should be altered whenever it varies its share capital.265 The 
following proposed provision is based on clause s 36, 35(4), 35(5) and 37(3) of 
the Companies Bill.  
 
Authorisation of shares 
(1) A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation must set out the classes of 
shares, and the number of shares of each class, that the company is 
authorised to issue;  
_________________________________________________________________ 
264  See paragraph 2.3 above. 
265  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
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(2) Any reference by a company on a letterhead, invoice or other trading 
document to the number of authorised shares shall be qualified by stating the 
number of issued shares and the extent to which they have been paid up. 
Rights associated with shares 
(1) If a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation has established - 
(a) only 1 class of shares –  
(i) those shares confer the right to vote on every matter that may be 
decided by shareholders of the company; and 
(ii) those shares entitle their holders to receive the net assets of the 
company upon its liquidation; or 
(b) more than 1 class of shares, the Memorandum of Incorporation must 
provide that –  
(i) at least 1 of those classes of shares has voting rights that may be 
exercised on any particular matter that may be submitted for a 
decision to shareholders of the company; and  
(ii) the holders of at least 1 of those classes of shares, which may be 
the same class or classes as contemplated in the paragraph (b)(i), 
are entitled to receive the net assets of the company upon its 
liquidation. 
(2) Subject to paragraph (b) of this subsection a company’s Memorandum of 
Incorporation  
(a) must set out, with respect to each class of shares –  
(i) a distinguishing designation for that class; and  
(ii) the preferences, rights, limitations and other terms associated with 
that class, subject to paragraph (d); 
(b) may authorise a number of unclassified shares, which are subject to 
classification by the board in accordance with subsection (3)(c); and 
(c) may set out a class of shares -  
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(i) without specifying the associated preferences, rights, limitations or 
other terms of that class; 
(ii) for which the board must determine the associated preferences, 
rights, limitations or other terms; and 
(iii) which must not be issued until the board has determined the 
associated preferences, rights, limitations or other terms, as 
contemplated in sub-paragraph (ii). 
8.3 Variation of share capital 
Provision should be made for the variation of share capital, but these provisions 
should be less complex than those in the current section 75 which also regulates 
share capital accounts. Companies should be afforded maximum freedom to 
order their internal affairs. However, since the authorised capital is stated in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation, any variation of capital must be reflected in an 
appropriate alteration of the Memorandum.266 The following proposed provision is 
based on clause  36(2) – (4). 
Variation of share capital  
(1) The authorisation and classification of shares, the numbers of authorised 
shares of each class, and the preferences, rights, limitations and other terms 
associated with each class of shares, as set out in a company’s Memorandum 
of Incorporation, may be changed only by –  
(a) an amendment of the Memorandum of Incorporation by special 
resolution of the shareholders; or 
(b) by the board, acting in terms of an express authority granted in the 
Memorandum of Incorporation as contemplated in subsection (2). 
(2) A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may authorise the board 
absolutely or subject to express limits, to – 
(a) increase or decrease the number of authorised shares of any class of 
shares;  
_________________________________________________________________ 
266  See paragraph 2.5 above. 
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(b) re-classify any classified shares that have been authorised but not 
issued; 
(c) classify any unclassified shares that have been authorised but not 
issued; or 
(d) determine the preferences, rights, limitations or other terms of shares in 
a class for which the board must determine the terms. 
(3) If the board of a company acts pursuant to its authority contemplated in 
subsection (2), the company must file a Notice of Amendment of its 
Memorandum of Incorporation, setting out the changes effected by the board. 
Status of reacquired shares 
Shares of a company that have been issued and subsequently –  
(a) acquired by that company, whether for consideration or in any other 
way; or 
(b) surrendered to that company in the exercise of appraisal rights  
have the same status as shares that have been authorised but not issued. 
8.4 Minimum issued capital 
The minimum issued capital should be prescribed to make it clear that there 
should always be at least one share in issue with residual rights. I also 
recommend that companies should not be allowed to issue shares to themselves 
or to their subsidiaries.267 The following proposed provision is based to an extent 
on clause s 35(3) and 37(3). 
Requirement to have shareholders 
(1) At all times a company should have in issue  
(a) at least one share that confers the right to vote on every matter that may 
be decided by shareholders of the company and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
267  See paragraph 2.2 above. 
  
557
(b) at least one share, which could be the same share referred to in 
paragraph (a), that entitles its holder to receive the net assets of the 
company upon its liquidation.268      
(2) A company may not issue shares to itself or to its subsidiary.  
8.5 Protection against dilution of shareholder interests. 
The expectation of shareholders that their relative interests in the company will 
not be exposed to unreasonable dilution is accommodated by regulating the 
power of directors to issue shares. This is done through restricting the number of 
shares in accordance with the memorandum, by prescribing shareholder approval 
for certain share issues and by giving the existing shareholders pre-emptive 
rights. The proposed provisions are based on clause s 38, 39 and 41 of the 
Companies Bill. In line with the criticisms expressed, directors should also be 
liable to persons who subscribed for unauthorised shares if the issue is not 
authorised retroactively, and the threshold for substantial further issues should be 
reduced and refined. Pre-emptive rights should apply to all companies unless 
excluded or limited by the memorandum. In private companies the default option 
should be that the shares that are not subscribed for by a particular shareholder 
should be allotted to remaining shareholders under a top-up provision.269  
Issue of shares 
(1) The board of a company may resolve to issue shares of the company at any 
time, but only within the classes, and to the extent, that the shares have been 
authorised by or in terms of the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation.  
(2) If a company issues shares - 
(a) that have not been authorised in accordance with its Memorandum of 
Incorporation; or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
268  It is suggested that it is unnecessary to specify that the share should not be redeemable or 
convertible. If the company has no other qualifying share in issue, this provision will prevent it 
from converting or redeeming all the relevant shares unless it first issued at least one new 
qualifying share. In view of the restrictions applicable to crossholdings by subsidiaries it is 
unnecessary to address this issue in the minimum issued share capital provision.  
269  See paragraph 2.1 above. 
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(b) in excess of the number of authorised shares of any particular class; 
(2) the issue of those shares may be retroactively authorised. 
(3) If a resolution seeking to retroactively authorise an issue of shares, as 
contemplated in subsection (2), is not adopted when it is put to a vote – 
(a) the share issue is a nullity to the extent that it exceeds any 
authorisation; 
(b) the company must return to any person the fair value of the 
consideration received by the company in respect of that share issue to 
the extent that it is nullified; 
(c) any certificate evidencing a share so issued and nullified, and any entry 
in a securities register in respect of such an issue, is void; and 
(d) a director of the company is liable to the extent set out in this Act in 
relation to violation of the solvency and liquidity test if the director - 
(i) was present at a meeting when the board approved the issue of 
any unauthorised shares, or participated in the making of such a 
decision; and 
(ii) failed to vote against the issue of those shares, despite knowing 
that the shares had not been; and 
(e) a director who is liable to the company in terms of subsection (d) is also 
personally liable to the person who purported to subscribe for the 
shares for any loss, damages or costs sustained as a result of the 
invalidity.  
Shareholder approval for issue of shares in certain cases 
(1) Subject to subsection (2), an issue of shares, securities convertible into 
shares, or rights exercisable for shares must be approved by a special 
resolution of the shareholders of a company, if the shares, securities or rights 
are issued to –  
(a) a director, future director, prescribed officer, or future prescribed officer 
of the company; 
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(b) a person related or inter-related to the company, or to a director, future 
director, prescribed officer, or future prescribed officer of the company; 
or 
(c) a nominee of a person contemplated in paragraph (a) or (b). 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply if the issue of shares, securities or rights is - 
(a) under an agreement underwriting the shares, securities or rights; 
(b) in the exercise of a pre-emptive right to be offered and to subscribe 
shares; 
(c) in proportion to existing holdings, and on the same terms and conditions 
as have been offered to all the shareholders of the company or to all the 
shareholders of the class or classes of shares being issued; 
(d) pursuant to an employee share scheme; or 
(e) pursuant to an offer to the public. 
(3) An issue of shares, securities convertible into shares, or rights exercisable for 
shares in a transaction, or a series of integrated transactions, requires 
approval of the shareholders by special resolution if the voting power of the 
shares that are issued or issuable as a result of the transaction or series of 
integrated transactions will reduce the voting power enjoyed by the existing 
shares immediately before the transaction or series of transactions by more 
than 20%. 
(4) In subsection (3) -  
(a) for purposes of determining the voting power of shares issued and 
issuable as a result of a transaction or series of integrated transactions, 
the voting power of shares is the greater of - 
(i) the voting power of the shares to be issued; or  
(ii) the voting power of the shares that would be issued after giving 
effect to the conversion of convertible shares and other securities 
and the exercise of rights to be issued; 
(b) a series of transactions is integrated if –  
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(i) consummation of one transaction is made contingent on 
consummation of one or more of the other transactions; or 
(ii) the transactions are entered into within a 12 month period, and 
involve the same parties, or related persons; and –  
(aa) involve the acquisition or disposal of an interest in one 
particular company or asset; or 
(bb) taken together, lead to substantial involvement in a 
business activity that did not previously form part of the 
company’s principal activity. 
(5) A director of a company is liable to the extent set out in this Act in relation to 
the issue of securities if the director - 
(a) was present at a meeting when the board approved the issue of any 
securities as contemplated in this section, or participated in the making 
of such a decision; and 
(b) failed to vote against the issue of those securities, despite knowing that 
the issue of those securities was inconsistent with this section. 
(6) In this section, ‘future director’ or ‘future prescribed officer’ does not include a 
person who becomes a director or prescribed officer of the company more 
than 6 months after acquiring a particular option or right. 
Pre-emptive right to be offered and to subscribe shares  
(1) This section applies with respect to any issue of shares by a company, other 
than - 
(a) shares issued in terms of options or conversion rights; or 
(b) shares issued otherwise than for cash; or 
(c) shares issued as capitalisation shares. 
(2) If a company proposes to issue any shares, other than as contemplated in 
subsection (1)(a) to (c), each shareholder of that company has a right, before 
any other person who is not a shareholder of that company, to be offered and, 
within a reasonable time to subscribe for, a percentage of the shares to be 
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issued equal to the voting power of that shareholder’s general voting rights 
immediately before the offer was made. 
(3) A company’s Memorandum of Incorporation may extend,270 limit, negate or 
restrict the right set out in subsection (2), with respect to any or all classes of 
shares of that company. 
(4) Except to the extent that a company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides 
otherwise – 
(a) in exercising a right in terms of subsection (2), a shareholder may 
subscribe fewer shares than the shareholder would be entitled to 
subscribe under that subsection;  
(b) shareholders in a private company must be invited to subscribe for more 
shares in excess of their proportionate entitlement on the understanding 
that shareholders who indicate their willingness to take up excess 
shares will be entitled to be allotted shares not taken up by remaining 
shareholders 
(c) where two or more shareholders have, in terms of subsection 4(b) 
indicated their willingness to take up excess shares that become 
available as a result of shareholders not taking up their rights, such 
shares must be allotted to them in the same proportion as their voting 
rights stand in relation to each other, provided that a shareholder may 
not be allotted more than the maximum number of shares for which he 
or she subscribed 
(d) shares not subscribed by shareholders under subsection (2) or (4) may 
be offered to any other person. 
8.6 Consideration for shares 
The consideration for shares must be determined by the board.271 I support clause 
40 of the Companies Bill, although I recommend that the board should also be 
required to disclose particulars regarding any non-cash consideration it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
270  The Companies Bill does not provide for an extension of pre-emptive rights. 
271  See paragraph 3.1 above. 
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accepts.272 I propose a definition of cash consideration. I also recommend that a 
provision should be inserted to regulate the subsequent variation of the 
subscription contract. I propose that unpaid or partly paid shares should be 
allowed and support the proposals of the Companies Bill in this regard,273 
although I think the provisions should be contained in a separate section and not 
in the same provision that regulates the nature of consideration. This will make it 
easier to identify the provisions that are relevant to a specific share issue. 
 As regards the board determination of adequacy I regard a further 
determination as necessary if cash is accepted in lieu of previously agreed upon 
non-cash consideration. This is because the board is not required to fix the cash 
value of the consideration. It may also mean that an increase in the value of non-
cash consideration subsequent to the issue of the shares cannot be diverted from 
the company through agreeing on alternative consideration. 
Definition of cash consideration 
‘Cash’ includes promissory notes and any other undertaking to pay cash to the 
company in the future and the release of a liability of the company for a liquidated 
sum  
Consideration for shares  
(1) The board of a company may issue authorised shares only -  
(a) for adequate consideration to the company, as determined by the board;  
(b) in terms of conversion rights associated with previously issued 
securities of the company; or  
(c) as capitalisation shares. 
(2) Before a company issues any particular shares, the board must determine the 
consideration for which, and the terms on which, those shares will be issued.  
(3) If the board agrees to issue shares for consideration otherwise than in cash, 
full particulars of the consideration and of the terms on which the shares will 
be issued must be made available for inspection by shareholders at the 
company’s registered office. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
272  See paragraph 3.3 above. 
273  See paragraph 3.4 above. 
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(4) If, subsequent to the issue of shares the board agrees to accept consideration 
different from the consideration determined prior to the issue of those shares 
(a) the board must determine that the alternative consideration is at least 
equal to the present value of the consideration previously agreed upon, 
and 
(b) if the alternative consideration is consideration otherwise than in cash, 
disclose particulars of that consideration as prescribed in subsection (3). 
(5) A determination by the board of a company in terms of subsection (2) as to 
the adequacy of consideration for any shares may be challenged on the basis 
of a breach of the standards of conduct for directors, but such a challenge will 
have no effect on the validity of the issue or on the amount of consideration 
for which the shareholder is liable. 
Time when shares are issued 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) when a company has received the consideration 
approved by its board for the issuance of any shares –  
(a) those shares are fully paid; and 
(b) the company must issue those shares and cause the name of the holder 
to be entered on the company’s securities register. 
(2) If the consideration for any shares that are issued or to be issued is in the 
form of an instrument that is not negotiable by the company at the time the 
shares are to be issued, or is in the form of an agreement for future services, 
future benefits or future payment by the subscribing party, -  
(a) the consideration for those shares is deemed to have been received by 
the company at any time only to the extent -  
(i) that the instrument is negotiable by the company; or  
(ii) that the subscribing party to the agreement has fulfilled its 
obligations in terms of the agreement; and 
(b) upon receiving the instrument or entering into the agreement, the 
company must –  
  
564
(i) issue the shares immediately; and 
(ii) cause the issued shares to be transferred to a third party, to be 
held in trust and later transferred to the subscribing party in 
accordance with the conditions of a trust deed. 
(3) Except to the extent that a trust deed contemplated in subsection (5)(b) 
provides otherwise –  
(a) voting rights, and appraisal rights set out in section 164, associated with 
shares that have been issued but are in trust may not be exercised; 
(b) any pre-emptive rights associated with shares that have been issued 
but are in trust may be exercised only to the extent that the instrument 
has become negotiable by the company or the subscribing party has 
fulfilled its obligations under the agreement;  
(c) any distribution with respect to shares that have been issued but are in 
trust –  
(i) must be paid or credited by the company to the subscribing party 
to the extent that the instrument has become negotiable by the 
company or the subscribing party has fulfilled its obligations under 
the agreement; and 
(ii) may be credited against the remaining value at that time of any 
services still to be performed by the subscribing party, any future 
payment remaining due, or the benefits still to be received by the 
company; and 
(d) shares that have been issued but are in trust -  
(i) may not be transferred by or at the direction of the subscribing 
party unless the company has expressly consented to the transfer 
in advance; 
(ii) may be transferred to the subscribing party on a quarterly basis, 
to the extent that the instrument has become negotiable by the 
company or the subscribing party has fulfilled its obligations under 
the agreement; 
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(iii) must be transferred to the subscribing party when the instrument 
has become negotiable by the company, or upon satisfaction of all 
of the subscribing party’s obligations in terms of the agreement; 
and 
(iv) to the extent that the instrument is dishonoured after becoming 
negotiable, or that the subscribing party has failed to fulfil its 
obligations under the agreement, must be returned to the 
company and cancelled, on demand by the company. 
(4) A company may not make a demand contemplated in subsection (6)(d)(iv) 
unless – 
(a) a negotiable instrument is dishonoured after becoming negotiable by the 
company; or 
(b) in the case of an agreement, the subscribing party has failed to fulfil any 
obligation in terms of the agreement for a period of at least 40 business 
days after the date on which the obligation was due to be fulfilled. 
8.7 Capitalisation shares 
I am in favour of express regulation of capitalisation shares, clarifying that their 
issue is not subject to the requirements regarding consideration for shares and 
support the regulation of capitalisation shares in the Companies Bill.274  
8.8 Definition of distribution 
I recommend that a new Companies Act should contain a comprehensive 
definition of the concept distribution. Although the acquisition of shares by a 
subsidiary in its holding company can have the effect of a distribution, it should be 
regulated in a separate provision to provide clarity as to how the requirements 
should be applied to such distributions.275 I also recommend that appraisal 
payments should be regarded as distributions. The proposed definition of the 
Companies Bill is wide enough to include such payments and the authorisation 
_________________________________________________________________ 
274  See paragraph 3.2 above. 
275  See paragraph 4 above. 
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provision covers them as payments under an existing legal obligation. It will be 
easy to remove the express exclusion. I propose the following definition. 
Definition of distribution 
“distribution” means a direct or indirect –  
(a) transfer by a company of money or other property of the company, other 
than its own shares, to or for the benefit of 1 or more holders of any of 
the shares of that company, whether – 
(i) in the form of a dividend; 
(ii) as a payment in lieu of a capitalisation share; 
(iii) as consideration for the acquisition by the company of any of its 
shares.  
(b) incurrence of a debt or other obligation by a company for the benefit of 1 
or more holders of any of the shares of that company in respect of his or 
her shareholding; or 
(c) forgiveness or waiver by a company of a debt or other obligation owed 
to the company by 1 or more holders of any of the shares of that 
company in respect of his or her shareholding, 
but does not include any such action taken upon the final liquidation of the 
company. 
8.9 Making of distributions 
The making, as opposed to the authorisation of, distributions should be subject to 
compliance with the solvency and liquidity test.276 This requirement will 
necessarily also apply to the acquisition of shares for consideration. A distinction 
should nevertheless be made between the decision to make a distribution and the 
ultimate validity of the actual distribution.277 The words ‘it reasonably appears’ in 
(a) obliges the company to take into account objectively determinable facts while 
the phrase ‘reasonably concluded’ in (b) requires the board to objectively assess 
the circumstances. However, there is a subjective element in the fact that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
276  See paragraphs 5.2.1 and 5.2.4 above. 
277  See Chapter 5 paragraph 4.4.1.1. 
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reasonableness of the conclusions reached by the company and the board will 
depend on information available to them. 
I also propose that the effective date of a distribution should be specified in 
order to fix the time for application of the solvency and liquidity test and the 
enforceability of the distribution.278 I submit that it is unnecessary to require 
express board authorisation for distributions, although it should be a requirement 
for the acquisition of own shares.279 I propose the following provision. 
Making of distributions 
(1) A company must not make any proposed distribution unless -  
(a) it reasonably appears that the company will satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test immediately after completing the proposed distribution; and 
(b) the board of the company, by resolution, has acknowledged that it has 
applied the solvency and liquidity test and reasonably concluded that 
the company will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately after 
completing the proposed distribution. 
(2) When more than 120 business days have lapsed since an acknowledgement 
required by subsection (1)(b), the company may not proceed with or continue 
the distribution unless the board has reconsidered the solvency and liquidity 
test with respect to the intended implementation280 of the original resolution, 
order or obligation; and has, by resolution, acknowledged that it has applied 
the solvency and liquidity test and reasonably concluded that the company 
will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test immediately after the proposed 
implementation. 
(3) When, after having adopted a resolution contemplated in subsection 1(b), the 
board is no longer satisfied that the company will satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test, it shall retract the resolution and not proceed or continue with the 
distribution. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
278  See paragraph 5.2.4 above. 
279  See paragraph 8.14 below. 
280  The word ‘implementation’ is preferable to ‘distribution’. 
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Effective date of distribution 
(1) If a distribution takes the form of a transfer of money or assets as 
contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition of ‘distribution’, its effective 
date is the date of actual transfer of the money or assets.  
(2) If a distribution takes the form of the incurrence of a debt or other obligation 
by the company, its effective date is 
(a) where satisfaction of the debt or obligation is conditional upon the 
solvency and liquidity of the company, the date of each action taken in 
satisfaction of that debt or obligation, 
(b) in every other case, the date of incurrence of the debt.  
(3) If a distribution takes the form of the forgiveness or waiver of a debt or 
obligation as contemplated in paragraph (c) of the definition of ‘distribution’, its 
effective date is the date on which the liability of the shareholder is 
extinguished.  
Enforceability of dividends 
(1) When the board has authorised a distribution by way of dividend the 
shareholder acquires an enforceable claim against the company, subject to 
subsection (2). 
(2) An obligation of a company to pay a dividend cannot be enforced against that 
company to the extent that the company is unable to fulfil that obligation 
without violating the solvency and liquidity test. 
8.10 Solvency and liquidity test 
The solvency and liquidity test must be formulated objectively with reference to 
the actual financial position of the company. However, since the liquidity element 
requires a prediction to be made, it is still necessary to refer to foreseeable 
circumstances. This does not change the test into a subjective test, as the 
circumstances must be reasonably foreseeable. I suggest that the requirement 
that it should ‘reasonably appear’ that the test will be satisfied, should be 
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restricted to the provision regulating the ‘making’ of a distribution.281 This will 
facilitate a distinction between an improper decision to make a distribution and an 
improper distribution as such. The distinction is necessary for purposes of the 
regulation of liability of directors and shareholders respectively.282 The proposed 
provision is as follows. 
Solvency and liquidity test 
(1) A company satisfies the solvency and liquidity test if,   
(a) the assets of the company, fairly valued, equal or exceed the liabilities 
of the company; and 
(b) considering all reasonably foreseeable financial circumstances of the 
company at that time, it appears that the company will be able to pay its 
debts as they become due in the ordinary course of its business. 
(2) Unless the Memorandum of Incorporation of the company provides otherwise, 
any amount that would be required, if the company were to be liquidated at 
the time of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon liquidation of 
shareholders whose preferential rights upon liquidation are superior to the 
preferential rights upon liquidation of those receiving the distribution, must be 
regarded as liabilities. 
8.11 Liability for distributions in violation of solvency and liquidity test 
The liability of shareholders and directors in respect of distributions in violation of 
the solvency and liquidity test should be regulated expressly. In my view it is 
unnecessary to provide separately for liability of directors in respect of unlawful 
agreements to acquire shares. They will be liable in respect of an unlawful 
distribution if the financial restrictions have not been met. In respect of non-
compliance with the further requirements for share repurchases, they will be liable 
for breaching their duties to the company.283 The following provision is proposed. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
281  See the proposed provision in paragraph 8.9 above. 
282  See paragraphs 5.2.2 – 5.2.4 above. 
283  See paragraphs 5.4 – 5.4.2 above. 
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Liability for distributions in violation of solvency and liquidity test 
(1) A director of a company is liable to restore to the company the amount of any 
distribution made in violation of the solvency and liquidity test, to the extent 
that it has not been recovered from shareholders, if that director   
(a) was present at the meeting and failed to vote against the adoption of a 
resolution by the board in which it acknowledged that it has applied the 
solvency and liquidity test and reasonably concluded that the company 
will satisfy the solvency and liquidity test, while it was unreasonable to 
reach that conclusion; or 
(b) was aware that the company was about to make, or proceed with, a 
distribution in circumstances where it was unreasonable to have 
remained satisfied of the company’s solvency and liquidity, and failed to 
take reasonable steps to prevent the making of the distribution. 
(2) A director who is liable under this section is liable jointly and severally with 
any other directors who are so liable.284 
(3) A shareholder or former shareholder who received a distribution made in 
violation of the solvency and liquidity test is liable to restore to the company 
the amount of the distribution. 
(4) A director who is liable under this section is entitled to institute proceedings 
against a shareholder to recover the amount of the distribution on behalf of 
the company or, to the extent that the director has already restored the 
amount of the distribution to the company, on behalf of that director 
personally.  
8.12 Regulation of dividends 
A definition of dividend should be contained in the Companies Act in order to 
facilitate distinction between proportionate and non-proportionate distributions.285 
My proposed definition and the further regulation are based on the example in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
284  It is unnecessary to provide for recovery of a contribution from co-directors, as this is covered 
by the general principles of joint liability. 
285  See paragraph 6 above. 
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New Zealand Companies Act.286 The following provision is proposed. 
Dividends 
(1) A dividend includes any distribution by a company other than a payment in 
respect of an acquisition by it of its own shares or a payment in lieu of a 
capitalisation share. 
(2) Unless expressly permitted by the Memorandum of Incorporation of a 
company, and subject to the provisions regarding shares that have not been 
paid up in full, every holder of 1 or more shares of the class in respect of 
which a particular distribution is made is entitled to a distribution in respect of 
each share held.  
8.13 Definition of acquisition 
A definition of ‘acquisition’ should be contained in the Companies Act to make it 
clear that the requirements of the Act apply only where consideration is involved. 
Acquisitions for no consideration, including the cancellation of partly-paid shares 
in the event of default, are not subject to the requirements that apply to 
repurchases. Acquisitions in compliance with court orders and the ‘surrender’ of 
shares under the proposed appraisal remedy should both be regarded as 
acquisitions to ensure consistency.287 I propose the following definition. 
Definition of acquisition of own shares 
‘acquisition of own shares’ includes any acquisition by a company of its own shares 
for consideration, whether by way of a repurchase or redemption or in compliance 
with a court order or in terms of the appraisal remedy, but does not include an 
acquisition for no consideration, a rescission of the issuance of shares or a 
cancellation of partly-paid shares. 
8.14 Power to acquire shares 
The requirements for the acquisition of shares by a company and by its subsidiary 
_________________________________________________________________ 
286  Although the New Zealand Companies Act of 1993 also expressly excludes financial 
assistance while the Bill does not regard this as a distribution in the first place. An alternative 
is to leave out the definition and insert a provision on ‘proportionality of distributions’ which will 
have the same effect for distributions otherwise than acquisitions. In view of the proposed 
provision regarding rights and preferences, provision for selective repurchases is actually 
required – it will have to be allowed by the memorandum. 
287  See paragraph 5.1 above. 
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should be separated. This will clarify application of the financial restrictions and 
other requirements and eliminate the spectre of a group concept in relation to 
distributions. Selective repurchases should be subject to shareholder approval by 
special resolution, after full disclosure. It should also be made clear that 
shareholders cannot be coerced into selling their shares to the company. For this 
reason the authorisation should not be for the acquisition of shares as such, but to 
make an ‘offer’ for the acquisition of shares, except of course in the case of a 
redemption of shares.288 My proposal is the following. 
Company acquiring its own shares  
(1) A company may acquire its own shares, including redeemable shares  
(a) in terms of a resolution of the board, approved by an ordinary resolution 
of all the shareholders whose interests are affected, to make an offer to 
acquire the shares proportionately from all the holders of that class who 
are willing to dispose of them, provided that shares may not be acquired 
at a price higher than the price at which they are then redeemable; 
(b) in terms of a resolution of the board, which has been approved by the 
general meeting by special resolution, excluding the votes of the 
shareholders to which the offer will be made, after full disclosure of the 
reasons for and the terms of the offer, to make an offer to acquire its 
own shares from one or more specific shareholders who are willing to 
dispose of them; 
(c) pursuant to an existing legal obligation of the company, a court order or 
in terms of the appraisal remedy;289  
(d) pursuant to a resolution of the board to redeem shares that are subject 
to redemption at the option of the company, or 
(e) pursuant to a general power given to the board by special resolution of 
the general meeting, by offering to acquire a maximum of 10% of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
288  See paragraphs 5.3.1-5.3.3 and 5.7 above. 
289  The redemption of shares otherwise than at the option of the company will resort under this 
paragraph. 
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issued shares of any  class of shares, upon the terms set out, and at a 
price within the range specified in, the special resolution. 
(2) An agreement with a company providing for the acquisition by the company of 
shares issued by it is enforceable against the company, subject to subsection 
(3). 
(3) An obligation of a company to acquire its shares, whether in terms of an 
agreement, court order, under the appraisal remedy or otherwise, cannot be 
enforced against that company to the extent that the company is unable to 
fulfil that obligation without violating the solvency and liquidity test. 
(4) If, in proceedings to enforce an obligation to acquire its shares, a company 
alleges that, as a result of the operation of subsection (3), it is unable to fulfil 
its obligation to acquire its shares the company has the burden of proving that 
fulfilment of its obligation would put it in breach of the solvency and liquidity 
test. 
(5) If a company pays consideration for the acquisition of its own shares in 
violation of the solvency and liquidity test, the payment of the consideration 
and the transfer of the shares are invalid and restitution must take place, 
provided that the contract will remain enforceable subject to the solvency and 
liquidity of the company. 
(6) Until a company has fully performed an obligation to acquire its shares, 
shareholders whose shares are being acquired retain the status of claimants 
entitled to be paid as soon as the company is able to do so without infringing 
the solvency and liquidity test or, on liquidation, to be ranked subordinate to 
creditors and to shareholders whose claims are in priority to the claims of the 
class of shares being acquired, but in priority to the claims of the other 
shareholders. 
(7) A general power envisaged in subsection 1(e) may be revoked or varied by 
special resolution of the general meeting and, unless revoked earlier, will be 
valid only until the next annual general meeting of the company. 
(8) When the board has acquired shares pursuant to a general power envisaged 
in subsection 1(e), it has to disclose particulars of the exercise of that power 
to the next general meeting of that company.  
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(9) A company may acquire the shares of a deceased or disabled shareholder 
from the net proceeds of a life policy or disability policy even if the company 
does not comply with the solvency and liquidity test.  
 Acquisition of shares by subsidiary 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) a subsidiary may acquire shares of its holding 
company290 
(a) in terms of a resolution of its board and the board of its holding 
company to make an offer to acquire the shares proportionately from all 
the holders of that class who are willing to dispose of them; 
(b) in terms of a resolution of its board and the board of its holding 
company, which has been approved by the general meeting of the 
holding company by special resolution,291 to make an offer to acquire 
shares from one or more specific shareholders of the holding company 
who are willing to dispose of them; 
(c) provided that payment in respect of the acquisition may be made only if 
both the subsidiary and the holding company satisfy the solvency and 
liquidity test.  
(2) Not more than 10% in aggregate of the number of issued shares of any class 
of shares of a holding company may be held by or for the benefit of the 
subsidiaries of that company. 
(3) No voting rights attaching to shares may be exercised by or on behalf of a 
subsidiary in respect of the shares it holds in its holding company. 
(4)  If, by reason of the cancellation of shares, a company becoming a subsidiary 
of a holding company, or for any other reason, it appears that subsidiaries 
taken together hold more than 10% in the aggregate of the number of issued 
shares of any class of shares of the holding company, the excess over 10% 
shall be disposed of, or the percentage otherwise reduced to 10%, within 120 
_________________________________________________________________ 
290  It is unnecessary to provide for court orders, the appraisal remedy or existing legal obligations 
as these do not arise in the context. It is also unnecessary to provide for a general repurchase 
power in respect of shares of the holding company. 
291  Since the effect of a disproportionate repurchase will be felt by the shareholders of the 
holding company, it is they who should approve a selective offer. 
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business days, failing which the excess shares will be deemed to have been 
surrendered to the holding company in proportion to the number of shares 
held by each subsidiary.  
(5) An agreement in terms of which a subsidiary agrees to acquire shares in its 
holding company is enforceable against the subsidiary company, subject to 
subsection (6). 
(6) An obligation of a subsidiary to acquire shares of its holding company cannot 
be enforced against the subsidiary to the extent that the subsidiary is unable 
to fulfil that obligation without violating the solvency and liquidity test or while 
its holding company does not satisfy the solvency and liquidity test. 
(7) If, in proceedings to enforce an obligation to acquire its shares, a subsidiary 
company alleges that, as a result of the operation of subsection (6), it cannot 
fulfil its obligation to acquire shares in its holding company, it has the burden 
of proving that fact. 
(8) If a company pays consideration for the acquisition of shares in violation of 
the solvency and liquidity test, the payment of the consideration and the 
transfer of the shares are invalid and restitution must take place, provided that 
the contract will remain enforceable subject to the solvency and liquidity of the 
company. 
(9) Until a subsidiary company has fully performed an obligation to acquire 
shares in its holding company, shareholders whose shares are being acquired 
retain the status of claimants entitled to be paid as soon as the company is 
able to do so without infringing the solvency and liquidity test or, on 
liquidation, to be ranked subordinate to creditors of the subsidiary.292 
(10) The directors of the holding company and of the subsidiary are jointly and 
severally liable to restore the amount of the consideration to the subsidiary 
company, to the extent that it cannot be recovered from the shareholders. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
292  It does not make sense to provide for the ranking of this claim in priority to remaining holders 
of the same class upon liquidation of the subsidiary, as the other shareholders do not have a 
claim against the subsidiary in respect of its net assets.  
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9 FINAL ANALYSIS  
The notion of limited liability entails that shareholders stand to lose only their 
capital contribution to the company. As the owners of the company, the 
shareholders are expected to bear the risk of its failure. But in addition to the 
ultimate return of their investment when the company is dissolved, shareholders 
expect to receive a return on their investment during the life of the company. Their 
expectations have to be balanced against the prior right of creditors to the 
satisfaction of their claims. The capital maintenance doctrine responds to this 
challenge by allowing distributions to shareholders on condition that their initial 
contribution is left intact in the interest of creditors. The functioning of this theory 
relies on the accurate determination of what constitutes capital and what does not. 
This is a relatively complex exercise which, depending on the size of the capital, 
may not be worth the effort.  
Over the past three decades the capital maintenance doctrine has been 
replaced in a number of jurisdictions by alternative financial restrictions on 
distributions to shareholders. In 1999 South Africa also started making the 
transition from the capital maintenance doctrine to a system where most 
distributions depend on the solvency and liquidity of the company. The 
amendments created certain anomalies and uncertainties, primarily due to the fact 
that the provisions on share capital structure and consideration for the issue of 
shares were not revised. The requirements for certain types of distributions that 
are expressly regulated in the Act have not been harmonised with the new 
requirements for share repurchases and payments to shareholders, resulting in 
undesirable fragmentation.  
The financial restrictions of solvency and liquidity provide creditors with 
adequate protection. The solvency element ensures that the priority of creditors is 
not endangered, while the liquidity element addresses the expectation of creditors 
to receive payment when due. 
The rules governing the share capital of a company, which have become 
irrelevant to creditors, remain important to shareholders. Shareholders have an 
interest in the preservation of their relative equity interests in the company, on 
which their rights to vote and to share in returns on and of capital depend. These 
interests can be affected by reorganisations of capital and by disproportionate 
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contributions and distributions. While it is fairly easy to provide protection to 
creditors, addressing shareholder interests involves more complex issues. 
Although the relationship between shareholders as set out in the constitution 
of the company is regarded as contractual in nature, the legislation plays an 
important role by ensuring minimum protection and providing default 
arrangements. The regulation of capital structure, capital contributions and 
distributions to shareholders all are important facets of shareholder protection. 
The real challenge is to find an appropriate balance between shareholder 
protection and commercial flexibility.  
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